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Hondon: C. J. CLAY AND SONS, 

Leipsig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. 






IN THE YEAR 1889, 





[All Rights reserved. ] 



ὁ γυμνὰ dissertation is published in accordance with the 
conditions attached to the Hare Prize, and appears 
nearly in its original form. For many reasons, however, 
I should have desired to subject the work to a more 
searching revision than has been practicable under the 
circumstances. Indeed, error is especially difficult to 
avoid in dealing with a large body of scattered authorities, 
the majority of which can only be consulted in a public 

The obligations, which require to be acknowledged for 
the present collection of the fragments of Zeno and 
Cleanthes, are both special and general. The former are 
soon disposed of. In the Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Phalo- 
logie for 1873, p. 435 foll., Wellmann published an 
article on Zeno of Citium, which was the first serious 
attempt to discriminate the teaching of Zeno from that 
of the Stoa in general. The omissions of Wellmann were 
supplied and the first complete collection of the fragments 
of Cleanthes was made by Wachsmuth in two Gottingen 
programs published in 1874—1875 (Commentationes vg 

et II de Zenone Citiensi et Cleanthe Α 8810). Mullach’s 

coliection of the fragments of Cleanthes in vol. I of the 
Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum is so inadequate 
as hardly to deserve meution. 


Among the general aids the first place is claimed by 
Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, which has been con- 
stantly consulted. The edition referred to is the Second 
edition of the English Translation of the part dealing with 
the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, which appeared in 
1880. In a few cases the fourth German edition has 
also been quoted. Reference is also made to the English 
Translations of the other parts of Zeller’s book, wherever 
available. Except incidentally, Zeller gives up the at- 
tempt to trace the development of the Stoa in the hands 
of its successive leaders, and this deficiency is to some 
extent supplied by the ingenious work of Hirzel, die 
Entwicklung der Stoischen Philosophie, forming the second 
volume of his Untersuchungen zu Cicero’s Philosophischen 
Schriften. To Hirzel belongs the credit of having vin- 
dicated the originality of Cleanthes against ancient and 
modern detractors, although in working out his views he 
often argues on somewhat shadowy foundations, and has 
unduly depreciated the importance of the contributions 
made by Zeno. Lastly, Stein’s two books die Psychologie ὦ 
der Stoa (1886), and die Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa (1888), 
have -been of great service, and his views, where he 
disagrees with Hirzel, have been generally adopted. Many — 
other books have of course been consulted and will be 
found cited from time to time, among which Krische’s | 
die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker, and 
Diels’ Dowographi Graect, deserve special mention. ΑἹ- 
though the results arrived at have been checked by the 
aid of modern writers, the ancient authorities and es- 
pecially Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, 
Stobaeus (elogae), and Cicero have been throughout 
treated as the primary source of information. The refer- 
ences to Stobaeus are accommodated to Wachsmuth’s — 
edition (Berlin, 1884). Susemihl’s article on the birth-— 


year of Zeno in the Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie for 
1889 appeared too late to be utilised for the introduction. 
A word must be said with reference to the plan of 

the present collection. No attempt has been made to 

disentangle in every case the words of the writer from 
the body of the citation in which they appear. Although 
this is practicable in some cases, in others it is mere 
guess-work, and a uniform system has therefore been 
adopted. For similar reasons the fragments have been 
arranged as far as possible in natural sequence, without 
regard to the comparatively few cases in which we know 
the names of the books from which they were derived. 
However, the arrangement has been a matter of much 
perplexity, especially in those cases where the authorities 
overlap each other, and several modifications in the order 
would have been introduced as the result of a larger 
experience, were it not that each alteration throws all the 
references into confusion. The collection was made and 
put together practically in its present form before an 
opportunity offered of consulting Wachsmuth’s pamphlets, 
and it was satisfactory to find that only a few of his 
passages had been missed. On the other hand, the ad- 
ditional matter which will be found here for the first time 
is not large. It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded 
that we now possess the greater portion of the material, 
which is available for reconstructing the history of the 
earlier Stoa. For the sake of completeness I have included 
even those notices, whose authenticity is open to suspicion, 
as well as a collection of the so-called Apophthegmata, 
though it is often impossible to draw a strict line between 
written and oral tradition. 

I desire to thank Mr R. D. Hicks, Fellow of Trinity 
College, for many valuable suggestions and criticisms. 


p. 37, 1. 18, for ‘*he was only able’’ read ‘‘he alone was able”. 
p. 58, 1, 23, add ‘‘ see however on Cleanth. frag. 114.” 


81. Life of Zeno. 

THE chronology of Zeno’s life’, formerly a subject of much 
dispute, has been almost entirely cleared up by an important 
' passage discovered in one of the papyrus rolls found at Hercu- 
laneum, which contains a history of the Stoic philosophers and 
was first edited by Comparetti in 1875°. From this we learn 
that Cleanthes was born in 331 B.c., and, as we know from 
other sources*® that he lived to the age of 99, he must have 
died in B.c. 232 in the archonship of Jason*. But, according 
to the papyrus (col. 29), at the time of his death he had pre- 
sided over the School for 32 years’, which fixes the death of 
Zeno as having taken place in B.c. 264, thus confirming the 
authority of Jerome, who says under the year Ol. 129, 1=B.c. 
264, 3° “Zeno Stoicus moritur post quem Cleanthes philosophus 
agnoscitur.” Now, in Diog. Laert. vir. 28 we have two distinct 

1 See Rohde in Rhein. Mus. 33, p. 622. Gomperz ib. 34, p. 154. 
Susemihl’s article in Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. for 1882, vol. 125, pp. 737—746, 
does not add anything to our knowledge of the chronology of Zeno’s life. 

2 Col. 28, 29. Comparetti believes this book to be the work of 

3 Lucian Macrob. 19. Val. Max. vir. 7, Ext. 11. 

4 So too the papyrus col. 28 (ἀγπηλλάγ(η ἐπ᾽ ἄρχοντος ᾿Ι)άσονος. 

5 Such at least is the restoration of Gomperz: Comparetti reads 
τριάκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ, but admits that δύο is possible. The word after καὶ 
is illegible. 

6 So Rohde states, but in Migne’s ed. of Eusebius 1. p. 498 the state- 
ment appears to belong to Ol. 128. 

H. P. 1 


accounts of his age at the time of his death, the one, that of 
Persaeus, in his 7@:xai cyoAai, who makes him 72, and the 
other apparently derived from Apollonius Tyrius', declaring 
that he lived to be 98 years old. Apart from internal con- 
siderations, the authority of Persaeus is unquestionably the 
higher, and reckoning backwards we are thus enabled to place 
the birth of Zeno in the year 336 B.c.* Rohde suggests that 
the other computation may have been deduced by Apollonius 
Tyrius from the letter to Antigonus, now on other grounds 
shown to be spurious, but which Diogenes unquestionably 
extracted from Apollonius’ book on Zeno*. In this Zeno is 
represented as speaking of himself as an octogenarian, so that 
on the assumption that the letter was written in B.c. 282, shortly 
after Antigonus first became king of Macedonia, and, calcu- 
lating to the true date of Zeno’s death (B.c. 264), he would 
have been 98 years of age in the latter year*. 

Zeno, the son of Mnaseas®, was born at Citium, a Greek 
city in the south-east of Cyprus, whose population had been — 
increased by Phoenician immigrants®. Whether he was of 
pure Greek blood or not we cannot tell’, but we can readily 
believe that his birthplace, while it in no degree influenced his 
philosophical genius, which was truly Hellenic, yet gave an 

1 A Stoic philosopher (floruit in the earlier half of the 150 century 
ong Ned his work on Zeno’s life see Diog. L. vir. 1. 2, 24. 28. Strabo 
xvi. 2. 24, 

2 Gomperz 1. 6. undertook to prove that Zeno died in the month Sciro- 
phorion (Ol. 128, 4)=June 264 B.c., offering to produce the proofs in a 
later article, but this promise does not seem to have been fulfilled. 

3 Diog. L. vu. 7. 8. 

4 The weakness of this hypothesis lies in the fact that Antigonus 
Gonatas did not become King of Macedon until 278—277 Β.0., although 
no doubt he was struggling for the crown from the time of the death of 
his father Demetrius in B.c. 283. This is met to some extent by Rohde 
l. 6. p. 624 n. 1. 

5 Diog. L. vm. 1 mentions Demeas as another name given to his 
father but elsewhere he is always Ζήνων Mvacéov. 

6 Cimon died while besieging this place (Thue. 1. 112). 

7 Stein, Psychologie der Stoa ἢ. 8 sums up, without deciding, in 
favour of a Phoenician origin. So also Ogereau p. 4 whereas Hoa 
I ἣν me points the other way (Bursian’s Jahresbericht - 
vo Ρ 


Oriental complexion to his tone of mind, and affected the 
character of his literary style, so that the epithet ‘‘ Phoenician,” 
afterwards scornfully cast in his teeth by his opponents’, is 
in any case not altogether unwarranted. 

Again following the authority of Persaeus (Diog. L. l.c.)’, 
we may conclude that he arrived at Athens at the age of 22, 
but as to the cause which brought him thither we are dif- 
ferently informed, and it is uncertain whether he came for the 
express purpose of studying philosophy®, or in furtherance of 
some mercantile enterprise’, There is however a consensus of 
testimony to the effect that he suffered shipwreck on his 
voyage to Athens, a misfortune which he afterwards learnt to 
bless as it had driven him to philosophy’. The story of his 
first meeting with Crates is characteristic’: Zeno, who had 
recently arrived at Athens, one day sat down by a bookseller’s 
stall and became engrossed in listening to the perusal of the 
second book of Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Suddenly he en- 
quired of the bookseller where such men as Socrates were to 
be found. At that moment Crates happened to pass down 
the street, and Zeno, acting on a hint from the bookseller, 
from that time attached himself to the Cynic teacher. 

It is impossible to reconcile the dates, which we have 
taken as correct, with the remaining indications of time, 
which are scattered through the pages of Diogenes. Thus we 
are told that Zeno was a pupil of Stilpo and Xenocrates for 
ten years, that the whole time spent under the tuition of 
Crates, Stilpo, Xenocrates and Polemo was twenty years, and 
that Zeno presided over the School, which he himself founded, 
for fifty-eight years’. This last is the statement of Apollonius, 

1 So φοινικίδιον Crates ap. Diog. L. v1. 3. Cf. Cic. de Fin. rv. 56 et saep. 

2 Another account gives his age as thirty (Diog. L. vi. 2). 

3 Diog. L. vit. 32. 

4 Diog. L. vit. 3. 

5 See Zeno apoph. 3, and the notes. 

6 Diog. L. vu. 3. 

7 Diog. L. vir. 2. 4. 28. The other tradition is traced by Rohde to 
Apollodorus known as ὁ τοὺς χρόνους avaypayas. Evidence of his having 
dealt with Zeno’s chronology will be found in Philod. περὶ φιλοσόφων 



and must be taken in connection with his opinion that Zeno 
lived till he was 98 years of age. Probably, Apollonius 
adopted the tradition that Zeno came to Athens at the age of 
thirty, and allowed ten years for the period of tuition. He 
must have assigned B.c, 322 as the date of the foundation of 
the Stoa, which is obviously far too early. According to the 
chronology adopted above, Zeno came to Athens about B.c. 314, 
and, if so, he cannot have been a pupil of Xenocrates, who 
died in that year. All that can be said with any approach to 
certainty is that after a somewhat extended period of study 
under Crates, Stilpo, and Polemo, Zeno at length, probably 
soon after 300 B.c.’, began to take pupils on his own account, 
without attaching himself to any of the then existing philo- 
sophical schools. These pupils were at first called Zenonians, 
but when their master held his lectures in the Stoa Poikile, 
they adopted the name of Stoics which they afterwards 

Though not yet rivalling the Peripatetic school in respect 
of the number of its followers*, the Stoic philosophy steadily 
won its way into general esteem no less by the personal influ- 
ence of its founder than through the fervour of its adherents. 
So great, indeed, was the respect which the character of Zeno 
inspired at Athens, that shortly before his death‘ a decree 

col, x1. (Here. vol. coll. prior vol..v1i1.) For Zeno’s teachers ef. Nume- 
nius ap. Euseb. P. ΕἸ. xtv. 5, p. 729 Πολέμωνος δὲ ἐγένοντο γνώριμοι 
᾿Αρκεσίλαος καὶ Zjvwv...Zqvwva μὲν οὖν μέμνημαι εἰπὼν Ξενοκράτει εἶτα δὲ 
Πολέμωνι φοιτῆσαι, αὖθις δὲ παρὰ Κράτητι κυνίσαι. νυνὶ δὲ αὐτῷ λελογίσθω, 
ὅτι καὶ Στίλπωνός τε μετέσχε, καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ᾿Ηρακλειτείων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ 
συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις συμπαρέλαβον εἰς τὴν 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην, ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Στίλπωνα ἅμα καὶ Κράτητα, ὧν 
ὑπὸ μὲν Στίλπωνος ἐγένετο μαχητής, ὑπὸ δὲ ἩΗρακλείτου αὐστηρός, κυνικὸς δὲ 
ὑπὸ Κράτητος. 

i According to Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 321, Zeno was a πρεσβύτης 
when he προσεμαρτύρησεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. This refers to 
the publication of his writings, but this must have shortly followed the 
opening of the school. Jerome on Euseb, Chron. (1. Ρ. 498 Migne) says 
opposite Ol. 126 “ anon Stoicus philosophus agnoscitur.” 

2 Diog. L. vir. 
® Zeno apoph. 6 
4 The decree was carried in the archonship of Arrhenides, i.e. Nov. 
265 3.c., if Arrhenides was archon 265—264 as seems to be Gomperz’s 
opinion, "vid. supr. p. 2, n. 2. 

was passed by the assembly awarding him a golden crown 
and entitling him to a public funeral in the Ceramicus on 
his decease. The grounds mentioned in the body of the 
decree, which is preserved by Diog. L. vu. 10, for conferring 
this special honour on Zeno were the high moral tone of his 
teaching and the example which he set to his pupils in the 
blamelessness of his private life. Greatly however as he was 
honoured by the Athenians, he steadily refused the offer of 
their citizenship’, and on one occasion, when holding an 
official position, insisted on being described as a citizen of 
Citium?. This devotion to his native town, whether a genuine 
sentiment of the heart or assumed in order to avow his con- 
viction of the worthlessness of all civic distinctions, seems to 
have been appreciated by his countrymen, who erected his 
statue’ in their market-place, where it was afterwards seen 
by the elder Pliny*. 

In the later years of his life, Zeno’s fame extended beyond 
the limits of Athenian territory; there is ample record of his 
intimacy with Antigonus Gonatas’, the son of Demetrius 
Poliorcetes and king of Macedon, and from one anecdote we 
learn that he had attracted the attention of Ptolemy Phila- 
delphus®, Now that Athens had completely lost her freedom,. 
she became a hotbed of political intrigue in the interests of 
the various successive pretenders to the Macedonian throne; 
some beguiled her with the promise of liberty’, but by far the 
most potent instrument to gain her favour was gold. Thus, 
while the internal politics of Athens had become of purely 
municipal interest, the greatest services to which Demochares, 
the nephew of Demosthenes, could lay claim as meriting the 
gratitude of the Athenians were the substantial money presents 

1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1. 

2 Diog. L. vir. 12. 

3 Diog. L. vit. 6. 

4 "HON: xxxiv. 19. 32. 

5 See Zeno apoph. 25 and 26. 

8 See note on apoph. 25. 

7 So Demetrius Poliorcetes: Grote vol. x11. p. 196. 


which he had obtained for the treasury from Lysimachus, 
Ptolemy, and Antipater’. We cannot be surprised that, in 
such a period as this, Ptolemy and Antigonus, hoping to gain 
him over by personal condescension and munificent liberality, 
should have eagerly courted the adherence of one, whose influ- 
ence like that of Zeno extended over a wide circle among the 
youth of Athens. It seems clear however that, in general, Zeno 
avoided politics altogether’; and, although it may be doubtful 
whether his friendship for Antigonus may not have induced 
Zeno to espouse his political cause, we can at least be sure that 
the presents of the king were not accepted as bribes by the Stoic 
philosopher. If Zeno died in B.c. 264, he cannot have lived to 
see the conclusion of the so-called Chremonidean war, when 
Athens was besieged by Antigonus and defended by the joint 
efforts of Ptolemy and the Spartans, and it is impossible to say 
on which side his sympathies were enlisted, although he is said 
to have been a lover of Chremonides’, 

In voluntarily hastening his own end, Zeno only illustrated 
the teaching of his school. One day, on leaving the Stoa, he 
stumbled and fell, breaking one of his fingers in his fall. 
Regarding this as a warning of Providence, which it was 
folly to neglect, and convinced that the right course for a 
wise man is willingly to assist in carrying out the decrees of 
destiny, he returned home and at once committed suicide*. 

His personal Bppearance was evidently not attractive. 
Timotheus’, in his work περὶ βίων, described him as wrynecked, 
while Apollonius called him lean, rather tall, and of a dark 
complexion®, with thick calves, flabby flesh, and a weak 

1 See Grote vol. x11. p. 214. 

2 Cf. Seneca de Tranq. An. 1. 7 Zenonem Cleanthem Chrysippum, 
quorum nemo ad rempublicam accessit. 

3 Zeno apoph. 44. 

4 Zeno apoph. 56. 

5 Nothing seems to be known of the date of this writer: see Dict. 
Biog. These authorities are quoted by Diog. L. vu. 1. 

6 An uncomplimentary epithet, cf. Theocr. x. 26 Βομβύκα χαρίεσσα 
Σύραν καλέοντί τυ πάντες, ἰσχνὰν ἁλιόκαυστον, ἔγὼ δὲ μόνος μελίχλωρον. id. 
iii. 35 ἁ μελανόχρως. 


digestion. The last-named defect is said to have been the 
cause of his frugal diet*, but this was no doubt also recom- 
mended to him by his philosophical views. In spite of his 
habitual abstinence, he enjoyed the company of his friends at 
a convivial banquet, where his severity relaxed with the wine 
he drank, just as (to use his own comparison) beans are im- 
proved by soaking®. For the rest, he seems to have been a 
man of few words, but quick at repartee, disliking all dis- 
play and effeminacy, and generally of a somewhat stern and 
reserved cast of mind, though not without consideration for 
the wants of others. 

§ 2. Stoicism as established by Zeno. 

It will be convenient at this point to summarise those 
leading doctrines which the evidence here collected establishes 
as having been introduced by Zeno into the Stoic school, with- 
out paying regard to isolated expressions or to views of minor 

philosophical importance. 
Zeno divided philosophy into three parts, logic, physics 
and ethics, and we may take them in the order named, as 
being that which he recommended. 

To the formal side of logic Zeno paid but little attention, 
regarding it as useful only for the detection of error, rather 
than as a means towards the establishment of truth. The 
doctrine of the four categories, and the elaborate treatment of 
ἀξιώματα and syllogisms, belong almost entirely to Chrysippus, 
and, when we remember that out of 750 books which he is 
said to have written no fewer than 311 were devoted to 
logical studies, it is not improbable that he owed much of his 
reputation to his performances in this branch. In Zeno’s 
eyes the most important division of logic was the question of 
the standard of knowledge, although strictly speaking this 
should rather be considered as belonging to psychology. He 

1 εἷς ἄρτος, ὄψον ἰσχάς, ἐπιπιεῖν ὕδωρ. Philemon ap. Diog. L. vm. 27. 
2 See Zeno apoph. 27. 


held that, though the senses themselves are unerring, the im- 
pressions they convey are often erroneous, and that only such 
impressions are to be trusted as are in themselves perspicuous. 
The ultimate test of truth resides in the strength of tension 
in the impression, as it strikes the sense-organ. If satisfied 
in this way that the impression is such that it must proceed 
from a real object, the mind in the exercise of its ever present 
activity grasps the impression, and assents to it. This is the 
meaning which Zeno expressed by saying that φαντασία κατα- 
ληπτικὴ is the criterion of truth’, Diogenes Laertius, however, 
mentions. certain ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικὼν as teaching that 
ὀρθὸς λόγος is the standard of truth. This passage has been 
treated by Hirzel (in whose judgment other authorities have 
concurred) as proving that Zeno and Cleanthes were the philo- 
sophers indicated, and that Chrysippus was the first to in- 
troduce the definition of the φαντασία καταληπτική. The only 
other evidence, by which he connects Zeno with ὀρθὸς λόγος, 
is Philo quis virtuti studet p. 880 appearing in our collection 
as frag. 157. To this might have been added Arr. Epict. diss. 
Iv. 8. 12 (frag. 4) and Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 8 (frag. 117). 
It is submitted, however, that these passages by no means 
prove the point in question, as against the positive testimony 
which attributes to Zeno the φαντασία καταληπτική. In Philo 
there is no question of a logical criterion at all, but Zeno is 

1 As the matter is one of considerable importance, in order to relieve 
the notes, it is desirable to quote Stein’s remarks (Erkenntnistheorie, 
Ρ. 174):—Mit Zeller muss man annehmen, dass das καταληπτικὸν 
urspriinglich einen aktiven Sinn halte, da der Tonus desselben Zweifels- 
ohne auf die διάνοια einwirkt. Andererseits muss man Hirzel wieder 
darin Recht geben, dass die διάνοια sich unmiéglich rein leidend verhalten 
kann, dass vielmehr das καταληπτικὸν auch einen passiven Beigeschmack 
hat. Und doch lassen sich beide, sich scheinbar ausschliessende Stand- 

vereinigen, wenn man in das καταληπτικὸν den von uns vermu- 
teten Doppelsinn hineinlegt, den Zeno wohl absichtlich andeuten wollte, 
Danach wiiren die φαντασία und διάνοια bei der κατάληψις gleicherweise 
teils aktiv, teils passiv, woraus sich die schwankende Anwendung dieses 
Ausdrucks sehr wohl erklirt.” For the connection of révos with κατά- 
ληψις, which is not however proved to be Zenonian, οἵ. Sext. Emp. adv. 
Math. vir. 408 ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων φαντασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ ἔντονον ἰδίωμα παρίσταται. 


speaking of the state of mind of the wise man, whose soul is 
in perfect conformity with the law of reason, and who has 
mastered all his impulses and passions. This is still more plain 
in the extract from Philodemus, where ὀρθοὺς λόγους are coupled 
with, σπουδαίας διαθέσεις. The weight of evidence the other 
way must remain to be stated hereafter, but it may be re- 
marked that, even if Cicero’s testimony is discredited, the fact 
of the controversy between Zeno and Arcesilas is not thereby 
disproved’?, Again, if Zeno defined φαντασία as a τύπωσις, and 
discriminated between the truth of various φαντασίαι, he must 
‘have pursued the subject still farther ; and, if art and memory 
are defined with reference to κατάληψις and opinion is: dis- 
tinguished therefrom, it follows of necessity that he must have 
defined κατάληψις itself. Still, even admitting to the full the 
ethical significance of ὀρθὸς λόγος", the passage in Diogenes is 
not thereby disposed of, for if Zeno and Cleanthes are not 
indicated by the words of ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν to whom 
does this expression refer? Must we, then, suppose that Zeno 
put forward two criteria of knowledge, rational thought (ὀρθὸς 
λόγος) as well as the experience of sense (κατάληψις) 1 Such ἃ 
conclusion would be inconsistent with the clearness and direct- 
ness of Zeno’s teaching. The only way out of the difficulty * 
is to adopt the theory of Stein, who regards the doctrine of 
ὀρθὸς λόγος as a concession to rationalism. ὀρθὸς λόγος be- 
comes, in this view, a subsidiary and secondary criterion®, so 
that the results of thought must be confirmed by experience. 
In other words, the potential notions inspired in us by the 
divine Adyos require to be completed and corrected on the side 

1 For Epict. 1. 6. see note on Zeno frag. 4. 

2 It is satisfactory to find that Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 341, claims 
for Zeno the φαντασία καταληπτικὴ on precisely similar grounds to those 
stated in the notes to frag. 11. 

3 For this see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 259—264. 

4 It should be mentioned that Corssen de Posidonio Rhodio (1878) 
pp. 17—19 proposed to eliminate Στωικῶν as a blunder of Diogenes or 
his authority, assuming that Posidonius was speaking of Empedocles, 
the Pythagoreans, and Plato, 

5 The meaning of the word ἀπολείπουσιν should in this case be pressed. 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 259. 


of sensible experience before they can attain to objective 

From this point of view, then, it is not unreasonable to 
credit Zeno with the substance of the teaching recorded in 
Cic. Acad. 1. 41, 42. If so much be admitted, it is most un- 
likely that he should have refrained from enquiring into the 
nature of knowledge and ignorance, which carry with them 
the doctrine of assent. On the other hand, it is most probable 
that he only touched lightly the doctrine of évvow and not at 
all that of προλήψ εις". 

The remainder of the logical fragments are not of much 
importance as regards the positive teaching of the school. 
They include a nominalistic criticism of the Platonic theory of 
ideas, a curious statement of the nature of causation, a few 
scraps dealing with various rhetorical terms, a definition of 
geometry, some discussion as to the meaning of the word 
σόλοικος, and a symbolical explanation, recorded by Cicero, of 
the different degrees of knowledge. 

Zeno’s contributions to Physics have been unduly de- 
preciated by some authorities but, while it is true that the 
development of this branch is largely due to Cleanthes, still a 
fair estimate of the fragments here collected will lead us to 
the conclusion that the essential groundwork of the Stoic 
physical teaching was laid by the founder of the school’. 
Zeno started from the proposition that nothing exists but the 
material, inasmuch as body alone is capable of acting and 
being acted upon. All body is thus either active or passive — 
and the material world is itself the result produced from the 

1 Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 314, 315. 

3 Stein holds that πρόληψις was substituted by gi adh for Zeno’s 
ὀρθὸς λόγος, in so far as the latter is concerned with epistemology 
(Erkenntnistheorie p. 269, 270). 

8 See Stein, Psychologie p. ὅθ and n. 77, whose reference to the number 
of fragments in Wachsmuth’s collection is however misleading. As 
regards Zeno, Wachsmuth’s fragments are only intended to be supple- 
mentary to Wellmann’s article in Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. for 1873, so that no 
inference can be drawn from the fact that there are more physical than 
ethical fragments. It will be seen from the er collection that the 
numbers are very nearly equal. 


operation of these two principles. The active principle is God, 
and the passive is matter. God is more closely defined as the 
fiery aether', which permeates the whole of the universe, even 
as honey passes through the honeycomb. He is at once the 
embodiment of reason and of law, and the power which binds 
_in one the various portions of the universe, who, though his 
essence is constant, appears in different forms in everything 
that exists. Nature, forethought and fate are thus only different 
names for the same being ; as nature he creates the world, and 
creates it in entire harmony with the law of fate. Matter, on 
the other hand, is formless and indeterminate, though limited 
in extent, and can exist only in conjunction with some active 
quality ; although it is itself eternal, its parts are subject 
to change. The creation of the world is brought about by the 
action of God upon matter, whereby the creative fire through 
an intermediate watery stage passes into the four elements - 
fire, air, water and earth out of which everything else is formed. 
To explain the production of the individual thing by the in- 
termingling of its elements, Zeno broached the celebrated 
theory of κρᾶσις δι᾿ ὅλου, which is in effect a denial of the axiom 
that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. 
_ The world, however, will not last for ever, nor are we left 
- without indications of its destructibility. In the inequality of 
the earth’s surface, in the retrocession of the sea, in the mor- 
tality of every substance with which we are acquainted, and 
lastly in the fact that the human race and all living creatures 
can be shown to have had a beginning in time Zeno saw clear 
proofs that the universe itself is destined to pass away. There 
will comea time when by the unceasing law of fate the world 
and all that it contains will again be merged in the primeval fire, 
only to be created anew, as the embryo is formed from the 
seed. For the process is unvarying no less than never-ending ; 
a new Heracles will free a young world from its plagues, and 
a new Socrates will plead his cause against the same accusers. 

1 Stein, Psychologie p. 58, remarks that there is no evidence of Zeno 
having used the term πνεῦμα in this connection. 


The individual and the cosmos are thus partakers in the 
same decree of fate, but their likeness does not stop here. Not 
only is the world a unity, but also a living unity; it is more- 
over sentient, rational, intelligent, and wise. 

Two characteristics are especially prominent in Zeno’s 
system, first, his metaphysical contrast between God and 
matter, and, secondly, his materialism. He seems to have | 
been animated by a desire to combine the results of later 
thought with the simplicity and directness of the early Ionian 
physicists. All is to be evolved out of fire: but fire is clothed — 
with divine attributes, and sharply contrasted with the passive 
material on which it works. But Zeno did not observe that — 
the combination is in reality self-destructive, and that with a 
materialistic system metaphysics are superseded, It remained 
for his successors to eradicate the dualism which is here in- © 
volved, and, while thrusting into the background the points — 
borrowed from Aristotle, to take their stand upon pantheism — 
pure and simple. . 

Passing from the account of the cosmogony to the deserip- © 
tion of the different component parts of the universe, we find 
that the circumference of the sphere is occupied by a revolving 
belt of aether, in which are the sun, moon and stars, divine © 
beings formed of creative fire. No void exists within the 
world, but outside it there is unlimited void; at the same © 
time the world is kept together and preserved from dissolution 
into space by the attraction of its parts to the centre, in 
which the earth is placed. Zeno also explains certain natural 
phenomena such as _ eclipses, lightning, thunderbolts and 
comets, and defines time and colour. 

We proceed to his anthropology, in which the account of 
the soul is most important. Although he apparently omitte T 
to describe God, who is the soul of the universe, as fiery breath, 
yet the soul, which is the moving principle of the body, is | 
defined as a warm breath, or (after Heraclitus) as a sentient 
exhalation. For the soul is fed by exhalation from the blood, 
just as the heavenly bodies are by particles from the lower 


elements. Moreover, it is corporeal and grows up with the 
body, gradually expanding under the influence of external im- 
pressions, so that the perfect power of reason is only developed 
at the age of puberty. Though it is a simple essence, its 
faculties are diverse, and being extended from the ἡγεμονικὸν 
which {s situated in the heart to the various organs of sense, 
it is said to have eight parts, namely, the ἡγεμονικὸν itself, the 
five senses, and the capacities of speech and generation. The 
soul entirely permeates the body, and at its departure the 
composite structure of soul and body is destroyed. The soul 
itself endures for a time after its separation from the body 
but is not immortal, and its condition after death is deter- 
mined by the grade of purity to which it has attained. Such, 
at least, seems to be a fair inference from a passage of 
‘Lactantius in which Zeno speaks of the separation of the 
unholy from the holy and contrasts the misery of the former 
with the blessedness of the latter. On his discussion of the 
voice, sleep, vision, and the seed we need not dwell. 

It remains to consider Zeno’s attitude towards the popular 
religion. Although, in the strict sense, he teaches that there 
is but one God, yet he admits that there is a certain amount 
-of truth in polytheism, as implying a recognition of the 
ubiquity of the divine presence. The manifestation of God 
in the powers of nature is symbolised by Zeus, Here and 
Poseidon, who represent the aether, the air, and the water 
‘respectively. In his interpretation of Hesiod’s Theogony he 
gives the reins to his etymological fancy, so as to bring the 
‘cosmogony of the poet into accordance with Stoic views. 
Lastly the existence of divination is inferred from the fore- 
thought, which characterises the divine government. 

Ethics, which are the crowning point of the Stoic system, 
come next in order. The aim and object of life is to live in 
agreement with nature, which is, in other words, to live 
aceording to virtue: for this is the goal to which nature 
conducts us. It would seem that Zeno did not accurately 
explain what he meant by nature, since Chrysippus and 


Cleanthes took divergent views of its character, but, recog- 
nising the manner in which the different branches of the 
Stoic system are interlaced with one another’, we may reason- 
ably conclude that by the prominence given to nature Zeno 
desired to connect his moral teaching with the divine creative 
aether, which permeates the universe*. Our first impulses, 
however, tend not to virtue but to self-preservation, and virtue 
is impossible in the child or the brute, since neither of them 
possesses the informing power of reason. These natural im- 
pulses require the guidance of reason, and in their proper 
subordination to it is to be found the condition of happiness, 
which may be described as the unruffled flow of life. For 
happiness nothing is required but virtue, and no external 
circumstances, nothing but what is morally evil, can diminish 
the satisfaction belonging to the virtuous. In this way we 
are led to discriminate between ἀγαθὰ and κακά: only virtue 
and vice or their accessories can be classed as good and evil; 
everything else, even life and death, is morally indifferent. 
But this classification does not exhaust the capacities of τὰ 
κατὰ φύσιν. The value of virtue is absolute and for all time: 
but, just as the supremacy of the monarch does not imply the 
absolute equality of his subjects, so the ἀδιάφορα are ranged 
between virtue and vice in a graduated scale of negative and 
positive value (ἀπαξία and ἀξία), the middle place being oc- 
cupied by τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα, i.e. such matters as haying an 
even or odd number of hairs in one’s head. Everythin, 
possessing ἀξία is κατὰ φύσιν, and everything possessing ἀπαξί 
is παρὰ φύσιν. At the same time ἀξία is not a permanen 
attribute of any ἀδιάφορον, for that which is at one time car 

1 Of. Stein, Psychologie p. 13. 

2 Hirzel, Untersuchungen τι. p. 108, thinks otherwise and the point i 
certainly a doubtful one. If Zeno spoke only of human nature, Cleatth 
may have here, as elsewhere, shown the connection of ethical wi 
physical doctrine by explaining φύσις as κοινὴ φύσις. Then Chrysipp 
would have united both views. lf this was the real development, 
would be some pretext for Stobaeus’ assertion that Cleanthes added 
φύσει to the definition, while the authority of Diogenes Laertius wo 
remain unimpaired. See however Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 260. 


φύσιν might, under certain circumstances, become παρὰ φύσιν. 
Herein lies the vita] distinction between ἀδιάφορα and ἀγαθά, 
for the latter are unaffected by any possible change of circum- 
stances: a virtuous action can never be contrary to nature. 
Still, although there is not an absolute, there is yet a practical 

permanence in the value of certain things, which in the 

absence of some paramount objection (-- κατὰ προηγούμενον 
λόγον Or ἄνευ περιστάσεως) We shall always choose in preference 
to their contraries. These then are the προηγμένα. Cor- 
responding with this classification of objects, we have a scale 
of actions ranging from κατόρθωμα (virtuous action) to ἁμάρ- 
τημα (sinful action), wherein καθῆκον answers to the class of 
ἀδιάφορα. Every καθῆκον is thus directed to the choice of τὰ 
κατὰ φύσιν and the avoidance of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. The doctrines 
of καθῆκον and προηγμένον are not to be regarded as an 
excrescence foisted on to the Stoic system in consequence of 
the pressure of the arguments of opponents, but are an 
integral and necessary portion of the original structure as 
established by Zeno. The apparent inconsistency, which the 
application of these doctrines sometimes produces e.g. in the 
remarks on marriage, often disappears when we remember that 

‘the πολιτεία proposed to establish a socialistic constitution 

under which the importance of ἀδιάφορα would be reduced to 
a minimum. 

Zeno held further that virtue is one and_ indivisible, 
springing from the ἡγεμονικόν, of which it is a fixed and 
permanent condition. Consistently with this, he maintains 
that all sinful actions are equally wrong, since all alike imply 
an aberration from a standard, which excludes increase or 

diminution. None the less, however, can we distinguish , 

between different manifestations of virtue or separate virtues: 

virtue itself is identical with wisdom (φρόνησις), and justice, | 
courage, and temperance are the particular applications of © 

wisdom in diverse spheres. Whether Zeno also distinguished 
between two different kinds of φρόνησις, one as the ground- 
work, and the other as a particular species of virtue, must 


remain doubtful. Hirzel (lc. p. 99) infers that he did, but 
Plutarch’s words do not necessarily lead to such a conclusion, 
and we ought to hesitate to attribute such an inconsistency to { 
Zeno without direct evidence. No doubt the Stoic school 
generally put forward four cardinal virtues φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, 
ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, but inasmuch as Zeno’s position was ; 
admittedly modified by his successors we are left to judge of 
his views entirely from the two passages in Plutarch, in which 
he is mentioned by name. 

The theory of the emotions, which was introduced by Zeno, j 
constitutes one of the most distinctive features of Stoic ethics. 
Whereas Plato and Aristotle agreed in admitting the legiti- 
macy of certain emotions, Zeno declared all alike to be 
sinful, as being due to an irrational and unnatural movement — 
in the soul, or an excess of impulse. The four chief emotions 
are pleasure, grief, fear and desire, and Zeno in describing their ~ 
nature dwelt, if we may trust Galen’s statements, rather on Π 
the psychological effects of the irrational impulse upon the ~ 
soul than on the mental conditions which produce them. The — 
special difficulties surrounding this subject will be discussed in 
the notes to the fragments themselves, 

The whole of mankind was divided by Zeno into two ~ 
classes, entirely distinct from one another, that of the wise 
and that of the foolish; Every action of the wise man is 
prompted by virtue and every action of the fool by vice. 
Hence it is generally true that the wise man performs every | 
action well, and the fool fails in everything. Friendship, || 
freedom, piety, riches, beauty, the arts of kingship and general- — 
ship, even success in culinary operations belong to the wise © 
man alone: he is never mistaken, never regrets what he has © 
done, feels no compassion, and is absolutely free from every © 
form of emotion. At the same time, it is clear that Zeno | 
contemplates a progress from the state of folly to that of | 
wisdom as practicable; this advance is characterised by the © 
purgation of the soul from emotional and delusive affections 
under the influence of reason. Even though he ultimately 


| emerges from the conflict with success, the wise man still feels 
the scars from the wounds he has received during its course, 
and is often reminded of his former evil impulses after he has 
completely suppressed them. Finally, since death belongs to 
the class ἀδιάφορα, suicide is justifiable in the wise man, if 
circumstances prescribe such a course. 

It is obvious that a teacher, whose ethical views were of 
the nature, which we have just indicated, could not rest 
satisfied with the existing constitution of civic life in Greece. 
Equally unsatisfactory to him was the aristocratical com- 
munity of Plato, with the sharply drawn dividing line between 
the guardians and the rest of the citizens. For this reason 
Eros, the god of friendship and concord, is taken as the 
presiding deity of Zeno’s ideal state, a state which in no way 
corresponds to the Greek πόλις, but comprises the whole of 
mankind living together like a herd of cattle’. In this state 
there will be no temples, law-courts, or gymnasia; no work of 
human craftsmen is worthy of divine acceptance; the state 
must be adorned not with costly offerings, but by the virtues 
of its inhabitants. Zeno likewise advocates an abolition of 
coinage, a community of wives, and a thorough revolution of 
the current system of education. 

The remaining fragments, dealing mainly with particular 
καθήκοντα, do not require to be summarised here. 

§ 3. Zeno’s relation to previous philosophers. 

The opponents of the Stoic school were fond of accusing 
its members of plagiarism and want of originality. Zeno is 
the keen Phoenician trader, pilfering other men’s wares, and 
passing them off as his own?: if all that belongs to others were 
withdrawn from the voluminous writings of Chrysippus, we 
should have a blank page*. Antiochus, in Cicero*, represents 

1 Cf. Newman, Politics of Aristotle, vol. 1. p. 88. 

2 Cf. Diog. L. vir. 25. 

3 Diog. L. vir. 181. 

4 Acad. 1.43. The same argument is put forward by Cicero himself 
against Cato in the 4th book of the de Finibus. 

Η. P. 2 


the views of Zeno as merely immaterial changes in minor 
points of the genuine Academic doctrine, while Juvenal 
only repeats current opinion in speaking of the Stoic dogmas 
as “a Cynicis tunica distantia”’. Even a slight acquaintance 
with the Stoic system is sufficient to refute these gross 
charges: indeed, its originality is abundantly vindicated when 
we point to the influence it exercised for several centuries on 
the intellectual life of Greece and Rome*. At the same time 
it must be admitted that Zeno was largely indebted to his 
predecessors—especially to Antisthenes and Heraclitus—for 
the bricks and mortar with which he constructed so splendid an 
edifice. Οἱ Cynicism in particular he appropriated the kernel, 
while discarding the husk. It is, however, when we look at 

Stoicism as a whole that we are able to appreciate the skill ~ 

with which its incongruous elements were fused, and the 
unity of thought which pervades a variety of detail. The Stoic 
wise man is as far removed from Diogenes in his tub, as is the 
all permeating aether from the fiery element of Heraclitus. 
We proceed to discuss in detail the various points in which 
Zeno’s obligation to previous thinkers is most strongly marked. 

A. To Antisthenes and the Cynics. 

The resemblances between Zeno and the Cynics are natu- 
rally to be found chiefly in their ethical doctrines. Physics 
were almost entirely neglected by the Cynics, and their nomina- — 
listic logic was not of great importance for Stoicism, although | 
we may observe in passing that both schools maintained in | 
similar terms® that Plato’s ideas were a mere fiction of the 
brain and had no objective existence. The Stoic doctrine of 
life in accordance with nature finds its historical origin in the 

1 xn, 121. 

2 “Die Stoa war vielmehr die weitaus selbstindigste Schule der 
nacharistotelischen Philosophie,” Stein, Psychologie p, 10. 

3. Antisthenes ap. Simpl. in Cat. p. 54b ὦ Πλάτων, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ 
ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ. Cf. Zeno frag. 23, 


teaching as well as in the life of Diogenes’, Like Zeno, 
Antisthenes teaches that virtue is in itself sufficient to secure 
happiness’, that nothing is a Good but virtue, nothing an Evil 
but vice, and that everything else is indifferent®. Accordingly 
Diogenes held that death, since it involves no disgrace, cannot 
be an Evil*, Hence it is not surprising to learn that many of 
the Cynics put an end to their lives by suicide, though we 
have sayings both of Antisthenes and Diogenes on record 
denying the legitimacy of such a course’. Virtue itself is 
described, after Socrates, as consisting in wisdom and pru- 
dence: “prudence,” says Antisthenes, “is the safest wall; it 
cannot be undermined or betrayed”®. At the saine time the 
futility of the ordinary course of Greek education is strongly 
insisted on’. The distinction between virtue and vice draws 
with it that between the wise and the foolish; the philoso- 
pher’s wallet preserves a chosen few from a condition border- 
ing on madness’*. 

We are told, on the authority of Diogenes Laertius®, that 
Zeno adopted the Cynic form of life. This is probably to be 
taken with some limitation, as the incidents recorded of his 
life only partially agree with it. It is certain, however, that 
his life was one of abstinence and simplicity’, and for this 
reason he became the butt of the comic poets, who thus un- 
consciously testified to his merit. Apollodorus Ephillus, a 
later Stoic writer, declared that the wise man would cynicise, 
and that Cynicism was a short cut to virtue’. It should, 
however, always be borne in mind that the Stoic ideal was 

1 Diog. L. νι. 71 δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν 
ἑλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως. Zeno frag. 120, 

2 Diog. L. v1.11. Zeno frag. 125. 

3 Diog. L. v1. 105. Zeno frag. 128. 
Arr, Epict. Diss. i. 24. 6. Zeno frag. 129. 
Zeller Socrates, etc. Eng. Tr. p. 319, n. 5. Cf. Zeno frag. 161. 
Diog. L. νι. 18. Zeno frag. 134. 
Diog. L. νι. 103. Zeno frag. 167. 
Diog. L. vr. 33, 35. Zeno frag. 148. 
Diog. L. vr. 104. 
10 Diog. L. vir. 26, 27. 
1 Diog. vi. 104. vir. 121. 




humanised and elevated to an extent entirely incompatible 
with Cynicism, mainly owing to the attention which was 
bestowed on mental culture’. 

Turning to the views of the two schools in applied moral 
science, we find a curious agreement as to the relations of the 
sexes: Zeno and Diogenes both held that, in the ideal state, 
there should be a community of wives, and neither saw any- 
thing revolting in marriage between the nearest relations’. 
At the same time marriage and the begetting of children are 
recommended for the wise man both by Zeno and Antisthenes, 
and apparently we must regard this as intended to apply to 
the existing condition of life, in which marriage was a civil 
institution®. Both teachers allow to the wise man the passion 
of love, as he alone will be able to select a suitable object*: 
both maintain that the virtuous alone are capable of genuine 

Lastly, Zeno copied Antisthenes in his treatment of the 
Homeric poems, and particularly in explaining certain ap- 
parent contradictions as due to the fact that the poet speaks at 
one time κατὰ δόξαν and at another κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν. The al- 
legorising method of interpretation is common to both, and 
was afterwards developed to an excessive degree by Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus’. 

Though we have thus seen that Zeno’s ethical teaching is 
largely founded on Cynicism, we must not forget the many 
points of divergence. Thus, for example, we find the Cynics 
treating honour and wealth as absolute evils®; these things, 

1 The difference of spirit in the two schools is well put by Sir A. 
Grant (Ar. Eth. vol. 1. p. 317 ed. 3). 

3 Diog. L. v1. 72. Dio. Chrys, x. 29. Cf. Zeno frags. 176 and 179. 
These passages are from the πολιτεία of Zeno, which is supposed to have 
been written while he was still an exponent of orthodox Cynicism. Chry- 
sippus, however, is reported to have also held this repulsive doctrine. 

3 Diog. L. v1.11. Zeno frag. 171. 

4 Diog. L. v1.11. Zeno frag. 172. 

5 Diog. L. v1. 12. Zeno frag. 149. 

6 Dio. Chrys. 53, 4. Zeno frag. 195. 

7 See Cic. N. Ὁ. 11. 63 foll. 

8 See the passages collected by Zeller Socrates, etc. Εἰ. T. p, 804, 


according to Zeno, belonged to the class οὗ zponypéva. Again, 
to take their attitude towards the popular religion, we know 
that Zeno expressly countenanced divination, while the ex- 
istence of prophets made Diogenes think man the most foolish 
of animals’. 

B. To Heraclitus. 

There can be no doubt that Zeno borrowed some important 
principles in his physical teaching from the writings of He- 
raclitus, and particularly from his account of the cosmogony. 
There is, however, a difficulty in comparing the doctrines of 
the two schools minutely, owing to the obscurity in which our 
knowledge of the Heraclitean theories is involved, and which 
is often increased by the doubt as to whether some particular 
doctrine belonged equally to the Stoics and the philosopher 
of Ephesus, or whether some later development, introduced by 
the former, has not been wrongly ascribed to the latter by our 
authorities. For instance, it was at one time stoutly main- 
tained that the conflagration of the world was not taught by 
Heraclitus but that it was first propounded by Zeno, although 
the contrary opinion seems now to prevail®. Again, it is not 
entirely clear whether we are to class Heraclitus, as Aristotle 
does*, with the early Ionian physicists, starting from his 
dogma that all things are fire, or whether we are to regard 
this principle as a metaphysical abstraction, metaphorically 
shadowing forth the eternal flux of all things, a view which is 
more in accordance with Plato’s criticism in the Theaetetus’. 
However this may be, Heraclitus is essentially a hylozoist, 
who, following Anaximenes, chooses fire as being the rarest 
element, and insists on the continuity of change in order to 
escape from the mechanical theories of Anaxagoras and Em- 

1 Diog. νι. 24 and contrast Zeno frag. 118. 

2 See the elaborate discussion in Zeller, Pre-Socr. Phil. Eng. Tr. 1. 
pp. 62—77. See however Bywater, Journ. Phil. 1. 42. 

3 Met.1.3.8. This is the view of Ueberweg p. 40 and is also held by 
Dr Jackson. 

4 Zeller’s position (p. 20 foll.) combines the two views. 


pedocles on the one hand, and the Parmenidean immobility on 
the other. The λόγος ξυνὸς is with him the expression of the 
truth that nothing can be known but the law of mutability, 
the harmony in difference, which he likens to the stretching of 
a bowstring'. This law he calls γνώμη, δίκη, εἱμαρμένη, τὸ 
περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ὃν καὶ φρενῆρες, and ὁ Ζεύς", but these 

terms are mere metaphors and we should be wrong in straining ~ 

their philosophic import: they represent, in fact, the law of 
change and nothing more. Still, there can be no doubt that ἢ 
the use which Heraclitus made of his formtla λόγος was one 
of the chief points in his system which attracted the attention 
of Zeno. As a disciple of Cynicism he was familiar with 
λόγος as a dialectical and an ethical principle: neither of these 
aspects of λόγος was discarded by him in broaching. his own 
system. Yet, through the help of the Heraclitean λόγος, he 
was enabled to take one step further. Just as Plato gave to 
the Socratic ὑπόθεσις or general conception a metaphysical 
existence in the form of the idea, so did Zeno elevate the λόγος 
of Antisthenes from its position as a criterion for thought and 
duty to that of the physical cause of being and movement’. 
The Stoic deity is, like the Heraclitean Adyos, provided with 
many names, such as God, Mind, the all pervading Aether, 
Fate, Forethought, and Zeus, but on the other hand it belongs 
to an essentially later period of thought. We have here set 
forth the teleological view of Nature, which is regarded as 
creating all things out of itself for a good purpose*. The 
Stoics, at least after Cleanthes, are also pantheists in so far as 
they acknowledge that God and the world are identical. Even 
where Zeno followed Heraclitus most closely there are essential 
differences in treatment. The fire of Heraclitus becomes — 

1 Heraclitus frag. 56 ed. Bywater. Hirzel finds here the origin of the 
Stoic τόνος, but this is very questionable. 

2 For a detailed statement see Krische, Forschungen p. 368 foll. 

% The comparison is suggested by Hirzel τι. p. 42. But Hirzel very 
much underestimates the influence of Heraclitus on Zeno, as Heinze has 
pointed out. It is quite contrary to the evidence to attribute the Hera- 
clitean tendencies of the Stoa solely, or even mainly, to Cleanthes. 

4 Cie. Ν, Ὁ. τι. 58. 


aether or πῦρ texvixov—for this distinction is unknown to the 
Ephesian—and is thereby spiritualised and rarefied. Instead 
of three elements the Stoics have four, according to the universal 
practice of post-Aristotelian writers. Cleanthes, at least, re- 
garded these four elements merely as graduations of rovos, a 
notion entirely alien to Heraclitus. The doctrine of πάντα 
ῥεῖ is replaced by that of μεταβολή, and ἀλλοίωσις gives way 
to the characteristic theory of the mixture of substances, 
known as κρᾶσις δι ὅλων. In stating the differences between 
the two schools we have indicated how the Stoic physics were 
built upon Heraclitus. The remaining resemblances are com- 
paratively unimportant. It was a natural corollary to both 
systems to maintain the unity of the cosmos’. Zeno seems to 
have adopted Heraclitus’ definition of the soul as an ava- 
θυμίασος, but, instead of regarding this exhalation as imbibed 
from the outer air (τὸ περιέχον), he taught that the soul was 
fed by emanation from the warm blood. Where Heraclitus 
regarded dryness as an essential characteristic of the wise 
soul’, the Stoics rather looked for warmth or evxpacia. Lastly, 
we may observe that Heraclitus attributed immortality to 
the soul, and that in Ethics he counselled submission to the 
common law and the regulation of speech and thought in ac- 
cordance with the demands of nature’. 

C. To Plato and Aristotle. 

It has often been observed as a remarkable fact that the 
influence exercised both by Plato and Aristotle on their im- 
mediate successors was comparatively small. Zeno and Epi- 
curus sought the groundwork of their ethics in the systems of 
Antisthenes and Aristippus, and followed in their physics, 
with surprising closeness, the pre-Socratic philosophers He- 
raclitus and Democritus. Indeed, the Peripatetic school itself 
showed no great vitality after Theophrastus, the new Academy 

1 Stob. Ecl. 1. 22. 3 b p. 199, 10. 
2 Heracl. frag. 74, Bywater. 
3 Stob. Floril. m1. 84. 


of Arcesilas and Carneades bore no resemblance to that founded 
by Plato, and Antiochus owed more to the Stoa than to the 
old Academy which he professed to resuscitate. In the post- 
Aristotelian philosophy, taken as a whole, we find a universal 
tendency to materialistic views, a striking decline of interest 
in purely intellectual research, as an end in itself, and a 
general agreement in confining the area of speculation to the 
two questions of the standard of ethics and the logical criterion. 
However we are to explain this phenomenon, and even if we 
consider inadequate the explanation of Zeller, who attributes 
this result to the loss of political freedom and the consequent 
concentration of thought on the needs of the individual, we 
are more concerned with the fact itself than with its possible 
causes’. It is enough to say that the system founded by Zeno 
was in no sense the offspring of those of Plato and Aristotle, 
although in many points it presupposes their existence. 

In the case of Chrysippus we may go further, for there is 
no doubt that his logic was largely a development, and that 
not a very happy one, of the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
syllogism. Zeno, however, although the titles of several of 
his logical treatises have come down to us, was not considered 
to have paid great attention to this branch of philosophy. 
The principal contribution made by Zeno to the theory of 
knowledge is the establishment of the φαντασία καταληπτικὴ 
as the criterion: in this, the essential point, whereby the con- 
vincing power of the impression is made the test of its reality, 
is due entirely to Zeno, but he was obviously influenced by 
the Aristotelian treatment of φαντασία, in which it appears as 
‘decaying sense,”* and is more accurately defined as “the 
movement resulting from the actual operation of the sense 
faculty”*. Again, in the Zenonian definitions of memory 
and art there will be found a familiarity with the progres- 
sive stages in the growth of knowledge, as enunciated by 

' This question is discussed in Benn’s Greek Philosophers (Preface). 
2 Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 28. ᾿ 
8. de An, m1. 8. 429 41. 


Aristotle’, and his terminology, at any rate, is recognisable in 
a logical fragment preserved by Stobaeus’. 

Diogenes Laertius introduces his discussion of the Stoic 

physics by stating that the two ἀρχαί posited by the school 
_were God and Indeterminate Matter: here we have not only 
the well-known Aristotelian distinction between the formal 
and the material cause, but also his description of matter as 
that which is entirely formless and contingent*®. The aether, 
the so called quinta essentia of Aristotle, of which the heavenly 
bodies were composed, has its representative under the system 
of Zeno, who held that the circumference of the world was 
surrounded by a moving belt of aether. 

Cicero puts into the mouth of professed Antiocheans, and, 
when speaking in the character of Antiochus, himself makes 
the charge that Zeno’s Ethics are identical with those of the 
Academy, and that the only change is one of terminology. 
This is developed at length in the fourth book of the de Finibus, 
where Cicero points out the inconsistency of denying that 
external goods contribute to happiness, while admitting that 
they have a certain positive value. There is considerable force 
in the objection in so far as it lays bare a weak point in the 
Stoic stronghold, but, if it is meant for a charge of plagiarism, 
it is grossly unfair. In fact, as has been remarked, Antiochus, 
who himself stole the clothes of Zeno, was always anxious to 
prove that they never belonged to Zeno at all. As we know, 
however, that Zeno was a pupil of Polemo, it is not unnatural 
to tind that he was to some extent influenced by his teaching. 
Thus, life according to nature was one of Polemo’s leading 
tenets, and Clement of Alexandria has preserved the title of 
one of his books which deals with this subject*. Zeller well 

1 Met. 1.1. Anal. Post. 11. 19. 

2 Zeno frag. 24. 

3 Metaph. vi. 3. 1029 a 20 λέγω δ᾽ ὕλην ἢ Kad’ αὑτὴν μήτε τι μήτε 
ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται ols ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. 

4 Cie. Fin. 1v, 6. 14. Clem. Alex, Strom. vir. p. 304 Sylb. Polemo 
himself is represented as saying to Zeno:—ov λανθάνεις, ὦ Ζήνων, ταῖς 
κηπαίαις παρεισρέων θύραις, καὶ τὰ δόγματα κλέπτων φοινικικῶς μεταμφιεννύς 
(Diog. L. vir. 25). One of the doctrines, which were in this way appro- 


sums up the extent of Academic influence when he says’ that 
‘such points in Platonism as the Socratic building of virtue 
on knowledge, the comparative depreciation of external goods, 
the retreat from sensuality, the elevation and the purity of 
moral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for 
life according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of 
virtue and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to prac- 
tical issues—all these were questions for a Stoic full of in- 
terest.” Amongst the particular points, in which Zeno seems 
to have felt the influence of Plato, may be mentioned the 
doctrines of the cardinal virtues (frag. 134) and the πάθη 
(frag. 142) and the explanation of the world as ζῷον ἔμψυχον 
(frag. 62). 

We have endeavoured briefly to indicate certain leading 
points of doctrine in which Zeno was influenced by his pre- 
decessors, leaving minor resemblances to be pointed out in 
the notes, 

§ 4. The writings of Zeno. 

A list of the titles of Zeno’s works is preserved in Diog. L. 
vil. 4, but is admittedly incomplete, as the same writer himself 
makes additions to it in his exposition of the philosophical 
views of the Stoic school. This list was probably derived by 
Diogenes from two distinct sources, as it is divisible into two- 
separate portions. The first or main division gives the names 
of 13 (or 14) works, of which 6 deal with ethical, 4 with 
physical, and 3 (or 4) with logical and miscellaneous subjects ; 
then follows a kind of appendix giving 4 (or 3) additional 
titles. Apollonius Tyrius has been with much probability 
suggested as the authority to whom the main division is due’, 

priated by the Stoa, appears to be the third definition of ἔρως preserved 
by Andronicus περὶ παθῶν c. 4 as ὑπηρεσία θεῶν els νέων κατακόσμησιν καὶ 
καλῶν : οἵ, Plut. ad prin. iner. 780» Πολέμων ἔλεγε τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι θεῶν 
ὑπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιμέλειαν (Kreuttner, Andronicus p. 49). 

1 Stoics ete. p. 399. 

2 See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Antigonos p. 107: Zeller and Wachs- 
muth adopt Nietzsche’s hypothesis (Rhein. Mus. xxiv. ΒΝ that all the 
lists in Diog. are, with certain exceptions, derived from etrius 0 



for not only does Diogenes in several places cite him by 
name (e.g. ὃ 2) but also Strabo (xvi. 2. 24, p. 757) expressly 
mentions a work of his with the title πίναξ τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος 
φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν βιβλίων ; who supplied Diogenes with the 
appendix has not been determined. 

The works, of which any record has survived to us, may 
be divided into four classes :— 

I. Logical. 

(1) περὶ λόγου. From this work, not mentioned in the 
general catalogue, Diog. L. (vi. 39. 40) cites the triple division 
of philosophy and the order of arrangement for its study, which 
Zeno recommended. According to Susemihl, this book con- 
tained Zeno’s epistemology, but, being superseded by the 
writings of Chrysippus, lost its place in the canon. 

(2) καθολικά. Nothing is known of this work but the 
title (Diog. 4)': Wachsmuth thinks that καθολικὰ περὶ λέξεων 
is the title of a single work. 

(3) περὶ λέξεων (Diog. 4). In Stoic terminology λέξις is 
detined as φωνὴ éyypappatos as opposed to λόγος which is φωνὴ 
σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη (Diog. vir. 56). It is pro- 
bable, therefore, that this work dealt specially with the defini- 
tion of terms, and to it may perhaps belong the fragments in 
which Zeno explains the proper meaning of σολοικίζειν (frags. 
30 and 31), Wellmann (Neue Jahrb. fiir Philol. 107, p. 478) 
suggests that this treatise gave rise to the oft-repeated ac- 
cusation made by Cicero that Zeno’s innovations in philosophy 
were solely of a verbal character, and that Chrysippus had 
defended his master from a similar charge in the work περὶ 
τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 

(4) τέχνη (Diog. 4). This is identified by Zeller and 

Magnesia, who is specified by name with reference to Xenophon’s works 
(Diog. L. 1. 57). Susemih] (Jahrbiicher fiir Philol. 125, p. 741) thinks 
that the Diogenes catalogue comprises only those writings of Zeno which 
were included in the Stoic canon, and that the πολιτεία, the τέχνη ἐρωτική, 
and the διατριβαὶ were treated as apocryphal while their genuineness was 

1 See however on frag. 23. 


Wellmann with the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη of § 34, while Wachsmuth © 
writes τέχνη καὶ λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι β΄ as one title. The third 
course, which at first sight seems the most natural inasmuch — 
as τέχνη bears this special meaning from Corax and Tisias | 
downwards, is to regard it as an art of rhetoric. The οὔ- 
jection to this view is that it is inferred from Cicero de Fin. 
Iv. 7 that no work of Zeno bearing this title was known to © 
Cicero or his authority, but too much reliance need not be © 
placed on this, as it is clear that Zeno’s logical treatises had 
been cast into the shade by the more elaborate performances 
of Chrysippus. On the other hand, there is a fair amount of 
evidence to show that Zeno did to some extent busy himself — 
with rhetoric (frags. 25, 26, 27, 32), and though Zeller suggests — 
that the definitions of dupynows and παράδειγμα may belong to 
some other Zeno, this does not apply to the passages in Sextus 
and Quintilian, 

(5) λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι β΄ (Diog. 4). Possibly owing to 
the influence of Stilpo the Megarian, Zeno may have devoted 
some attention to this branch of logic, which in general he 
regards as of less importance’: see frag. 6. 

II. Physical. 

(6) περὶ τοῦ ὅλου (Diog. 4) seems to have been the most 
important of Zeno’s physical writings. Diogenes refers to it as 
containing Zeno’s views about the elements (vi1. 136) and the 
creation and destruction of the world (ib. 142), and quotes 
from it the statement that there is only one world (ib. 143). 
It also contained an account of the eclipses of the sun and 
moon (ib. 145), and explanations of the phenomena of thunder | 
and lightning (ib. 153). | 

(7) περὶ φύσεως cited by Stobaeus Eel. τ. 5. 15. p. 78, 18. 
for Zeno’s views on the subject of εἱμαρμένη : Krische (p. 367) 
would identify it with the last named treatise. 

1 This is the only work which deals with the formal side of logic, so 
that Stein’s argument in Erkenntnistheorie ἢ, 689 might have been put 
more strongly. He follows the old reading and speaks of two treatises, 
τεχνικαὶ λύσεις and ἔλεγχοι β΄. 


(8) περὶ οὐσίας unnecessarily identified by Wellmann (l.c. 
p. 442) and Susemihl with περὶ ὅλου and περὶ φύσεως is quoted 
by Diog. (134) for Zeno’s definition of the two tirst principles, 
God and Matter. 

(9) περὶ σημείων : a treatise on divination (Diog. 4). 
Thus μαντικὴ is defined in Stob. Ecl. 1. 122, 238 as ἐπιστήμη 
θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον 
συντεινόντων. This is no doubt the work referred to by Cic. de 
Div. 1. 3, 6 sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa diffunderent quod 
et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset. 
Its position in the catalogue makes against Prantl’s hypo- 
thesis', who classes it as a logical work. 

(10) περὶ ὄψεως only known by its title (Diog. 4) is re- 
garded as logical by Stein. 

(11) Πυθαγορικά (Diog. 4) classed by Wachsmuth as a 
physical book owing to its position in the catalogue, but nothing 
else is known concerning it. 

III. Ethical. 

(12) περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (Diog. 4). Here must belong 
Zeno’s definition of duty (frag. 145), from the terms of which 
Wellmann conjectures without much probability that we should 
identify this treatise with the following. 

(13) περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου (Diog. 4). 

(14) περὶ ὁρμῆς ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως (Diog. 4). 
Diogenes quotes the Zenonian definition of the summum 
bonum from this book (vu. 87); Fabricius (Bibl. Gr. m1. 580) 
proposed to separate this title reading η΄ =octo, and Weygoldt 
adopting this further identified περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως with περὶ 
φύσεως, but the latter is not an anthropological work. 

(15) περὶ παθῶν (Diog. 4) containing the general defini- 
tion of emotion and the discussion of its several subdivisions, 
pain, fear, desire and pleasure (ib. 110). 

(16) πολιτεία. This seems to have been the most 
generally known, as it is certainly the most often quoted, of 
Zeno’s writings; it was also one of the earliest in point of 

2 τ. p. 458. So also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 689. 

time, having been written while its author was still under the 
influence of Cynicism (Diog. 4). Plutarch informs us that it 
was written as a controversial answer to Plato’s Republic. 
The allusions to it are too numerous to be specified here in 

(17) περὶ νόμου (Diog. 4). From its position in the 
catalogue this work must have belonged to the political side 
of ethics, and Krische’s supposition (p. 368) that it treated of 
the divine law of nature is therefore rebutted. Themist. Or. 
xxi. p. 287 4 speaks of the νόμοι of Zeno but appears to be 
referring generally to his philosophical precepts. 

(18) περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας (Diog. 4): cf. frag. 167, 
which however is stated to belong to the πολιτεία. | 

(19) ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Diog. 34). To this book pro- 
bably belongs the interesting fragment (174) preserved by 
Clem. Alex. relating to the behaviour suitable to young 
men. | 
(20) διατριβαί (Diog. 34): a similar work, as we are 
told by Diog. whose statement is confirmed by the passages 
(frags. 179, 180) quoted from it by Sextus. As we are told 
by Plutarch that something of the same kind was contained in 
the πολιτεία, we may believe that this and the last three works 
were written in close connection with it, as shorter appendages 
dealing with special topics, and before Zeno had worked out 
the distinctive features of Stoicism. From the general meanin, 
of “lectures, discussions” (for which cf. Plat. Apol. 37 ν τὰ 
ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους) διατριβη seems to have assum 
the special sense of a short ethical treatise, if we may trust 
the definition of Hermogenes (Rhett. Gr. ed. Waltz, t. m1. p. 
406) διατριβή ἐστι βραχέος διανοήματος ἠθικοῦ ἔκτασις. Zeller’ 
identification with the χρεῖαι is improbable, and Susemihl 

2 A summary will be found in Wellmann 1. ὁ. p. 437 foll. As reg 
its Cynic tendencies Susemihl observes :—Wer den Witz machte, er 
bei ihrer Abfassung wohl schon iiber den Hund gekommen, aber ἢ 
nicht iiber den Schwanz, schrieb eben damit dies Werk einer et 
spiitern Zeit, zu friihesten etwa als er von Krates zu Stilpon iiber 

gangen war. 


believes that the διατριβαὶ was excluded from the πίναξ as 
being an earlier Cynic work. 

(21) ἡἠθικά (Diog. +). The title is somewhat doubtful, 
as Wachsmuth reads ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος ἠθικά as a 
single title, and Wellmann would emend 7 χρεῖαι for ἠθικά: 
- more probably however it was a collection of short ethical 

[ IV. Miscellaneous. 

(22) προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν ε΄ (Diog. 4): we learn from 
Dio. Chrys. 53, 4 that Zeno wrote on the Iliad, Odyssey 
and Margites, and that his object was to show the general 
consistency of Homer by explaining that a literal meaning 
was not to be applied throughout the poems, which ought 
in many instances to be interpreted allegorically. That he 
in some cases proposed emendations may be seen from 
Strabo vir. 3. 6, cf. ib. 1. p. 41, xvi. p. 1131. Krische p. 392 
shows that there is no foundation for the suggestion that 
Zeno attributed the Iliad and the Odyssey to different 

(23) περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως (Diog. 4). Stein, Er- 
kenntnistheorie n. 689, speaks of this work, the προβλ. “Opnp. 
and the περὶ Ἕλλην. wad. as an educational series, and regards — 
them as an appendix to the πολιτεία. 

(24) ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος (Diog. +) also mentioned 
by Athen. iv. 162 B as Ζήνωνος ἀπομνημονεύματα, from which 
Persaeus is said to have made extracts. There seems little 
doubt that this was identical with the χρεῖαι mentioned in Diog. 
vi. 91 in connection with Crates, or that Wachsmuth is right 
in referring to this book the story of Crates and the cobbler 
(frag. 199). Aphthonius’ definition of χρεῖαι runs thus :—azo- 
μνημόνευμα σύντομον εὐστόχως ἐπί TL πρόσωπον ἀναφερόμενον. 

(25) ἐπιστολαί (Maxim. Floril, ed. Mai, ὁ. 6). This 
reference was first pointed out by Wachsmuth, see frag. 190. 

The passage in Οἷς. N. D. 1. 36 (cum vero Hesiodi Theo- 
goniam interpretatur) led Fabricius to insert among his list of 
Zeno’s writings (111. p. 580) ὑπομνημόνευμα εἰς τὴν Ἡσιόδου 


θεογονίαν', and there can be no doubt from the statements in 
Proclus and the other Scholiasts* that Zeno’s labours extended — 
to Hesiod as well as to Homer. It is, however, impossible to 
say in what work these fragments appeared, and we do ποῦ 
feel much inclined to accept Krische’s view (p. 367) that the 
allegorical explanations of Hesiod were worked into the περὶ 
ὅλου. May they not belong to the περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως 
It remains to call attention to Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 9, ὅδ. 
Ρ. 245, 8. p. 681, P. ἀλλὰ καὶ of Στωικοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ 
γεγράφθαι τινα ἃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγι- 
γνώσκειν μὴ οὐχὶ πεῖραν δεδωκόσι πρότερος εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖεν, 
but similar suggestions οὗ esotericism are made against all 
the post-Aristotelian schools, and especially against the New 
Academy. (Mayor on Cic. N. D.1. 11.) 

§5. Zeno’s style. 

The fragments which survive of Zeno’s writings are not 
sufficient to enable us to form any satisfactory opinion of his 
style, and it would be unsafe to generalise from such scanty 
data. We shall therefore only attempt to point out those 
characteristics about which there can be no doubt. 

The later Greek philosophers troubled themselves but little 
with the graces of literary ornament. Philosophy had now 
become scientific in its treatment and ceased to be artistic in 
form. Zeno was no exception to this rule, and was satisfied if 
he presented his arguments to his readers with directness and 
perspicacity. In this respect, he has been successful in avoid- 
ing obscurity*, though he lays himself open to the charge of 

: < See Flach, Glossen und Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie, p. 29 

3 Cf. also Diog. L. vir. 48, Minue. Felix Octav. xrx. 10 Chrysippus 
Zenonem interpretatione physiologiae in Hesiodi Homeri Orpheique 
carminibus imitatur. 

8. Zeller who formerly supported this view (Stoics p. 40) now thinks 
otherwise (Ph. ἃ. Gr. ται. 1. 32). 

4 Fronto ad Verum Imperat. 1. p. 114 ad docendum planissimus 
Zenon. Cf. Diog. L. vit. 38 ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ προσγεγραμμένα βιβλία 



abruptness and want of finish. To this tendency was due his 
custom of couching his arguments in syllogistic formulae, 
which often served to cloak a somewhat obvious fallacy’. 
This formally logical style subsequently grew so habitual with 
the Stoics that they earned for themselves the title of διαλεκ- 
τικοί, Cicero (N. Τὸ. mi. 22) especially observes on Zeno’s 
fondness for certain “breues et acutulas conclusiones,” and 
several examples of these are to be found in his remaining 
fragments. ‘That which is reasonable is better than that 
which is unreasonable: but nothing is better than the world: 
therefore the world is reasonable.” ‘That thing at whose 
departure the living organism dies is corporeal: but the living 
organism dies when the breath that has been united with it 
departs: therefore this breath is corporeal: but this breath is 
the soul; therefore the soul is corporeal.” “That is altogether 
destructible all whose parts are destructible: but all the parts 
of the world are destructible; therefore the world is itself 
destructible,” cf. also frags. 59, 60, 61, 129, 130. 

Passing to quite a different characteristic, we remark in 
Zeno’s style a certain picturesqueness and love of simile, which 
perhaps may be regarded as traceable to the Oriental influence 
of his birth-place*. Particularly striking is his observation 
that those who are in a state of προκοπὴ may from their 
dreams discover whether they are making progress, if then 
the imaginative and emotional part of the soul is clearly 
seen dispersed and ordered by the power of reason, as in the 
transparent depth of a waveless calm (frag. 160). Zeno, 
says Cicero (N. D. τι. 22), “similitudine, ut saepe solet, 
rationem concludit hoe modo.” “If tuneful flutes were pro- 
duced from an olive should not we regard some knowledge of 

πολλά, ἐν ols ἐλάλησεν ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν Στωικῶν in which passage Stein, 
Psychologie n, 2, finds evidence of ‘die Klarheit und Gediegenheit der 
Schriften Zenos,” 

1 In Cie. N. D. τι. 20 the Stoic claims that such arguments “apertiora 
sunt ad reprehendendum.” Elsewhere Cicero calls them “ contortulis 
quibusdam et minutis conclusiunculis nec ad sensum permanentibus.” 
Tuse. 11. 42. 

3 Cf. Wellmann 1. ὁ. p. 445. 

H. P. 3 


flute-playing as inherent in the olive?” (frag. 63). In like 
manner he uses the simile of the minister in a royal court to 
explain his doctrine of the προηγμένον (frag. 131), and likens 
his ideal commonwealth to a herd grazing on a common — 
pasture (frag. 162). 

Not only in elaborate comparisons but also in single ex- 
pressions may the same picturesque touch be seen. Thus 
character is said to be the fountain of life (frag. 146), emotion — 
a fluttering of the soul (frag. 137), and happiness the unruffled 7 
flow of life (frag. 124). 

ΤῸ will be remembered that Cicero, or his authority, con- 
stantly taunts Zeno with being the inventor of new words, 
and new words only’. When scrutinised, this appears to mean 
not so much that he was a coiner of new expressions, as that 
for the purposes of his system he appropriated words already 
in existence as part of his special terminology. Putting aside 
προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, which stand on rather a 
different footing, we may instance προκοπή, ἐνάργεια, συγκατά- 
Gears, κατόρθωμα, κατάληψις, καθῆκον, ἔννοια(!), and τύπωσις : ” 
πρόληψις is certainly not due to Zeno. Yet, although none 
- of these words are new coinages, κατάληψις and καθῆκον are 
instances specially selected by Cicero in support of his statement. 

Diog. Laert. x. 27 speaking of Chrysippus observes:—xat 
τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαῦτα ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκείνων μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, 
καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ζήνωνί ἐστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ παρὰ ᾿Αριστοτέλει. 
The existing fragments however do not justify this assertion. 

Finally, although doubtless the circumstances under which 
the fragments have been preserved render this tendency more 
noticeable than it otherwise would be, we shall not be wrong 
in attributing to Zeno a love of precise definition. The school 
afterwards became famous for their definitions (cf. Sext. 
Pyrrh. 11. 205—212), and it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the habit originated with the founder. Instances of this 

1 Cic. Fin. mt. 5. 15. Tuse. v. 32. 34. Legg. 1. 38, ete. Cf. Gal 
de diff. puls. viz. 642 ed Κύμη Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἔτι πρότερον ἐτόλμησ' 
καινοτομεῖν τε καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 


will occur passim. In fact, his writings in their ene 
character were dogmatic and terse rather than discursive and 
polemical. The longest extract in the following pages is of 
dubious authenticity, and therefore for a specimen of the style 
of our author we would refer to the description of youthful 

modesty in frag. 174. 

§ 6. Cleanthes. 

In discussing the dates of Zeno’s life we have seen that 
there is good reason to believe that Cleanthes was born in the 
year B.c. 331, and if so he was only five years younger than 
Zeno. We also saw that he lived to the age of 99 and 
presided over the Stoa for 32 years from B.c, 264 till his death 
in B.c. 232. Against this computation there is to be taken 
into account the fact that Diogenes (vi. 176) states that he 
lived to the age of 80 and was a pupil of Zeno for nineteen 
years. Unless we are prepared to reject the authority of the 
papyrus altogether, we have in Diogenes’ account either a 
different tradition or a stupid blunder’. In any case, 
Cleanthes was well advanced in life when he became head 
of the Stoic School. 

He was born at Assos, a town in the Troad, but at what 
age he came to Athens or under what circumstances he be- 
came a pupil of Zeno we have no information. His circum- 
stances were those of extreme poverty : he is said to have been 
a boxer before he embraced philosophy, and the story is well 
known how he earned his living by drawing water at night, in 
order to devote his daytime to study*. Hence the nickname 
of Φρεάντλης was given to him by his opponents, while his 
friends in admiration of his laborious activity called him a 
“second Heracles.” The man’s mind is shadowed forth in 
these anecdotes : the same earnestness and thoroughness which 

1 Rohde 1. 6. p. 622 n, 1 suggests that Diogenes subtracted the 19 
years passed under Zeno’s tuitién from the years of his life, but this is 
hardly credible. 

2 Diog. L. viz. 168. ; 


characterised his life are no less apparent in his teaching. 
Whatever he did was marked by energy and completeness 
and was grounded on deeply-rooted conviction. Philosophy 
with him was not merely an intellectual exercise, but far 
more a religious enthusiasm. ‘This religious fervour led him 
to regard the theological side of philosophy as of the highest 
importance, and, feeling that the praise of the divine majesty 
should be set forth in something higher than sober prose, his 
genius expressed itself in poetical compositions of the greatest 
merit. It is easy to believe that a man of this character may 
have proved an unsuccessful teacher, and there is some evi- 
dence that under his presidency the Stoic school was in danger 
of losing ground, cf. Diog. L, vit. 182 οὗτος (Chrysippus) 
ὀνειδισθεὶς ὑπό τινος ὅτι οὐχὶ παρὰ ᾿Αρίστωνι μετὰ πολλῶν σχολάζοι, 
εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἶπε, προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα. His ap- 
parent want of success possibly stimulated the unfavourable | 
estimate with which his written works were received by 
antiquity’. The Stoa was now fiercely assailed by various 
opponents—its ethics by the Epicureans, and its logical 
theories by Arcesilas. Skill in controversy was more than 
ever needed, if the position won by Zeno’s efforts was to be 
maintained. Herein lay the specia] strength of Chrysippus, 
who was very probably employed in defending Stoicism during 
his predecessor’s life’, and who surpassed Cleanthes in fine- 
ness and subtlety, even if he was inferior to him in depth*. 
Most suggestive, in this view, becomes the passage in Diog. 
L. vit. 179 διηνέχθη (Chrysippus)...7pds Κλεάνθην ᾧ καὶ πολ- 
λάκις ἔλεγε μόνης τῆς τῶν δογμάτων διδασκαλίας χρήζειν, τὰς 

1 There is no direct evidence for this, but the whole of Diogenes’ 
account implies it. 

2 Of. Diog. L. vit. 182 πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατεξανιστάμενον Κλεάνθους διαλεκτι- 
κόν, Kal mporelvovra αὐτῷ σοφίσματα, πέπαυσο, εἶπε, παρέλκων τὸν πρεσβύ- 
τερον ἀπὸ τῶν πραγματικωτέρων, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς νέοις ταῦτα προτίθει. 

3 So Hirzel τι. p. 180 “‘Kleanthes war keine die Begriffe zerglie- 
dernde, sondern eine anschauende Natur, er war wohl minder riihrig aber 
vielleicht tiefer angelegt als sein Schiiler,” and Stein, Psychologie p. 171 
‘“‘Kleanthes erscheint als der rauhschaalige, miihsam stammelnde, aber 
tiefe Denker, Chrysipp dagegen als der feinere, leichtbewegliche, elegant 
vermittelnde Schénredner.” 


δὲ ἀποδείξεις αὐτὸν εὑρήσει. The anecdote leads us to infer 
that Chrysippus was conscious of a want of originality in 
himself, and a want of combative force in his master. 

The position of Cleanthes among the early leaders of the 
Stoic school has quite recently been subject to a considerable 
_ modification in current opinion. He has been generally re- 

garded as merely the exponent of his master’s teaching, and 
as having contributed no new views of his own to the de- 
velopment of the system. This opinion is not without justi- 
fication in the ancient authorities. Diogenes Laertius ex- 
pressly asserts that Cleanthes adhered to the same tenets as 
his predecessor (vir. 168), and that h he did not object to be 
called an ass, declaring that héywas only able to bear Zeno’s 
burden (ib. 170). This estimate of his powers was for some 
time acquiesced in by modern investigators, so that even 
Zeller says of him (p. 41):—‘Cleanthes was in every way 
adapted to uphold his master’s teaching, and to recommend it 
by the moral weight of his own character, but he was in- 
capable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it 
on a wider basis” (see also Krische, Forschungen, pp. 417 and 
418). Now however a reaction in his favour has set in, and 
from a closer scrutiny of the notices concerning him the 
opinion has been formed that “his contributions were more 
distinctive and original than those of any other Stoic” 
(Encycl. Brit. Art. Stoics)’, In a question of such im- 
portance it is singularly unfortunate that the hand of time 
has dealt so hardly with him, not only in the actual amount 
of the fragments which have been preserved to us, but also 
in their relative importance for his philosophic system. For 
one fragment of supreme value such as frag. 24 we have 
six or seven trifling etymologies of the names of the gods, 

1 Hirzel has carried this view to an extreme, which the facts do not 
warrant. At um. p. 137 he curiously says :—‘‘ Da wir aber nichts unver- 
sucht lassen diirfen, um eine eigentiimliche Lehre des Kleanthes heraus- 

_ zabringen.”’ On the other hand, Windelband, writing as late as 1888, 
_ says of Cleanthes :-—“als Philosoph ist er unbedeutend gewesen ” (Miiller’s 
Handbuch, v. 292). 


of so extravagant a character that it is hard to credit their 
seriousness. The happy chance that has preserved to us the 
Hymn to Zeus is counterbalanced by the consideration that — 
we only know of his theory of tension through two or three 


Cleanthes divides philosophy into six branches, but in — 
reality this is only the triple division of Zeno, logic being — 
subdivided into dialectic and rhetoric, physics into physics 
and theology, and ethics into ethics and polities. 

In his estimate of logic he resembles Zeno: at least it 
seems to have played only a subsidiary part in his system, 
judging both from the number of his recorded works on this 
subject (about 10 out of a total of 56) and from the in- 
significance of the fragments which remain. Four only are 
of any importance, and one of these, his criticism of the 
Platonic idea, is involved in such obscurity that it will be 
convenient to defer its consideration for the notes. As it is 
clear throughout all his teaching that Cleanthes was the 
most advanced materialist in the Stoic school, so we find that 
his epistemology rests on a still stronger empirical basis than 
that of his predecessor Zeno or his successor Chrysippus. 
Zeno had not defined φαντασία further than by describing it 
as an impression on the soul. Cleanthes explained this as an 
actual material concavity impressed by the object, an ex- 
planation which found no favour with Chrysippus. There is 
also high probability in the view which ascribes to Cleanthes 
the authorship of the “tabula rasa” theory, a theory made 
celebrated in modern philosophy owing to its adoption by 
Locke, namely, that when a man is born his mind is like a 
blank sheet of parchment ready to receive a copy. At least 
we know of no other Stoic philosopher to whom the int 
duction of this extreme result of sensualistic views so properly 
belongs. Since Chrysippus, in express opposition to Cleanthes, 
defined φαντασία as ἑτεροίωσις ἡγεμονικοῦ, it is less likely th 
he should have propounded a theory which in its very terms 
carries out the more materialistic doctrine of his opponen 

—= “διιδόννυ 


We have therefore, in accordance with Stein’s view, included 
the passage of Plutarch, which attributes the doctrine to the 
Stoics in general, among the fragments of Cleanthes. Stein, 
however, goes further’. Zeno had conceded this much to 
rationalism, that we derive directly from God the capacity 
“for abstract thought, and that certain notions are the pro- 
- duct of this potentiality when actualised by experience. In 
an ingenious and closely-reasoned argument, whose force it 
is difficult to reproduce within short limits, Stein contends 
that this position was thrown over by Cleanthes. According 
to the latter, the capacity given us by nature is solely that 
for moral and not for intellectual activity’, The belief in 
God himself does not, as with Zeno, arise from a ‘‘certa 
animi ratio” but rather from induction founded on empirical 
observation®. The conclusion is that Cleanthes is a thorough- 
going advocate of empiricism. But a divergence from the 
rest of the school in a matter of such importance ought not 
to be assumed on mere inference resting on ambiguous state- 
ments, although were this doctrine explicitly ascribed to Cle- 
anthes in a single passage we should not hesitate to accept 
it, as being in entire consonance with his general bent of 
mind. What then is the evidence which Stein produces apart 
from the passage of Cicero just referred to, which is by no 
means conclusive? In the first place he appeals to two 
passages which prove that moral impulses are transmitted to 
us from our parents and implanted in us by nature’, and 
lays stress on the fact that intellectual powers are not in- 
cluded. This, however, is only negative evidence, and for 
positive proof we are referred to frags. 106 and 100; in the 
first of these we read that the uneducated differ from the 
brutes only in shape, and in the second that the undiscerning 
opinion of the many should be totally discarded. Surely 
these grounds are insufficient to support the conclusion: 

1 Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 322—328. 
2 Cleanth. frags, 82 and 36. 
3 Cleanth. frag. 52. (Cic. N. Ὁ. τι. 13.) 



Plato himself might have greeted these sentiments with ap- 
probation. But a more serious stumbling-block remains in 
the oft quoted passage from Diog. L. vu. 54. If, as Stein 
himself admits, Chrysippus substituted πρόληψις for the — 
Zenonian ὀρθὸς λόγος, Cleanthes must of necessity be included — 
in the term ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν, for there-is no one else 
to whom the words could apply’. Were further positive 
evidence of Cleanthes’ “concession to rationalism ” required, 
it would surely be as reasonable to supply it froin frag. 21 
ψυχήν... ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς ἐμψυχοῦσθαι as to deduce the 
contrary from frags. 100 and 1006, For these reasons we feel 
bound to withhold assent to Stein’s hypothesis, until some 
weightier proof is put forward to support it. 

Cleanthes was also involved in a controversy with reference 
to the sophism known as 6 κυριεύων and first propounded by the 
Megarian Diodorus. This sophism was concerned with the 
nature of the possible ; and Cleanthes tries to escape from the 
dilemma in which Diodorus would have involved him by deny- 
ing that every past truth is necessary, or, in other words, by 
asserting that since that which is possible can never become 
impossible, it is possible for the past to have been otherwise, 
in the same way that it is possible for a future event to occur 
even though that event will never take place. Besides this 
we learn that he introduced the term λεκτὸν in the sense of 
xaTnyopypa.*, that he left definitions of art and rhetoric, and 
that he explained the names given to a certain kind of slippers 
and a drinking-cup. 

The first five of the physical fragments need not detain us 
here, containing, as they do, with one exception, merely a 
restatement of positions already taken up by Zeno. The 
exception referred to is the introduction of πνεῦμα as the 

1 Stein himself supplies the materials for his own refutation. At 
p. 267 in dealing with a similar question he says :— Ohne Not sollte 
Niemand unter ἀρχαιότεροι andere Stoiker als Zeno Kleanthes und — 
Chrysipp verstehen.” Chrysippus is here excluded by the nature of the — 
case: the inference need not be stated. 3 
* See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 327. 


truest description of the divine permeating essence, which 
Zeno had characterised as aether. With frag. 17 however we 
are on a different footing. Cleanthes teaches, according to 
Cicero’s account, that the world is God, and it is significant 
that, although the same doctrine is attributed by him to 
Chrysippus (N. D. 1. 39), no such statement is found with 
regard to Zeno (ib. 36). Zeno had indeed declared that God 
permeates every part of the universe: would he have gone so 
far as to identify the universe with God? It is true that we 
find among his fragments (frag. 66) οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ τὸν ὅλον 
κόσμον Kai Tov οὐρανόν, but this is not conclusive. Not only 
the general cast of the expression, but also the addition of the 
᾿ words καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, make us hesitate to ascribe to these 
words their full pantheistic sense. However, even if Cleanthes 
was not following in his master’s footsteps, he was only carry- 
ing Zeno’s teaching to its logical conclusion. The dualism 
of God and Matter was inconsistent in a materialistic system. 
But Cleanthes went further. Teaching that God creates the 
world through the medium of the four elements 1 and teaching 
that these elements themselves do not remain stable but are 
in a restless and continual mutation, he was led to search for 
the cause of this ceaseless movement. The question may be 
put in another form, why did God create the world? The 
answer was found in a comparison of the structure of indi- 
vidual things. Every creature is produced at the proper time 
by means of certain proportions of the soul’s parts, which are 
found in the seed. The soul, however, is material and is 
braced up by that tension which is elsewhere described as “a 
stroke of fire.” This tension is ever varying and is the cause 
of movement in the human frame. Now, since the individual 
is a pattern of the universe’, the cause of movement in the 
cosmos must be the tension which permeates all its parts. 

1 Not three in spite of Hirzel’s Excursus 1. 737—755. See Stein, 
Psychologie n. 113. 

? This is probably the meaning of 1. 4 in the Hymn to Zeus, where 
see note. For the doctrine of the macrocosm and the microcosm in 
general see Stein’s Appendix to Psych. pp. 205—214. 



Thus the phenomenal world is created and again destroyed b 
the successive phases in the ever varying tension of the fiery 
breath, which is at once identified with God and with the 

As the ἡγεμονικὸν of the human soul is placed in the 
breast, so did Cleanthes teach that the ruling part of the 
world is in the sun, to which is due day and night and the 
seasons of the year. He was led to this opinion by his inves- 
tigations in natural science. Observing that nothing can 
exist without warmth, he inferred that warmth constitutes 
the essence of things. Since however warmth is given to the 
whole world and to each individual thing from the sun, the 
‘sun must be the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world. In the sun is the 
fiery breath found in its purest form, and at the conflagration, 
when the world is destroyed, the sun will assimilate to itself 
moon and stars and all the heavenly bodies. If Aristarchus 
therefore taught that the earth revolves round the sun, he 
was guilty of impiety for displacing the earth, which is the 
hearth of the world. The sun is fed by exhalations from th 
sea, and moves in an oblique course through the zodiac. The 
stars are formed of the same fiery substance as the sun, and, 
as the sun is the cause of life to everything, its essence must 
be akin not to the earthly fire, which is destructive, but to 
the creative. As the sun strikes the world with his rays, 
he is called a plectrum. Sun, moon, and stare are alike 
conical in shape. 

Cleanthes proved that the soul is material by two syll 
gistic arguments, founded on the mental resemblance betw 
parents and children and the sympathy of the soul with th 
body. So far indeed did his materialism extend that he ev 
maintained that the act of walking was the extension of πνεῦ 

m the ἡγεμονικὸν to the feet. In other respects he seems 
have concurred in Zeno’s psychology, teaching that th 

A For the tension-theory in general see Stein, Psychologie, pp. 73 an 
74, nn. 109 and 110. The notion of τόνος is not entirely unknown 
° Zeno : ef. Zeno frags, 56, 67, 103. 


reasoning powers are developed by external impressions, and 
that all souls exist after death till the time of the general con- 
flagration. His views on zoology comprise a statement that 
the pig was provided with a soul to keep him fresh for sacrifice 
and a curious anecdote proving the intelligence of ants. 

To the theological branch of physics Cleanthes devoted 
considerable attention’, but in practice no sharp dividing line 
can be drawn between physics and religion, since in the Stoic 
system they necessarily overlap. It is hardly necessary to 
analyse the Hymn to Zeus, but it may be observed that 
Cleanthes refuses to admit that evil is due to the divine 
agency, a remark which must be taken in connection with the 
statement of Chalcidius that, while Chrysippus identified fate 
with forethought, Cleanthes distinguished them. Five dis- 
tinct reasons are given for the existence of God:—(1) the 
ascending series of organisms from plants to man, which 
shows that there must be some being who is best of all, and 
this cannot be man with all his imperfections and frailties, 
(2) the foreknowledge of coming events, (3) the fruitfulness of 
the earth and other natural blessings, (4) the occurrence of 
portents outside the ordinary course of nature, and (5) the 
regular movements of the heavenly bodies. Zeus ie. πῦρ 
ἀειζῷον is the only eternal god; the rest are perishable and 
_ will be destroyed at the ἐκπύρωσις. The popular religion is a 
representation of truth, but requires interpretation if we 
_ would understand its real significance. Thus, the Eleusinian 
mysteries are an allegory; Homer, if properly understood, is a 
witness to truth; the very names given to Zeus, Persephone, 
Dionysus, Apollo, and Aphrodite are indications of the hidden 
meaning which is veiled but not perverted by the current 
belief, and-the same is true of the myths of Heracles and 
Atlas. It is difficult now-a-days to enter into the spirit with 
which the Stoic school pursued these etymological fancies. 
_ At times it is hard not to acquiesce in Plutarch’s opinion (see 

ΣΙ ΟἿο, ON. Dy 1. 68. ταῖν 88. 


frag. 55), who attributes them to παιδιὰ and εἰρωνεία. But, if 
this is so, it is impossible to account for the extreme diligence, 
which was expended upon them. Rather, having once taken 
up the position that the popular belief can only be explained 
by Stoic methods, they were often driven to defend it by argu-— 
ments which they must themselves have perceived to be of 
questionable validity. For example, Cleanthes may not have 
been satisfied with the derivation of Dionysus from διανύσαι, 
but his explanation could not be disproved, and he was bound — 
to explain the name somehow, since, so long as it remained 
unexplained, it was a standing objection to his method’. 

The number of ethical works attributed to Cleanthes, 32 
out of a total of 56, shows that he paid considerable attention 
to this branch of philosophy. Yet, in the main, he seems to 
have accepted the principles laid down by Zeno, except in 
those cases where his physical innovations demanded a 
separate treatment, and many of the fragments which have 
come down to us deal rather with the practical than with the 
theoretical side of morals. This agrees with what we are 
told as to the titles of his books (see infra, p. 52). Defining 
the aim of life and happiness in the same manner as Zeno, 
Cleanthes laid special stress on the agreement with the 
general law of nature, while Chrysippus is said to have 
emphasised the necessity for agreement with human nature no 
less than with nature in general. This view is thoroughly in 
consonance with the general bias of Cleanthes’ teaching. One 
of the most striking and important of his doctrines is the 
parallelism between the macrocosm of the world and the 
microcosm of the individual. The more, therefore, that man 
brings himself into harmony with the spirit which breathes 
throughout the universe, the more does he fulfil the réle to 
which he is destined. The same spirit may be traced in the 

1 The etymologies of Plato inthe Cratylus are quite as bad as any of 
these, but they are wer: in pert at least playful. The most recent 
po γττα of this dialogue is by Heath in Ἢ Journal of Philology 
xvi. 192. 

<a ας 
lines in which the subordination of the individual to the 
decrees of Zeus and of destiny is so forcibly advocated. 
Cleanthes is perhaps the author of a distinction which subse- 
quently became of some importance whereby happiness is de- 
scribed as σκοπός, and the attainment of happiness as τέλος". 
The doctrine of τόνος was applied by Cleanthes, with im- 
portant results, to two branches of his master’s ethical system, 
namely, the nature of virtue and the emotions. Zeno had 
identified virtue with φρόνησις, but Cleanthes, while retaining 
the intellectual basis which Zeno made the groundwork of 
virtue, sought to explain its character more precisely. 
Again he had recourse to his physical theories, Every body 
contains within it a material air-current with ever-varying 
tension. When this tension is strong enough to perform its 
fitting duties it is regarded as strength and power, and this 
strength and power as applied to different spheres of activity 
gives rise to the four virtues ἐγκράτεια, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, and 
σωφροσύνη. It will be observed that ἐγκράτεια here occupies 
the position which by Chrysippus and his followers is assigned 
to φρόνησις. Thus Cleanthes fortifies his main position, that 
strength of tension is the necessary starting-point of virtue, 
by a tacit appeal to the authority of Socrates, who had pointed 
‘to ἐγκράτεια as κρηπὶς ἀρετῆς. A recurrence to the same 
teacher may also be recognised in the approbation with which 
his identification of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ δίκαιον is cited. To 
return to τόνος; when the tension is relaxed, a weakness of 
soul follows, and in this weakness is to be found the explana- 
tion of the πάθη. Thus the essence of virtue and emotion, 
which Zeno had left unexplained on the physical side, is 
traced to a single source, and this source is the same power 
which is the origin of all movement and life. 
The application of τόνος to the πάθη leads us to the con- 
sideration of another question, not indeed directly raised by 
the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, but having an important 

1 See however Hirzel 11. p. 557. 


bearing on our general view of their ethical doctrines. What 
position do the πάθη occupy in the classification of goods? 
Zeno classified ἡδονὴ and therefore presumably the other πάθη 
among the ἀδιάφορα, and the reason is not far to seek. He 
regarded πάθη as distinct from vice, because they have nothing 
to do with ignorance (Plut. Virt. Mor. 10 τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν 
παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐν 
ἣ τὸ ἁμαρτητικόν). Only κακία or τὸ μέτεχον κακίας is κακόν, 
according to Zeno, and πάθος is neither, but rather an ἐπεγέν- 
νημα. (CE. τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεσιν Zeno frag. 139 and for the © 
distinction between ἐπιγεννήματα and μετέχοντα cf. Diog. L. vu. 
95.) That this applies to all the πάθη and not merely to— 
ἡδονὴ is made clear by the following considerations. In frag. ; 
169 Zeno recommends the rational use of wealth ὅπως ἀδεῆ 
καὶ ἀθαύμαστον πρὸς τἄλλα τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοντες ὅσα 
μήτε καλά ἐστι μήτε αἰσχρὰ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ 
χρῶνται τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων μηδὲν δεδοικότες λόγῳ καὶ μη φόβῳ τούτων 
ἀπέχωνται. This shows that the ἀδιάφορα are the field of 
φόβος, and for λύπη we may refer to Cie. Tuse. 11. 77 nihil 
enim esse malum quod turpe non sit si dugenti 
tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi 
aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum 
malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. It is noteworthy, moreover, 
that Cleanthes, who is allowed to have been the severest 
opponent of pleasure’, declares ἡδονὴν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν εἶ 
μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ (frag. 88) but does not venture to 
class it as κακόν. The result of this discussion is that Zen 
and Cleanthes did not class λύπη and φόβος with κακά, and 
therefore Wachsmuth cannot be right in attributing to Zen 
a passage in Stobaeus’ where this classification is implied 

1 Zeller, Stoics p. 237. The remarks in the text are intended 
obviate the difficulty as to the classification of ἡδονὴ suggested by Heinz 
de Stoicorum affectibus p, 37. 

2 See Wachsmuth’s Stobaeus vol. τι. p. 58. That this question 
much debated appears from Cic. Tusc. 1v. 29. Some appear to have 
that πάθος was κακὸν but not κακία (Stob. 1. 6.}, because πάθος is κίνησι 
but κακία is διάθεσις (Cie. 1. 6. 30). 

POS Pa ee 


That this view did not continue to be the orthodox view of the 
school after their time is possible, but to pursue the subject 
further would be foreign to our purpose. 

The uncorrupted impulses given by nature tend towards 
virtue, and, when they are suitably developed, wisdom founded 
on firm apprehension, so that it can never be lost, follows in 
due course. Secure in the possession of virtue, the wise man 
partakes of the same excellence as God. 

In the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς Cleanthes seems to have en- 
gaged in a spirited controversy with the Epicureans, and to 
have attacked their moral teaching, just as he perhaps assailed 
their physics in the work περὶ ἀτόμων. Pleasure is a mere 
useless ornament: it possesses no value whatever, nay, it is 
absolutely contrary to nature. If, as we are told, pleasure is 
the ultimate goal of life, it was an evil spirit which gave to 
mankind the faculty of wisdom. He sarcastically likened his 
opponents’ position to an imaginary picture in which Pleasure, 
seated on a throne in gaudy apparel, is ministered to by the 
virtues, who form her willing slaves, declaring that this service 
is the sole reason of their existence. 

Passing to those fragments, which seem more strictly to 

belong to the παραινετικὸς or ὑποθετικὸς τόπος (i.e. the region of 

applied morals), we notice that Cleanthes frequently refers his 
precepts to the general principle, which is a leading character- 

istic of Stoic morals, namely, that virtuous conduct depends 
not on the nature of the deed but on the disposition of the 

agent. The same action may be either vicious or virtuous, 
according to the motive which prompts its performance. To 
many of the subjects which fall under this branch separate 
treatises were devoted, among which are the books περὶ εὐ- 
βουλίας, περὶ χάριτος, περὶ POovepias, περὶ τιμῆς, περὶ δόξης, 
περὶ φιλίας, περὶ συμποσίου x.t.A. Τὸ the book περὶ χάριτος we 
may assign three of the extant fragments (frags. 97, 98, 99) 
all of which are preserved by Seneca in the de Beneficiis, 
The theory of consolation (frags. 93 and 94) may belong either 

to the περὶ ἀρωγῆς or the περὶ φιλίάς. Frags. 100—103 all in 


verse and one in hexameter metre ought to be referred to the 
περὶ δόξης. 

One solitary fragment attests the political studies of Cle- 
anthes, to which at least four of the works in: the catalogue 
must be referred. 

The result of our investigation has been to show con- 
clusively that all those doctrines which are most character- 
istic of the true essence of Stoicism were contributed by Zeno 
and Cleanthes. To Zeno belong the establishment of the 
logical criterion, the adaptation of Heraclitean physics, and 
the introduction of all the leading ethical tenets. Cleanthes 
revolutionised the study of physics by the theory of tension, 
and the development of pantheism, and by applying his 
materialistic views to logic and ethics brought into strong 
light the mutual interdependence of the three branches. The 
task of Chrysippus was to preserve rather than to originate, 
to reconcile inconsistencies, to remove superfluous outgrowths, 
and to maintain an unbroken line of defence against his 
adversaries. Although it might seem to many that this less 
ambitious réle requires less brilliant capacities in its per- 
former, yet Chrysippus was commonly regarded as the second 
founder of the Stoa, and the general opinion of his contem- 
poraries is aptly summed up in the line εἰ μὴ yap ἦν Χρύσιππος 
οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά (Diog. L. vit. 183). The reason of this has 
been already indicated. The extraordinary fertility of the 
writer commanded admiration even where it failed to win 
assent, nor was his dialectical skill (Diog. L. vir. 180) 
matter of small moment. Though logic was only the p 
paedeutic of philosophy, it was the battleground of the 
fiercest controversy. Vitally opposed in other respects, 
Epicureans and Stoics here at least were allied in maintaini 
the possibility of knowledge against the universal scepticism 
the New Academy. It is not surprising, therefore, that th 
foremost champion of dogmatism should have taken the nin 
place in the Stoic triad. 


§ 7. The writings of Cleanthes. 

The relation of the poetical to the prose writings of 
Cleanthes has not been accurately determined, and the evi- 
dence does not enable us to decide whether the former were 
published separately from, or in conjunction with the latter. 

- The only indication we possess is in frag. 49, in which Cleanthes 

describes poetry as being peculiarly adapted to theological 
subjects. Yet the only book in the catalogue with a dis- 
tinctively theological title is the work περὶ θεῶν, and there is 
direct evidence that this contained etymological explanations 
of the names of the gods, and that part of it, at any rate, was 
written in prose. Krische p. 422 supposes that the Hymn 
to Zeus was a poetical supplement incorporated with this 
treatise, but such treatment would surely have produced 
highly incongruous results. It is possible that we ought to 
separate Cleanthes the philosopher from Cleanthes the poet, 
and to infer that works published by him in the latter capacity 
were not included in the list of his philosophical treatises. 
At the same time we should remember that Chrysippus (Galen. 
plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 315) and Posidonius (ib. p. 399 ῥήσεις 
τε ποιητικὰς παρατίθεται καὶ ἱστορίας παλαιῶν πράξεων pap- 
τυρούσας οἷς λέγει) were accustomed to freely interpolate 
poetical quotations in their prose writings, and Cleanthes 
may have composed his ‘own florilegia, just as Cicero trans- 
lated from the Greek where the Latin poets failed him 
(Tusce. D. 11. 26). A catalogue of the titles known to us is 
subjoined; where not otherwise indicated, the source of 
reference is Diog. L. vir. 174, 175. 

I. Logical. 

(1) περὶ ἰδίων. For ἴδια cf. Ar. Top. i. 5, p. 102 ἃ 17: the 
essential attributes of a thing are its ἴδια : thus γραμματικῆς 
δεκτικὸς is an ἴδιον of man. 

(2) περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων. 

(9) περὶ διαλεκτικῆς. 

H. P. 4 


(4) περὶ τρόπων. Probably this is logical rather than 

(5) περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To this book may be referred 
frag. 7. 

(6) περὶ μεταλήψεως (Athen. x1. 467 ἃ, 471 b). 

(7) περὶ τοῦ κυριεύοντος (Arr. Epict. πι. 19. 9). Krische 
p. 427 n. gives to this work the title περὶ δυνατῶν, but Epict. — 
distinctly contrasts Chrysippus’ work bearing the general title 
with a treatise by Cleanthes on the particular fallacy (Κλεάνθης 
δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ γέγραφε περὶ τούτου), Wachsmuth, Comm. 1. p. 18. 

(8) περὶ τέχνης may be the same work as the ars rhetorica 
mentioned in Cic. Fin. iv. 3, but if so it is out of its place in 
the catalogue, where it appears between nos. 4 and 5 of the 
physical books. 

(9) περὶ rod λόγου γ. This and the following book ap- 
. pear in the catalogue among the ethical works. 

(10) περὶ ἐπιστήμης. 

Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 722, counts among the logical — 
works the books περὶ χρόνου περὶ αἰσθήσεως and περὶ ddgys,-but 
omits, probably by an oversight, the book περὶ τρόπων. He 4 
also observes that from the number of books treating of the 

theory of knowledge Cleanthes must have displayed more — 

activity in treating of the subject than the remaining frag- — 
ments would lead us to suppose. 

II. Physical. 

(1) περὶ xpdvov. 

(2) περὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας β΄. 

(3) τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεων δ. Cf. Diog. L. 1x. 1 
πλεῖστοί τε εἰσὶν ὅσοι ἐξήγηνται αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα. καὶ γὰρ 
᾿Αντισθένης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ ἸΤοντικὸς Κλεάνθης τε καὶ Σφαῖρος 
6 Στωικός. The influence of Heraclitus on Cleanthes has been | 
variously estimated. Hirzel is the chief advocate in favour of 
it, holding e.g. that Cleanthes agreed with him in his hypo- 


thesis of three elements, and that τόνος is traceable to παλίν- 
tovos (or παλίντροπος) ἁρμονίἤ. Stein’s more moderate estimate 
appears to us truer. 

(4) περὶ αἰσθήσεως. 

(5) πρὸς Δημόκριτον, perhaps the same as περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων 
(Diog. L. vir. 134) so Krische p. 430. 

(6) πρὸς ᾿Αρίσταρχον, see on frag. 27. Some have erro- 
neously supposed that the Aristarchus here referred to was 
the Homeric critic, whose date is a century later than 
Cleanthes; cf. Krische p. 394 and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in 
Hermes xx. 631. ; 

(7) ὑπομνήματα φυσικά (Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 8). 

The books next in order treat of θεολογικόν. 

(8) ἀρχαιολογία has been identified with μυθικά (Athen. 
x1. 572 6, Porphyr. vit. Pyth. c. 1), but the genuineness of the 
latter work is seriously questioned. Miiller frag. hist. Gr. 11. 
Ρ. 5. 9. 11 thinks that the τὰ κατὰ πόλιν μυθικὰ of Neanthes of 
Cyzicus (cf. Plut. quaest. syrup. 1. 10) is referred to in both 
passages and Zeller Pre-Socr. 1. p. 308 says:—The Cleanthes 
of Porphyry is certainly not the Stoic but most likely a mis- 
spelling for Neanthes of Cyzicus. 

(9) περὶ θεῶν, cf. Plut. de vit. aer. alien. c. 7. To this 
work Wachsmuth refers frags. 47. 54. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 
62. 63. Krische (p. 418, 422) also the statements in Cic. 
N. D. 1. 37 (frags. 14—17) and the hymn to Zeus (frag. 48). 
See also Osann Praef. Cornut. p. ix. 

(10) περὶ γιγάντων. 

(11) περὶ Ὑμεναίου. This is a curious title. Perhaps it 
should rather be classed as ethical. Cf. Persaeus’ book zepi 
γάμου (Diog. L. vr. 36). 

(12) περὶ rod ποιητοῦ. This book treated of the interpre- 
tation of Homer, and Wachsmuth accordingly refers to it 
frags. 55. 65. 66. 67. To these should be added frag. 63 and 
perhaps frag. 54. 

(13) θεομαχία (ps.-Plut. de Fluv. v. 3. 4) was identified 
by Krische with the book περὶ γιγάντων supra (p. 434) but this 



and the next book are rightly described by Wachsmuth as 
“ficta ab papel ps.-Plutarcho,” see note on frag. 69. 

(14) περὶ ὁρῶν, ib. v. 17. 4. 

Fabricius Bibl. Gr. m1. p. 552 ‘infers from Simplic. in 
Epict. Man. ο. 78 that one of Cleanthes’ works bore the title 
Ἰαμβεῖα, but the words simply mean “‘in his well known Iambie 

11. Ethical. 

(1) πρὸς Ἥριλλον. For Herillus see Zeller p. 42. 

(2) περὶ ὁρμῆς β΄. 

(3) περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος γ΄. 

(4) περὶ εὐβουλίας. 

(5) περὶ χάριτος. 

(6) προτρεπτικός. Cf. Diog. L. vir. 91. 

(7) περὶ ἀρετῶν. 

(8) περὶ εὐφυΐας. 

(9) περὶ Τοργίππου “num πρὸς Tépyurrov qui idem fuerit — 
atque Τοργιππίδης ad quem complura scripta Chrysippus misit?”” 
Wachsm. Mohnike p. 100 wishes to read Τοργιππίδου. 

(10) περὶ φθονερίας. 

(11) περὶ ἔρωτος. Here belongs perhaps frag. 108. 

(12) περὶ ἐλευθερίας. 

(13) ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη. 

(14) περὶ τιμῆς. 

(16) περὶ δόξης. 

(16) πολιτικός. Here belongs frag. 104, cf. Plut. Sto. 
Rep. c. 2. , 

(17) περὶ βουλῆς. 

(18) περὶ νόμων. 

(19) περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν. 

(20) περὶ ἀρωγῆς. 

(21) περὶ τέλους. 

(22) περὶ καλῶν. 

(23) περὶ πράξεων. 

(24) περὶ βασιλείας. 

Ve ae 


; ie glk os Ὁ 5 

Ὡ-:- 8 ϑὀ 


(25) περὶ φιλώας. 

(26) περὶ συμποσίου. Persaeus wrote συμποτικὰ ὑπομνή- 
ματα or διάλογοι (Athen. Iv. 162 b, χιπι. 607 a). 

(27) περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς Kat γυναικός. So 
Antisthenes also taught (Diog. L. v1. 12) and cf. Socrates in 
Xen. Symp. 1. 9. Otherwise Aristotle, Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21. 
Eth. vin. 14. 1162 a 26. 

(28) περὶ rod τὸν σοφὸν σοφιστεύειν. 

(29) περὶ χρειῶν. 

(30) διατριβών β΄. 

(31) περὶ ἡδονῆς. For this book see Krische p. 430 foll. 

(32) περὶ χαλκοῦ (Diog. L. vir. 14). The title of this book 
has been much discussed. It was altered to περὶ χάριτος by 
Casaubon, to περὶ χρόνου by Menagius, Fabricius and Mohnike, 
and to περὶ χρειῶν by Wachsmuth. It is possible that χαλκοῦ 
is due to the scribe’s eye catching the word χαλκὸν which 
closely precedes in the citation, and, if so, we have no clue to 
the true title. 

(33) περὶ στοᾶς. This book is supposed to have existed 
from a mutilated passage of Philodemus περὶ φιλοσόφων in vol. 
Here. vit. col. 13 v. 18 ὡς αἵ τ᾽ ἀναγραφαὶ τῶν π(ι)νάκων (al)re 
βιβλιοθῆκαι σημαίνουσιν, (παρὰ KA)eavOy ἐν τῷ περὶ στ(οᾶς ἐ)σίτιν) 
Διογένους αὕτη ἡ μνήμη. See howevey gu Clean δ. 

tvue. ὅν 


1. Diog. L. vit. 39, τριμερῆῇ φασὶν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ 
φιλοσοφίαν Χόγον. εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικόν" τὸ 
δὲ ἠθικόν: τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ 
Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου. 

The triple division of philosophy was first brought into 
prominence by Zeno and the Stoics, though it seems to 
have been adopted before them by Xenocrates and the 
Peripatetics, cf. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vit. 16 ἐντελέστερον 
δὲ.. οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας TO μέν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν TO 
δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν: ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν 
ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ 
ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθείς" ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν 
ἘΞενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς 
. στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. Ar. Top. 1. p. 105 Ὁ 19 
ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προ- 
βλημάτων μέρη τρία" αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ 
δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ must not be taken as indicating 
that Aristotle had in view the triple division (see Waitz in 
loc.). Cicero speaking of Speusippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates, 
Polemo, and Theophrastus says (de Fin. Iv. 4) :—totam 
philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt, quam partitionem 
a Zenone esse retentam videmus. In Acad. 1. 19 he wrongly 
attributes the division to Plato (fuit ergo jam accepta a 
Platone philosophandi ratio triplex): Diog. L. m1. 56 only 
says that Plato introduced the διαλεκτικὸς τόπος, not that 


he recognised the triple division. With the Stoics it 
became so fundamental that they did not hesitate to refer 
to it the three heads of Cerberus and Athene’s name Tpzto- 
γένεια (Zeller, pp. 363, 364). Hirzel (de logica Stoicorum 
in Sauppe’s Satura Philologa, p. 71) thinks that Zeno was ~ 
the inventor of the term λογικὴ in place of Xenocrates’ 

2. Diog. L. vir. 40, ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λογικὸν 
τάττουσι᾽ δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικόν" καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἠθικόν. 
ὧν ἐστι Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου. 

As logic is obviously the least important to the Stoics 
of the three divisions, Zeno regarded Ethics, not Physics, 
as the kernel of his system. The authorities are however 
very confusing on this point, for of Chrysippus, who is 
coupled with Zeno in Diog., Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1 says :— 
τούτων (μερῶν) δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ λογικά, 
δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικά, τρίτα δὲ τὰ Hvowa—and yet in the 
same passage we find attributed to Chrysippus the state- 
ment οὐδ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παρα- 
ληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν, 
which shows that he must have regarded ethics as con- 
taining the consummation of philosophy. Again, the 
Stoics compared the three parts of philosophy to a fruit 
garden surrounded by a wall and also to an egg, but 
whereas according to Diog. (v11. 40) physics are likened to 
the fruit of the garden and the yolk of the egg, in Sextus 
(adv. Math. vit. 17—19) they are compared to the trees in 
the garden and the white of the egg, having changed 
places with ethics. But both alike in recording the 
comparison, which Posidonius thought more apt, yield the 
place of honour to ethics, which are compared to the soul 
of man. It is not improbable, as Wellmann and Stein 
(Erkenntnistheorie, p. 302) think, that the two former of 


these similes may be due to Zeno, on whose fondness for 
such similes we have remarked in the Introd. p. 33, but 
there is no evidence to decide. The confusion about the 
whole matter seems to have arisen from the distinction: 
made by the Stoics between the order of relative im- 
portance and the order of teaching (cf. Sext. 1. ο. 22, 23). 
At any rate, as regards Zeno, it is most natural to suppose 
that the pupil of Crates and the admirer of Socrates 
placed ethics in the forefront of his system. [Ritter and 
Preller, § 390 n. and Ueberweg, p. 192 apparently regard as 
the earlier view that which gave physics the most im- 
portant position, but see Stein, Psychologie n. 7.] 


3. Arr. Epict. diss. τν. 8, 12, θεωρήματα τοῦ φιλοσό- 
ov... Ζήνων λέγει γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖόν 
τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἁρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα 
καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθά ἐστι. 

It is difficult, in the absence of Zeno’s context, to 
decide the exact meaning of τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα. 
There is no doubt that the Stoics used this phrase in the 
sense of “parts of speech” (Diog. VIL. 58 ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι... 
στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπτωτον), but this meaning is not general 
enough and is certainly excluded by the words im- 
mediately preceding in Epictetus τί τέλος ; μή τι φορεῖν 
τρίβωνα; ov, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. It is sug- 
gested, therefore, that Zeno is here expressing, possibly in 
an earlier work, the nominalism of Antisthenes and that 
λόγου στοιχεῖα = the (indefinable) elements of definition. 
It is now generally admitted (see 6.5. Dr Jackson in 
Journ. Phil. xu. 262) that the opinion stated at some 
length by Socrates in Theaet. p. 201 E—202 Ο is that of 
Antisthenes, and the words στοιχεῖον and λόγος in this 
sense must have belonged to his terminology (see the 


whole passage and especially τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ 
στοιχεῖα... λόγον οὐκ ἔχει 201 E, οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα 
ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωτα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ, cf. 206 Ε τὸ ἐρωτη- 
θέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν 
στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ): with this should be 
compared the passages in Ar. Metaph. vim. 3. 1048 b 23, 
XIV. 3.1091 a7 ὥστ᾽ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι 
ὅρον καὶ λόγον οἷον τῆς συνθέτου ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε 
νοητὴ 4° ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὕτη πρώτων οὐκ ἔστιν. It is nota 
necessary inference from this passage that Zeno treated — 
ὀρθὸς λόγος as κριτήριον ἀληθείας, or that he and 
Cleanthes are the ἄλλοι τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν 
whom Diogenes (VII. 54) mentions as holding this opinion, 
although Hirzel thinks this established, comparing frag. ~ 
157 (Untersuchungen, u. pp. 14 f. 23). Indeed it is 
difficult to understand how, except on the hypothesis of 
a change of opinion, this is reconcilable with the fact that 
Zeno introduced the φαντασία καταληπτική, as will 
appear hereafter. Hirzel further remarks :—“Unter den 
τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τινες des Alexand. Aphrod. zur Topik 
(schol. Arist. p. 256 Ὁ 14) welche den λόγος durch τί ἦν 
definirten kénnte Zenon gemeint sein.” The latter part 
of this note requires some modification if Stein’s view 
referred to in the Introd. p. 9 be accepted. The same 
writer (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 90, 91) explains γνῶναι τὰ 
τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα as “die Erkenntnis der Elemente des 
Denkens ἃ. ἢ. wie das Denken beschaffen sei und worin — 
die gegenseitige Verbindung der Gedanken bestehe und 
welche Konsequenzen sich aus dieser Gedankenverbind- 
ung ergeben.” 

4. Arr. Epict. diss. 1. 17. 10, 11, καὶ τὰ λογικὰ 
ἄκαρπά ἐστι...καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὀψόμεθα, εἰ δ᾽ οὖν Kai 
τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνα ἀπαρκεῖ, ὅτε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστι 


διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ Kal ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μετρη- 
τικὰ καὶ στατικά" τίς λέγει ταῦτα ; μόνος Χρύσιππος 
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ KreavOns ; 

This and the two following fragments show us the 
view which Zeno took of the value of logical studies, 
which were recommended not so much o1i account of the 
value of the results obtained, as because they enable us tw 
test the theories and expose the fallacies of others and to 
clear the ground for further enquiries, cf. Ar. Top. 1. 104 
Ὁ 1 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς 
ἐστιν" ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων 
ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει, cf. also the title ὄργανον given to 
Aristotle’s logical treatises (Waitz 11 294) and the name 
xavovixn adopted by the Epicureans. For the distinction 
between the Peripatetic and Stoic views of logic see 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie ἢ. 207. Hirzel’s remarks about 
Zeno (de log. Stoic. p. 72) do not take into account this 

στατικά, “weighing.” The word is used by Plato, cf. 
Phileb. 55 Ε οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν Tis ἀριθμητικὴν 
χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. 

Charmid. 166 8. 

5. Stob. Ecl. 1. 2. 12 p. 22, 12 Wachsm. [vulgo Floril. 
LXXXIL. 5], Ζήνων τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας εἴκαζε τοῖς 
δικαίοις μέτροις οὐ πυρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο TL τῶν σπουδαίων 
μετροῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἄχυρα καὶ κόπρια. 

At first sight this and the next fragm. appear con- 
tradictory, but probably this is directed against some 
particular opponents. The Megarians, the Eristics of this 
period, are most likely to be meant, and we know that 
they were often called διαλεκτικοί, as the Stoics them- 
selves are by Sextus (Zeller, Socrates etc. p. 250 n. 3). 
Moreover Alexinus was a determined opponent of Zeno 


(Diog. 11. 109 διεφέρετο δὲ μάλιστα πρὸς Ζήνωνα) and 
Sextus tells us how he controverted Zeno’s proof that the 
world is λογικός (Math. rx. 107). Stein thinks that the 
inconsistency is to be explained by the importance 
attributed by Zeno to the question of the criterion 
(Erkenntnistheorie, p. 303), but surely διαλεκτικῶν in 
frag. 5 and διαλεκτικὴν in frag. 6 must refer to the 
same branch of logic. The explanation is however 
perfectly valid to explain the difference of statement 
between Cic. Fin. Iv. 9 and id. Acad. 1. 40. τέχνας = 
treatises. | 

δικαίοις: so the three best MSs AM and S: εἰκαίοις 
adopted by Mein. from Ms B (late and untrustworthy) is 
virtually a conjecture. Wachsm. suggests χυδαίοις but, on 
the interpretation given above, δικαίοις is more forcible: 
the methods are good enough (cf. μετρητικά frag. 4) but 
they are put to base uses, 1.6, to mere quibbling. After 
μέτροις Gaisf. add. οἷς. 

If the fragment be interpreted quite generally as a 
depreciation of logical studies, we have here an approxi- 
mation to the position of Aristo (Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 2. 14, 18, 
22=Floril. LxxxiL 7, 11, 18) in one of the points on 
which he severed himself from the Stoic scheol. 

6. Plut. Sto. Rep. v1 2, ἔλυε δὲ (scil. Zeno) σοφίσ- 
pata καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην 
ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. Hence Schol. 
ad Arist. 22 b 29 ed. Brandis speaking of Zeno of Elea 
says that he was called ἀμφοτερόγλωσσος οὐχ ὅτι dia- 
λεκτικὸς ἦν ὡς ὁ Κιτιεύς. 

σοφίσματα, cf. the anecdote related by Diog. vil. 25. 
A logician showed Zeno seven διαλεκτικαὶ ἰδέαι in the 
Reaper fallacy, and received 200 drachmas, although his 
fee was only half that amount, ib. VIL 47 οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ 


τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔνεσθαι ἐν 
λόγῳ...τό τε ἀμφιβόλως λεγόμενον διευκρινεῖσθαι. 

τὴν διαλεκτικήν. Strictly speaking, λογικὴ is a wider 
term than διαλεκτική, cf. Diog. vit. 41 τὸ δὲ λογικὸν 
μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς 
ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν, Sen. Ep. 89, 16. 

7. φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. Sext. Emp. 
Math. vil. 228, 236 distinctly attributes this definition to 
Zeno. Diog. vil. 45 τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν 
ψυχῆ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν 
τύπων ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γυγνομένων, ib. 50 
quoting Chrysippus’ gloss ἀλλοίωσις : cf. Plut. Comm. 
Not. 47. 

For the use of τύπωσις see Introd. p. 84. That 
Zeno did not define his meaning further than by the bare 
statement is evident from the controversy which after- 
wards arose between Cleanthes and Chrysippus as to the 
exact meaning of τύπωσις: for which see on Cleanth. 
frag. 38. It would seem however from the expressions 
“effictum” and “impressum” in Zeno’s definition of dav- 
τασία καταληπτικὴ (frag. 11) that Cleanthes is a truer 
exponent of his master’s teaching in this matter than 
Chrysippus. Zeno must have been influenced by Aristotle’s 
treatment of φαντασία (de An. Ur. 3): see Introd. p. 24. 
See further Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 157. 

8. τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν Tas 
μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. This is attributed to the 
Stoics generally by Stob. Ecl. 1. 50. 21, Plut. plac. tv. 8. 
9, but must belong to Zeno having regard to Sext. Emp. 
adv. Math. vill. 355, Δημόκριτος μὲν πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν 
ὕπαρξιν κεκίνηκεν, ᾿Επίκουρος δὲ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε 
βέβαιον εἶναι ὁ δὲ Στωικὸς Ζήνων διαιρέσει ἐχρῆτο; Cic. 


N. Ὁ. τ᾿. 70 urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa 
omnia diceret quae sensibus viderentur; Zeno autem 
nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia; Cic. Acad. 1. 41 yisis 
non omnibus adjungebat fidem. 

Zeno is not entirely a sensualist: Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie, p. 307. For the general doctrine see ib. p. 142—_ 
151. Zeno is here again following the lead of Aristotle, 
ef. de An. UL 3. 7 εἶτα ai μὲν (scil. αἰσθήσεις) ἀληθεῖς 
ἀεί, ai δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται ai πλείους ψευδεῖς. On the 
other hand Epicurus held πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς 
εἶναι (Sext. Math, vir. 204). 

9. Cic. Acad. 1 41, (Zeno) adjungebat fidem...iis 
(visis) solum, quae propriam quamdam haberent decla- 
rationem earum rerum, quae viderentur. 

Cicero is here speaking of the Greek évapyeva, for 
which he elsewhere suggests as translations perspicuitas 
or evidentia (ib. Π. 17). Every sense impression is 
ἐναργὲς according to the Epicureans (Zeller, p. 428), but 
with Zeno ἐνάργεια is simply introduced as an attribute 
of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία: cf. Sext. Math. vil. 257 speaking 
of the x. φ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον 
οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγ- 
κατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη 
προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑπο- 
βάλλειν. Hirzel (Untersuchungen, 1. pp. 8, 6) attributes 
ἐνάργεια to the Cynics but his authorities merely show 
that Diogenes proved the possibility of motion by walking 
about (Diog. V1. 39), which Sextus (Math. x. 68) calls a 
proof δι’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. 

10. Sext. Math. vil. 253, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιό- 
τεροι τῶν Στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν 
καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ib. 227 κριτήριον ἀληθείας 
εἶναι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. This is to be at- 


tributed to Zeno partly as an inference from the word 
ἀρχαιότεροι, partly as a necessary corollary from the next 
fragment, and partly in accordance with the testimony of 
Cic. Acad. 1. 42 sed inter scientiam et inscientiam com- 
prehensionem illam (κατάληψιν) quam dixi collocabat 
eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat sed 
soli credendum esse dicebat. Diog. L. vir. 46 refers the 
citation to the school generally and in 54 quotes it from 
Chrysippus ἐν τῇ δυωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν. 

For the doctrine of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία see 
Zeller, pp. 87—89. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 167 foll. 
Four different explanations of the meaning of the term 
have been given (1) καταλ. active. The irresistible cha- 
racter of the impression compels assent, Zeller. (2) καταλ. 
passive: the perception is grasped by the mind, Hirzel. 
(3) The object of representation (τὸ ὑπάρχον) and not 
the perception is grasped by the mind, Ueberweg, p. 192 
(now given up by Heinze). (4) καταλ. both active and 
passive, Stein, thus reconciling the apparent contra- 
diction between Cic. Acad. I. 41, and Sext. Math. vit. 257. 
For the exact meaning of κατάληψις)(καταληπτικὴ φαν- 
τασία cf. Sext. Emp. Math. x1. 182 κατάληψίς ἐστι κατα- 
ληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις : a distinction, possibly 
due to Zeno, which tends to disappear in practice. See 
also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 182. κατάληψις κατα- 
ληπτικὴ, etc. were new terminology invented by Zeno, 
according to Cic. Acad. 1. 41 comprehensionem appel- 
labat similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex 
quo etiam nomen hoe dixerat cum eo verbo antea nemo 
tali in re usus est, ib. 11 145, but the verb καταλαμ- 
βάνειν had been used by Plato in the sense “to grasp 
with the mind,” Phaedr. 250 D περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ 
εἴπομεν, μετ᾽ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τε ἐλθόντες 
κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν 


ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. Zeno, therefore, only 
specialised the meaning of the word, see Introd. p. 84. 
and generally Introd. p. 9. 

11. Sext. Math. vi. 248, φαντασία καταληπτική 
ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος Kal κατ᾽ αὐτὸ TO ὑπάρχον 
ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γέ- 
νοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, ib. 426, Pyrrh. τι. 4. Diogenes 
gives the definition in substantially the same words in 
§ 50 adding however καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη after ἐναπο- 
μεμαγμένη: in ὃ 46 he omits ὁποία---ὑπάρχοντος but 
adds :---ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ 
ὑπάρχοντος μέν, μὴ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον τὴν μὴ τρανῆ 
μηδὲ ἔκτυπον, which very possibly belongs also to Zeno. 
The evidence attaching the definition to Zeno is as fol- 
lows :—Cic, Acad. τι. 18 si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, 
tale visum impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale 
esse non posset ex eo unde non esset, id nos a Zenone defi- 
nitum rectissime dicimus; ib. 113, ib. 1. 41 id autem visum 
cum ipsum per se cerneretur comprehendibile (of Zeno) 
ib. π. 77. Speaking of the controversy between Arcesilas 
and Zeno, Cic. states that the last words of the definition 
were added by Zeno because of the pressure put upon 
him by Arcesilas. Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, 
p. 733 τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο αὐτοῦ (scil. Ζήνωνος) πρώτου 
εὑρομένου καὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα βλέπων εὐδοκιμοῦν. ἐν ταῖς 
᾿Αθήναις τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν πάσῃ μηχανῇ 
ἐχρῆτο ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν (of Arcesilas). August. c. Acad. 11. 9, 
18 sed videamus quid ait Zeno. Tale scilicet visum com- 
prehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet 
signa communia. 

The controversy between Arcesilas and Zeno is a his- 
torical fact about which there can be no doubt, and, apart 
from direct evidence, the chronology proves that our defi- 


- nition can hardly be due to Chrysippus, who only sue- 
ceeded to the headship of the Stoa eight years after the 
death of Arcesilas (cf. Plut. Com. Not. ec. 1). This ques- 
tion of the criterion was the chief battle-ground of the 
Stoi¢s and the New Academy, and in later times Carneades 
maintained ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἶναι ov πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα 
(Zeller, ρ. δδδ). In the second book of Cicero’s Academica 
the question is discussed at length. Sext. Math. vir. 248— 
252 shows in detail the reason for the insertion of each 
member of the definition: the impression must be from 
the object to exclude the visions of madmen, and with 
reference to the object to exclude a case like that of 
Orestes, who mistook his sister for a F ury. It must be 
imprinted and stamped on the mind to ensure that the 
percipient shall have noticed all the characteristics of the 
object. Lastly, the addition ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ 
μὴ ὑπάρχοντος was inserted to meet the Academic ob- 
jection that two impressions, one true and the other false, 
might be so entirely alike (ἀπαράλλακτον) as to be in- 
capable of distinction, which of course the Stoics did not 
admit. For ἐναπομεμαγμένη cf. Ar. Ran. 1040 ὅθεν ἡμὴ 
φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν. 

12. Olympiodorus in Plat. Gorg. pp. ὅ8, 54 (ed. Jahn 
ap. Neue Jahrb. fiir Philol. supplement bd. xtv. 1848 
p. 239, 240) Ζήνων δέ φησιν ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ 
καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένον (3 -ων) πρός τι τέλος εὔ- 
χρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. 

Cf. Lucian Paras. c. 4 τέχνη ἐστίν, ὡς ἐγὼ διαμνη- 
μονεύω σοφοῦ τινος ἀκούσας, σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων 
συγγεγυμνασμένων πρός τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ 
βίῳ. Schol. ad. Ar. Nub. 317 οὕτω yap ὁριζόμεθα τὴν 
τέχνην οἷον σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων 
καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς. Sext. Emp. Math. π. 10 πᾶσα τοίνυν 

HP. 5 


τέχνη σύστημά ἐστιν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων 
καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων τὴν ἀνα- 
φοράν. The same definition partially in id. Pyrrh. m1. 
188, 241, 251, Math. 1. 75, vit. 109, 373, 182, Wachsm. 
also quotes (Comm. I. p. 12), Schol. Dionys. Thrac. p. 649, 
31, ib. p. 721, 25 of Στωικοὶ οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὴν τέχνην᾽ 
τέχνη ἐστι σύστημα περὶ ψυχὴν γενόμενον ἐγκαταλήψεων 
ἐγγεγυμνασμένων κιτιλ. Cf. also Quintil. 1. 17, 41 Nam 
sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas via, id est, ordine 
efficiens: esse certe viam atque ordinem in benedicendo 
nemo dubitaverit; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus 
finis observatur artem constare ex praeceptionibus con- 
sentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem vitae utilem. Cic. 
frag. ap. Diomed 414 ed. Putsch ars est perceptionum 
exercitarum constructio ad unum exitum utilem vitae 
pertinentium. Cic. Acad. 11. 22 ars vero quae potest esse 

nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi — 

perceptionibus constat. Fin. m1. 18 artes...constent ex 
cognitionibus et contineat quiddam in se ratione consti- 
tutum et via (illustrating also the next frag.). N.D. 1. 
148 ex quibus (perceptis) collatis inter se et comparatis 
artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae...necessarias. 
It is worth while to compare with Zeno’s definition of 
art those to be found in Aristotle: both philosophers 
alike recognise its practical character (cf. Eth. vi. 4 6 
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική 
ἐστιν) and that it proceeds by means of regulated prin- 
ciples (cf. Met. I. 1. 5 γίνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν 
τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν 
ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις). Aristotle’s distinction that τέχνη is 
concerned with γένεσις while ἐπιστήμη deals with ὃν 
(Anal. Post. τι. 19. 4) is of course foreign to Zeno’s system. 
Zeller’s note on p. 266, 2 (Eng. Tr.) is inaccurate but 
appears correctly in the 4th German ed. (111. 1. 247), 



13. Schol. ad Dionys. Thracis Gramm. ap. Bekk. 
Anecd. p. 663, 16, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Ζήνων λέγων τέχνη ἐστὶν 
ἕξις ὁδοποιητική, τουτέστι, δι’ ὁδοῦ καὶ μεθόδου ποιοῦσά τι. 

The authenticity of this fragment is rendered doubtful 
(1) by the fact that Zeno had defined τέχνη differently, 
as we have seen, (2) because Cleanthes defined τέχνη as 
ἕξις ὁδῷ πάντα ἀνύουσα (frag. 5). It is of course possible 
that Zeno left two alternative definitions as in the case 
of πάθος (frags. 136 and 137), and that Cleanthes adopted 
one of these with verbal alterations, but it seems most 
probable that the Schol. has made a mistake, and certainly 
ὁδοποιητικὴ has a suspicious look. Stein however, Er- 
kenntnistheorie, p. 312, accepts the definition, 

14. μνήμη θησαυρισμός ἐστι φαντασιῶν. 

These words are shown to belong to Zeno by the 
following considerations. Sext. Emp. Math. vu. 372 foll. 
is describing the controversy between Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus as to the meaning of Zeno’s τύπωσις and 
introduces one of Chrysippus’ arguments εἰ yap κηροῦ 
τρόπον τυποῦται ἡ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα ἀεὶ τὸ 
ἔσχατον κίνημα ἐπισκοτήσει τῇ προτέρᾳ φαντασίᾳ, ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἡ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγῖδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικός ἐστι 
τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θη- 
σαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη: 
σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων «tr. Now 
one might suspect from internal evidence alone that 
Chrysippus is appealing to the school definitions of Memory 
and Art as established by Zeno in support of his argument 
against Zeno’s pupil, but the inference becomes irresistible 
when we find that the definition of Art is certainly Zeno’s, 
as has already been shown. Cf. Οἷς, Acad. 1 22 quid 
quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendit et 
tenet ? ib. 106 memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque 



rerum est. Plut. plac. Iv. 11. 2. Aristotle discusses the — 

relation between μνήμη and φαντασία in the tract de — 
Memoria (see Grote’s Aristotle, pp. 475,476). μνήμη = μονὴ 
τοῦ αἰσθήματος, An. Post. τι. 19. 99 Ὁ 36. 

15. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vit. 151, δόξαν εἶναι τὴν ὁ 
ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατάθεσιν attributed to Zeno by ~ 
Cic. Acad. I. 41 ex qua (inscientia) exsisteret etiam opinio, 
quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis, 
ef. ib. Tusc. Iv. 15 opinationem autem...volunt esse im- 
becillam assensionem. Stobaeus speaks of two Stoic defi- 
nitions of δόξα Ecl. 11. 7. 11", p. 112, 2[=u. 231] διττὰς 
γὰρ εἶναι δόξας THY μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν 
δ᾽ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ, cf. ib. τι. 7. 10. p. 89, [=u 169] 
παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπο- 
λήψεως. It is possible from a consideration of the next 
frag. that Zeno’s word was οἴησις. Thus, as with Plato, 
δόξα and ἄγνοια are ultimately identical. See further 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 204, 205. 


16. Diog. L. vit 23, ἔλεγε δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῆς oin- 
σεως ἀλλοτριώτερον πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. 

τῶν ἐπιστημῶ. The plural is used because ἐπιστήμη 
in the narrower sense in which Zeno used the word is | 
a single κατάληψις. The Stoics also defined ἐπιστήμη 
as a σύστημα (cf. Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. δ᾽ p. 73, 21 =11. 129) 
of such perceptions. At the same time we must be- 
ware of supposing that ἐπιστήμη is according to Zeno 
identical with κατάληψις. ἐπιστήμη is the conscious 
knowledge of the wise man, whereas κατάληψις may be 
possessed by the φαῦλος. The latter may occasionally 
and accidentally assent to the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, 
but the former’s assent is regular and unerring. Cf. Sext. 
Math. vil. 152 ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι 
λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις 


τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι. We have here, 
in fact, the Platonic distinction between δόξα ἀληθὴς and 
ἐπιστήμη in another form. 

17. Cic. Acad. 1. 41, si ita erat comprehensum ut 
convelli ratione non posset scientiam sin aliter inscientiam 
nominabat (Zeno). 

The Greek sources for this will be found in Stob. 
Ecl. π΄ 7, δ᾽ p. 73, 19 τε τ. 129 εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατά- 
Anu ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ib. 11™ p. 111, 
30 =11. 231, τὴν ἄγνοιαν μεταπτωτικὴν εἶναι συγκατά- 
θεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ, cf. Sext. Emp. Math. vit. 151, ἐπισ- 
τήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ Kai βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ 
λόγου κατάληψιν, see also Stein, p. 311 and n. 711, who 
concludes that these definitions are Zenonian. Diog. 
L. vit. 47, αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν 
ἀσφαλῆ, ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει, ἀμετάπτωτον 
ὑπὸ λόγου. The definition of ἐπιστήμη as ἕξις κιτιλ. is 
due to Herillus, cf. ib. vu. 165, but I am unable to see 
why on that ground Zeller, Ῥ. 82, ἢ. 1, and Wellmann, 
p. 480, should also infer that it was introduced by Zeno. 
It is far more natural to suppose that the simplest form 
of the definition was first put forward by the founder of 
the school, and that it was subsequently modified by his 
successors in accordance with their different positions: 
thus Herillus’ definition is undoubtedly modelled on Zeno’s, 
but is adapted to his conception of ἐπιστήμη as the 
ethical τέλος. 

18. Cic. Acad. 1. 42, inter scientiam et inscientiam 
comprehensionem collocabat, eamque neque in rectis 
neque in pravis numerabat. 

Cf. Sext. Math. vit. 151, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν 
ἐν μεθορίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν... κατάληψιν δὲ 


τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων: ib. 153, ὁ ᾿Αρκεσίλαος...δεικνὺς ὅτι 
οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξὺ ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἡ κατά- 
Anus. (It will be observed that where Cicero speaks of 
inscientia Sextus mentions δόξα, but, as has been shown, 
they are practically identical.) Wellmann, p. 484, thinks 
that either there is some mistake in the text or that 
Cicero has misunderstood his authorities, but the passage 
in Sextus Le. 151—153 makes the meaning perfectly 
clear: see the note on frag. 16. The latter part of 
Cicero’s statement may be either an inference by his 
authority ex silentio, or a record of an express statement 
by Zeno. In any case, it derives its force here simply 
from the antithesis to scientia and inscientia: thus the 
Stoics classed certain virtues (goods) as ἐπιστῆμαι and 
certain vices (evils) as ἄγνοιαι, cf. Stob..Ecl. τι. 7. 5°, 
Ρ. 58, 5—59, 3= 11. 92—94. 

19. Cic. Acad. 1. 41, Zeno ad haec quae visa sunt et 
quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animorum: 
quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. 

In this case it is impossible to recover Zeno’s actual 
words, nor can we tell how much of the Stoic doctrine 
handed down by Sext. Math. vr. 397, belonged to Zeno; 
ef. especially συγκατάθεσις ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι 
πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. <A full list of authorities 
is given by Zeller, Stoics, p, 88, π. 1. The free power of 
assent must be understood only in the limited sense in 
which free will is possible in consequence of the Stoic 
doctrine of εἱμαρμένη : see Wellmann, 1. ὁ. pp. 482, 483. 
It is moreover only the wise man who can distinguish 
accurately the relative strength of divers impressions, 
and he alone will consistently refuse assent to mere 


20. Cic. Acad. 1. 41, Quod autem erat sensu compre- 
hensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat. 

For the different meanings of αἴσθησις in the Stoic 
school, see Diog. L. vil. 52 αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ 
τοὺς Στωικοὺς TO Te ἀφ᾽ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα Kal ἐπὶ τὰς 

> / a \ ¢ 2 ᾽ a / ᾿ e x 
αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις, Kal ἡ περὶ 
τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ᾽ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται: 
the second of these definitions is thus attributed by Cicero 
to Zeno. So Dr Reid: it is however possible that sensum 
is past part. pass. of sentio and is a translation of αἰσθητὸν 
or αἰσθητικὸν rather than of αἴσθησις, in which case cf. 
Diog. L. vil. 51 τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς αἱ μέν 

᾿ bf 4 € ? ” 3 Ni \ © 7 > 
εἰσιν αἰσθητικαὶ ai δ᾽ ov. αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν ai δι’ αἰσθη- 
τήριου 7 αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι K.T.d. 

21. Cic. Acad. 1. 42, Zeno sensibus etiam fidem 
tribuebat quod comprehensio facta sensibus et vera ill 
et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re 
comprehenderet sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset 
relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et prin- 
cipium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis 
imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores 
quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. 

For the general sense see Zeller, p. 80, n. 1. 

non quod omnia: Dr Reid cites Sext. Pyrrh. 1. 92 
ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑπο- 
πίπτειν δοκεῖ οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. 
ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς 
ποιότητας ἢ μονοποιὸν μέν ἐστι παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον 
κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται ἢ καὶ 
πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δὲ 
οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν, ib. 97. These passages 
however do not refer to Stoic teaching but are used in 
furtherance of the Sceptical argument. 


notiones: a translation of ἔννοιαι. It seems certain that 
the distinction between προλήψεις and ἔννοιαι (for which 
see R. and P. § 393 and note c. and Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie, p. 237) is not at least in terms Zenonian, though 
he may have spoken of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι. Reid (on Acad. I. 
30) suggests that the word πρόληψιες was introduced by 
Zeno, but ef. Cic. N. D. τ. 44 ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψις 
appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat, so that 
it is more probable that Chrysippus borrowed it from the 
rival school ; but see Stein, l. c. p. 248—250. ἔννοια, on 
the other hand, used by Plato (Phaed. 73 c) in quite a 
general sense, and defined by the Peripatetics as ὁ ἀθροισ- 
μὸς τῶν TOD νοῦ φαντασμάτων Kal ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν 
ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ καθόλου (Sext. Emp. Math. vit. 224) 
must have received its special Stoic sense from Zeno. 

principia : it is difficult to determine whether this is 
a translation of a Stoic technical term, cf. Acad. τι. 21. 

22. Cic. Acad. 1. 42, Errorem autem et temeritatem 
et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno 
nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis 
adsensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat. 

With this may be compared the Stoic definitions of 
ἀπροπτωσία, ἀνεικαιότης, ἀνελεγξία, and ἀματαιότης 
quoted by Diog. L. vu. 46, 47. Temeritas is probably 
a translation of προπέτεια, a favourite word with Sextus 
when speaking of the dogmatists (e.g. Pyrrh. 1 20) but 
also used by the Stoics (Diog. vil. 48). Reid also quotes 
(on Ac, I. 66) Epict. d. m1. 22. 104 προπετὴς συγκατά- 

23. Stob. Ἐπ]. 1,12. 3, p. 136, 21, Ζήνωνος «καὶ τῶν 
ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ». τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε 
ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δέ τινα καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα Ψυχῆς" 


A N Ae ᾿ a 9 , 5 7 , lal 
ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι. τῶν 
γὰρ κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα ὑποπιπτόντων εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, 
οἷον ἀνθρώπων, ἵππων, κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν 

, \ A vw. Ε / , > / 3 / 
ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁπόσων λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι. [ταύτας 
δὲ of Στωικοὶ φιλόσοφοί φασιν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι καὶ τῶν 
μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ἃς On 
προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν]. 

Cf. Euseb. P. E. xv. 4, of ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοή- 
ματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας. Plut. Plac. 1. 10, 4, of ἀπὸ 
Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν. 

Wellmann, p. 484, (followed by Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie, n. 689) suggests that this may have come from 
the book entitled καθολικά. Possibly this criticism of 
the ideas formed part of the attack upon Plato mentioned 
by Numenius, ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, p. 733, ὁ δ᾽ (Ζήνων) 
ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστέρῳ ὧν ἡσυχίαν ἄγων ov δυνάμενος ἀδι- 

nr > U N % / \ nx > “Ὁ » 
κεῖσθαι ᾿Αρκεσιλάου μὲν ἀφίετο, πολλὰ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχων, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελε, τάχα δὲ μᾶλλον ἄλλως, πρὸς δὲ τὸν 

Ε] , > lal ” , 3 , x \ ’ \ 
οὐκέτι ἐν ζῶσιν ὄντα datwva ἐσκιαμάγει, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ 
ἁμάξης πομπείαν πᾶσαν κατεθορύβει, λέγων ὡς οὔτ᾽ ἂν 
τοῦ [[λάτωνος ἀμυνομένου, ὑπερδικεῖν τε αὐτοῦ ἄλλῳ 

γὼ 7 ᾿ " , > , ee 
οὐδένι μέλον᾽ εἴτε μελήσειεν Αρκεσιλάῳ, αὐτὸς γε κερ- 
δανεῖν @eTo ἀποτρεψάμενος ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ᾿Αρκεσίλαον. 

ἴων \ Ὑ ΔΨ 2 AY , “ 
τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη καὶ ᾿Αγαθοκλέα τὸν Συρακόσιον ποιήσαντα 
τὸ σόφισμα ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. At any rate, both 
the circumstances and the chronology indicate that the 
reference is not to the Πολιτεία (Introd. p. 29). 

éworpara. For the definition cf. Plut. Plac. Iv. 11 
” Ν / ih / lel , i 
ἔστι δὲ νόημα φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου, i.e., as he 
goes on to explain, ἐννόημω stands to φάντασμα in the 
relation of εἶδος to γένος : φαντάσματα are shared with us 
by all other animals whereas ἐννοήματα belong to the 
gods and mankind alone. Diog. vil. 61, ἐννόημα δέ ἐστι 
φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τι ὃν οὔτε ποιόν, ὡσανεὶ δέ τι 


ὃν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ 
μὴ παρόντος. 

twa...moud, Le, they have no existence or definiteness. 
For the Stoic conception of τὸ and ποιόν, see Zeller, 
pp. 98f. and 102 ἢ It has been inferred from this passage 
that the doctrine of the four categories does not belong 
entirely to Chrysippus (Petersen, Chrys. phil. fundam. 
p. 18). 

ἰδέας. The meaning is that the Platonic ideas are 
identical with ἐννοήματα, inasmuch as they possess no 
objective existence, but are mere figments of the mind. — 
Plato himself deals with this very point, Parm. 132 B 
ἀλλὰ... μὴ TOV εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἣ τούτων νόημα, Kal οὐδαμοῦ 

αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. Antis- 

_ thenes had already criticised the theory of ideas from this — 
point of view: see Introd. p. 18. 

ὑποπιπτόντων : the regular word for the presentation 
of external impressions to the organs of sense (e.g. 
Sext. Pyrrh. 1. 40 οὐχ ai αὐταί.. ὑποπίπτουσι φαν- 

ὁπόσων, «tA. So far as it goes this passage is in 
agreement with Aristotle’s statement that Plato recog- 
nised ideas of ὁπόσα φύσει only (Metaph. A. 3. 1070 a 18): 
see Dr Jackson in Journ. Phil. x. 255, ete. 

ravras—rvyxdvev. These words are not expressly attri- 
buted to Zeno: hence Diels followed by Wachsm. adds 
to the lemma Ζήνωνος the words καὶ τῶν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. 

τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, «tA. This passage is extremely diffi- 
cult and is supposed to be corrupt by Zeller, m1‘. 2. 79 
and Wachsmuth. The latter suggests τὰς δὲ ποιότητας 
ἐπωνυμιῶν, K.7.r. or if πτώσεων is corrupt for ἐπωνυμιῶν 
“jin fine talia fere interciderint τὰς κοινὰς ποιότητας, ef. 
᾿ς Diog. vit. 58,” the former (coll. Sext. Math. vir. 11) would 
read ta τυγχάνοντα in place of τυγχάνειν (die Gedanken 


selen in uns, die Bezeichnungen gehen auf die Dinge). 
The text, as it stands, has been interpreted in three ways: 
(1) notitiae rerum rationi nostrae insitae sunt, nomina 
fortuito obveniunt, Diels. (2) πτώσεις = omnes singulae 
res cuiuscumque qualitatis )( yevexa ποιά, 1.6. ἰδέαι. These 
impress themselves on the mind of man (τυγχάνειν), 
Petersen, l.c. p. 82, foll.: but this interpretation of πτῶσις 
is unwarranted and is founded on a misconception of 
Diog. L. vu. 58. (3) Prantl’s interpretation (1. p. 421, 
n. 63) is a combination of these two views. That the 
text is sound in the main is, I think, proved by Simplic. 
Cat. p. 54 (quoted by Petersen) of δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ᾿Ακαδημίας 
ἐκάλουν τὰ μεθεκτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετέχεσθαι Kal Tas πτώσεις 
τευκτὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ τυγχάνεσθαι, and Clem. Alex. VIII. 9. 26: 
after saying that the πτῶσις for the κατηγόρημα “τέμ- 
νεται 15 “ τὸ τέμνεσθαι," and for ναῦς γίγνεται “ τὸ ναῦν 
γίνεσθαι" and explaining that Aristotle called the πτῶσις 
προσηγορία he proceeds ἡ πτῶσις δὲ ἀσώματος εἶναι 
ὁμολογεῖται" διὸ καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ἐκεῖνο λύεται, ὃ λέγεις 
διέρχεται σοῦ διὰ τοῦ στόματος, ὅπερ ἀληθές, οἰκίαν δὲ 
λέγεις, οἰκία ἄρα διὰ τοῦ στόματος σοῦ διέρχεται ὅπερ 
ψεῦδος" οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν οἰκίαν λέγομεν σῶμα οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ 
τὴν πτῶσιν ἀσώματον οὖσαν, ἧς οἰκία τυγχάνει. A 
consideration of the latter passage, which it is surprising 
that no one has cited, warrants the suggestion that τὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα or some such words have fallen out after 
τυγχάνειν. All would then be plain: πτῶσις = name 
\(évvonua=thought. πτῶσις was also) (κατηγόρημα as 
noun to verb (Plut. qu. Plat. x. 1, 2). For the present use 
of πτώσις, cf. also Sext. Math. x1. 29, vi. 42, for πτῶσις in 
Aristotle see Waitz, Organon, vol. 1. p. 328, 329. προση- 
yopia is a common noun, such as “man” “horse” (Diog. 
vil. 58, Sext. Pyrrh. 1. 14) tending in practice to become 
identical with πτῶσις, though theoretically narrower. 


24. Stob. ἘΠ]. 1. 13, 1°, p. 188, 14 (Ar. Did. 457, 
Diels), αἴτιον δ᾽ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι Sv 8° οὗ δὲ αἴτιον 
συμβεβηκός" καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατη- 
γόρημα" ἀδύνατον δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρεῖναι οὗ δέ 
ἐστιν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει 
δύναμιν. αἴτιόν ἐστι δ ὃ γίγνεταί τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν 
φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται 
τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. 
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περί τινα οὔσης μὴ 
σωφρονεῖν ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν. 

It is difficult to understand why Zeller, Stoics, p. 95, 
ἢ, 2, regards the main point of this fragment as a gram- 
matical distinction between noun and verb: it appears 
rather that Zeno is discussing the nature of αἴτεον from a 
logical standpoint, and that κατηγόρημα is introduced to — 
explain αἴτιον and not vice versa. The fragments of 
Chrysippus and Posidonius which follow our passage in 
Stobaeus should be compared with it. Zeno did not 
adopt the four Aristotelian causes because his material- 
istic views led him to regard the efficient as the only 
true cause. 

συμβεβηκός = “result” or “inseparable consequence,” cf. 
Stob. ἘΠ]. 1. 13 ad init. αἴτιόν ἐστι δι’ ὃ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἣ 
δι᾿ ὃ συμβαίνει τι. This meaning οἵ συμβεβηκὸς is also to 
be found in Aristotle, who uses the word in two distinct 
senses: see an elaborate note of Trendelenburg on de An. 1. 
1 p. 402 a 8 who quotes amongst other passages Metaph. 
A 30 1025 a 30 λέγεται δὲ Kai ἄλλως συμβεβηκὸς οἷον 
ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα οἷον 
τῷ τρυγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν. That συμβεβηκὸς must 
be used in this sense here and not in its more common 
Aristotelian sense of “accident” seems indubitable, when 
we read infra that the αἴτιον can never be present unless 
accompanied by the οὗ αἴτιον. 


copa: the materialism of the Stoics is well known: to 
what lengths it was pushed may be seen from Zeller, 
Stoics pp. 127—132, with the examples given in the 

κατηγόρημα : the οὗ αἴτιον was therefore something in- 
corporeal, and Chrys. and Posid. accordingly speak of it 
as non-existent. Probably this inference did not present 
itself to Zeno’s mind, as the question of the ὕπαρξις of 
AexTa Only arose later: see further on Cleanth. rag 
The present passage is illustrated by Sext. Pyrrh. 11. 14 
οἱ μὲν οὖν σῶμα, οἱ δ᾽ ἀσώματον τὸ αἴτιον εἶναί φασιν. 
δόξαι δ᾽ ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς & ὃ 
ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ 
τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως 
τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασιν, οἱ μὲν 
προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἷον τῆς 
χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ χεῖσθαι. ib. Math. 
IX. 211 Στωικοὶ μὲν πᾶν αἴτιον σῶμά φασι σώματι 
ἀσωμάτου τινὸς αἴτιον γενέσθαι, οἷον σώμα μὲν τὸ σμιλίον, 
σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατη- 
γορήματος, καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ 
ξύλῳ, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καίεσθαι κατηγορήματος. 

φρόνησιν κιτιλ. A parallel to this will be found at 
Stob. Ecl. π. 7 11f p. 98, 3 τὴν γὰρ φρόνησιν αἱρούμεθα 
ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Ala τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ 
σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορήματα. Stein, 
Erkenntnistheorie p. 307, infers from this passage that, 
according to Zeno, not a single moment in life passes 
without thought, but that the ἡγεμονικὸν always thinks. 

25. Anonymi τέχνη ap. Spengel Rhet. Gr. 1. 434, 23, 
Ζήνων δὲ οὕτω φησί: διήγησίς ἐστι τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει 
πραγμάτων ἔκθεσις εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον 


Perhaps this frag. comes from the τέχνη of Zeno: 
see Introd. p. 27. Zeller is inclined to doubt whether 
the words do not belong to some other Zeno, but inas- 
much as this anonymous writer also quotes Chrysippus 
(p. 454, 4), the presumption is that he refers to Zeno of 
Citium, and there is no a priori reason to discredit his 

διήγησις : the narrative portion of a speech contain- 
ing the statement of facts, cf. Ding. L. vit. 48 τὸν δὲ, 
ῥητορικὸν λόγον εἴς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν 
καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον. Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rhet. x. 12 ἔστι δὲ τὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως στοιχεῖα 
τέσσαρα, προοίμιον, διήγησις, πίστεις, ἐπίλογοι. Lysias 
especially excelled in his treatment of this branch of his 
art. Dion. H. Lys. c. 18 ἐν δὲ τῷ διηγεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα, 
ὅπερ, οἶμαι, μέρος πλείστης δεῖται φροντίδος καὶ φυλακῆς, 
ἀναμφιβόλως ἡγοῦμαι κράτιστον αὐτὸν εἶναι πάντων 
ῥητόρων κ.τ.λ. 

ὑποθέσει: cf. Sext. Emp. Math. UL 4 ὑπόθεσις προσ- 
αγορεύεται ἐν ῥητορικῇ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ζήτησις. 

ds τὸ κιτλ. “adapted to the character maintained on 
behalf of the speaker.” πρόσωπον is technical )( πρᾶγμα. 
τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον τοῦ προοιμίου δόξα προσώπων τε καὶ 
πραγμάτων Dion. H. Ant. Rhet. x. 13, cf. the Latin 
persona, Cic. pro Mil. § 32 itaque illud Cassianum cui 
bono fuerit in his personis valeat, pro Cluent. § 78 huius 
Staleni persona ab nulla turpi suspicione abhorrebat. For 
ῥέουσα cf. Plat. Rep. 485 D ὅτῳ γε eis ἕν τι ai ἐπιθυμίαι 
σφόδρα péovow...d δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ 
τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν. 

26. Anonymi τέχνη ap. Spengel Rhet. Gr. 1. 447, 11 
ὡς δὲ Ζήνων᾽ παράδειγμά ἐστι γενομένου πράγματος 
ἀπομνημόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένουι Maxi- 



mus Planudes ap. Walz. Rhet. Gr. v. 396 παράδειγμα 
δέ ἐστιν, ὡς Ζήνων φησίν, γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνη- 
μόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου. 

This frag. must stand or fall with frag. 25. 

παράδειγμα: a technical term in rhetoric. Aristotle 
regards the example of the orator as an imperfect repre- 
sentation of the Induction of the philosopher: cf. Anal. 
Post. 1.1, 71 ἃ 9 ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ of ῥητορικοὶ συμπεί- 
᾿θουσιν᾽ ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ Ov 
ἐνθυμημάτων, ὅπερ ἐστι συλλογισμός. 

27. Quintil. Inst. Or. Iv. 2. 117 hic expressa (verba) 
et ut vult Zeno sensu tincta esse debebunt. 

It has been supposed by some that these words are a 
reference to apoph. 13, but inasmuch as sensu is a very 
.mappropriate translation of εἰς νοῦν, and Quintilian 15 
speaking of the narrative portion of a speech, the meaning 
is rather “coloured by the actual impressions of sense” 
1.6, giving a vivid and clear representation of the actual 

28. Anonymi variae collectiones mathematicae in 
Hultschiana Heronis geometricorum et stereometricorum 
editione p. 275, Ταύρου Σιδονίου ἔστιν ὑπόμνημα eis 
Hodutetav Ἰ]λάτωνος ἐν ᾧ ἐστι ταῦτα: ὡρίσατο ὁ Πλάτων 
τὴν γεωμετρίαν... Ἀριστοτέλης δ᾽...Ζήνων δὲ ἕξιν ἐν 
προσδέξει φαντασιῶν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. 

This frag. is due to Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 12) 
who emends as above for the meaningless ἕξιν πρὸς δεῖξιν 
φαντασιῶν ἀμεταπτώτως ὑποδίκου, coll. Diog. L. vu. 45. 
It is barely credible that Zeno can have defined geometry 
in the same words by which Herillus certainly and he 
himself possibly defined knowledge. There is doubtless 
some mistake in the tradition: possibly μαθηματικῶν has 


dropped out. I cannot find any evidence to illustrate 
Stoic views on mathematics. | 

29. Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 1, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα 
μηδὲ δίκην δικάσῃς πρὶν (qu. add dv) ἀμφοῖν μῦθον 
ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων, τοιούτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος" εἴτ᾽ 
ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπὼν οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου 
λέγοντος" πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον᾽ εἴτ᾽ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν' 
ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδὲ ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ ὑπακούσας 
érepéricev’ ἤτοι δ᾽ ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν. οὐκ 
ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος. The same is — 
preserved by Schol. ad Lucian. Cal. 8 with unimportant β 
μηδὲ κτλ. A verse of uncertain authorship commonly 
referred to Phocylides on the authority of the Schol. ad 
Lucian. Le. but called by Cicero Ψευδησιόδειον (Att. VIL. — 
18), see Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gk. p. 464: cf. Ar. Vesp. 725 7 
που σοφὸς ἦν ὅστις ἔφασκεν, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον 
ἀκούσῃς οὐκ ἂν δικάσαις. Eur. Heracl. 179 τίς ἂν δίκην 
κρίνειεν ἢ γνοίη λόγον πρὶν ἂν παρ᾽ ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἐκμάθῃ 
σαφῶς; a 
λόγῳ. The argument is couched in the syllogistic 
form which Zeno especially affected: see Introd. p. 33. 
Whether the first speaker proves his case or not, the 
argument of the second speaker is immaterial; but he 
must have either proved his case or failed to do so: 
therefore the second speaker should not be heard. 
ὑπήκουσε: appeared in court when the case was called 
on—answered to his name: cf. Dem. F. L. p. 423 § 257 
ἠτίμωσεν ὑπακούσαντά τιν᾽ αὑτοῦ κατήγορον “procured 
the disfranchisement of a man who had actually ap- 
ἃ as his accuser.’ The word was used indifferently 
of plaintiff and defendant, ib. p. 434 § 290 οὐδ᾽ ὑπακοῦσαι 


καλούμενος ἤθελεν. Meid. p. 580, 581 καλούμενος ὀνομαστί 
...0ua ταῦτ᾽ οὐχ ὑπήκουσε. Andoc. Myst. ὃ 112 καθ᾽ 6 
κῆρυξ ἐκήρυττε τίς τὴν ἱκετηρίαν καταθείη, καὶ οὐδεὶς 
ὑπήκουσεν. Isae. p. 49, 25=84 R. ἀπογραφεὶς εἰς τὴν 
βουλὴν κακουργῶν ὑποχωρῶν ὥχετο καὶ οὐχ ὑπήκου- 

κληθείς : either (1) by the presiding magistrate, cf. 
Dem. Olymp. p. 1174 ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐκάλει ὁ ἄρχων εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας κατὰ τὸν νόμον. 
Ar. Vesp. 1441 ὕβριζ᾽ ἕως ἂν τὴν δίκην ἅρχων καλῇ, or (2) 
by the officer of the court solemnly calling him by name. 
We know that this procedure (κλήτευσις) was adopted in 
the case of a defaulting witness, and it may also have been 
applied if one of the parties failed to put in an ap- 

30. Diog. L. vii. 18, ἔφασκε δὲ τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀσολοίκων 
λόγους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τῷ ἀργυρίῳ τῷ 
᾿Αλεξανδρείῳ: εὐοφθάλμους μὲν καὶ περιγεγραμμένους, 
καθὰ καὶ τὸ νόμισμα, οὐδὲν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα βελτίονας. τοὺς 
δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀφωμοίου τοῖς ᾿Αττικοῖς τετραδράχμοις 
εἰκῆ μὲν κεκομμένους καὶ σολοίκως, καθέλκειν μέντοι 
πολλάκις τὰς κεκαλλιγραφημένας λέξεις. 

λόγους. For the comparison of words to coins ef. Hor. 
A. P. 59 licuit semperque licebit signatum praesente nota 
producere nomen. Juv. vil. 54 qui communi feriat carmen 
triviale Moneta and Prof. Mayor’s note. Possibly this and 
the following frag. came from the work περὶ λέξεων. 

᾿Αλεξανδρείῳ : in this phrase which recurs at VIII. 85 
I have followed Kohler (Rhein. Mus. xxx1x. 297) in 
reading ᾿Αλεξανδρείῳ for ᾿Αλεξανδρίνῳ. It appears that 
Alexandria had struck no coinage in the reign of the 
Ptolemies (Head, Historia Numorum p. 718); on the 
other hand the tetradrachm of Alexander was part of the 

H. P. 6 


current coinage all over Greece (ib. p. 198 foll. and see — 

Hultsch, Gr. and Rom. Metrologie pp. 243-—245), 

kexoppévors...codoixws, MSS. κεκομμένοι. Bywater — 
(Journ. Phil. xvut. 76) reads κεκομμένους καὶ σολοίκους 

and the former certainly seems necessary to restore the 
balance of the sentence. 

καθέλκειν : this meaning of καθέλκω is omitted by L. 
and S. s. v. 

λέξεις bracketed by v. Wilamowitz and Kdéhler is 
rightly retained by Bywater. 

31. Zonarae Lex. s.v. σολοικίζειν col. 1662, σολοικίζειν 

οὐ μόνον τὸ κατὰ φωνὴν Kai λόγον χωρικεύεσθαι ἀλλὰ Kal — 
ἐπὶ ἐνδυμάτων ὅταν τις χωρικῶς ἐνδιδίσκηται ἢ ἀτάκτως 
ἐσθίῃ ἢ ἀκόσμως περιπατῇ ὥς φησι Ζήνων. Wachsmuth, © 

Comm. I. p. 12, cites Cyrilli, Lex. cod. Bodl. ant. T. τι. 11. 
ap. Cramer anec. Paris Iv. p. 190 V. σολοικισμός" ὅτε τις 
ἀτέχνως διαλέγεται" σολοικίζειν ov μόνον τὸ κατὰ λέξιν 
καὶ φωνὴν ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ φορημάτων, ὅταν τις 
χωρικῶς ἐνδέδυται ἣ ἀτάκτως ἐσθίει ἡ ἀκόσμως περιπατεῖ 
ὥς φησι Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. 

σολοικίζειν. Zeno is not alone in using the word in 
this extended sense, cf. Xen. Cyr. vil. 3. 21 Aaidépyns 
δέ τις ἦν σολοικότερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ. 

ἐπὶ ἐνδυμάτων. The Athenians attached great import- 
ance to κοσμιότης in dress as in other matters of 
personal behaviour. The cloak was required to be of 
a certain length, cf. Theopbr. Char. 24 (Jebb) of the 
Penurious Man:—dopodvtas ἐλάττω τῶν μηρῶν τὰ 
ἱμάτια; and to wear it in the fashionable style (ἐπὶ δεξιὰ 
ἀναβάλλεσθαι) was a mark of sobriety. Cf. Ar. Av. 1567 
οὗτος τί Spas; ἐπ᾽ ἀριστέρ᾽ οὕτως auméyer; οὐ μεταβαλεῖς 
θοἰμάτιον ὧδ᾽ ἐπὶ δεξιάν; 

ἀτάκτως ty, How carefully children were trained 


in this respect may be seen from three passages of Plutarch 
cited by Becker, Charicles, E. T. pp. 236, 237. Of. e. 
Edue. Puer. 7 τῇ μὲν δεξιᾷ συνεθίζειν τὰ παιδία δέχεσθαι 
τὰς τροφάς, κἂν προτείνειε τὴν ἀριστεράν, ἐπιτιμᾶν. 

ἀκόσμως περιπατῇ. Fast walking in the streets was so 
severely criticised that it was a circumstance which 
might be used to damage an opponent before a jury ; ef. 
Dem. Pantaen. p. 981 ὃ 52 Νικόβουλος δ᾽ ἐπίφθονός ἐστι, 
καὶ ταχέως βαδίζει καὶ μέγα φθέγγεται, καὶ βακτηρίαν 
φορεῖ and see Sandys on id. Steph. 1. §§ 68, 77. Luysias 
protests against such matters being considered of any 
importance in a law court, Or. Xvi δ 19 πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ 
μικρὸν διαλεγόμενοι καὶ κοσμίως ἀμπεχόμενοι μεγάλων 
κακῶν αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν, ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελοῦντες 
πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ ὑμᾶς εἰσιν εἰργασμένοι. 

32. Sext. Emp. Math. τι. 7, ἔνθεν γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων 
ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῳ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς 
συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη “ τούτῳ 
κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς 
διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίωμα διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ 
ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμεως 
αἰνιττόμενος. Οἷς, Fin. τι, 17 Zenonis est inquam hoc 
Stoici omnem vim loquendi, ut jam ante Aristoteles, 
in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricae palmam, dialecti-. 
cam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur 
rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. Orat. 32, 113 
Zeno quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, manu 
demonstrare solebat quid inter has artes interesset, nam 
cum compresserat digitos pugnumque fecerat, dialecticain 
aiebat eiusmodi esse; cum autem diduxerat et manum 
dilataverat, palmae illius similem eloquentiam esse dicebat. 
Quint. Inst. Or. τι. 20 Ttaque cum duo sint genera 
orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera 



concisa, quae dialectice; quas quidem Zeno adeo con- 
iunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam 
explicitae, diceret similem. 

Although this extract and the next purport to be 
merely spoken remarks of Zeno, it has been thought 
better to insert them at this place, as distinctly belonging 
to λογική. Very probably in their original form they 
came from some written work. 

τὸ στρογγύλον is used of a terse and compact as 
opposed to a florid and elaborate style: thus Dion. Halic. 
in contrasting the styles of Lysias and Isocrates says :— 
ἐν τῷ συστρέφειν τὰ νοήματα Kai στρογγύλως ἐκφέρειν 

ὡς πρὸς ἀληθινοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐπιτήδειον Λυσίαν aredeyounv 

(Isocr.11). The translation “well rounded” while seeming 
to preserve the metaphor conveys a false impression. 

33. Cic. Acad. τι. 145, At scire negatis quemquam — 
rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu 
conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ~ 

ostenderat, “visum” inquiebat “huiusmodi est.” Deinde, 
cum paullum digitos contraxerat, “adsensus huiusmodi.” 
Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, com- 

prehensionem illam esse dicebat: «qua ex similitudine 

nomen ei rei quod antea non fuerat κατάληψεν imposuit- 
Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum 
arte vehementerque compresserat scientiam talem esse 
dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem. 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 181, 313, finds in this 
passage an indication of the tension theory, but surely 
this is somewhat far-fetched, for although it is no doubt 
true that the Stoic theory of knowledge is often made to 
depend on τόνος, yet probably the introduction of TOVOS 
is later than Zeno. He suggests with more reason p. 126 
that the activity of the ἡγεμονικὸν in the process of 


reasoning may be inferred from this, i.e. the ἡγεμονικὸν is 
not merely receptive (κατὰ πεῖσιν) but also productive 
(κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν). 

scire: we have already seen that ἐπιστήμη is peculiar 
to the wise man, while κατάληψις is also shared by the 
φαῦλος : see note on frag. 16. Sextus speaking of the 
inconsistency of the Stoics, who would not admit that 
even Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus had attained to 
perfect wisdom, cites as a Stoic dogma πάντα ἀγνοεῖ ὁ 
φαῦλος (Math. vit. 434). Reid quotes Sext. Pyrrh. 11. 83 
διόπερ THY μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, 
τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον 
ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν. 

visum = φαντασία frag. 7. adsensus = συγκατάθεσις 
frag. 19. comprehensionem = κατάληψιν, see on frag. 10. 
scientiam, frag. 17. 


34. Cic. Acad. 1. 39, (Zeno) nullo modo arbitrabatur 
quicquam effici posse ab ea (scil. natura) quae expers esset 
corporis nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut’ quod 
efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 

Zeno adopted the Platonic dogma that everything 
which exists is capable either of acting or being acted 
upon, cf. Soph. 247 D λέγω δὴ τὸ Kal ὁποιανοῦν κεκτη- 
μένον δύναμιν, εἴτ᾽ εἰς TO ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκός, 
εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, 
κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι: he differed, 
however, widely from Plato in limiting these things to 
material objects. For Stoic materialism cf. Plut. plac. Iv. 
20 πᾶν yap τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα (quoted by 
Zeller, Stoics p. 126) and further references ap. Stein, 
Psychologie n. 21. For the application of this doctrine. 


to theories of sensation and thought see the authorities 
collected in Dr Reid’s note. 

35. Diog. L. vit. 184, δοκεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι 
τῶν ὅλων δύο τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην" τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν 
τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα ἀΐδιον διὰ 
πάσης ὕλης δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα 
τοῦτο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ οὐσίας. Plut. plac. 
1. 3.39 Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεὸν καὶ 
τὴν ὕλην, ὧν ὁ μέν ἐστι τοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιος ἡ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν, 
στοιχεῖα δὲ τέτταρα. Stob. Ἐπ]. τ. 10. 14 f. 126, 17 Ζήνων 
Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην στοιχεῖα δὲ 
τέτταρα. Diels,p. 289, adds the following passages:—Achill. 
Tat. p. 124 Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς εἶναι λέγει τῶν ὅλων 
θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, θεὸν μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὕλην δὲ τὸ ποιούμενον, ἀφ᾽ 
ὧν τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα γεγονέναι. Philo, de Provid. 1. 22 
Zeno Mnaseae filius aerem deum materiam et elementa qua- 

-tuor [aerem is a blunder arising from ἀρχάς (Diels), which 

seems better than Stein’s suggestion (Psych. n. 31) to sub- 

stitute aethera]. Theodoret, Gr. cur. aff. rv. 12 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ 
Κιτιεύς, ὁ Μνασέου, ὁ Κράτητος φοιτητὴς ὁ τῆς Στωικῆς 
ἄρξας αἱρέσεως τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχὰς ἔφησεν εἶναι. 

Cf Sext. Math. rx..11: further authorities for the- 

Stoic school in general are given by Zeller, p. 141. 

In distinguishing between God as the active efficient 
cause of the universe and formless indeterminate matter 
as its underlying substratum Zeno is following on the 
lines laid down by Plato in the Timaeus and by Aristotle, 
cf. Theophr. frag. 48 Wimmer (speaking of Plato) δύο τὰς 
ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην, ὃ 
προσαγορεύει πανδεχές, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινοῦν, ὃ 
περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τἀγαθοῦ δυνάμει: see 

Introd. p. 25. When we remember that God is by the 


Stoics identified with fiery breath, the purest and rarest 
of all substances, while on the other hand the world itself 
is merely a temporal manifestation of the primary fire, it 
becomes apparent that the Stoic dualism is ultimately 
reducible to a monism and that the system is essentially 
hylozoistic, like those of the early Ionians (Zeller, Stoics, 
p. 155, 6. Stein, Psychologie n. 25, collects the passages 
which prove this). How far this was worked out by Zeno 
may be doubted: indeed there is no evidence to show 
that he ever passed beyond the stage of regarding the 
dual origin of the world as fundamental, and the opinion 
is now prevalent that Cleanthes by his principle of τόνος 
was the first to consciously teach the pantheistic doctrines, 
which subsequently became characteristic of Stoicism. 

δημιουργεῖν : a favourite Platonic word, recalling the dne- 
ουργὸς of the Timaeus. For the distinction between ἀρχαὶ 
and στοιχεῖα cf. Diog. L. vu. 134 διαφέρειν δὲ eae apyas 
Kal στοιχεῖα" τὰς pet van εἶναι ἀγεννήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους" 
τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθείρεσθαι. 

86. Hippolyt. Philosoph. 21, 1. p. 571 Diels Χρύ- 
outros καὶ Ζήνων οἱ ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν 
τῶν πάντων σώμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον διὰ πάντων δὲ 
. διήκειν τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ. Galen. Hist. Philos. 16. p. 241. 
Diels Ῥ. 008 Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς περὶ 
τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ διεληλυθότες οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ταύτης 
διενοήθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων θεὸν ἀσώματον, Ζήνων 
δὲ σῶμα περὶ τῆς μορφῆς μηδὲν εἰρηκότες [if we may 
rely on Diels’ text here, some modification will be required 
in Stein, Psychologie n. 88, where Kiihn’s reading ov 
κόσμον ἀλλὰ παρὰ TadTa...TL ἄλλο is adopted]. 

Cf. generally Tatian ad Graee. c. 25 ᾿ 162 c (speaking 
of the Stoics) σῶμά τις εἶναι λέγει θεόν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀσώματον. 

August. adv. Acad. m1. 17. 38 (quoted below). 


τὸ καθαρώτατο. “God is spoken of as being Fire, 
Aether, Air, most commonly as being πνεῦμα or Atmo- 
spheric Current, pervading everything without excep- 
tion, what is most base and ugly as well as what is 
most beautiful,” Zeller, Stoics p. 148, who gives the 
authorities in the notes. καθαρώτατον is used with 
special reference to διήκειν, cf. Sext. Emp. vil. 375 οὐδὲ 
τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τοῦτο [τὐπωσιν] ἐπιτήδειον, 
λεπτομερέστατον καὶ εὔρουν παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμά- 
των ὑπάρχον. Ar. Metaph.1. 8. 3, 4 (speaking of those of 
his predecessors who had explained generation by σύγκρι- 
σις and διάκρισις) τῇ μὲν yap ἂν δόξειε στοιχειωδέστατον 
εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὗ γίγνονται συγκρίσει πρώτου, τοιοῦτον 
δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἂν εἴη τῶν σωμά- 
των. διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι μάλιστα ὁμολο- 
᾿γουμένως ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν. Krische, Forschungen 
p. 382. | 

πρόνοιαν like rationem in the next frag. brings into pro- 
minence the spiritual side of the Stoic conception of God, 
which is everywhere strangely blended with the material. 

37. Οἷς. N. D. τ. 36, rationem quandam per omnem 
rerum naturam pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat. 
Cf. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. m1. 2. 9 (111 36) Diels. p. 592 
ἔλεγε δὲ πάντα διήκειν τὸ θεῖον. 

rationem: the Heraclitean λόγος, Introd. p. 22. 

38. Tertullian, ad Nat. 1. 4, ecce enim Zeno quoque 
materiam mundialem a deo separat et eum per illam 
tamquam mel per favos transisse dicit. Cf. id. adv. 
Hermog. 44 Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam 
decucurrisse quomodo mel per favos (quoted by Stein, 
Psychologie, p. 35, n. 43). 

favos: κηρία. Zeno’s fondness for simile has been 



observed upon in the Introd. p. 33. Virgil’s lines are 
well known, Georg. Iv. 219 sqq. His quidam signis atque 
haec exempla secuti Esse apibus partem divinae mentis et 
haustus Aetherios dixere; deum namque ire per omnes 
Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum. It is 
curious that bees should have suggested themselves to 
both writers, though in a different way, in connection 
with the same thought, cf. Cic. Acad. 1. 120 cuius 
(divinae sollertiae) vos majestatem deducitis usque ad 
apium formicarumque perfectionem ut etiam inter deos 
Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opusculorum fabricator 
fuisse videatur. 

separat: if this is pressed, we must conclude that 
Zeno never identified God with matter: see n. on frag. 35. 

39. Cic. N. 1). 1. 36, Zeno naturalem legem divinam 
esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem pro- 
hibentemque contraria. Lactant. Inst. 1. 5 Item Zeno 
{deum nuncupat) divinam naturalemque legem. Minuce. 
Felic. Octav. 19. 10 Zeno naturalem legem atque divinam... 
omnium esse principium. 

Cf. Diog. L. vil. 88, ὡς ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν 6 νόμος 6 
κοινὸς ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ 
αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Διὶ καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοική- 
σεως ὄντι. Schol. on Lucan 11. 9 hoe secundum Stoicos 
dicit, qui adfirmant mundum prudentia ac lege firmatum, 
ipsumque deum esse sibi legem. Law regarded in its 
moral rather than its physical aspect is defined in similar 
terms in Stob. ἘΠ]. τι. 7. 11° p. 96, 10 = Floril. 46, 12 τόν 
τε νόμον σπουδαῖον εἶναί φασι λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα προσ- 
τακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποι- 
ητέον repeated at τι. 7. 11], p. 102, 4. 

Gods and men are influenced by the same law “ quae 
est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio” Cic. N.D. τι. 78. 


Law is the human counterpart of the “ratio summa 
insita in natura” id. Leg. 1. 18. The origin of law is 
simultaneous with that of the divine mind: quamobrem 
lex vera atque princeps apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum 
ratio est recta summi Iovis, id. ib. 0. 10. For Zeno Right 
exists φύσει and not merely θέσει, cf. Krische p. 371. 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 708. 

40. Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 8, δεῖ τὴν <d>vvapw 
οὖσαν cuva<T>TiKny oike<i>ws τῶν μερῶςν» Tpd<s 
ἄξιλληλα καὶ éx...wv τὴν δ᾽ ava<tor)>v h<di>ov καὶ 
κύκκλησιν; ἢ περίοδον. 

The position of these words with reference to their 
context corresponding to Cic. N.D. 1. 36 points to Zeno’s 
authorship. “Stoica frustula dubitanter ad Zenonem 
refero” Diels p, 542. 

τὴν δύναμι. This is evidently a Stoic description of 
God as the power which binds the parts of the world 
together and keeps them in union. 

συναπτικήν. We should expect συνεκτικήν, which is 
the more natural word in this connection. Sext. Math. 
1X. 84 ἀνάγκη dpa ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτὸν (τὸν κόσμον) 
φύσεως συνέχεσθαι ἐπεὶ καὶ περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεις 
«τοιαύτη δὲ τυγχάνουσα θεός ἐστιν. On the other hand 
συνάπτω συναφή and the like are technically applied to 
the structure of manufactured articles, which are said to 
be ἐκ συναπτομένων) (ἡνωμένα : ib. 78 ἐκ συναπτομένων 
δὲ τὰ ἔκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἕν τε κεφάλαιον νευόν- 
των συνεστῶτα ὡς ἁλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ νῆες. 

41. Cic. N.D. 1. 36, aethera deum dicit (Zeno). Ter- 
tullian adv. Marcion I. 13 deos pronuntiaverunt...ut Zeno 
aerem et aetherem. Minuc. Fel. 19. 10 aethera interdiu 
omnium esse principium. Cic. Acad. 1. 126 Zenoni et 
reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus [if fere 


is pressed here, it points to the exception of Cleanthes, 
but see on Cleanth. fr. 15]. 

aethera not to be confounded ἜΤ ἀὴρ, which is one 
of the four elements and subject to destruction ; aerem in 
Tertull. is probably a blunder, unless with Stein, Psych. 
n. 80, aut should be read for et. The aether here in 
question is an equivalent of πνεῦμα or of πῦρ τεχνικόν, 
ie. it is merely one of the labels convenient to express 
the material essence of God. Neither πῦρ nor αἰθὴρ is 
regarded in itself as a complete description. For the 
distinction between the Stoic αἰθὴρ and the Heraclitean 
πῦρ see Stein, Psychologie p. 26 and n. 31. The Stoic 
deity is at once corporeal and rational: but how far it may 
be said to have been personified cannot be determined: in 
fact, as has been remarked, the ancients seem to have 
grasped the notion of personification with much less 
distinctness than modern thinkers. 

42. Stob. Ecl. 1.1. 29” p. 35, 9, Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς νοῦν 
κόσμου πύρινον (scil. θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο). August. adv, Acad. 
I. 17. 38 nam et deum ipsum ignem putavit (Zeno). 

Cf. Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 1. 29° p. 38, 2 ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν 
ἐναιθέριον εἶναι θεόν. 

For the Stoic conception of the World-Soul see Stein, 
Psychologie p. 41, who distinguishes the world soul from 
the Aether God, the former being an offshoot from the 
latter. “Die Weltseele ist nur ein Absenker jenes Ur- 
pneumarestes der als Gott Aether unser Weltganzes 
umspannt ; sie ist als Ausfluss der Gottheit jenes kiinst- 
lerische gottliche Feuer (πῦρ τεχνικὸν) das die Keimkriifte 
(σπερματικοὺς λόγους) der Weltbildung im allgemeinen 
und der Einzelbildungen insbesondere in sich enthilt.” 
In regarding νοῦς as an indwelling material essence Zeno 
revived the position formerly taken up by Diogenes of 


Apollonia in opposition to Anaxagoras: see the fragment 
‘quoted by Zeller, Pre-Socraties, E. Τὶ 1. p. 287 n. 7. 

The MSS κόσμον was corrected to κόσμου by Krische 
p. 378, who supplies θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο. Hirzel τι. p. 220, 2 
prefers to put a comma after κόσμου: otherwise καὶ 

πύρινον is necessary. 
43. Themist. de An. 72b [ed. Speng. 1. p. 64, 25] 

τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος σύμφωνος ἡ δόξα διὰ 
πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις καὶ ποῦ 
μὲν εἶναι νοῦν ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν ποῦ δὲ φύσιν ποῦ δὲ ἕξιν. 
This same force, appearing in different substances, is 
called ἕξις as the bond of union for inorganic matter, 
_ φύσις in the case of. plants, ψυχη in the case of animals, 
and voids as belonging to rational beings. Diog. L. vu.139 80’ 
ὧν μὲν yap ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν Kal τῶν 
νευρῶν δι’ ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, cf. 
Cleanth. Frag. 51. Some Stoics seem however to have 
denied this distinction between ψυχὴ and νοῦς. Nemes. 
Nat. Hom. c. 1 (quoted by Stein, Psych. pp. 92, 3) τινὲς 
δὲ οὐ διέστειλαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν: ἀλλὰ τῆς 
οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τὸ νοερὸν ἡγοῦνται. Stein 
however is not justified in holding that the living principle 
of animals occupies a position midway between φύσις and 
ψυχή, as will be shown on Cleanth. frag. 44. That the 
passage is good evidence that the distinction between 
ἕξις, φύσις and ψυχὴ is Zenonian may be inferred from 
the words σύμφωνος ἡ δόξα. 

44. Lactant. de Vera Sap. c. 9, Zeno rerum naturae 
dispositorem atque artificem universitatis λόγον praedicat 
quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum 
Iovis nuncupat. Tertull. Apol. 21 Apud vestros quoque 
sapientes λόγον id est sermonem atque rationem constat 
artificem videri universitatis. Hune enim Zeno determinat 



factitatorem qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit eundem 
et fatum vocari et deum et animum Iovis et necessitatem 
omnium rerum. Mainuce. Fel. 19. 10 rationem deum vocat 
Zeno. Lact. Inst. Iv. 9 siquidem Zeno rerum naturae dis- 
positorem atque opificem universitatis λόγον praedicat 
quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum 
Jovis nuncupat: ea scilicet consuetudine qua solent Iovem 
pro deo accipere. 

45. Stob. Ecl. 1. 5. 15. p. 78, 18, Ζήνων 6 Στωικὸς 
ἐν TO περὶ φύσεως (THY εἱμαρμένην) δύναμιν κινητικὴν τῆς 
ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν 
πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν. Theodoret, Graec. Aff. Cur. 
vi. 14. p. 87, 26 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτεὺς δύναμιν κέκληκε 
τὴν εἱμαρμένην κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ 
πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν ὠνόμασεν. 

μὴ διαφέρειν. God receives different names, while his 
essence is constant, owing to the various phases of his 
union with matter (τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνειν Sv 
ὅλης τῆς ὕλης δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε παράλλαξαν Stob. Ecl. 1. 
1. 29b p. 37, 23, according to Diels and Wachsmuth ἃ 
mistake for διὰ tas τῆς ὕλης Ov ἧς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξεις). 
Thus he is Fate as acting in accordance with a constant 
law, Forethought as working to an end, and Nature as 
creator of the word. Cf. Athenag. Supplic. ο. 6. p. 7B 
οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς Kav ταῖς προσηγορίαις κατὰ τὰς 

, a a Bee \ fe) a lal 
παραλλάξεις τῆς VANS, δι’ ἧς φασι τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ 
θεοῦ, πληθύνωσι τὸ θεῖον τοῖς ὀνόμασι, τῷ γοῦν ἔργῳ 
ἕνα νομίζουσι τὸν θεόν" εἰ yap ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν 
can , 5. \ , , > ΝΥ 
ὁδῷ βαάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας 
τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ᾽ ods ἕκαστα καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην 
γίνεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, 
ς \ e > ’ \ \ \ Ν \ / a “, 

ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης 
> , “ \ κ᾿ \ 7 \ \ \ ᾽ 
ὀνομαζόμενος Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ 


ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκεν καλούμενος. In 
this connection it may be observed that Gercke(Chrysippea, 
p- 697) is mistaken in speaking of a fragment of Zeno 
as préserved by Aristocles ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 14. The 
reference there is to the Stoics generally and not to Zeno 
in particular. 

45a. Diog. L. vit. 149, καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ 
πάντα γίγνεσθαι Χρύσιππος...καὶ ἸΠοσειδώνιος... καὶ 
Ζήνων Βοηθὸς δέ. 

Since εἱμαρμένη is identical with πρόνοια, it follows 
that everything is produced κατὰ πρόνοιαν. Cleanthes, 
however, demurred to this (frag. 18). 

46. Cic. N.D. π΄ 57, Zeno igitur ita naturam definit 
ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum pro- 
gredientem via. Censet enim artis maxime proprium 
esse creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum 
artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam 
efficere, id est, ut dixi, ignem artificiosum magistrum ar- 
tium reliquarum. Cic. Acad. 1. 39 Zeno statuebat ignem 
esse ipsam naturam. N.D. ul. 27 naturae artificiose 
ambulantis, ut ait Zeno. Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 9) adds 
Tertull. ad. Nat. 11. 2 cuius (ignis) instar vult esse naturam 

The Greek of the definition is ἡ φύσις ἐστι πῦρ τεχνι- 
κὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον eis γένεσιν, Diog. L. vit. 156. Clem. 
Alex. Strom. v. p. 597. φύσις is only another name for 
God viewed in his creative capacity. Hence Stob. Ἐπὶ. 1. 
1, 29” p. 37, 20 of Στωικοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ 
τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς. 
πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ᾽ ods ἅπαντα καθ᾽ 
εἱμαρμένην γίνεται : Athenag. 1. 6. Wellmann, p. 472 and 
Weygoldt p. 35 think that λόγος σπερματικὸς is a Zenonian 
expression, So Stein, Psych. p. 49 and n. 87. 


47. ‘Tatian ad Graec. c. 3, p. 143.0, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀπο- 
δειχθήσεται κακῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν (scil. Ζήνωνα) ποιητής, ἐν 
ἀμάραις τε καὶ σκώληξι καὶ ἀρρητουργοῖς καταγινόμενος. 

Cf. Clem. Alex. Protrept. ὅ § 66 οὐδὲ μὴν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς 
Στοᾶς παρελεύσομαι διὰ πάσης ὕλης καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμο- 
τάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας" οἱ καταισχύνουσιν ἀτεχ- 
vos τὴν φιλοσοφίαν: Sext. Pyrrh. mt. 218 Στωικοὶ δὲ 
πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν : Cic. Acad. τι. 120 cur 
deus omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis— 
tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera 
tam multa et perniciosa terra marique disperserit? We 
have no information as to what answer Zeno made to this 
objection, but the later Stoics said that physical evils 
ultimately served a good purpose: so Chrysippus ap. Plut. 
Sto. Rep. 21, 4 quoted by Zeller, p. 189. As to the 
existence of moral evil see on Cleanth. fr. 48, 1.17 and 
Wellmann’s discussion at p. 472. 

48. Cic. N. D. τι. 58, Ipsius vero mundi qui omnia 
complexu suo coercet et continet natura non artificiosa 
solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur consultrix 
et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. 

An ingenious explanation of this difficult passage is 
given by Stein, Psychologie, pp. 42, 43 in accordance 
with his view of the distinction between World-Soul and 
Aether-God. “Die natura artificiosa ist unseres Erach- 
tens die Weltseele, wihrend die natura plane artifex 
sich auf den Gott Aether oder das ἡγεμονικὸν der Welt 
bezieht.” The πνεῦμα which permeates the universe is 
ignis artificiosus and only secondarily represents God, 
since it is an efflux from him. It cannot be described 
as plane artifex, a term which is applied to God (σῶμα 
τὸ καθαρώτατον), whereas the world-soul is less καθαρὸν 
from its combination with matter. 


artifex: probably a translation of τεχνίτης Diog. L. 
vu. 86, but Hirzel 11. p. 220 represents it by reap 
in which case ef. Diog. L. vil. 137. 

49. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 290, Plerique tamen silvam 
separant ab essentia, ut Zeno et Chrysippus. Silvam 
quippe dicunt esse id quod subest his omnibus quae 
habent qualitates, essentiam vero primam rerum omnium 
silvam vel antiquissimum fundamentum earum, suapte 
natura sine vultu et informe: ut puta aes, aurum, ferrum, 
et caetera huius modi silva est eorum, quae ex iisdem 
fabrefiunt, non tamen essentia. At vero quod tam his 
quam ceteris ut sint causa est, ipsum esse substantiam. 

This passage shows that Zeno distinguished between 
οὐσία and vAn—the former the indeterminate and formless 
matter underlying the universe, and the latter the stuff 
out of which a particular thing is made. ὕλη is thus 
from one point of view the more general term, since οὐσία 
Ξ- πρώτη ὕλη (frag. 51). Cf. Dexipp. ad Cat. Schol. Arist. 
Brandis 45 a 21 ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκειμένον διττὸν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς 
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἕν μὲν τὸ λεγό- 
μενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη ἣν δυνάμει σῶμα 
ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης φησὶν δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν 
ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίστατο κιτίλ. Similarly Arist. Metaph. 
vu. 4. 1044 a 15 distinguishes πρώτη and οἰκεία ὕλη and 
ib. Iv. 24. 1023 a 27 says that material origin may be 
specified in two ways ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἢ κατὰ 
τὸ ὕστατον εἶδος οἷον ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἅπαντα τὰ τηκτὰ ἐξ 
ὕδατος (i.e. brass as being fusible comes from water) ἔστι 
δ᾽ ὡς ἐκ χαλκοῦ ὁ ἀνδριάς. The point of view of Posi- 
donius is different: he holds διαφέρειν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς 
ὕλης τὴν «αὐτὴν; οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ 
μόνον. Stob. Ecl. 1. 11. 5°, p. 133, 22. Wellmann (Neue 
Jahrb. vol. 115, p. 808) denies that it is a necessary inference 


from this passage that Zeno taught the doctrine of the 
four Stoic categories. Stein, Psych. n. 73, explaining the 
passage generally as above, apparently identifies οὐσία 
with κοινῶς ποιόν, and ὕλη with ἰδίως ποιόν, but this 
distinction is a subordinate one, for οὐσία is entirely 
distinct from ποιόν, whether κοινῶς or ἰδίως, as Dexipp. 
lic. shows. 

50. Chalcid. in Tim. ο. 292. Deinde Zeno hanc ipsam 
essentiam finitam esse dicit unamque eam communem 
omnium quae sunt esse substantiam, dividuam quoque 
et usque quaque mutabilem: partes quippe eius verti, 
sed non interire, ita ut de existentibus consumantur in 
nihilum. Sed ut innumerabilium diversarum, etiam 
cerearum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec 
ullam omnino qualitatem propriam fore censet funda- 
menti rerum omnium silvae, coniunctam tamen esse 
semper et inseparabiliter cohaerere alicui qualitati. Cum- 
que tam sine ortu sit quam sine interitu, quia neque de 
non existente subsistit neque. consumetur in nihilum, 
non deesse ei spiritum ac vigorem ex aeternitate, qui 
moveat eam rationabiliter totam interdum, nonnumquam 
pro portione, quae causa sit tam crebrae tamque vehe- 
mentis universae rei conversionis ; spiritum porro motivum 
illum fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem rationabi- 
lem, quae vivificans sensilem mundum exornaverit eum 
ad hanc, qua nunc inlustratur, venustatem. Quem qui- 
dem beatum animal et deum adpellant. 

fintam. This is in strong contrast with Epicurean 
teaching: it follows from the Stoic doctrine of the unity 
of the world, and is connected with that of the infinity 
of space, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 18. 44 p. 161, 19 
tov δὲ τόπον (1.6. full space) πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν 
σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι. καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν πεπε- 

UP, 7 


ρασμένον εἶναι οὕτως τὸ ἀσώματον ἄπειρον, Diog. VIL. 150 
σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία καὶ πεπερασμένη. The 
Stoic view is refuted by Lucr. 1. 1008—1051, who con- 
cludes thus:— infinita opus est vis undique materiai. 
Similarly Diog. L. x. 41 εἴτε yap ἦν τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον 
τὰ δὲ σώματα ὡρισμένα, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν ἔμενε τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα, οὐκ ἔχοντα 
τὰ ὑπερείδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀντικοπάς. 

unamque eam ete. See on frag. 51. 

cerearum : wax is chosen as being one of the most 
pliable substances. Cf. Sext. Math. vil. 375 ὁ μαλακώ- 
τατος κηρός...τυποῦται μὲν ὑπό τινος ἅμα νοήματι διὰ τὴν 
ὑγρότητα οὐ συνέχει δὲ τὸν τύπον. A very close parallel} 
will be found in Ov. Met. xv. 169: (of Pythagoras) 

utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris, 
nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem, 
sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper 

esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras. 

neque formam ete. Cf. Posid. ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 11. 5° 
p. 133, 18 τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ 
ἄμορφον εἶναι καθ᾽ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει 
σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀεὶ δ᾽ ἔν τινε σχήματι 
καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. In this respect the Stoics simply 
adopted Aristotle’s conception of ὕλη, ef. Metaph. Z. 3. 
1029 a 20 λέγω δ᾽ ὕλην ἣ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν 
μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. Arist. ap. 
Stob. Ecl. 1. 11. 4, p. 132 foll. concluding thus :---δεῖν γὰρ 
ἀμφοῖν (1.6. ὕλης καὶ εἴδους) τῆς συνόδου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
σώματος ὑπόστασιν. The distinction between the two 
schools is that, whereas the Stoics defined ὕλη as σῶμα 
(Stob. Ecl. 1. 11. δὴ p. 133, 16), Aristotle declared it to be 
σωματικὴ merely, but this distinction is more apparent 
than real. 



sine ortu: ἀΐδιος, σύγχρονος τῷ θεῷ, infra frag. 51. 

neque de non eaistente: the denial of ἁπλῶς γένεσις 
ἐκ μὴ ὄντος is common to all ancient philosophy. See 
Tyndall, fragments of Science p. 91 (quoted by Munro on 
Luer. 1. 150), “One fundamental thought pervades all 
these statements, there is one taproot from which they 
all spring: this is the ancient notion that out of nothing 
nothing comes, that neither in the organic world, nor in 
the inorganic, is power produced without the expenditure 
of other power.” Cf. Posidonius ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 20. 7, 
Ῥ. 178, 2, τὴν μὲν yap ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων Kal τὴν εἰς οὐκ 
ὄντα (φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν)... ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὖσαν. 
M. Aurel. Iv. 4. 

moveat, κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης, frag. 45. 

non naturam: in apparent contradiction to frag. 46, 
but we shall probably explain: the πνεῦμα is not merely 
φύσις, it is also ψυχή, nay more it is ψυχὴ λόγον ἔχουσα, 
Le. νοῦς. 

animal, frag. 62. dewm: observe that this is attributed 
to the school in general and not to Zeno in particular, 
cf. frag. 66. 

51. Stob. ἘΠ]. 1. 11. 5°, p. 132, 26. Ζήνωνος" οὐσίαν 
δὲ εἶναι THY τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ 
πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω" 

\ \ ,ὔ if. ᾽ + ieee ’ Ἂς ,ὔ > δ ὃ 
τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ διαμένειν ἀλλὰ διαι- 
ρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ 

Ν a a 
παντὸς λόγον, ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἱόνπερ ἐν TH 
γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα. Ἐρίρῃδη. Haeres. 1. 5, Diels, p. 558, 

, ? \ ᾽ν , \ “ , a 
paces οὖν καὶ οὗτος (Ζήνων) τὴν ὕλην σύγχρονον καλῶν 
τῷ θεῷ ἴσα ταῖς ἄλλαις αἱρέσεσιν, εἱμαρμένην τε εἶναι 
καὶ γένεσιν ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται καὶ πάσχει. Diog. 
L. vil. 150, οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν 

, 7 

2. “ As , a Ἂ al ᾽ 4 \ 

πρωτην ὕλην ὡς... Ζήνων... καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε Kal 



ὕλη ἥ τε τῶν πάντων Kal ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. ἡ μὲν οὖν 
τῶν ὕλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται ἡ δὲ τῶν 
ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Tertull. de Praes. 
Cup. c. 7, et ubi materia cum deo exaequatur Zenonis 
disciplina est. 

Cf Chalcid. in Tim. ο. 294, Stoici deum scilicet hoc 
esse quod silva sit vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem 
deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare, velut semen 
per membra genitalia. 

οὔτε πλέω The ἄποιος ὕλη is, as we have seen, 
ὡρισμένη and πεπερασμένη: being also ἀΐδιος it is in- 
capable of increase or diminution. Its parts however (i.e. 
matter as seen in the ἰδίως ποιὸν or individually deter- 
mined thing) are subject to destruction and change. See 
the further authorities cited by Zeller, Stoics, p. 101, n. 2: 

διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. Strictly speaking both these 
terms are to be distinguished from the theory of inter- 
mingling which was characteristic of Stoicism (κρᾶσις 
8’ ὅλων, and see infra). Thus διαίρεσις is the sepa- 
ration of substances which have been combined by 
παράθεσις, e.g. a heap of barley, wheat or beans, while 
σύγχυσις is the chemical fusion of two distinct substances 
which lose their essential properties in consequence of the 
process (Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 17. 4, p. 154, 10—155, 
14). The Stoic κρᾶσις or μῖξις is distinguished from the 
former by its implication of entire permeation, and from 
the latter owing to the retention of their properties by 
the ingredients. 

52. Stob. Ecl. τ. 17. 3, p. 152, 19. Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως 
ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαῤῥήδην" τοιαύτην δὲ δεήσει εἶναι ἐν 
περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅταν ἐκ 
πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι᾿’ ἀέρος γένηται, τὸ μέν τι ὑφίσ- 
τασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι [καὶ] ἐκ τοῦ λουποῦ δὲ τὸ 


\ ’ A > \ lal > , ΝᾺ / 
μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιξομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι 
λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μῖξιν 
«καὶ» κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων 

a , vA 3° 6 7 δυο , 

μεταβολῇ σώματος ὅλου δι᾽ ὅλου τινὸς ἑτέρου διερχομένου. 
Diog. L. vil. 135, 136, ἕν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ 
εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλαῖς τε ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσ- 
ονομάξεσθαι. κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν 
τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ' καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ 
γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν 
λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 
εὐεργὸν αὑτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς 
γένεσιν" εἶτα ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα 

fal [72 δι, lol / \ \ > a , 3: A 
πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν τῷ 
περὶ τοῦ ὅχου. Diog. 1. vil. 142, γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον 
ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα 
τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτο- 

\ > a iN pant eet omeh § , \ a ᾽ 

μερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπο- 
γεννήσῃ" εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ 

\ Μ- ,ὔ \ \ > lal , \ a “Ὁ 
τὰ ἄλλα γένη. περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς 

“- , ,Ἶ ᾿ \ >’ a \ “ 
τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου, κ.τ.λ. 
Probus ad Verg. p. 10, 33 K. ex his (quatuor elementis) 
omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt Zenon Citieus 
et Chrysippus Solaeus et Cleanthes Assius. 

ἐν περιόδῳ: these words seem to refer to the periodic 

renewal of the world after each ἐκπύρωσις and to a 
constantly recurring cycle in the course of the universe, 
rather than to the mutual interchange of the four elements 
which goes on during the actual existence of the world, 
cf. Mare. Aurel. X. 7, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν 

ae , » \ / > / » 
τοῦ ὅλου λόγον, εἴτε κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρουμένου εἴτε K.T.DV. 
Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 18,1, ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς 
πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης ἐξυγροῦσθαι 
πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας εἰς πῦρ αἰθε- 
ρῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. 


ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ κτλ. The evolution of ὕδωρ 
from the πῦρ τεχνικὸν is first described and then the 
subsequent generation of the four elements from τὸ 
ὑγρόν. This appears more clearly in the first extract 
from Diogenes than in the actual words of Zeno as 
reported by Stobaeus. Zeno is here following very closely 
in the footsteps of Heraclitus (πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον 
O@dracca’ θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῇ τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ 
πρηστήρ, R. and P. ὃ 30) but differs from him in adopting 
the theory of the four elements, and to this fact is due 
the introduction of the words δ ἀέρος. Cf. also the 
account of Anaximenes, ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 6 a, ’Avafi- 
μένης ἀραιούμενον μὲν τὸν ἀέρα πῦρ γίγνεσθαί φησι, 
πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἶτα νέφος, εἶτα ἔτι μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, 
εἶτα γῆν, εἶτα λίθους τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτων. The ἄνω 
κάτω ὁδὸς appears clearly in the passage in Stobaeus, cf. 
Cleanth. frag. 21. There are certain difficulties in this 
account of the διακόσμησις, which, although not discussed 
in the authorities, it is right to state even if no satis- 
factory solution of them can be given. (1) Is the ἐξύ- 
γρωσις entirely distinct from and anterior to the formation 
of the four elements? If Diog.’s account is based upon 
Zeno, this question must be answered in the affirmative, 
but in Stobaeus it appears rather as an ordinary stage in 
the κάτω ὁδός. That an entire resolution of the πῦρ 
τεχνικὸν into ὑγρόν (except as regards τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ 
πυρός) was taught by the Stoa is also clear from Cornut. 
c. 17, p. 85, Osann. ἔστι δὲ Χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακοσ- 
μήσεως γενόμενον ὑγρόν, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὕτως ὦνο- 
μασμένον, ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ὅ ἐστιν οἱονεὶ κάος...ἦν δέ ποτε, ὦ 
παῖ, πῦρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ γενήσεται πάλιν ἐν περιόδῳ" 
σβεσθέντος δ᾽ εἰς ἀέρα αὐτοῦ μεταβολὴ ἀθρόα γίνεται 
εἰς ὕδωρ" ὃ δὴ λαμβάνει τοῦ μὲν ὑφισταμένου μέρους τῆς 
οὐσίας κατὰ πύκνωσιν τοῦ δὲ λεπτυνομένου κατὰ ἀραίωσιν. 


(2) Is the éEvypwous merely a step in the creative process 
or is it to be regarded, as it apparently was by Cleanthes, 
as the antithesis of the ἐκπύρωσις ἡ Perhaps it is safest 
to regard Zeno as an exponent of the simple ὁδὸς ἄνω 
κάτω and to treat the complications in connection with 
the τόνος theory of Cleanthes (frag. 24). 

τροπῆ, codd. corr. Heeren. τραπῇ, Mein. (del. γένηται) 
coll. D. L. vir. 142. 

λεπτυνομένου, «.t.A. 15 the corr. of Wachsm. for the MSs. ἔκ 
τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, coll. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 3. 

μῖξιν. The mixture of dry substances )( κρᾶσιν the 
fusion of moist. For a full discussion of the peculiar 
Stoic doctrine, see Zeller, Stoics, p. 136 foll. It carries 
with it practically a negation of the physical truth that 
two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Chrysippus, 
who devoted much attention both to the positive expo- 
sition and controversial defence of this doctrine, illustrated 
it by several practical examples, one of which, from its 
obscurity, deserves consideration: καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος 
ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται συμ- 
φθαρήσεται (Diog. L. vit. 151), i.e. the disappearance of the 
wine particles can only be explained on the hypothesis of 
their equable distribution. Stein observes (Psych. nn. 29,35) 
that the Ionian ἀλλοίωσις is not found in the Stoa before 
Marcus Aurelius, but this is inaccurate. Thus Posidonius, 
ap. Stob. Eel. 1. 25, p. 178, 7, after explaining that there 
are four kinds of μεταβολή, (1) κατὰ διαίρεσιν, (2) κατ᾽ 
ἀλλοίωσιν, (3) κατὰ σύγχυσιν, (4) ἐξ ὅλων or κατ᾽ 
ἀνάλυσιν, proceeds :---τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς 
λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γινομένους. 

53. Galen, εἰς τὸ ‘Itrroxpatou ὑπόμνημα περὶ χυμῶν 
I, (XVI. 32 K.) Ζήνων τε ὁ Κιτιεὸς [ὃς] τὰς ποιότητας οὕτω 


καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι’ ὅλου κεράννυσθαι ἐνόμιξεν, id. de nat. 
facult. 1. 2, εἰ δ᾽ ὥσπερ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι᾿ 
ὅλων κεράννυσθαι χρὴ νομίζειν, ὡς ὕστερον ἀπεφήνατο 
Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεός. (Galen says that this theory was ulti- 
mately due to Hippocrates, from whom Aristotle took it.) 

The best commentary on this frag. is to be found in 
Sext. Pyrrh. 111. 57—62, which contains a statement and 
refutation of the doctrine here referred to. The following 
short summary will make the meaning clear :—Things 
which are subject to the influence of κρᾶσις are them- 
selves a combination of οὐσία and ποιότητες: when 
mixture takes place, we must either say that the οὐσίαι 
are mixed or that the ποιότητες are mixed, or that both 
or neither are mixed. The last alternative is obviously 
absurd, and the same may be shown to be the case with 
either of the two first, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι Kal ai ποιότητες 
τῶν κιρναμένων καὶ ai οὐσίαι χωροῦσι δι’ ἀλλήλων Kal 
μιγνύμεναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν (§ 59). But this is 
still more absurd. Mix one spoonful of hemlock juice 
with ten of water: if both entirely permeate each other, 
they must occupy the same space and be equal to each 
other. The result of the mixture ought therefore to give 
us either 20 spoonfuls or 2. The whole discussion is 
one which strikes a modern reader as particularly barren 
and pedantic, but it should never be forgotten that to the 
Stoics ποιότης was material no less than οὐσία. “ Aris- 
totle’s εἶδος becomes a current of air or gas (πνεῦμα), the 
essential reason of the thing is itself material, standing to 
it in the relation of a gaseous to a solid body.” (Encycl. 
Brit. Art. Stoics.) 

54. Stob. Ecl. 1. 20. 1°, p.171, 2. Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει 
καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον eis 
σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτε- 



λεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἵα πρότερον ἦν. Euseb. P. E. 
XV. 18. 3, ἀρέσκει γὰρ τοῖς Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὴν ὅχην 
οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν εἰς πῦρ οἷον εἰς σπέρμα καὶ πάλιν ἐκ 
τούτου αὐτὴν ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἵα τὸ πρό- 
τερον ἦν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως οἱ 
πρῶτοι καὶ πρεσβύτατοι προσήκαντο Ζήνων τε καὶ 
Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρύσιππος. Arnob. ad Nat. τι. 9, qui ignem 
minatur mundo et venerit cum tempus arsurum, non 
Panaetio, Chrysippo, Zenoni (credit) ? 

The Stoic authorities for the doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις 
will be found collected in Zeller, p. 164 n.2. On this 
point they were opposed to the Peripatetics who held the 
ἀφθαρσία of the κόσμος, and even some of the later Stoics, 
notably Panaetius and Boethus, diverged from the teaching 
of their predecessors. It is doubtful whether Zeno derived 
the ἐκπύρωσις from Heraclitus (see Introd. p. 21): it may 
however be observed that it was far more in accordance 
with his historical position to maintain the destructibility 
of the world, at any rate, so long as we concede any 
materiality to his primal fire; if fire is a mere metaphor 
to express πάντα ῥεῖ, the case is of course very different. 
Cf. Mare. Aurel. m1. 3. The Christian writers often 
allude to the ἐκπύρωσις, which serves at once as a 
parallel and a contrast to their own doctrine, e.g. Tatian, 
adv. Graec. c. 25, p. 162 ©, ἐκπύρωσιν (λέγει τις) ἀπο- 
βαίνειν κατὰ χρόνους ἐγὼ δὲ εἰσάπαξ. Justin Martyr, 
Apol. I. 20. 20, p. 66 D. 

τὸ wip, add. εἰς Heeren whom Heinze, Logos, p. 111, 
follows, but the alteration is needless, For σπέρμα cf. M. 
Aurel. Iv. 36. 

55. Tatian, adv. Graec. c. 5, τὸν Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπυ- 
ρώσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω δὲ Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ κατη- 


yopeiv Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ξενοκτονεῖν καὶ “Hpaxdéa πάλιν 
ἐπὶ τῷ ἀθλεῖν παραιτητέον. 

Cf. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 38, ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν 
Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι 
καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειριεῖσθαι 
καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίσ- 
τασθαι. The exact repetition in some future cycle of the 
world’s course of the events that have already happened 
was maintained also by the Pythagoreans, cf. Simpl. Phys. 
173 a, εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν 
τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ, κἀγὼ μυθολογεύσω τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων 
ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει 
καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὔχογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (quoted by 
Zeller, Pre-Socratics I. p. 474, n. 2). The Stoies were the 
more inclined to adopt such a view in consequence of 
their belief in the unswerving operation of the decrees of 
destiny. Somewhat analogous are the consequences which 
flowed from the Epicurean theory of an infinite number 
of worlds: ef. Cic. Acad. π΄ 125, et ut nos nunc simus ad 
Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus 
in locis isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, 
ingeniis, formis, aetatibus isdem de rebus disputantis? 
The subject is well treated by Ogereau, Essai, p. 70. 

maparnréov: Tatian’s objection to the Stoic theory is 
based on the ground that there is no progress towards 
perfection, the bad will be again more numerous than 
the just: Socrates and Heracles belong to a very small 

56. [Philo.] περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, cc. 23, 24, p. 510, 
11, foll. Mang. p. 264, 3 Bern. p. 486, Diels. Θεόφραστος 
μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου κατη- 
γοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, Yn 


’ , , BU , ς , a ne 
ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἑκάστου TOV τοῦ ὅλου 
μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζῴων. κατα- 
σκευάζειν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὕτως" “εἰ μὴ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν 
Ν. €. A , e \ 9 \ x »Μ ᾽ a e A 
ἔλαβεν ἡ γῆ, μέρος ὑπανεστὸς οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι αὐτῆς ἑωρᾶτο, 
\ > wv \ ow , > ΣΙ , \ e , 
χθαμαλὰ δ᾽ ἤδη τὰ ὄρη πάντ᾽ ἐγεγένητο, καὶ οἱ γεώλοφοι 
πάντες ἰσόπεδοι τῇ πεδιάδι" τοσούτων γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
> \ wv ’ Ἰιδί / > ᾿ ba A ὃ , 
ἐνιαυτὸν ὄμβρων ἐξ ἀϊδίου φερομένων εἰκὸς ἦν τῶν διηρμένων 
πρὸς ὕψος τὰ μὲν χειμάρροις ἀπερρῆχθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπονοστή- 
, U \ \ ͵ ΕΣ iA ἃ 
σαντα κεχαλάσθαι, πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων ἤδη λελειάνθαι 
\ \ lel > / \ 4 3 fal e \ 
νυνὶ δὲ συνεχῶς ἀνωμαλίαι Kal παμπόλλων ὀρῶν αἱ πρὸς 
> / id, «ς A ie ’ > A lal \ a x 
αἰθέριον ὕψος ὑπερβολαὶ μηνύματ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ THY γῆν μὴ 
> hi 4 Ἔ 4 , ¢€ » Ψ 9 / LA tal 
ἀΐδιον εἶναι πάλαι yap, ws ἔφην, ἐν ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ ταῖς 
ἐπομβρίαις ἀπὸ περάτων ἐπὶ πέρατα πᾶσ᾽ ἂν λεωφόρος 
> 4 / οἷ εν ts \ U > Ψ 
ἐγεγένητο. πέφυκε γὰρ ἡ ὕδατος φύσις καὶ μάλιστα ἀφ 
ὑψηλοτάτων καταράττουσα τὼ μὲν ἔξωθεν τῇ βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ 
ἢ ρ μὲν ἔξωθεν τῇ βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ 
a a a / / 
τῷ συνεχεῖ τῶν ψεκάδων κολάπτουσα κοιλαίνειν ὑπερ- 
/ , \ la \ 2 DS is 
γάζεσθαί τε THY σκληρογέων Kal λιθωδεστάτην ὀρυκτήρων 
> » ’ ἢ \ \ “ , ? ΄, εν 
οὐκ ἔλαττον. καὶ μὴν ἥ γε θάλασσα, φασίν, “ ἤδη 
μεμείωται" μάρτυρες δ᾽ αἱ νήσων εὐδοκιμώταται “Ῥόδος 
\ a ᾿ e \ \ \ \ 2 , 
τε καὶ Δῆλος" αὗται γὰρ τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἠφανισμέναι 
\ a / » > , / > 
κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδεδύκεσαν ἐπικλυζόμεναι, χρόνῳ ὃ 
ὕστερον ἐλαττουμένης ἠρέμα κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ἀνίσχουσαι, ὡς 
αἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνωαγραφεῖσαι μηνύουσιν ἱστορίαι" [τὴν δὲ 
Δῆλον καὶ ᾿Αναφὴν ὠνόμασαν δι’ ἀμφοτέρων ὀνομάτων 
! x / > \ Ay / ’ a 
πιστούμενοι TO λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ yap δήλη ἀναφανεῖσα 
> , τὰ 7 x 2 x. Ss \ , Ν x 
ἐγένετο ἀδηλουμένη καὶ ἀφανὴς οὖσα τὸ πάλαι] πρὸς δὲ 
, a / / \ a 
τούτοις μεγάλων πελαγῶν μεγάλους κόλπους καὶ βαθεῖς 
> ν᾽ a a a 
ἀναξηρανθέντας ἠἡπειρῶσθαι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι THs παρακει- 
/ a 
μένης χώρας μοῖραν οὐ λυπρὰν σπειρομένους Kal φυτευο- 
, ~ Μ a a 2 a 
μένους, ols σημεῖ ἄττα τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐναπολελεῖφθαι 
θαλαττώσεως ψηφῖδάς τε καὶ κόγχας καὶ ὅσα ὁμοιότροπα 
πρὸς αἰγιαλοὺς εἴωθεν ἀποβράττεσθαι. [διὸ καὶ Πίνδαρος 
ἐπὶ τῆς Δήλου φησί" 
Xaip’, ὦ θεοδμάτα, λιπαροπλοκάμου 









παίδεσσι Λατοῦς ἱμεροέστατον ἔρνος 
Πόντου θύγατερ, χθονὸς εὐρείας ἀκίνητον τέρας" av 
τε βροτοὶ 
40 Δᾶλον κικλήσκουσιν, μάκαρες δ᾽ ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ τηλέ- 
φαντον κυανέας χθονὸς ἄστρον. 

θυγατέρα γὰρ Πόντου τὴν Δῆλον εἴρηκε τὸ λεχθὲν αἰνιτ- 
τόμενος]. εἰ δὴ μειοῦται ἡ θάλαττα, μειωθήσεται μὲν ἡ 
γῆ, μακραῖς δ᾽ ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις καὶ εἰς ἅπαν ἑκάτερον 
- στοιχεῖον ἀναλωθήσεται, δαπανωθήσεται <dé> καὶ 6 
45 σύμπας ἀὴρ ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐλαττούμενος, ἀποκρι- 

θήσεται δὲ πάντ᾽ εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν τὴν πυρός. 
᾿ πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ τρίτου κεφαλαίου κατασκευὴν χρῶνται 
λόγῳ τοιῷδε" ‘ φθείρεται πάντως ἐκεῖνο, οὗ πάντα τὰ μέρη 
φθαρτά ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου πάντα τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, 
50 φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν. ὃ δ᾽ ὑπερεθέμεθα νῦν ἐπι- 
σκεπτέον. ποῖον μέρος τῆς γῆς, ἵν᾽ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρξώμεθα, 
μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον, οὐ χρόνῳ διαλυθήσεται; λίθων οὗ 
κραταιότατοι ap οὐ μυδῶσι καὶ σήπονται κατὰ τὴν ἕξεως 
ἀσθένειαν---. ἡ δ᾽ ἔστι πνευματικὸς τόνος, δεσμὸς οὐκ 
55 ἄρρηκτος, ἀλλὰ μόνον δυσδιάλυτος]---θρυπτόμενοι καὶ 
ῥέοντες εἰς λεπτὴν τὸ πρῶτον ἀναλύονται κόνιν ; [εἶθ᾽ 
ὕστερον δαπανηθέντες ἐξαναλύονται) τί δέ; εἰ μὴ πρὸς 
ἀνέμων ῥιπίζοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀκίνητον ἐαθὲν οὐχ ὑφ᾽ ἡσυχίας 
νεκροῦται ; μεταβάλλει γοῦν καὶ δυσωδέστατον γίγνεταε 
60 οἷα ψυχὴν ἀφῃρημένον ζῷον. αἵ γε μὴν ἀέρος φθοραὶ 
παντί τῳ δῆλαι" νοσεῖν γὰρ καὶ φθίνειν καὶ τρόπον τιν᾽ 
ἀποθνήσκειν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ τί ἄν τις, μὴ στοχαζόμενος 
ὀνομάτων εὐπρεπείας ἀλλὰ τἀληθοῦς, εἴποι λοιμὸν εἶναι 
πλὴν ἀέρος θάνατον τὸ οἰκεῖον πάθος ἀναχέοντος ἐπὶ 
65 φθορᾷ πάντων ὅσα ψυχῆς μεμοίραται ; τί χρὴ μακρη- 
γορεῖν περὶ πυρός ; ἀτροφῆσαν γὰρ αὐτίκα σβέννυται 
χωλόν, ἣ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί, γεγονὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. διὸ σκηριπ- 
τόμενον ὀρθοῦται κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀναφθείσης ὕλης νομήν, 
ἐξαναλωθείσης δ᾽ ἀφανίζεται. [τὸ παραπλήσιον μέντοι 


καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ᾿Ινδικὴν δράκοντάς φασι πάσχειν. 70 
\ a , 
ἀνέρποντας yap ἐπὶ Ta μέγιστα τῶν ζῴων ἐλέφαντας 
A 4 - A F 
περὶ νῶτα Kal νηδὺν ἅπασαν εἱλεῖσθαι, φλέβα δ᾽ ἣν ἂν 
τύχῃ διελόντας ἐμπίνειν τοῦ αἵματος, ἀπλήστως ἐπι- 
΄ , 
σπωμένους βιαίῳ πνεύματι καὶ συντόνῳ ῥοίζῳ. μέχρι μὲν 
οὖν τινος ἐξαναλουμένους ἐκείνους ἀντέχειν ὑπ᾽ ἀμηχανίας 75 
A a ny 
ἀνασκιρτῶντας καὶ TH προνομαίᾳ τὴν πλευρὰν τύπτοντας 
ὡς καθιξομένους τῶν δρακόντων, εἶτ᾽ ἀεὶ κενουμένου τοῦ 
fal - , 
ζωτικοῦ πηδᾶν μὲν μηκέτι δύνασθαι, κραδαινομένους δ᾽ 
΄ ef lal a Y 
ἑστάναι, μικρὸν δ᾽ ὕστερον Kal τῶν σκελῶν ἐξασθενησάν- 
/ ¢€ ἈΝ 4 J , Η , 
των κατασεισθέντας ὑπὸ λιφαιμίας ἀποψύχειν" πεσόντας 80 
΄ rn , lel 
δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους Tod θανάτου συναπολλύναι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε" 
\ e , a 
μηκέτ᾽ ἔχοντες τροφὴν οἱ δράκοντες, Ov περιέθεσαν δεσμὸν 
ΕῚ “ τ Ἅ > \ wv rn e \ \ 
ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐκλύειν ἀπαλλαγὴν ἤδη ποθοῦντες, ὑπὸ δὲ 
nr lal rg / a 
tov βάρους τῶν ἐλεφάντων θλιβόμενοι πιεζοῦνται Kal 
aA ΙΑ / x a ~ 
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὰν τύχῃ στέριφον «ὃν; καὶ λιθῶδες 85 
τὸ ἔδαφος" ἰλυσπώμενοι γὰρ καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντες εἰς 
διάλυσιν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πιέσαντος βίας πεδηθέντες ἑαυτοὺς 
πολυτρόπως ἐν ἀμηχάνοις καὶ ἀπόροις γυμνάσαντες 
a / nx 
ἐξασθενοῦσι «καὶ; καθάπερ οἱ καταλευσθέντες ἢ τείχους 
΄ +. 7 
αἰφνίδιον ἐπενεχθέντες προκαταληφθέντες, οὐδ᾽ ὅσον ava- 90 
fal a a \ a an 
κῦψαι δυνάμενοι πνιγῇ τελευτῶσιν. εἰ δὴ τῶν μερῶν 
σ aA 4 \ . ee id \ .¢ >: 
ἕκαστον Tov κόσμου φθορὰν ὑπομένει, δηλονότι καὶ ὁ ἐξ 
αὐτῶν παγεὶς κόσμος ἄφθαρτος οὐκ ἔσται. τὸν δὲ τέταρτον 
καὶ λοιπὸν λόγον ἀκριβωτέον ὧδέ φασιν. “εἰ δ᾽ ὁ κόσμος 
ἀΐδιος ἦν, ἦν av καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἀΐδια καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλον τὸ 9ὅ 
- > , [7 \ lod Μ Vv ’ Ν 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὅσῳ καὶ TOV ἄλλων ἄμεινον. ἀλλὰ 
> ae , lal a , > Aa Ν , 
καὶ ὀψίγονον φανῆναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐρευνᾶν Ta φύσεως. 
a ᾿] a 
εἰκὸς yap μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώποις συνυπάρξαι 
" aA as 
Tas τέχνας ws av ἰσηλίκας οὐ μόνον OTL λογικῇ TO ἐμμέ- 
a iQ lal » 
θοδον οἰκεῖον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ζῆν ἄνευ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν" 100 
ἴδωμεν τοὺς ἑκάστων χρόνους ἀλογήσαντες τῶν ἐπιτραγω- 
, a ͵ > \ > 4! Μ #99 
δουμένων θεοῖς μύθων y y % εἰ μὴ ἀΐδιος ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ 
ἄλλο ζῷον, ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἱ δεδεγμέ ῦ ὥραι γῆ 
; τι ζῷον, ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἱ δεδεγμέναι ταῦτα χῶραι γῆ 


καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ. ἐξ dv τὸ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον 
δῆλόν ἐστιν. 

It will be seen that the writer attributes to Theo- 
phrastus the statement and criticism of certain views as 
to the creation and destruction of the world, which were 
opposed to the Peripatetic doctrine of its eternity. After 
the above extract this hostile view is refuted by arguments 
obviously derived, in part at least, from Peripatetic 
sources’, although the name of Theophrastus is not again 
introduced. The question arises, assuming the good faith 
of the extract, to whom do these criticised views belong ? 
This point was first raised by Zeller in Hermes ΧΙ. 422— 
429 and by an ingenious process of reasoning he concluded 
that Zeno is the philosopher who is here attacked. First, 
the four arguments, by which the proposition that the 
world is mortal is supported, belong to the Stoic school. 
They cannot belong to a pre-Aristotelian philosopher, for 
the doctrine of the eternity of the world and of mankind, 
against which they are directed, had not been broached 
before Aristotle (see de Caelo 1. 10. 279°12); of the post- 
Aristotelians they obviously alone suit the Stoics, who 
were alone in holding the periodical destruction of the 
world. The second argument, built on the retrocession of 
the sea, finds a parallel in the views of a world-flood 
attributed to the Stoa by Alexander Aphrod. Meteor. 
90* m.; and the dialectical form in which the third and 
fourth arguments are couched suggests the same origin. 
Again, the authority of Diog. L. vil. 141 is conclusive as to 
the third argument, and the terminology of ἕξις, τόνος, 
πνεῦμα, and πνευματικὴ δύναμις, to which may be added 
οὐσία, ἀναφθείσης ὕλης, and φύσει οἰκεῖον, is undoubtedly 
Stoic. Next, it being proved that these arguments belong 
to the Stoic school, Zeno is the only Stoic whom Theo- 

1 This point is proved in detail by Zeller, 1. 6. p. 424, 5. 


phrastus could have criticised, for the latter died in 
Ol. 123, that is between 288 and 284 B.c., at a time when 
Zeno’s school had been founded for about 15 years. For 
the avoidance of a direct mention of Zeno, if such was 
really the case in the Theophrastean original, Zeller quotes 
the parallel cases in which Aristotle combats the views of 
Xenocrates and Speusippus without referring to them by 
name. As an additional circumstance pointing to Zeno’s 
authorship, we may refer to the form in which the 
syllogism introducing the third argument is cast. This is 
undoubtedly one of those breves et acutulae conclusiones, so 
often mentioned by Cicero as characteristic of the style 
of the founder of Stoicism and of which examples (in 
addition to those in Cicero) have been preserved by 
Sextus Empiricus and Seneca: see the collection in 
Introd. p. 38. This is perhaps the right place to observe 
that a supposed frag. of Zeno, extracted by Wachsmuth 
(Comm. I. p. 8) from Philo de Provid. 1. 12, and to the 
same effect as the third argument here, can no longer be 
regarded as belonging to Zeno on the authority of that 
passage after the explanation of Diels, Doxogr. Gr. proleg. 
p. 3. 

These views of Zeller have however been vigorously 
criticised by Diels (Doxogr. Gr. pp. 106—108). His main 
contention is that the authority of the compiler of the 
pseudo-Philonian treatise is too weak to support so im- 
portant a discovery as the alleged controversy between 
Theophrastus and Zeno, of which no trace has come down 
to us from other sources. He does not believe that this 
“nebulo” had ever read Theophrastus, and suggests that, 
finding the name of Theophrastus attached to the first 
two arguments in some work of Critolaus, he left his 
readers to assume that the elder Peripatetic was really 
responsible for those passages in which Critolaus himself 


attacks what is undoubtedly Stoic doctrine. The result 
is that Diels, though he prints cc. 23—27 in the body of 
his work, does not believe that they contain (even after 
allowing for later accretions) a genuine excerpt from the 
φυσικαὶ δόξαι of the Eresian philosopher. Now it is 
obvious that we are only concerned with the question of 
the fontes of the Philonian treatise and its general credi- — 
bility, in so far as its solution enables us to authenticate 
these fragments as belonging to Zeno. Thus, altogether 
apart from its appearance in this passage, the Zenonian 
authorship of the syllogism in 1]. 48—50 is extremely 
probable not only from internal indications, but also 
because of the evidence of Diogenes Laertius vil. 141, 142 
(observe especially the words περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως 
καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ 
ὅλου). But, as to the general body of the fragment, the 
case is different: if we cannot trust the good faith of the 
writer, as giving us a genuine statement of the refutation 
by Theophrastus of his opponents’ doctrine, it may well 
be that the two earlier arguments represent early Ionian, 
possibly Heraclitean, views (with Stoic additions), and 
that in the later portions we have the work of one of 
Zeno’s successors as set out by a later Peripatetic. On 
the other hand, if Theophrastus is responsible for the 
exposition of all four arguments, they certainly belong to 
a single teacher or a single school, and that teacher, as 
has been shown above, must be Zeno. It is therefore 
necessary for us to consider the tenor of Zeller’s rejoinder 
in Hermes xv. 137—146, which, briefly stated, resolves 
itself into a theory as to the origin of the pseudo-Philonian 
treatise. He fully admits the many absurdities with 
which the text is strewn, but argues that they can all be 
eliminated without interfering with the nexus of the 
arguments; nay more, that the original writing, though 


not of great value, was at least a clear and trustworthy 
exposition of the views of the Peripatetic school, to which 
the writer belonged, but that the sequence of its thought 
has been distorted and its whole character changed by the 
blundering additions of a later hand. We are able to 
recognise in this treatise the work of two distinct authors, 
the first probably an Alexandrian philosopher of the latter 
half of the first century before Christ, and a contemporary 
of Arius Didymus and Boethus, and the second an 
Alexandrian Jew of the first or second century of the 
Christian era. The references of the original writer to 
Greek philosophy are found to be correct in all cases 
where his statements can be scrutinised by the light of 
other evidence: why then should we mistrust his citation 
of Theophrastus? To test. this theory in detail would 
require a thorough examination of the treatise in question 
with reference to the suggested additions, an examination 
which would be out of place here. But we can gauge the 
character of the proposed explanation by the three passages 
which Zeller expels from our extract, and which may be 
fairly said to be typical of the accretions in the general 
body of the work. All three are certainly futile and 
purposeless, but that which is especially remarkable is the 
manner in which the course of the argument is improved 
by their removal. In particular, the long digression about 
the serpents and the Indian elephants prevents the con- 
clusion founded on the destructibility of the several 
elements from following in natural sequence the last of 
the arguments by which this destructibility is proved of 
each element in detail. The latest treatment of this 

ἢ question is to be found in von Arnim’s Quellen Studien 

zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin 1888) Ρ. 41 [0]. He 
believes that the compilator of the treatise only had later 

} Peripatetic writings—especially those of Critolaus—before 

H. Ρ, 8 


him, and that the main portion of our passage was derived 
from one of them. ΑἹ] that belongs really to Theophrastus 
is the statement of the headings of the four arguments 
(il. 1—5) and these headings, if taken alone, might refer 
to pre-Aristotelians. Yet, holding in agreement with 
Zeller and against Diels that the arguments by which 
the headings are supported are undeniably Stoic, he 
concludes that a younger Peripatetic adopted the Theo- 
phrastean scheme, originally a doxographical statement 
of pre-Aristotelian doctrines, as a groundwork for his 
polemic against the Stoics, who on their side had a- 
dopted these four arguments, perhaps from Heraclitus 
and Empedocles. Finally he suggests, on very inadequate 
grounds (p. 47), that Antipater of Tarsus was the particular 
Stoic whose views are summarised. If this theory is 
correct, it is certainly an extraordinary coincidence that 
Theophrastus should have selected from the older philo- 
sophy four particular statements, which go to prove the 
destructibility of the world, and that the Stoics should 
have unconsciously taken up identically the same ground 
in support of their own theory. Zeller’s opinion still 
appears to me more reasonable: see also Stein, Psych. n. 86, 
who has anticipated the argument used above from the 
syllogism in 1]. 38—35. 

8, τὰ ὄρη cf. Cornut. c. 17. p, 85 Osann, τὰ δ᾽ ὄρη 
(γέγονε) κατὰ ἐξοστρακισμὸν τῆς γῆς. Schol. Hes. Theog. 
p. 238, τὰ ὄρη περὶ τὸ ἀνώμαλον τῆς συνιζήσεως ἔλαβε 
τὰς ἐξοχὰς καὶ κατὰ ἐξοστρακισμὸν αὐτῆς. 

ἐγεγένητογζἐγένετο indicates that the process would 
have been already complete at the time specified i.e. long 
ago. In the case of verbs denoting an action the dis- 
tinction between plup. and aor. with ἂν is less apparent, 
though always present: cf. e.g. Dem. Timocr. p. 746 § 146, 
if imprisonment were contrary to the Ath. constitution 


οὔθ᾽ ὅσων ἔνδειξίς ἐστιν ἢ ἀπαγωγή, προσεγέγραπτο ἂν 
ἐν τοῖς νόμοις κιτιλ. “There would not have been Sound 
a clause enacted in the laws” ete. 

10. ἀπὸ περάτων κιτλ. “The whole earth would have 
become a highway from end to end.” πᾶσ᾽ ἄν: so Bi- 
cheler and Diels for πᾶσα. 

19. τῇ συνεχεῖ, MS. Med. whence Biicheler reads τῇ 
συνεχείᾳ, recalling the line κοιλαίνει πέτρην pavis ὕδατος 

20. τήν---πάλαι expelled by Zeller, Herm. xv. p. 140. 

28. γάρ: the sentence would run more smoothly if 
this word were omitted, 

33. οἷς σημεῖ᾽ ἄττα «rd. The observation of similar 
facts induced in Xenophanes the belief that the earth 
was originally in a fluid state: ef. Hippolyt. 1. 14 (quoted 
by Zeller, pre-Socrat. 1. p. 570), 6 δὲ Ξενοφάνης μῖξιν τῆς 
γῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ὑγροῦ λύεσθαι φάσκων τοιαύτας ἔχειν ἀποδείξεις, 
ὅτι ἐν μέσῃ γῇ καὶ ὄρεσιν εὑρίσκοντο κόγχαι καὶ ἐν 
Συρακούσαις δὲ ἐν ταῖς λατομίαις λέγει εὑρῆσθαι τύπον 
ἐχθύος καὶ φωκῶν, ἐν δὲ Ilapw τύπον ἀφύης ἐν τῷ 
βαθεῖ τοῦ λίθου, ἐν δὲ Μελίτῃ πλάκας συμπάντων θαλασ- 

35. διὸ----αἰνιττόμενος expelled by Zeller I. c. and also 
by Biicheler. 

37. Pindar, frag. 64[87] Bergk. 

43. περιόδοις : See on frag. 52. 

45. ἀποκριθήσεται “will be merged,” θ Thue). i 3, 
“EXAnvas...eis év ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι, Diog. L. vir. 148, 
φύσις... τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ᾽ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. 

48—50. Cf. Diog. L. vir 141. Philo, de provid. 1. 12. 

53. ἕξεως : lit. hold, an undoubtedly Stoic term. The 
ἕξις of inorganic matter answers to the φύσις of plants, 
and the ψυχὴ of animals: supra frag. 48. Cf. Sext. Math. 



IX, 81, τῶν ἡνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως 
συνέχεται...καὶ ἕξεως μέν, ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα (Zeller, p- 

54. πνευματικὸς τόνος : the favourite doctrine of Clean- 
thes: if this passage belongs to Zeno, we have an indica- 
tion here that the master prepared the way for the pupil, 
ef, Cleanth. frag. 24. The words however may in any case 
be a later addition, and under the circumstances they have 
been bracketed. 

56. ῥέοντες “ passing away” in the Heraclitean sense ; 
yet even Plato has εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ o@pa...(Phaed. 87 Ὁ). 
λεπτὴν κόνιν, Cf, Soph. Ant. 256. 

εἶθ᾽---ἐξαναλ. Om. Med. MS. cf. Biicheler Rhein. Mus. 
32, 442. : 

58, ἀνέμων : the illustration is suggestive in connection 
with the doctrine of πνεῦμα. For pumiforro cf. frag. 106 
κινούμενον καὶ ἀναριπιζόμενον ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου. 

60. ψυχὴν appears to be attributed to animals im 
general and not exclusively to man, see on frag. 43. | 

63. εὐπρεπείας. Cf. Plat. Euthyd. 3058, καὶ yap ἔχει 
ὄντως ὦ Κρίτων εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν. It is 
possible that there is a reference to some contemporary 
school here, which had explained λοιμὸς after the manner 
of Prodicus. For the definition cf. M. Aurel. rx. 2. 

69—91 ejected by Zeller, 1. ὁ. 

85. ὄν add. Diels. 89. καὶ add. Bernays. 

99, ὡς ἂν not merely equivalent to ὥσπερ but ellip- 
tical. The full phrase would be ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν ἂν εἰ ἰσή- 
λικες ἦσαν... Xen. Mem. τι. 6. 38, ἢ εἴ σοι πείσαιμι κοινῇ 
τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενος ὡς ἂν στρατηγικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ 
ἑαυτὴν ἐπιτρέψαι, where see Kiihner. In this way is to 
be explained Thue. 1. 33. 1. 

~ 102. “Deesse quibus εὑρημάτων tempora expli 
verant vidit Mangey,” Usener. . 


57. Philargyrius ad Verg. Georg. 11. 336, Zenon ex 
hoe mundo quamvis aliqua intereant tamen ipsum perpetuo 
manere quia inhaereant ei elementa e quibus generantur 
materiae: ut dixit crescere quidem, sed ad interitum 
non pervenire manentibus elementis a quibus revalescat. 

If taken literally, the doctrine here referred to would 
be inconsistent with the destructibility of the κόσμος, 
which, as we have seen, was held by Zeno: again, ele- 
menta can hardly be a translation of στοιχεῖα, which 
undoubtedly perished. We must suppose therefore that 
Zeno is speaking not of the visible world, but of the 
universe, and that elementa Ξε ἀρχαί. According to Diog. 
L. vit. 137 κόσμος is used by the Stoics in three senses: 
the first of these is αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης 
οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν ὃς δὴ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, and 
this is the sense which mundus must bear here. If this 
explanation be thought impossible, we can only suppose 
that there is a confusion with Zeno of Tarsus who is said 
to have withheld assent to the doctrine of the ἐκπύρωσις, 
Zeller, p. 168n. 1. Stein, Psych. p. 64 and n. 92, thinks 
that Zeno held that at the ἐκπύρωσις the various mani- 
festations of God—world-soul, λόγος σπερματικὸς οἴο.--- 
lose themselves in the divine unity, but that the inde- 
terminate matter (ἄποιος ὕλη) remains, cf. ib. p. 34, n. 42. 

58. Diog. Laert. vil. 143, ὅτι τε εἷς ἐστιν (ὁ κόσμος) 
Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου. Stob. Ecl. τ. 22. 3” p. 
199, 10, Ζήνων ἕνα εἶναι τὸν κόσμον. 

This was one of the points which distinguished the 
Stoics from the Epicureans, who held that there are an 
infinite number of worlds. See further Zeller, p. 183 and 
the notes: the characteristic and important view of 
συμπάθεια μερῶν or συντονία is one of the developments 
introduced by Cleanthes. 


59. Sext. Math. rx. 101, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς, ἀπὸ 
Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβών, οὑτωσὶ συνερωτᾷ" τὸ 
προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν" ὁ 
δὲ κόσμος προΐεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ" λογικὸν ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ὁ κόσμος. ᾧ συνεισάγεται καὶ ἡ τούτου ὕπαρξις. Cic. 
N. D. m. 22, nihil quod animi quodque rationis est 
expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotem- 
que rationis. Mundus autem generat animantes compo- 
tesque rationis. Animans est igitur mundus composque 

We need not infer from this passage that Zeno ex- 
pressed himself to be adopting Socrates’ argument, for 
in the preceding paragraphs in Sext.1. ο. 92 f. the passage 
referred to (Xen. Mem. 1. 4 §§ 2—5. 8) is set out and 
discussed. The parallel passage is ὃ 8 καὶ ταῦτα εἰδὼς ὅτι 
γῆς Te μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις K.T.A- 
...voov δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς 
συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα 
δ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν ; cf. Sext. 
Math. x. 77, Μ. Aurel. rv. 4 and see Stein, Psych. n. 53. 

τούτου. Bekker with some plausibility suggests τοῦ 
θεοῦ. The Stoics argued from the existence of God that 
the world must be reasonable and vice versa, For the 
relation of God to the world see infra, frag. 66. 

60. Cic. N. Ὁ. 1. 22, Idemque (Zeno) hoc modo: 
“Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. 
Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret 
sensu mundus.” ; 

Cf. Sext. Math. 1x. 85, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τὰς λογικὰς περιέ- 
χουδα φύσεις πάντως ἐστὶ λογική: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ ὅλον 
τοῦ μέρους χεῖρον εἶναι" ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀρίστη ἐστὶ φύσις ἡ τὸν 
κόσμον διοικοῦσα νοερά τε ἔσται καὶ σπουδαία καὶ 


61. Sext. Math. rx. 104, καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν 
“Ted] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν' οὐδὲν δέ 
γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν; λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. καὶ 
ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ ἐμψυχίας μετέχοντος. τὸ γὰρ 
νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου 
κρεῖττόν ἐστιν᾽ οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον' νοερὸς ἄρα 
καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. Cic. N. D. um. 21, quod 
ratione utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non 
utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mun- 
dus utitur. Cf ib. 111. 22, 23. 

Alexinus the Megarian attacked Zeno’s position with 
the remark that in the same way the world might be 
proved to be poetical and possessed of grammatical know- 
ledge. The Stoics retorted that it is not true that in the 
abstract τὸ ποιητικὸν is better than τὸ μὴ ποιητικὸν or TO 
γραμματικὸν than τὸ μὴ γραμματικόν : otherwise Archi- 
lochus would be better than Socrates, Aristarchus than 
Plato (Sext. 1. ο. 108—110). For the fact cf. Diog. vu. 
139, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα Kai ἔμψυχον 
καὶ λογικὸν κιτλ. Stein adds Philo, de incorr. m. p. 506 
M, ὁ κόσμος καὶ φύσις λογική, οὐ μόνον ἔμψυχος ὦν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ νοερὸς πρὸς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμος. Siebeck refers to 
Arist. de Gen. An, IL. 1. 731" 25, τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου 

62. Sext. Math. 1x. 107, δυνάμει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ 
Ζήνωνι λόγον ἐξέθετο (scil. Plato) καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ πᾶν 
κάλλιστον εἶναί φησιν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον 
καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον, ζῷον ἔμψυχον νοερόν τε καὶ 

Hirzel’s theory, u. p. 217, 218, that Zeno called the 
world ἔμψυχον and λογικὸν only but not ζῴον is con- 
troverted by Stein, Psych. n. 82 from this passage. The 
passage in Plato, part of which is quoted by Sextus, is 


Timaeus, p. 29 foll.; and see esp. 30 A, B which illustrates 
this and the last frag., cf. M. Aurel. Iv. 40. 

63. Cic. N. Ὁ. π. 22, Idemque similitudine, ut saepe 
solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: ‘si ex oliva modulate 
canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin inesset 
in oliva tibicinii quaedam scientia? quid? si platani 
fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeres 
in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non 
animans sapiensque judicetur, quum ex se_procreet 
animantes atque sapientes ?’ 

This recalls the anecdote about Amoebeus: apoph. 19. 

64. Stob. ΕΠ]. τ. 23. 1, p. 200, 21, Ζήνων πύρινον 
εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν. . 

Stobaeus couples Zeno with Parmenides, Heraclitus 
and Strato. For the Stoic authorities see Zeller, p. 201. 

65. Achill. Tat., Isag. in Arat. 5. p. 129 e, Ζήνων ὁ 
Κιτιεὺς οὕτως αὐτὸν ὡρίσατο' “οὐρανός ἐστιν αἰθέρος τὸ 
ἔσχατον" ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι πάντα ἐμφανῶς" περιέχει 
γὰρ πάντα πλὴν ἁυτοῦ" οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὸ περιέχει" ἀλλ᾽ 
ἑτέρου ἐστὶ περιεκτικόν. 

αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον: cf. Diog. L. vit. 188 quoted below. 
The genitive is partitive: “the extreme part of the 
aether.” This becomes clear when we remember that 
Zeno is closely following Aristotle here, cf. Phys. Iv. 5 καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, οὗτος 
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι, ὁ δ᾽ αἰθὴρ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ δ᾽ οὐρανὸς 
οὐκέτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. Just before he had said: ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ 
πάντα᾽ ὁ γὰρ οὐρανὸς τὸ πᾶν ἴσως. 

περιέχει. A direct parallel to this may be found in the 
teaching of the Pythagoreans (Zeller, pre-Socratics, I. 
p- 465), but there is possibly also a reminiscence of Plato, 
Timaeus 31 A, where οὐρανὸς is spoken of as τὸ περιέχον 


πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ Spa: cf. also the περιέχον φρενῆρες of 
Heraclitus (Sext. Math. vir. 127 foll.). M. Aurel. vin. 54, 

66. Diog. L. vir. 148, οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων φησὶ 
τὸν ὅλον κόσμον Kal τὸν οὐρανόν. 

Cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 1. 29, p.38,1. The Stoics held θεοὺς... 
τὸν κόσμον Kal τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν. In so far as 
God is manifested in the world, the world is God. Many 
more references are given in Zeller, p. 157. The words 
καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν are added because in it the material 
essence of divinity exists in its purest form. Diog. L. 
Vil. 138, οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ἣ πᾶν 
ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Hence Chrysippus and Posidonius spoke 
of the οὐρανὸς as τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου (ib. 139). 
Certainly, if these words are pressed, pantheism, involving 
the identification of God and matter, is distinctly at- 
tributed to Zeno. Wellmann, p. 469, suggests that Zeno 
may really only have said that the world is formed out of 
the divine essence (ὁ κόσμος οὐσία θεοῦ) and that Diog. 
through a confusion of subject and predicate interpreted 
this as a definition of the essence of God. Another 
possibility is that κόσμος is used in the same sense as in 
frag. 71. See also Stein, Psychologie n. 88. 

67. Stob. Ecl. 1.19. 4, p. 166, 4, Ζήνωνος. τῶν δ᾽ ἐν 
τῷ κόσμῳ πάντων τῶν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἕξιν συνεστώτων τὰ 
/ ‘ \ BA > \ aed , ¢ / N \ 
μέρη τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν εἰς TO τοῦ ὅλου μέσον, ὁμοίως δὲ Kal 
’ al fa) a 
αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου" διόπερ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι πάντα τὰ μέρη. 
τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κόσμου τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν, ὅ 
/ \ \ / »Μ ,’ \ ᾽ Μ Φ Ν 
μάλιστα δὲ τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα. ταὐτὸν δ᾽ αἴτιον εἶναι καὶ 
τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μονῆς ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ, καὶ τῆς γῆς παρα- 
πλησίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ περὶ τὸ τούτου κέντρον καθιδρυ- 
᾽ a > / § a U Μ » ’ 
μένης ἰσοκρατῶς. οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ, 
2 a . » \ le , \ \ a f, 
ἀβαρὴ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ trip’ τείνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτά πως 10 


ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τὴν δὲ 
σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι" φύσει 
γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. 
παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδ᾽ αὐτόν φασι τὸν κόσμον 
1ὅ βάρος ἔχειν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ σύστασιν ἔκ τε τῶν 
βάρος ἐχόντων στοιχείων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀβαρῶν. τὴν 
δ᾽ ὅλην γῆν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μὲν ἔχειν ἀρέσκει βάρος παρὰ δὲ 
τὴν θέσιν διὰ τὸ τὴν μέσην ἔχειν χώραν (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον 
εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου 
20 τούτου μένειν. 

2. συνεστώτων. This is the most general term, else- 
where opposed to συνάπτεσθαι, συνέχεσθαι etc. 

4. πάντα τὰ μέρη xd. This centralising tendency is 
called by Diogenes (vil. 140) τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ 
ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. In the Stoic doctrine 
of the microcosm and the macrocosm there is one dis- 
crepancy, in that while the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world is at 
its extreme periphery the ἡγεμονικὸν of man is in the 
breast. Stein, Psych. p. 211, finds in this passage an 
attempt to remove this inconsistency by making the earth 
the central point from which all motion originates and to 
which it returns. 

9. od πάντως δὲ κτλ. Cf Stob. Ecl. t 14. 1 f. p. 142, 9, 
οἱ Στωικοὶ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κοῦφα 
πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα" δύο δὲ βαρέα ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. κοῦφον γὰρ 
ὑπάρχει φύσει, ὃ νεύει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου μέσου, βαρὺ δὲ τὸ εἰς 
μέσον, i.e. light is opposed to heavy not relatively, as in 
our use of the words, but absolutely, implying motion in an 
outward or upward direction. Cic. Tuse. 1. 40, persuadent 
mathematici...eam naturam esse quattuor omnia gignen- 
tium corporum, ut, quasi partita habeant inter se ac 
divisa momenta, terrena et umida suopte nutu et suo 
pondere ad paris angulos in terram et in mare ferantur, 
reliquae duae partes, una ignea, una animalis,...rectis 


lineis in caelestem locum subvolent, sive ipsa natura 
superiora adpetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviora natura 
repellantur. N. D. 1. 116,117. The Stoics were following 
Aristotle (ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 19. 1, p. 163, 9, τῆς δὲ κατὰ 
τόπον κινήσεως τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ 
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὸ μέσον: πυρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ 
ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τοῦ 
πέμπτου περὶ τὸ μέσον... 

10. τείνεσθαι δέ: So Diels for MSS. γίνεσθαι, a correc- 
tion more probable for palaeographical reasons and in itself 
more attractive than Meineke’s κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Nemes. 2. 
p. 29, τονικὴν εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα εἰς τὸ ἔσω 
ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 
44, Τ. 1054 Ε, οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ 
κινουμένου «.7.r. The explanation is as follows:—the 
natural motion of the elements is restrained and modified 
‘ by the continual process of change (μεταβολή) by whose 
action the world is formed and exists. Fire and Air are 
perpetually being transformed into Water and Earth and 
thus, before their upward tendency has time to assert 
itself, they themselves becoming possessed of βάρος start 
again in the opposite direction. Thus each of the four 
elements is apparently stationary and remains constant : 
in reality its component parts are in continual motion. 
Cf. Chrysippus ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 44. 6, a passage too 
long to quote. This explanation is supported by the 
statement which is attributed to the Stoics by Stobzeus, 
that at the ἐκπτύρωσις the world is resolved into the void 
(Ecl. τ. 18. 4 Ὁ. p. 160, 11 and Euseb. P. E. xv. 40): eft ib. 
1. 21. 3 b, μήτε αὔξεσθαι δὲ μήτε μειοῦσθαι τὸν κόσμον 
τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὁτὲ μὲν παρεκτείνεσθαι πρὸς πλείονα τόπον 
ὁτὲ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι. This is not necessarily inconsistent 
with Prof. Mayor’s explanation (on N. D. τι. 116) that 
“the all-pervading aether, while it has a naturally ex- 


pansive and interpenetrative force, has also a strong 
cohesive force and thus holds all things together round 
the centre.” See also M. Aurel. x1. 20. 

11. σφαίρας: for the Stoic doctrine of the rotundity of 
the world, cf. Stob. Ἐπὶ. τ. 15. 6° of Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὸν 
κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, Diog. vil. 140, Cic. N. D. τ. 24, hence 
ἀντίποδες Cic, Acad. I. 123. 

17. παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν: in itself earth βάρος ἔχει and — 
so tends to move πρὸς τὸ μέσον, but owing to the accident 
of its position in the centre of the κόσμος its natural 
motion has no opportunity of becoming apparent. 

18. μέσην. For the position of the earth cf. Diog. L. 
vil. 137, 155, Cic. N. Ὁ. 1. 103. 

68. Stob. Ecl. τ. 15. 6* p. 146, 21, Ζήνων ἔφασκε τὸ 
πῦρ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν κινεῖσθαι. | 

Cf. Stob. Ἐπ]. τ. 14. 1. f p. 142, 12, τὸ μὲν περίγειον 
φῶς κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν...κινεῖται. This is only true of πῦρ 
ἄτεχνον, for the aether or πῦρ τεχνικὸν has a circular 
motion in the same manner as the πέμπτον σῶμα of 
Aristotle. So Ar. de Caelo, 1. 2.9, τό τε yap πῦρ ἐπ᾽ 
εὐθείας ἄνω φέρεται. , 

69. Stob. Ecl. 1. 18. 1° p. 156, 27, Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ 
αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἔξω δ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
ἄπειρον. διαφέρειν δὲ κενόν, τόπον, χώραν καὶ τὸ μὲν 
κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον 
ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον. 

Cf. Diog. vit. 140, ἔξωθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ περικεχυμένον 
εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον ὅπερ ἀσώματον εἶναι ἀσώματον 
δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον" ἐν 
δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν. Plut. plac. 1. 18, of Στωικοὺ 
ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου οὐδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἔξωθεν δ᾽ avr 

ἄπειρον. Μ. Aurel. Χ. 1. Diels adds Theodoret tv. 14, ἐντ' 


μὲν τοῦ παντὸς μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἐκτὸς δὲ αὐτοῦ πάμπολύ 
τε καὶ ἄπειρον. The Epicureans held that without the 
existence of void within the world motion was impossible 
(Lucr. 1. 329 foll., Reid on Acad. 1. 27, 11.125). The Stoics 
were unaffected by this argument in consequence of their 
doctrine of κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, see further on frag. 50, supra. 
Aristotle denied the existence of void altogether either 
within or without the universe. 

κενόν, τόπον, χώραν. The Stoics and the Epicureans 
were in virtual agreement in their definitions of these 
terms: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 2,3. For a fuller 
exposition ef. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 18. 4° p. 161, 8, 
who compares κενὸν to an empty, τόπος to a full, and χώρα 
to a partially filled vessel, cf. the similar views of Aristotle 
quoted by R. and P. § 327. 

70. Themist. Phys. 40° Speng. 11. 284, 10, (τὸ κενόν) 
κεχωρισμένον καὶ ἀθρόον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ περιέχον τὸν 
οὐρανόν, ὡς πρότερον μὲν ῴοντο τῶν ἀρχαίων τινές, μετὰ 
δὲ ταῦτα οἱ περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Κιτιέα. Philopon. on Ar. 
Phys. tv. 6. p. 318 ἃ 81, φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν 
Κιτιέα οὕτω (scil. ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἶναι κενόν τι Kal? 
αὑτὸ) δοξάζειν. 

τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς are probably the Pythagoreans who 
believed in an ἄπειρον πνεῦμα outside the universe, 
called κενὸν by some of the authorities (Zeller, pre-So- 
cratics I. pp. 467, 8). 

nd ~ i 
71. Stob. Ἐπ]. τ. 25. 5, p. 218, 15, Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιόν 
\ \ rd \ a ” ” “ 
φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρῶὼν ἐκᾶστον 
fal , 
εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον πύρινον πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ. δύο 
ς \ 
yap γένη πυρός, TO μὲν ἄτεχνον καὶ μετάβαλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ 
τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν, αὐξητικόν τε Kal THPNTLKOY, 
b] a a ” \ , “Δ \ Ui » ‘ 
οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔστι καὶ ζῴοις, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἔστι Ka 


Ψυχή" τοιούτου δὴ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄστρων οὐσίαν" 
τὸν δ᾽ ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην δυὸ φορὰς φέρεσθαι, τὴν μὲν 
ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἀπ᾽ ἀνατολῆς εἰς ἀνατολήν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐναντίαν 
τῷ κόσμῳ ἕῴδιον ἐκ ἕῳδίου μεταβαίνοντας. τὰς δ᾽ ἐκ- 
λείψεις τούτων γίγνεσθαι διαφόρως, ἡλίου μὲν περὶ τὰς 
συνόδους, σελήνης δὲ περὶ τὰς πανσελήνους" γίγνεσθαι δ᾽ 
ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τὰς ἐκλείψεις καὶ μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους. 
Stob. Ἐπ]. τ. 26. 1, p. 219, 12, Ζήνων τὴν σελήνην ἔφησεν 
ἄστρον νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον πύρινον δὲ πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ. 

πύρινον: they are situated in the external periphery 
of aether, and are themselves composed of the same sub- 
stance. The later Stoics, at any rate, held that the 
heavenly bodies are fed by exhalations of grosser matter, 
and hence their differentiation from their environment. 
Cf. Cleanth. frags. 29 and 30. 

δύο γένη : cf. Cleanth. frag. 30. 

φύσις refers to φυτοῖς and ψυχὴ to ζῴοις : cf. frag. 

φοράς. The first movement is the diurnal revolution 
from east to west (from one rising to another): the second 
is the orbit described κατὰ τὸν ζῳδιακὸν κύκλον, occupying 
either a year or a month, as the case may be. For the 
Zodiac ef. Diog. L. vi. 155, 156. 

ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, Le. they move with the aether which 
revolves round the three lower strata of the world. These 
latter are themselves stationary, so that κόσμου is used as 
in Cleanth. frag. 48, 1. 7, where see note. The whole 
structure of the cosmos is very clearly expounded by 
Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 21. ἢ p. 184, 185; and ef 
especially τοῦ... κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ 
᾿ μέσον τὸ δ᾽ ὑπόμενον᾽ περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα ὑπό- 
μενον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τόν ἀέρα...τὸ 
δὲ περιφερόμενον αὐτῷ ἐγκυκλίως αἰθέρα εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ τὰ 
ἄστρα καθίδρυται τά τ᾽ ἀπλανῆ καὶ τὰ πλανώμενα, θεῖα 


τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν 

ζῴδιον: according to Diels, the acc. is “insolenter 
dictum” and requires the addition of εἰς, but it has been 
pointed out to me that the true explanation of the acc. 
is to be found in the fact that ζώδιον is a measure of 
space = 30 μοῖραι, Hippol. Haer. v. 13: we should not 
therefore compare μεταβὰς βίοτον Eur. Hipp. 1292, which 
is in any case different. For the fact cf. Diog. vil. 144. 

τὰς δ᾽ ἐκλείψεις : see infra frag. 73. 

μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους : “entire and partial.” 

72. Οἷο. N. Ὁ. 1. 36, idem (Zeno) astris hoc idem 
(1.6. vim divinam) tribuit tum annis, mensibus, annorum- 
que mutationibus. 

astris. On the other hand the Epicureans taught 
that the stars could not possess happiness or move in 
consequence of design. Diog. L. x. 77, μήτε αὖ πυρώδη 
τινὰ συνεστραμμένα τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ 
βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν. 

annis: probably Zeno did not stop to enquire whether 
the seasons etc. were corporeal or not: he regarded them 
as divine “als regelmassig erfolgende Umlaufe der Sonne 
und des Mondes” (Krische, p. 389). Chrysippus must have 
been hard pressed when he delivered the extraordinary 
opinion quoted by Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 5 (see Zeller, 
Stoics p. 131). Krische appositely quotes Plat. Leg. x. p. 
899 B, ἄστρων δὲ δὴ περὶ πάντων Kal σελήνης ἐνιαυτῶν 
τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρών πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον 
ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ 
πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, 
θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα 
ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως: 
In Sext. Math. rx. 184 an argument of Carneades is 


quoted of the Sorites type, disproving the existence of 
God. If the sun is a god, so are days, months and years. 
This the Stoics might have admitted, but he concludes 
thus:—ovv τῷ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν θεὸν εἶναι 
λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἕω καὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν δείλην 

13. Diog. L. vit. 145, 6, ἐκλείπειν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον 
ἐπιπροσθούσης αὐτῷ σελήνης κατὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέρος, 
ὡς Ζήνων ἀναγράφει ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου. φαίνεται γὰρ 
ὑπερχομένη ταῖς συνόδοις καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσα αὐτὸν καὶ 
πάλιν παραλλάττουσα. γνωρίζεται δὲ τοῦτο διὰ λεκάνης 
ὕδωρ ἐχούσης. τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐμπίπτουσαν εἰς τὸ τῆς 
γῆς σκίασμα. ὅθεν καὶ ταῖς πανσελήνοις ἐκλείπειν 
μόναις, καίπερ κατὰ διάμετρον ἱσταμένην κατὰ μῆνα τῷ 
ἡλίῳ: ὅτι κατὰ λοξοῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον κινουμένη παραλ- 
λάττει τῷ πλάτει ἢ βορειοτέρα 7 νοτιωτέρα γινομένη. 
ὅταν μέντοι τὸ πλάτος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸν ἡλιακὸν καὶ τὸν 
διὰ μέσων γένηται εἶτα διαμετρήσῃ τὸν ἥλιον τότε 

ἐκλείπειν. The eclipse of the sun owing to the interposi- 
tion of the moon between it and the earth is a doctrine 
attributed by Stobaeus to Thales, the Pythagoreans, and 
Empedocles (Ecl. 1. 25. 1' 3° 3°): the same explanation was 
also given by Anaxagoras (Zeller, pre-Socratics 1. p. 361). 
The same account is given by the Stoic in Cic. N. Ὁ. τι. 
103, luna...subiecta atque opposita soli radios eius et 
lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incidens in umbram terrae, 
cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae 
repente deficit. 

ταῖς συνόδοις “at the period of conjunction.” Cf. Cic. 
Rep. 1. 25, Pericles...docuisse cives suos dicitur, id 
quod ipse ab Anaxagora, cuius auditor fuerat, exceperat, 
certo illud (eclipse of sun) tempore fieri et necessario, 


cum tota se luna sub orbem solis subiecisset: itaque, etsi 
non omni intermenstruo, tamen id fieri non posse nisi 
certo intermenstruo tempore. Thue. I. 28. 

σελήνην, Cf. Stob. Ecl. τ. 26. 3, p. 221, 23, Χρύσιππος 
ἐκλείπειν τὴν σελήνην τῆς γῆς αὐτῇ ἐπιπροσθούσης Kal 
εἰς σκιὰν ἀυτῆς ἐμπίπτουσαν. 

πανσελήνοις : the fact was a matter of common observa- 
tion: cf. Thue. vit. 50, ἡ μήνη ἐκλείπει; ἐτύγχανε yap 
πανσέληνος οὖσα. 

κατὰ λοξοῦ: hence ἑλικοειδῆ in Diog. L. vit. 144, see 
Krische p. 389. 

διὰ μέσων 501]. ζῳδίων. There is nothing distinctively 
Stoic in these explanations. Zeno was simply repeating 
the ordinary scientific theories of his age. Epicurus gave 
alternative explanations, of which this is one (Diog. L. x. 96). 

44. Diog. Ly -Vit.158, 154, ἀστραπὴν δὲ ἔξαψιν 
νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἢ ῥηγνυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος, ὡς 
Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου βροντὴν δὲ τὸν τούτων ψόφον ἐκ 
παρατρίψεως ἢ ῥήξεως" κεραυνὸν δὲ ἔξαψιν σφοδρὰν μετὰ 
πολλῆς βίας πίπτουσαν ἐπὶ γῆς νεφῶν παρατριβομένων 
ἢ ῥηγνυμένων. 

Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. τ. 29. 1, p. 233, 9, ἀστρα- 
πὴν ἔξαψιν νεφῶν ἐκτριβομένων ἢ ῥηγνυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύ- 
ματος, βροντὴν δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν τούτων ψόφον.. ὅταν δὲ ἡ τοῦ 
πνεύματος φορὰ σφοδροτέρα γένηται καὶ πυρώδης, κεραυ- 
νὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ib. p. 234, 1 where the same views are 
attributed to of Στωικοί. Here again there is nothing 
specially characteristic of the Stoa: Epicurus, as was his 
wont, gave a number of possible explanations and amongst 
them these: see Diog. L. x. 100—103, cf. Lucr. νι. 96 ἢ 
(thunder), 162 f. (lightning), 246 f. (thunderbolts). Lucan 1. 
151, qualiter expressum ventis per nubila fulmen aetheris 
impulsi sonitu ete. Aristoph. Nub. 404 foll. 

Η. P. 9 


75. Senec. Nat. Quaest. vi. 19. 1, Zenon noster in 
illa sententia est: congruere iudicat stellas, et radios inter 
se committere: hac societate luminis existere imaginem 
stellae longioris. 

On this point the majority of the Stoic school seem to 
have deviated from the teaching of Zeno, considering his 
view unsatisfactory: thus Diog. vil. 152, κομήτας δὲ καὶ 
πωγωνίας Kal λαμπαδίας πυρὰ εἶναι ὑφεστῶτα, πάχους 
ἀέρος εἰς τὸν αἰθερώδη τόπον ἀνενεχθέντος, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 
28. 1* p. 228, 6, Βοηθὸς ἀέρος ἀνημμένου φαντασίαν. Sen. 
N. Q. vil. 21, placet ergo nostris cometas...denso aere 

76. Stob. Ecl. 1. 8. 40° p. 104, 7, Ζήνων ἔφησε 
χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ 
κριτήριον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος ὅπως ἔχει «ἕκαστα». 
κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ γίγνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ περαινόμενα 
ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ὄντα εἶναι. Simplic. ad Cat. 80 a 4, 
τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως 
διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, who goes on to say that 
Chrysippus limited the definition by adding the words 
τοῦ κόσμου. Cf. Diog. vu. 141, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸν χρόνον 
ἀσώματον, διάστημα ὄντα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. 
Varro L. L. vi. 3 (quoted by Prof. Mayor on Cic. N. D. 1. 
_ 21.), tempus esse dicunt intervallum mundi motus. See 
also Zeller p. 198 and add Plotin. Ennead. 111. 7. 6, Sext. 
Pyrrh. 11. 136 ἡ Math. x. 170 f. Zeno held as against 
Chrysippus that time existed from eternity, and that it is 
not merely coeval with the phenomenal world Stein, 
Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 228—225. 

ἕκαστα is added by Wachsm. and some word is clearly 
wanted: Posidonius however in reproducing the clause — 
has ὅπως ἔχει τὸ ἐπινοούμενον (Stob. Ecl. τ. 8. 42, p. 105, 
21). It seems better to remove the comma usually placed 


after βραδύτητος, as the genitives depend at least as 
much on ὕπως ἔχει as on μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον, cf. e.g. 
Thue. 11. 90. 4, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος. 

ἅπαντα must be corrupt, as some verb is required to 
balance γίνεσθαι and εἶναι. Usener suggests ἀπαρτίζεσθαι, 
which gives the required sense, cf. ἀπαρτισμόν. Chrysipp. 
ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 8. 42, p. 106, 17. Diels’ correction ἀἅπαν- 
Tay 15 less satisfactory in meaning. 

77. Censorinus de die Nat. XVII. 2, quare qui annos 
triginta saeculum putarunt multum videntur errasse. hoe 
enim tempus genean vocari Heraclitus auctor est, quia 
orbis aetatis in eo sit spatio. orbem autem vocat aetatis 
dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur. 
hoc quidem geneas tempus alii aliter definierunt. Hero- 
dicus annos quinque et viginti scribit, Zenon triginta. 

genean: this substantially accords with the popular 
reckoning as recorded by Herod. 11. 142, γενεαὶ γὰρ 
τρεῖς ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν ἔτεά ἐστι. 

Heraclitus: for the other authorities which attribute 
this statement to Heraclitus see Zeller pre-Socratics Il. p. 
87, n. 4 and frags. 87 and 88 ed. Bywater. 

sementi: saeculum is properly used with the meaning 
“generation” and this supports the derivation from sero, 
satus (Curtius G. Εἰ. 1. p. 474 Eng. Tr.). For examples see 
the Lexx. 

Herodicus: either (1) the Alexandrian grammarian, or 
(2) the physician of Selymbria: see D. Biog. 

Zenon: according to Wachsmuth Jahn proposes to 
substitute Xenon, but the agreement with Heraclitus 
rather points to the founder of the Stoa. 

78. τοῦ. Ecl. 1. 16. 1, p. 149, 8, Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς τὰ 
χρώματα πρώτους εἶναι σχηματισμοὺς τῆς ὕλης. The 


same words occur also in Plut. plac. 1. 15. 5 and in Galen 
Hist. Phil. c. 10. χιχ. 258 Kiihn. 

The above extracts appear to represent all that is 
known of the Stoic theories about colour: for the Epi- 
curean view ef. Lucr. τι. 795 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie 
Ρ. 310, rightly observes that the definition, implying that 
colour is an actual attribute of matter, indicates Zeno’s 
reliance on sense-impressions. 

79. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. m1. 2. 9 (11. 36), Diels p. 
592, τὰς δε αἰτίας τῶν πραγμάτων πὴ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πὴ δὲ 
οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τουτέστι, τὰ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν 
τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. 

We have already seen that Zeno held καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην 
τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, frag. 45. How then are we to 
reconcile with this doctrine of necessity the fact that free 
will is here allowed to mankind even in a limited degree ? 
The Stoic answer is most clearly given by the simile with 
which they supported their position, cf. Hippolyt. adv. 
Haeres. 1. 18, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη 
διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ OTE 
ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ἢ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται 
ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται ἑκών, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξού- 
σιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης οἷον τῆς εἱμαρμένης" ἐὰν δὲ μὴ 
βούληται ἕπεσθαι πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται" τὸ αὐτὸ δή που 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων" καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν 
ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. 
The simile itself very possibly belongs to Cleanthes as it 
accords exactly with his lines in frag. 91. Chrysippus 
struggled vigorously with the difficulties in which he was 
involved in maintaining this theory: see the authorities 
collected by Zeller p. 177 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie 
pp. 828—332, who ascribes to Cleanthes the introduction 
of the Stoic answer to the dilemma, has omitted to notice 


the present frag. and does an injustice to Zeno in 
asserting that the conflict between free will and necessity 
never presented itself to his mind. 

80. Censorinus de die Nat. Iv. 10, Zenon Citieus, 
Stoicae sectae conditor, principium humano generi ex novo 
mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo 
adminiculo divini ignis, id est dei providentia, genitos. 

This doctrine is connected with that of the destructi- 
bility of the world: cf. frag. 56, where however there 
is unfortunately a lacuna at the point where the origin of 
man is being discussed. owéyovoy in that passage must 
not be supposed to be at variance with this: the argu- 
ment there is simply to show that the world cannot be 
without beginning, because facts show that mankind has 
not existed from eternity. Zeno is, therefore, distinctly 
opposed to a theory of progression; mankind was produced 
in the first stance, when the primary fire was in full 
sway, and was entirely formed out of the divine essence ; 
the inference must be that men have degenerated through 
the assimilation of coarser substances, and in this con- 
nection we may perhaps point to Posidonius’ belief in the 
popular view of a golden age, when there was a complete 
supremacy of wise men. Senec. Ep. 90, 5. There is a 
parallel to this passage in Next. Math. 1x. 28 where the 
arguments given by various schools for the existence 
of gods are being recited, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων στωικῶν φασί 
τινες τοὺς πρώτους καὶ γηγενεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ 
τῶν νῦν συνέσει διαφέροντας γεγονέναι, ὡς πάρεστι μαθεῖν 
ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαιοτέρους καὶ ἥρωας ἐκείνους, 
ὥσπερ τι περιττὸν αἰσθητήριον σχόντας τὴν ὀξύτητα 
τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβεβληκέναι τῇ θείᾳ φύσει καὶ νοῆσαί 
τινας δυνάμεις θεῶν. Cf. Cic. Leg. 1. 24. Tuse. I. 2, 
nunc parvulos nobis dedit (natura) igniculos quos celeriter 


malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restinguimus, 
ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. For the anthropo- 
logical aspect of this passage see Stein, Psych. p. 115. 

81. Varro de Re Rust. 1. 1, 3, sive enim aliquod fuit 
principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius 
et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit 
nullum, ut credidit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles 

It is obvious that only on the hypothesis of the world 
in its present form being without beginning is the doctrine 
of the eternity of the human race or of animals possible. 
Aristotle, however, expressly says (de Caelo L 10 279 Ὁ 12) 
that none of his predecessors had held the world to 
be without beginning in this sense. Unless therefore 
Aristotle is mistaken, the reference to Pythagoras in the 
present passage must be erroneous: see the discussion 
in Zeller pre-Socratics 1. pp. 439—442 and especially 
p. 439 n. 2 and for the similar case of Xenophanes ib. 
p. 570: see also Newman on Ar. Pol. 1. 8 1269 a 5. At 
any rate Zeno is in agreement with the great majority of 
those who went before him: the early philosophers held for 
the most part that animal life was produced by the action 
of the sun’s rays on the primitive slime, as Anaximander, 
Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Archelaus (Zeller 1. ο. 1. pp. 
255, 577, 601, 1. p. 392), or on the earth, as Diogenes 
of Apollonia (ib. 1. p. 296). Somewhat similar were the 
views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (ib. I. pp. 160, 365). 

82. Schol. ad Plat. Alcib. 1. p, 121 Ε dis ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν] 
τότε yap ὁ τέλειος ἐν ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνεται λόγος, ὡς ᾿Αριστο- 
τέλης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ ᾿Αλκμαίων ὁ Πυθαγόρειός φασιν. 

Cf. Stob. Ecl. τ. 48, 8, p. 317, 21, πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ 
vod καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττόνων δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς 


of μὲν Στωικοὶ λέγουσι μὴ εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, 
ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντα- 
σιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη. Plut. plac. Iv. 11, ὁ δὲ λόγος 
καθ᾽ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων 
συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα. 
(This points to some slight divergence in the school itself 
as to the exact period of life at which ὁ λόγος τελειοῦται: 
secus Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 116, but how can συμ- 
wrnpotabar=“begin”?) Diog. vi. 55, φωνή.. ἀπὸ διανοίας 
ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησίν" ἥτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων 
ἐτῶν τελειοῦται. The mind at birth is a tabula rasa: 
reason lies in the application of προλήψεις and ἔννοιαι, 
which are themselves ultimately founded on external 
impressions, cf. Cleanth. fr. 37 θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν 
νοῦν. The present fragment has been generally overlooked. 

᾿Αλκμαίων: this statement is not referred to in Zeller’s 
account of Alemaeon (pre-Socr. I. pp. 521—526). For 
Aristotle cf. Pol. 1. 13 1260 a 14. 

83. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20, 2. Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39, 
Diels p. 470, περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς Κλεάνθης μὲν ta Ζήνωνος 
δόγματα παρατιθέμενος πρὸς σύγκρισιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς 
ἄλλους φυσικούίς φησιν, ὅτι Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει 
ἀισθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος. βουλόμενος 
γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοεραὶ ἀεὶ 
γίνονται εἴκασεν αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς λέγων οὕτως “ποτα- 
μοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα 
ἐπιρρεῖ᾿ καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιώνται" 
2 , Ν᾽ ς κα ¢ A AE , x \ 
ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν 
3 / / > \ \ ’ Ν ἫΝ \ A 
ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων, ἀισθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο 
Υ͂ “ lal , , \ ,ὔ \ / \ 
λέγει, ὅτι τυποῦσθαί Te δύναται [TO μέγεθος] TO μέρος TO 
- A \ f 
ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων Kal ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν 
αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις" ταῦτα γὰρ 
ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστιν. , 


αἰσθητικήν : the MSS. have αἴσθησιν ἢ but the correction 
(made by Wellmann p. 475 and Zeller p. 212) is rendered 
certain by the parallel passage in ps-Plut. vit. hom. c. 127, 
τὴν ψυχὴν of Στωικοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ 
ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι 

ἀναθυμίασιν: cf. Ar. de Anim. 1. 2. 16. 405 a 25, καὶ 
Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν 
ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τάλλα συνίστησιν, i.e. Aristotle identi- 
fies the ἀναθυμίασις (“fiery process” Wallace) with πῦρ. 
Zeno adopts the word as an apt description of the warm 
breath of which the soul is composed. 

voepat. ‘The soul’s rational power is constantly renewed 
by the fiery process, because it is fed by the emanations 
from the περιέχον according to Heraclitus or from the 
moist parts of the body, i.e. the blood, according to Zeno. 
In this way Heraclitus explained his famous saying αὔη 
ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη (frag. 74 ed. Bywater), while the Stoics 
from their point of view regarded the excellence of the 
soul as consisting in a suitable admixture of heat. Stein, 
Psych. p. 105. Hence, as Diels observes, there is no 
necessity to read ἕτεραι ἀεί. 

εἴκασεν αὐτάς: the principle of πάντα pei applies 
no less, to the soul than to the world in general: 
thus Arist. Le. continues καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον 
ἀεί" τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γυγνώσκεσθαι" ἐν κινήσει 
δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾧετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί. The soul is 
νοερὰ because it is in flux. For ποταμοῖσι cf. Plat. Crat. 
402 A, Ἡράκλειτος...ποταμοῦ pop ἀπεικάζων ta ὄντα 
λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ av éuBains. R and 
Ρ 8 26. 

καί... «ἀναθυμιῶνται. Bywater Heracl. fr. 42 ascribes these 
words to Zeno and not to Heraclitus: the importance of 

this will appear presently. 


ὁμοίως : 1.6. in the same sense as Heraclitus: the latter 
however would not have called the soul αἰσθητική, dis- 
tinguishing as he did between sensation and knowledge : 
κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους 
ψυχὰς ἐχόντων frag. 11 Sch. and Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, 
p. 12: hence Sextus infers that Heraclitus held τὴν αἴσθησιν 
ἄπιστον εἶναι (Math. vil. 126). 

τυποῦσθαι: cf. frag. 7, and for ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων x.7.X. frag. 

84. Rufus Ephes. de part. hom. p. 44 ed. Clinch, 

θερμασίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα Ζήνων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί φησιν. 
This passage has been discovered by Stein, Psych. n. 
81 to whose remarks the reader is referred. 

85. Diog. L. vir. 157, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς.. .-πνεῦμα 
ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἐμπνό- 
ous, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι. 

Cf. Alex. Aphr. de an. p. 26, 16 ed. Bruns, οἱ ἀπὸ 
τῆς Στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν πως 
ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Sext. Pyrrh. τι. 70, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ 
πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν τι πνεύματος 
κατὰ. If any of the authorities seem to assert that 
Heraclitus defined the soul as πνεῦμα, this is doubtless 
either due to Stoic influence or is a mere gloss on ava- 
θυμίασις : see the reff. in Zeller pre-Socratics 11 p. 80 
where however the reference to Sext. Math. 1x. 363 (leg. 
361) is a mistake, as the passage is dealing with ta τῶν 
ὄντων στοιχεῖα. Not dissimilar is the Epicurean defini- 
tion of the soul: Diog. L. x. 63, ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα ἐστι λεπτο- 
μερὲς παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον᾽ προσεμ- 
φερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. Sext. 
Emp. Math. 1x. 71, λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὖσαι (αἱ ψυχαὶ) καὶ 
οὐχ ἧττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον 
τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν. 

ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι : frag. 91. 

86. Cic. Acad. 1. 39, (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse 
ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque 
sensus, Fin. Iv. 12, cum autem quaereretur res admodum 
difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse ex 
qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis 
cuius geveris essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem. 
Tusce. I. 19, Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur. 

See also Stein, Psychologie p. 101. 

87. Galen plac. Hippocr. et Plat. τι. 8 (v. 283 Kiihn), 
εἰ δέ ye ἕποιτο (Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος) Κλεάνθει καὶ 
Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐξ αἵματος φήσασι 
τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν δ᾽ αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα. 

It is doubtful whether the doctrine of the nourishment 
of the soul by the blood was held by Heraclitus and from 
him derived by Zeno. The only authority, besides the 
doubtful passage of Arius Didymus (frag. 83), from which 
it can be argued that such a view belonged to him is 
Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2 p. 28 (quoted by Zeller, pre- 
Socratics 11. p. 80) Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν 
ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν, who however goes on expressly 
to distinguish the individual soul from the world-soul and 
states that the former is composed ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς (avabv- 
puacews). It is best therefore to regard this as a Stoic 
innovation: just as the stars in the fiery aether are fed by 
the moist particles rising from the watery zone which 
they enclose, so is the fiery soul fed by the moist blood : 
thus man is in himself an organic whole, and the microcosm 
of the individual is an exact parallel to the macrocosm of 
the universe. Further references ap. Zeller p. 212 τ. 2. 
With regard to this passage, Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 10) 
suggests that there is here a confusion between Zeno of 
Citium and Zeno of Tarsus, but there is no necessity 


to adopt this supposition: that Zeno held the soul to 
be fed from the internal moisture of the body; which must 
be the blood, is clear from frag. 83 even if we leave out of 
account the frag. next following. 

88. Longinus ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 21, Ζήνωνι μὲν 
yap καὶ Κλεάνθει νεμεσήσειέ τις ἂν δικαίως οὕτω σφόδρα 
ὑβριστικῶς περὶ αὐτῆς (scil. ψυχῆς) διαλεχθεῖσι καὶ 
ταυτὸν ἄμφω τοῦ στερεοῦ αἵματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀναθυμίασιν φήσασι. Theodoret, gr. aff. cur. p. 934 Migne, 
ἄμφω yap (Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης) τοῦ στερεοῦ αἵματος 
εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν. 

In both cases the MSS. have σώματος for αἵματος, but 
the words are often confused and σώματος yields no 
satisfactory sense. The emendation is made by Stein, 
Psychol. p. 107, and is confirmed by the passages which he 
cites from Marcus Aurelius (Vv. 33, νι. 1ὅ). στερεοῦ αἵματος 
is rather an odd expression, but was probably introduced 
by way of contrast to ψυχὴ as λεπτομερέστατον πνεῦμα. 
For ἄμφω Viger suggested ἀμφοῖν, but the word is some- 
times indeclinable. 

89. Tertullian de Anima, c. 5, denique Zeno con- 
situm spiritum definiens animam hoc modo instruit, “quo” 
inquit “digresso animal emoritur, corpus est: consito 
autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus 
spiritus corpus est: consitus autem spiritus anima est: 
ergo corpus est anima.” Macrob. Somn. Sc. 1. 14. 19, 
Zenon (dixit animam) concretum corpori spiritum. 

Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Nem. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 33, ὁ 
θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος οὐδὲν δὲ 
ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται 
σώματος ἀσώματον" ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρί- 
ζεται τοῦ σώματος. σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. See Zeller, Stoics 


p. 211, where further illustrations to this and the following 
frag. will be found in the notes. concretum or consitum 
corpori spiritum = Chrys. ap. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. m1. 1 
(v. 287 Kiihn), ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν 
συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον (quoted by Zeller). For 
quo digresso etc. cf. Cic. Tuse. I. 18, sunt qui discessum 
animi a corpore putent esse mortem. Plat. Phaed. 64 ¢, 
dpa μὴ ἄλλο τι (ἡγούμεθα τὸν θάνατον εἶναι) ἢ τὴν τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν ; 

90. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 220, Spiritum quippe animam 
esse Zenon quaerit hactenus: quo recedente a corpore 
moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro | 
spiritu recedente moritur animal : naturalis igitur spiritus 
anima est. 

It is possible that this passage and the extract from 
Tertullian (fr. 89) are derived from a common original, 
but, as in their present form the syllogisms are directed 
to distinct points, it has been thought better to keep 
them separate. 

91. Galen, Hist. Phil. 24, Diels, p. 613, τὴν δὲ 
οὐσίαν αὐτῆς (ψυχῆς) of μὲν ἀσώματον ἔφασαν ὡς Πλάτων, 
οἱ δὲ σώματα κινεῖν ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πνεῦμα 
γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι. 

σώματα κινεῖν. So MS. A, but B has σώματα συγκινοῦν 
and the Latin version of Nicolaus has “corpus simul 
secum movens.” Wachsm. conj. σῶμα σώματα ἅμα κινοῦν. 
Usener: σῶμα τὰ σώματα κινοῦν. Diels: σῶμα αὑτὸ 
κινοῦν sive ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον. Coll. Gal. def. Med. 30 
κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωικοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κιν- 
ovpevov. Whatever may be the right reading, σώμα 
certainly seems wanted as well as σώματα to point the 
contrast with Plato. For the doctrine of the soul re- 


garded as the principle of movement, see the summary of 
the views of previous philosophers given by Arist. de An. 
1. 2. § 2—6, 403 b 27—404 b 7. That the soul was self- 
moving as being the principle of motion, was a dis- 
tinctively Platonic dogma. Phaedr. 245 ©, μὴ ἄλλο τι 
εἶναι TO αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν. Legg. 895 A, ψυχήν 
οὐὐτὴν δυναμένην αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν, Where the argument 
is made use of to prove the immortality of the soul. 

For the Stoics cf. Sext. Math. 1x. 102, πάσης yap 
φύσεως Kal ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ 
ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ, and the references collected by Stein, 
Psych. nn. 217 and 221 to which add M. Aurel. v. 19. 
The theory of τόνος throws an entirely new light on this, 
as on many other Stoic doctrines, which were originally 
adopted on independent grounds. 

92. Stob. Ecl. 1. 49. 33, p. 867, 18, ἀλλὰ μὲν of γε 
ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι 
σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νοοῦσι Tas μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ 
ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς 
οὐσίαν προὐποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασιν, ἐκ δ᾽ ἀμφο- 
τέρων τούτων σύνθετον φύσιν ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνάγουσιν. 

ποιότητας... «οὐσίαν. This distinction we have already 
met with in frag. 53. It properly belongs to the depart- 
ment of logic but, in consequence of the Stoic materialism, 
it has also a quasi-physical application : see Zeller, Stoics, 
pp. 105, 127, Reid on Cic. Ac. 1. 24 [0]. The different 
activities of the soul bear the same relation to the soul 
as a whole, as the qualities of any particular object bear 
to its substance: hence Sext. Emp. Math. vi. 234, φασὶ 
yap ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγ- 
κρίσιν καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. 

προὐποκειμένην : for the significance of this expression, 
see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 310. 


93. Nemes. de Nat. Hom. p. 96, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωικὸς 
ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διαιρῶν αὐτὴν εἴς τε τὸ 
ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ εἰς τὸ φωνη- 
τικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν. Stob. Ecl. τ. 49. 34, p. 369, 6, 
οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ὀκταμερὴ τὴν ψυχὴν διαδοξάζουσι περὶ 
«ἣν; τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ 
ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας, συγκαταθέσεως, ὁρμῆς, λόγου. 

We must distinguish the μέρη ψυχῆς from the δυ- 
νάμεις, for they are not identical, as the passage in 
Stobeeus shows. Sext. Emp. Math. vil. 237, καὶ γὰρ ἡ 
ὁρμὴ Kal ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροιώσεις 
εἰσὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. In spite of this eightfold division 
of local extension (see Zeller, p. 214 ἢ. 2) the Stoics 
held the unity of the soul as an essence: see especially 
Stein, Psych. pp. 119, 122, who suggests “ soul-functions ” 
as a more suitable expression for the Stoics than “ parts 
of the soul”. 

τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. We have clear evidence here that the 
term ἡγεμονικὸν is Zenonian. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie 
nn. 219 and 693, is inconsistent on this point, in the 
former passage attributing its introduction to Cleanthes 
and in the latter to Zeno. It is very possible that 
Cleanthes first spoke of τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, which 
with him was the sun, in furtherance of his view of man 
as a microcosm. 

94. Tertullian de Anima, c. 14, dividitur autem in 
partes nunc in duas a Platone, nunc in tres a Zenone. 

This passage is at variance with the account given by 
Nemesius. Wellmann, 1. c. p. 476, prefers the authority 
of Tertullian, thinking that the three divisions in question 
are the ἡγεμονικόν, the φωνητικόν, and the σπερματικόν, 
and that the five organs of sense were regarded by Zeno 
as parts of the body, though the centre of sense resides 


in the ἡγεμονικόν. On the other hand Weygoldt, 1. ο. 
p. 36, and Heinze in Bursian’s Jahresb. I. p, 191, think 
Nemesius more trustworthy than Tertullian, and certainly 
the better opinion is that Zeno taught the eightfold 
division (see Stein’s full discussion, Psych. pp. 158—160). 
It is just possible that the triple division mentioned by 
Tertullian is (1) τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, (2) the five senses, and 
(3) the voice and the reproductive organism, and that, if 
we were in possession of the full text of Zeno, the dis- 
crepancy would explain itself. If all that we knew of 
Plato’s psychological divisions had been contained in this 
passage and a statement that he divided the soul into λόγον 
ἔχον, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν, we should have had 
some difficulty in reconciling the two. Hirzel, 11. p. 154, 
155 appears to be unaware of the passage in Nemesius: 
he accepts the evidence of Tertullian, but explains it as 
an ethical rather than a physical distinction. je ee 
Vien a 

95. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. 111. 2. 9 (111. 36), Ζήνων ὁ 
Κιτιεὺς ὁ Στωικὸς ἔφη... δεῖν... ἔχειν TO θεῖον ἐν μόνῳ τῷ 
νῷ μᾶλλον δὲ θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀθάνα- 
OS ssi ἔλεγε δὲ Kal μετὰ χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος * * * 
καὶ ἐκάλει τὴν ψυχὴν πολυχρόνιον πνεῦμα, οὐ μὴν δὲ 
ἄφθαρτον δι’ trov ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἐκδαπανᾶται yap 
ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὥς φησι. Cf. 
August. contra Acad. 111. 17, 38, quamobrem cum Zeno 
sua quadam de mundo et maxime de anima, propter 
quam vera philosophia vigilat, sententia delectaretur, 
dicens eam esse mortalem, nec quidquam esse _praeter 
hunc sensibilem mundum, nihilque in eo agi nisi corpore ; 
nam et deum ipsum ignem putabat. 

τὸ θεῖον : cf. Cleanth. frag. 21, Stein, Psychol. p. 97. 

πολυχρόνιον: the language of this extract recalls the 
objection of Cebes in the Phaedo to Socrates’ proof of 


the immortality of the soul p. 87 A—88 B, recapitulated — 
by Socrates p. 95 B—E, cf. especially τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι 
ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον 
πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι οὐδὲν κωλύειν φὴς πάντα 
ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ 
ἐστιν ψυχή, καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον 
καὶ ἤδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα κιτιχλ. For the 
limited future existence which the Stoics allowed to the 
soul see Zeller, p. 218 foll. and add Schol. ad Lucan. rx. 1, 
alii (animas) solidas quidem, postquam exierint de corpore, 
permanere, sed deinde tractu temporis dissipari: haec 
opinio Stoicorum. There was considerable variation in 
points of detail among the various members of the soul: 
see on Cleanth. frag. 41. 

τοῦ σώματος : some such words as χρόνον τινὰ διαμένειν 
have fallen out here. 

οὐ.. ἀφθαρτον : this is not inconsistent with ἀθάνατος 
above. The soul never perishes entirely, although event- 
ually it passes into a higher power, Diog. vil. 156. 
ψυχὴν μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν, φθαρτὴν δὲ εἶναι. Stein 
Psychol. p. 145. 

96. Themist. de An. 68 a Speng. UL. p. 30, 24, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὅμως Ζήνωνι μὲν ὑπολείπεταί τις ἀπολογία κεκρᾶσθαι 
ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος φάσκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν 
ἔξοδον αὐτῆς ἄνευ φθορᾶς τοῦ συγκρίματος μὴ ποιοῦντι. 

The passage of Aristotle is de An. τ. 8 § 6, p. 400 ἃ 
30—65, where he says that one of the objections to 
the view that the soul κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα is that in that case 
the soul’s movements will correspond to those of the 
body, so that if the body moves locally, the soul may do 
the same and change its position with regard to the body 
by leaving it. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, ἕποιτ᾽ av τὸ ἀνίσ- 
τασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων. We might therefore 


infer from this passage that Zeno taught that the soul 
moved the body (frag. 91). 

Themistius says that Zeno is rescued from this dilemma 
by the doctrine of κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, for which see on frag. 
52. He seems to refer to the Stoic view of the soul as 
the bond of union for the body, so that body cannot exist 
qua body without the presence of soul, cf. Iambl. ap. 
Stob. Ecl. 1. 49. 33, p. 368, 6, καθ᾽ ots δὲ μία ζωὴ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ συνθέτου, συγκεκραμένης τῆς ψυχῆς 
τῷ σώματι. Sext. Math. 1x. 72, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ 
σῶμα διακρατητικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν (τῶν ψυχῶν) ἀλλ᾽ αὐταὶ 
τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς ἦσαν αἴτιαι x.7.A. The best illus- 
tration however is Sext. Math. vil. 234, φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν 
λέγεσθαι διχῶς, TO τε συνέχον THY ὅλην σύγκρισιν Kal 
κατ᾽ ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστάναι 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι 
χωρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἰδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγε- 
μονικόν, the meaning of which passage seems to be that 
only the ἡγεμονικὸν and not the whole soul is said to 
depart, inasmuch as the corpse must possess συνεκτικὴ 
δύναμις in the form of ἕξις, for otherwise it will be 
altogether non-existent. (See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, 
p. 105 foll.) But there is no inconsistency with the 
present passage, since the change of τὸ συνέχον from 
ψυχὴ to ἕξις is φθορὰ τοῦ συγκρίματος (for φθορά 
γθάνατος see on frag. 95). 

97. Lactant. Inst. vil. 7. 20, Esse inferos Zenon 
Stoicus docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: 
et illos quidem quietas et delectabiles incolere regiones, 
hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni 
voraginibus horrendis. 

Cf. Tertull. de anima ὁ. 54, quos quidem miror quod 
imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant cum illas 

H. P. 10 


a sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirment. ubi 
erit scholae regio in tanta distantia diversoriorum? qua 
ratione discipulae ad magistros conventabunt, tanto dis- 
crimine invicem absentes? quid autem illis postremae 
eruditionis usus ac fructus iam iam conflagratione peri- 
. turis? reliquas animas ad inferos deiciunt. Hirzel thinks 
that Virgil’s description of the souls of the lost in Aen. 
vi. is derived from Stoic sources, and therefore ultimately 
from Zeno, and refers to Ecl. vi. 31, Georg. Iv. 220, Aen. 
vi. 724, for the influence of Stoicism on Virgil. The same 
writer correctly points out the distinction between the 
treatment of popular religion in this doctrine of Zeno and 
that which appears in those passages (to be presently 
considered) where the attributes of the popular deities 
are explained away by rationalistic allegory. He compares 
the spirit of the present passage with the Platonic myths, 
called by Grote “fanciful illustrations invented to expand 
and enliven general views,” and suggests that it may 
have occurred in the πολιτεία, which Zeno, as we are told 
by Plutarch, directed against the Platonic school (see 
Hirzel, Untersuchungen 11. pp. 25—31). It is certainly 
hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philo- 
sophical importance to a theory stated in these terms, 
and it is better to regard it as a concession to popular 
belief in a matter which could not be formulated with 
scientific precision. See also Stein, Psych. p. 149 and 
162, who infers that Zeno agreed with Chrysippus rather 
than with Cleanthes in the controversy appearing in 
Cleanth. frag. 41. The general view of the school was 
that the soul after death ascends to the upper aether and — 
is preserved there among the stars to which it is akin: 
Sext. Math. rx. 73, 74, Cic. Tuse. 1. 42, 43. 

98. Plut. plac. Iv. 21. 4, τὸ δὲ φωνᾶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος 


᾽ , a \ x le 4 a a 
εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνὴν καλοῦσιν, ἔστι πνεῦμα διατεῖνον 

an a , , a 
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλώττης καὶ TOV 
οἰκείων ὀργάνων. 

Cf. on Cleanth. frag. 49. 
99. Eustath. in 1]. = 506, p. 1158, 37, ἠεροφώνους 

κήρυκας “Ὅμηρος κἀνταῦθα εἰπὼν τὸν κατὰ Ζήνωνα τῆς 
φωνῆς ὅρον προὐὔπέβαλεν εἰπόντα᾽ “ φωνή ἐστιν ἀὴρ πε- 

Cf. Diog. L. vir. 55, ἔστε δὲ φωνὴ ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος. 
This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. 1. p. 12. 
Sound is produced by the breath coming in contact with 
the external air; in the case of an animal the air is said 
to be struck ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς, while the voice of man is ἔναρθρος 
καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, Diog. 1. 6. See also the 
passages quoted by Stein, Psychol. n. 248. 

Cf. Plato’s definition, Tim. p. 67 Β., ὅλως μὲν οὖν 
φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι’ ὦτων ὑπ᾽ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ 
αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην. Ar. de An. 
II. 8 discusses ψόφος, ἀκοή, and φωνή. Sound is formed 
ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ Kal μὴ διαχυθῇ (ὃ 3, p. 419 
b 21): voice is then defined as ψόφος tis ἐμψύχου 
(δ 9, p. 420 b. 5) and is minutely described. 

100. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. um. 5, v. p. 241, K, 
ὁ θαυμαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν λόγος ὁ Ζήνωνος... 
ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. “ φωνὴ διὰ φάρυγγος χωρεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἦν ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου χωροῦσα, οὐκ ἂν διὰ φάρυγγος ἐχώρει. 
ὅθεν δὲ λόγος, καὶ φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν χωρεῖ. λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ 
διανοίας χωρεῖ, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια." 

It is tempting to suggest that λόγος and φωνὴ have 
changed places: the argument would certainly be more 
transparent if the transposition were made: cf. the 
following passage in Galen, speaking of Diogenes Baby- 
lonius: ὅθεν ἐκπέμπεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἡ ἔναρθρος" οὐκοῦν 



καὶ ἡ σημαίνουσα ἔναρθρος φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν" τοῦτο δὲ λόγος. 
καὶ λόγος ἄρα ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπεται ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. 
Galen’s comment is that Zeno has omitted some of the 
necessary ἀξιώματα, while Diogenes has too many. He 
also points out the fallacy underlying the preposition 
ἀπό, which is ambiguous; either ἐξ or ὑπὸ ought to have 
been used, in which case the argument could never have 
stood the test of daylight. The gist however of his 
argument against Zeno, which is given at some length, 
is that Zeno has been deceived by the following fallacy: 
ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἐκπέμπεται, ἐκεῖ δεῖ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν 
γίγνεσθαι, τουτέστιν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μορίῳ. τοῦτο δὲ φήσομεν 
ἄντικρυς εἶναι ψεῦδος, οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔκ 
τινος ἐκπέμπεται Kat ἐκεῖνο τὸ μόριον δείκνυται τὴν 
διάνοιαν ὑπάρχειν, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ οὖρον οὐδε τὸ πτύελον 
οὐδὲ ἡ κόρυζα οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποπάτημα. Wachsmuth quotes 
further passages from Galen’s argument in which Zeno’s 
name is mentioned, but they add nothing to the words 
cited above. Chrysippus, and after him Diogenes of Babylon 
(Οἷς. N. D. 1. 41), laboured to prove that the birth of 
Athene from the head of Zeus in no way conflicted with 
their view that the breast was the seat of reason (Zeller, 
p. 364). See generally Stein, Psychol. p. 137. 

101. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. π. 5, v. p. 247, 
Kiihn, καὶ τοῦτο βούλεταί ye Ζήνων καὶ Χρύσιππος ἅμα 
τῷ σφετέρῳ χορῷ παντὶ διαδίδοσθαι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ προσ- 
πεσόντος ἔξωθεν ἐγγενομένην τῷ μορίῳ κίνησιν εἰς τὴν 
ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν᾿ αἴσθηται τὸ ζῷον. 

This passage occurs in the course of the discussion 
as to φωνὴ and διάνοια as a parenthetical argument, and 
Galen objects that there is no perceptible interval of time 
between the impression and the sensation. Cf. Plut. plac. 
Iv. 23, 1, impressions are made on the organ of sense but 



the seat of feeling is in the ἡγεμονικόν. Philo de mund. 
Opif. p. 114 Pfeiff. (quoted on Cleanthes, frag. 3). See 
also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 306. 

102. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. m1. 5, v. p. 322, 
Kiihn, 6 τε Ζήνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιλαμβανομένους, ὅτι πάντα 
τὰ ζητούμενα εἰς τὸ στόμα φέρει, ἔφησεν “ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα 
καταπίνεται᾽᾽, οὔτε τῆς καταπόσεως ἄλλως ἂν οἰκειότερον 
λεγομένης οὔτε τῆς καταβάσεως τῶν ῥηθέντων, εἰ μὴ 
περὶ τὸν θώρακα τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῖν ἦν, εἰς ὃ ταῦτα 
πάντα φέρεται. 

φέρει, SO I. Miiller for MSS. φέρειν. This obscure passage 
was formerly punctuated as though Zeno’s words extended 
from add’ ov πάντα to φέρεται, but, if the context is read, 
it is at once plain that I. Miiller is right in putting the 
inverted commas after καταπίνεται. Chrysippus, who is 
being quoted, is aiming to prove the location of the ἡγε- 
μονικὸν in the breast by the usage of ordinary speech: 
eg. ἀναβαίνειν τὸν θυμόν---καταπίνειν τὴν χολήν---σπα- 
ράγματα καταπίνεσθαι---καταπιὼν τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀπῆλθεν: 
then comes this reference to Zeno, and the conclusion 
οὔτε---φέρεται is the inference drawn by Chrysippus from 
the facts stated. Still, it is by no means clear what was 
the force of the objection made to Zeno or of his rejoinder. 
Miller translates:—Et Zeno reprehendentibus, quod 
omnia, quae in quaestionem vocarentur, in ore gestaret, 
‘at, inquit, ‘non omnia a me devorantur, apparently 
making Zeno the subject of φέρει, but the Latin is in 
other respects hardly less obscure than the Greek. 
Wachsmuth, who has the old punctuation, interprets 
πάντα τὰ ξητούμενα as “affectus” and suggests φέρεται 
for φέρειν, but what meaning he deduces from the passage 
I do not understand. In this perplexity, the following 
-explanation is suggested. πάντα ta ζητούμενα is the 


subject of φέρει and the objectors say:—all objects of 
investigation are ultimately concerned with the mouth. 
For φέρει see L. and S. of ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι are the 
Epicureans, who denied the existence of any intermediate 
σημαινόμενον (λεκτόν) between σημαῖνον (φωνή) and 
τυγχάνον (τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον), cf. Sext. Math. vim. 11 
foll. and esp. 13, of δὲ περὶ τὸν ᾿Επίκουρον.. φαίνονται... 
περὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπειν. Diog. L. 
χ. 33, πᾶν οὖν πρᾶγμα ὀνόματι τῷ πρώτως ἐπιτεταγμένῳ 
ἐναργές ἐστι. But this nominalism went hand in hand 
with the most absolute credence in every sense-perception. 
To the Stoic, however, not every φαντασία is ἐναργής, but 
only that which is καταληπτική. Hence Zeno’s reply :— 
however this may be, we can’t swallow everything. κατα- 
πίνεται is substituted for καταλαμβάνεται, just as στόμα 
takes the place of φωνή. Some confirmation of this guess 
“may be found in the recurrence of τὸ ἕητούμενον, ξητεῖν, 
etc. in Epicurean texts (Diog. x. 33, 37, 38, Sext. Math. 
x1. 21). If Miiller’s punctuation is adopted, this fragment 
ought rather to be numbered with the ἀποφθέγματα, but, 
in a matter of so much uncertainty, I have not ventured 
to remove it from the physical fragments, among which it 
is placed by Wachsmuth. 

οὔτε x.7.d. It would not be correct to speak of “swallow- 
ing” or “imbibing” another's words, in any other case 
unless (ἄλλως εἰ μή) the dominant part of the soul were 
in the breast. For καταπόσεως cf. Ar. Ach, 484 (of 
Dicaearchus encouraging his θυμὸς to persevere in taking 
the part of the Lacedaemonians) ἕστηκας ; οὐκ εἶ κατα- 
πιὼν Εὐριπίδην; 

103. Cic. de Divin. um. 119, contrahi autem animum 
Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere et ipsum esse 


Elsewhere sleep is said to be caused by a slackening 
of the tension in the πνεῦμα. Diog. L. Vit. 158, τὸν δὲ 
ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκχυομένου Tod αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ TO 
ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. plac. v. 23. 4, Πλάτων οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν 
μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος, οὐ 
κατ᾽ ἀναχαλασμόν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, φερομένου δὲ ὡς 
ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μεσόφρυον. For Plato’s theory of sleep 
ef. Tim. p. 45 D, E, and for the Stoics, Stein, Psychol. 
p. 141. 

104. Stob. Flor. Monac. 198, ὁ αὐτὸς (Ζήνων) ἔφη 
τὴν μὲν ὅρασιν ἀπὸ Tod ἀέρος λαμβάνειν τὸ φῶς, τὴν δὲ 
ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων. 

For the Stoic theory of vision see Zeller, p. 221, n. 4. 
Stein, Psych. n. 241. In Plut. plac. Iv. 21, ὅρασις is 
defined as πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις 
ὀφθαλμῶν. The views of the ancient philosophers before 
Aristotle will be found concisely stated in Grote’s Plato, 
Il. 265 n., and for Aristotle see Grote’s Aristotle, p. 465. 

105. Varro de 1, L. v. 59, sive, ut Zenon Citieus, 
animalium semen ignis is, qui anima ac mens. 

Mueller’s punctuation of the passage has been followed: 
in Spengel’s edition, Zeno’s statement is made to extend 
farther. ignis = πνεῦμα in the next fragment. Zeller 
remarks: “ Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2. 17, 1. 24, 1) draws 
attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal 
soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, 
has been developed thereout by cooling and condensation,” 
p. 213, n.1. Stein’s explanation of this paradox (Psych. 
p- 115—117) is ingenious, but he is driven to assume 

that φύσις is warmer than ψυχή, which seems question- 

106. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 1, Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39, 


Diels p. 470, τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ὃ 
μεθίησιν ἄνθρωπος πνεῦμα μεθ᾽ ὑγροῦ, ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ 
ἀπόσπασμα καὶ τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα 
καὶ μῦγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν συνεληλυθός" ἔχον γὰρ 
τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὅλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦτο, ὅταν ἀφεθῇ εἰς τὴν 
μήτραν συλληφθὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου πνεύματος, μέρος ψυχῆς 
τῆς τοῦ θήλεος κρυφθέν τε φύει κινούμενον καὶ ἀναρριπι- 
ζόμενον ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου προσλάμβανον ἀεὶ [εἰς] τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ 
αὐξόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Theodoret freely copies Euseb. gr. 
aff. cur. V. 25, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆσδε τῆς αἱρέσεως 
ἡγησάμενος τοιάδε περὶ ψυχῆς δοξάξειν τοὺς οἰκείους 
ἐδίδαξε φοιτητάς" τὸν yap τοι ἀνθρώπινον θορὸν ὑγρὸν 
ὄντα καὶ μετέχοντα πνεύματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἔφησεν εἶναι 
μέρος τε καὶ ἀπόσπασμα καὶ τοῦ τῶν προγόνων σπέρματος 
κέρασμα τε καὶ μῖγμα ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων 
συναθροισθέν. Plut. de cohib. Ira, 15, καίτοι (καθάπερ 6 
Ζήνων ἔλεγε τὸ σπέρμα σύμμιγμα Kal κέρασμα τῶν τῆς 
ψυχῆς δυναμέων ὑπάρχειν ἀπεσπασμένον) οὕτω «.T.d. 
ib. plac. v. 4. 1, Ζήνων (τὸ σπέρμα) σῶμα" ψυχῆς yap 
εἶναι ἀπόσπασμα. Same in Galen, hist. phil. 31. ΧΙΧ. 
322 K., cf. Galen, ὅροι ἰατρ. 94 (XIX. 370 K.), σπέρμα ἐστὶν 
ἀνθρώπου 0, μεθίησιν ἄνθρωπος μεθ᾽ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρους 
ἅρπαγμα καὶ σύμμιγμα τοῦ τῶν προγόνων γένους, οἷόν 
τε αὐτὸ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ συμμιχθὲν ἀπεκρίθη. Diog. vil. 158, 
. ἀνθρώπου δὲ σπέρμα, ὃ μεθίησιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μεθ᾽ ὑγροῦ 
συγκίρνασθαι (λέγουσιν) τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι κατὰ 
μιγμὸν τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου. 

See also Zeller, p. 212, 213. Stein, Psych. n. 252, 
collects the various points of resemblance between the 
Stoics and the Hippocratean school of medicine. 

συλληφθέν : conceptum, cf. Sext. Math. v. 55 foll. 

φύει : is productive (not intrans.). So perhaps in the 
well known line: Hom. 1]. vi. 149, ὡς ἀνδρῶν yeven, ἡ 
μὲν φύει ἡ δ᾽ ἀπολήγει. Otherwise, as re is not required 


by the sense, we might suggest that reves arose from 
φυεται, cf. Diog. L. vit. 159, τῶν εἰς τὴν γῆν KaTa- 
βαλλομένων σπερμάτων ἃ παλαιωθέντα οὐκ ἔτι φύεται. 
Cleanth. fr. 24, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα 
φύεται κιτιλ. Diels suggests κερασθέν τε φύει and Usener 
κρύφα ἐπισχύει. 

εἰς after ἀεὶ is perhaps due to dittography. 

107. Plut. plac. v. 5. 2, Ζήνων (τὰς θηλείας) ὕλην 
μὲν ὑγρὰν προΐεσθαι, οἱονεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς συγγυμνασίας ἱδρῶτας, 
οὐ μὴν σπερματικόν. The same in Galen, hist. phil. c. 31, 
mix. 322 K., cf Diog: Li. vit) 159, ro: Se τῆς θηλείας 
(σπέρμα) ἄγονον ἀποφαίνονται ἄτονόν τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ 
ὀλίγον καὶ ὑδατῶδες, ὡς ὁ Σφαῖρος φησίν. 

σπερματικόν. Diels, p. 418 reads σπέρμα πεπτικόν. 

108. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1x. 138, Ζήνων δὲ καὶ 
τοιοῦτον ἠρώτα λόγον᾽ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῳη. 
τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἄν τις εὐλόγως τιμῴη᾽ εἰσὶν ἄρα 

Sextus proceeds to describe the forced interpretation 
which Diogenes of Babylon and others put upon Zeno’s 
words in order to get rid of the transparent sophistry 
(ib. 133—136). Theon, Progymn. 12, p. 251 (Spengel, 
Rhet. gr. p. 126, 16) gives proofs of the existence of the 
gods, among which is: ἑξῆς δὲ ὅτι Kal τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκεῖ, 
οἷον Πλάτωνι, ᾿Αριστοτέλει, Ζήνωνι. 

109. Lactant. de ira Dei c. 11, Antisthenes...unum 
esse naturalem Deum dixit, quamvis gentes et urbes suos 
habeant populares. Eadem fere Zeno cum suis Stoicis. 
Cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 84 Gomp., πάντες οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ 
Ζήνωνος, εἰ καὶ ἀπέλειπον τὸ δαιμόνιον...ἕνα θεὸν λέγου- 
σιν εἶναι. 


At first sight these passages are inconsistent with frag. 
108, but in reality there is no such difficulty: cf. Athenag. 
Suppl. c. 6, p. 73, quoted supra on frag. 45. The Stoics 
strongly opposed the follies of the popular belief, while at 
the same time they called attention to the germ of truth 
which it contained, being no doubt anxious to preserve it 
as a basis for morality. Zeller well observes, p. 347, 
“Holding that the name of God belongs in its full and 
original sense only to the one primary being, they did not 
hesitate to apply it in a limited and derivative sense to 
all those objects by means of which the divine power is 
especially manifested.” In testing how far this admission 
goes, it should be observed that the Stoic in Cic. N. D. πὶ. 
45 distinctly denies that the derivative gods are human 
in shape, cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 85 G., ἀνθρωποειδεῖς 
yap ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρας καὶ πνεύματα Kal 
αἰθέρας. For Antisthenes cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 78 G., 
map ᾿Αντισθένει δ᾽ ἐν μὲν TO φυσικῷ λέγεται TO κατὰ 
νόμον εἷναι πολλοὺς θεούς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕνα. 

110. Cic. N. Ὁ. 1. 36, Cum vero Hesiodi θεογονίαν 
interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque cogniti- 
ones deorum; neque enim Jovem neque Iunonem neque 
Vestam neque quemquam qui ita appelletur in deorum ~ 
habet numero sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam 
significationem haec docet tributa nomina. 

Hesiodi θεογονίαν : Introd. p. 31. 

Iovem: see on frag. 111 and cf. Flach, Glossen u. 
Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie, p. 66. 

Iunonem = air : see infra and ef. Cic. N. 1). 11. 66; she is 
identified with air as being the wife of luppiter (= aether), 
and air is regarded as feminine, quod nihil est eo mollius. 
Similarly” Hpy =air in Empedocles (R. and P.§ 131). ἀὴρ 
is also one of Plato’s derivations, who says the order of 


the letters has been reversed, γνοίης δ᾽ ἂν εἰ πολλάκις 
λέγοις TO τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα, Crat. p. 404 C. 

Vestam: ct. N. Ὁ. π. 67. “Wahrscheinlich leitete 
Zenon ihren Namen von ἑστάναι ab und brachte hiermit, 
anspielend auf den Altar der Hestia im Prytaneum, den 
Stillstand der Erde im Mittelpunkt der Welt in Verbind- 
ung.” Krische, p. 401. 

This is perhaps the best place to refer to a supposed 
fragment of Zeno contained in Philodem. περὶ θεῶν δια- 
γωγῆς, Hercul. vol. vi. Tab. 1. 1, «αὐ; 84 «ὁ» Ζήνων 
ἕκαστον «τὸν θεὸν ἄπειρα κατέχειν; δὴ τὰ Eve <TNPLA>... 
«οὐκ a>v συνακοςλούθει εἰ μή τι; τῶν αἰώνων; καὶ 
ἀςξι; οὔται Sia<p>Oicape<vos> ὡς we<taTta>s θεάς. It 
will be seen that so little of the papyrus is legible here 
that the sense for which it is quoted by Zeller, p. 165 
n. 5, is entirely due to the imagination of the Naples 
editor. Prof. Scott (Fragm. Hercul. p. 181) rightly 
characterises this as “gibberish,” and wonders that Zeller 
should have seriously quoted it: see also Wachsm. Comm. 
IL p.9n. If we are to follow the conjectures of the 
Naples editor of this work of Philodemus, there are at 
least three other fragments of Zeno preserved in it. In 
no place but this, however, does the name of Zeno occur, 
and, though the doctrines appear to belong to some Stoic, 
there is no reason whatever for supposing that they 
originated with Zeno. They will be found at Tab. Iv. 7. 

Ὁ, iv. col. τ ὃ. xi. and col. Il. Ὁ: xii. 

111. Minucius Felix Octav. 19. 10, Idem (Zeno) 
interpretando Iunonem aera Jovem caelum Neptunum 
mare ignem esse Vulcanum et ceteros similiter vulgi deos 
elementa esse monstrando publicum arguit graviter et 
revincit errorem. 

Iovem: it is clear that Zeus was identified with the 


aether or pure fiery essence, of which caelum is here an 
equivalent, as in Pacuvius ap. Cic. N. Ὁ. 11. 91, hoe quod 
memoro nostri caelum Grai perhibent aethera. Cf. Chrysipp. 
ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 79 Gomp.,”Hgaiorov δὲ πῦρ 
elvat...Aia δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα. Diog. L. vit. 147 God is the 
creator of the universe, and, as it were, the father of all; 
his various manifestations are described by different names. 
Ala μὲν yap φασι δι᾽ ὃν τὰ πάντα" Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ᾽ 
ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιός ἐστιν, ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν...... 
Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα: καὶ “Ἥ φαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς 
τὸ τεχνικὸν Tip’ καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. 
The extract from Minue. Felix lends some slight weight 
to Krische’s theory (p. 398) that the whole of Diogenes’ 
description is ultimately derived from Zeno. The same 
writer thinks that the explanation of the myths of the 
mutilation of Uranus and the binding of Cronos (Cic. 
N. Ὁ. 11. 63, 64) belongs to Zeno. 

ignem. Diogenes’ πῦρ τεχνικὸν is, according to Krische, 
a blunder: Hephaestus is elsewhere identified with earthly 
fire (τὴν φλόγα in Plut. de Iside c. 66, for which however 
see on Cleanth. frag. 23). But see Zeller, p. 359, 1. 
These explanations were not novelties introduced by the 
Stoa, except in so far as they were specially adapted to Stoic 
_ dogmas. Cf. Sext. Math. 1x. 18 (after citing Euhemerus 
and Prodicus), καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δημήτραν 
νομισθῆναι τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα 
τὸ δὲ πῦρ φαιστον καὶ ἤδη τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον. 

112. Valer. Probus in Virg. Ecl. vi. 31, p. 21, 14 Keil: 
sunt qui singulis elementis principia adsignaverunt... 
Thales Milesius magister eius (Anaximenis) aquam. Hane 
quidem Thaletis opinionem ab Hesiodo putant manare 
qui dixerit: ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα. 
Nam Zenon Citieus sic interpretatur aquam χάος ap- 



pellatum ἀπὸ τοῦ χέεσθαι, quamquam eandem opinionem 
ab Homero possumus intellegere quod ait ‘OQxeavov τε 
θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν. This frag. is cited by 
Wachsmuth Comm. 1. p. 11, who adds “eadem originatio 
est apud Achill. Tat., Isag. in Arat. phaen. 3. 125 6. Petav.” 

The lines of Hesiod, Theog. 116 foll. are often quoted, 
e.g. by Plato, Symp. 178 B, to prove the antiquity of love, 
and by Ar. Met. 1 4. 1 as an indication that Hesiod 
recognised both the efficient and the final cause. Aris- 
totle also refers to the passage in Phys. Iv. 1 and de Caelo 
ut. 1. 298 Ὁ. 25, and Krische suggests (p. 395) that the 
application which is put upon it by him in the latter 
place prevented Zeno from identifying yaos with his own 
πρώτη ὕλη as might have been expected. Cf. also the 
anecdote related of Epicurus in Sext. Math. x. 18, 19. 

ἀπὸ τοῦ xéo0a. Krische |. c. remarks that this deri- 
vation is probably referred to in Plat. Cratyl. 402 B 
where Socrates, after saying that Heraclitus likened all 
things to a flowing river, and that Homer’s line showed 
that he was of the same opinion, proceeds: οἶμαι δὲ καὶ 

118. Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. 1. 498, καὶ Ζήνων δὲ τὸ 
tap Ἡσιόδῳ χάος ὕδωρ εἶναί φησιν, οὗ συνιζάνοντος 
ἰλὺν γίνεσθαι, ἧς πηγνυμένης ἡ γῆ στερεμνιοῦται. τρίτον 
δὲ "Ἔρωτα γεγονέναι καθ᾽ Η σίοδον, ἵνα τὸ πῦρ παραστήσῃ" 
πυρωδέστερον γὰρ πάθος "Ἰὰρως. 

This passage shows clearly that Zeno must have re- 
jected or been ignorant of ll. 118 and 119 of the Theog. 
see Krische, p. 396. 

χάος. See on frag. 112 and add Cornut. c. 17, p. 85 
Osann, ἔστε δὲ χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακοσμήσεως γε- 
νόμενον ὑγρόν, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὕτως ὠνομασμένον. 

itv: similar views with regard to the formation of the 


earth are attributed to Xenophanes. Hippolyt. 1. 14, ταῦτα 
δέ φησι γενέσθαι ὅτε πάντα ἐπηλώθησαν πάλαι τὸν δὲ 
τόπον ἐν τῷ πηλῷ ξηρανθῆναι x.7.r., and to Anaxagoras 
(Zeller, pre-Socratics 11. p. 356). Hence Zeno himself 
spoke of earth as ὑποστάθμη πάντων, frag. 114. 

πυρωδέστερον : a familiar comparison. Pind. P. Iv. 219 
Medea ἐν φρασὶ καιομέναν. Virg. Aen. Iv. 68, uritur in- 
felix Dido. Georg. 111. 244, in furias ignemque ruunt: 
amor omnibus idem. Cf. Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, ἠδ᾽ 
Epos...évior δὲ πῦρ' τὸ πυρῶδες yap THs ἐπιθυμίας. 

The authorities give two further Stoic explanations of 
Hesiod’s Eros; (1) with a reference to λόγος σπερματικός. 
Cornut. c. 17, p. 86 Osann, ὁ δὲ [Ἔρως σὺν αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι 
ἐρρήθη, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ γεννᾶν. (2) Fire regarded as 
σννεκτικὴ δύναμις : Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, τὰ τρία 
στοιχεῖα εἰπὼν τὸ ὃ λέγει τὸ πῦρ ὅπερ δαιμονίως ἔρωτά 
φησι, συναρμόζειν γὰρ καὶ συνάγειν καὶ ἑνοῦν πέφυκεν. 
On the passage generally cf. Flach, Glossen u. Scholien, 
p. 37, who attributes to Zeno the words in the Schol. on 
1. 115, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐγένοντο τὰ στοιχεῖα, γῆ κατὰ 
συνίζησιν, ἀὴρ κατὰ avadoow* τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς τοῦ 
ἀέρος γέγονε πῦρ, τὰ δὲ ὄρη κατὰ ἐξοστρακισμὸν τῆς γῆς, 
which appear also in Cornut. ο. 17, p. 84 Osann. This is 
likely enough, but there is no direct evidence. The same 
remark applies to the derivation of Κρόνος from χρόνος 
id. p. 44 (cf. Cic. N. D. 11. 64). Flach refers many other 
definitions to Zeno: a list of some of them will be found 
at p. 48 of his work, but those of his inferences which are 
not supported by direct evidence cannot be dealt with 

114. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 117, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωικὸς 
ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὴν ὑποστάθμην γῆν γεγεννῆσθαί φησιν, 
τρίτον δὲ "Epwra γεγονέναι, ὅθεν ὁ ἐπαγόμενος ἀθετεῖται 


στίχος. Cf. Diog.. L. vit. 137, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων 
τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν. 

Wachsmuth connects this with frag. 113. For the 
general sense cf. frag. 52. The word ὑποστάθμη is Platonic 

(Phaed. 109 c). 

115. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 134 Gaisf. Gr. Poet. Min. 
1. 482, ὁ Ζήνων φησὶ τοὺς Τιτᾶνας διὰ παντὸς εἰρῆσθαι 
τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου. Kotov γὰρ λέγει τὴν ποιότητα 
\ \ > \ a \ \ lal \ \ 
κατὰ τροπὴν ᾿Αιολικὴν τοῦ π πρὸς TO K, Κρεῖον δὲ τὸ 
βασιλικὸν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, Ὑπερίονα δὲ τὴν ἄνω κίνησιν 
ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπεράνω ἰέναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει πάντα τὰ 
βάρη ἀφιέμενα πίπτειν ἄνωθεν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ᾿Ιάπετον 
ποιότητα, frag. 53. πάντα τὰ βάρη, frag. 67. βάρη... ἄνωθεν... 
εἶδος : SO Flach, p. 223 after Schoemann. The old reading 
was κοῦφα... ἄνω...μέρος. Osann suggested imrew for 
ε a 
πίπτειν. Cf. Cornut. c. 17, p. 91 Osann, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν 
lal + U \ ’ / ς / + a \ 
παλαιῶν Ἰάπετος μὲν ὠνομάσθη ὁ λόγος Kal’ ὃν φωνητικὰ 
Xs lal / PR A ¢ ᾿ > og te A ie 
τὰ ζῷα ἐγένετο Kal ὅλος ὁ ψόφος ἀπετελέσθη, ἰάφετός τις 
v aN \ ec , ° \ > ἃ al Nise. 
ὧν" iad yap ἡ φωνή. Koios δὲ καθ᾽ ὃν ποῖά τινα τὰ ὄντα 
ἐστί τῷ γὰρ κ πολλαχοῦ οἱ Ἴωνες ἀντὶ τοῦ T χρῶνται... 
Κρῖος δὲ καθ᾽ ὃν τὰ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ δυναστεύει τῶν πραγ- 
μάτων τὰ δ᾽ ὑποτέτακται καὶ δυναστεύεται᾽ ἐντεῦθεν τάχα 
καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ποιμνίοις κριοῦ προσαγορευομένου. Ὕπερ- 
ίων δὲ καθ᾽ ὃν ὑπεράνω τινα ἑτέρων περιπορεύεται. See 

Flach, Glossen u. Scholien zur Hes. Th. p. 42 foll. 

116. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 139, Gaisf. Gr. Poet. Min. 
1. 484. Κύκλωπας. Ζήνων δὲ πάλιν φυσικωτέρως τὰς 
ἐγκυκλίους φορὰς εἰρῆσθαί φησι: διὸ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα 
τούτων ἐξέθετο Βρόντην τε καὶ Στερόπην᾽ “Apynv δὲ 
ἐπειδή φασι τὸν ἀργῆτα Kepavvov’ παῖδας δέ φησιν 
αὐτοὺς τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη περὶ 


τὸν οὐρανόν εἰσι...[ἐν χρόνῳ yap τινι ἐγένοντο ἔγκυκλοι 
περιφοραὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος. 

Flach’s arrangement of the text is quite different: he 
inserts the words ἐν ypovw—dépos after εἰρῆσθαί φησιν, 
altering φορὰς into περιφοράς. See his interpretation, 
p. 50. . 

ἐγκυκλίους φοράς. The band of aether which formed the 
external stratum of the world revolved in a circle round 
it. Stob. Ecl. τ. 14 1‘ p. 142, 13, τὸ αἰθέριον (φῶς) περι- 
φερῶς κινεῖται. In the matter of the revolving aether 
Zeno followed Aristotle, whose quinta essentia is described 
by Sextus as τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα (Pyrrh. πὶ. 31). 
Aristotle himself approves of the Platonic derivation from 
ἀεὶ θεῖν and censures Anaxagoras for referring it to ai@w 
(de Caelo 1. 2); see also Krische, p. 306 foll. 
ο΄ Βρόντην τε καὶ Στερόπην. Wachsmuth says :—* immo 
βρόντην τε καὶ στερόπην, but surely Hesiod is the 
subject to ἐξέθετο as to φησι below. τίθεσθαι ὄνομα is 
used regularly of the father: eg. 1586. τι. ὃ 36, τῷ ἐμῷ 
παιδίῳ ἐθέμην τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐκείνου. 

ἐν χρόνῳ κτλ. These words cannot belong to Zeno, 
unless Flach’s view of the passage is adopted, as they 
are inconsistent with the rest of the explanation. 

117. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 8, r<od>s δὲ ὀρθοὺς 
«λόγ;ους καὶ σπουδαίας διαθέσεις Διοσκούρους. 

From the position of these words in the fragments of 
Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας it appears probable that they 
belong to Zeno: see on frag. 40. Gomperz however p. 74 
puts a full stop after διαθέσεις. 

ὀρθοὺς λόγους: see Introd. p, 8, and for the ethical 
importance of the expression Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, 
p. 259 foll. Cic. Tuse. Iv. 34, ipsa virtus brevissime recta 
ratio dici potest. 

se νυλβὌνροο 

— a νων 


διαθέσεις are opposed to ἕξεις as “permanent forms 
admitting neither of increase nor diminution,” Zeller, 
p. 103. Thus intellectual goods are divided into (1) 
virtues = διαθέσεις, (2) σπουδαίας ἕξεις such as μαντική, 
and (3) ἐπαινετὰς ἐνεργείας = οὔτε ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις, 
such as φρονίμευμα, Stob. ἘΠ]. 11. 7. 5, e and f, Diog. VIL. 
98, Cleanth. frag. 51, cf. Sext. Pyrrh. τη. 243, αὐτὴ yap ἡ 
φρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι μήτε ἐξ αὐτῆς ἁπλῶς 
καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς" κοινὰ 
yap ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. For the distinction 
between ἕξις and διάθεσις in Aristotle see Wallace on de 
An Te δὲ 410 bi 15. 

Διοσκούρους: explained physically by Xenophanes as 
clouds made to shine by their movement (Stob. Ecl. 1. 24. 
1" p. 204, 18). See also the explanations cited by Sext. 
Math. rx. 37. 86: the latter passage appears to be Stoic, 
as recognising the belief in demons. 

118. Diog. L. vir. 149, καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν vpeo- 
τάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ Kal πρόνοιαν εἶναι" Kal αὐτὴν καὶ 
τέχνην ἀποφαίνουσι διά τινας ἐκβάσεις, ὥς φησι Ζήνων. 

μαντική. The Stoic definition was as follows: Stob. 
Ἐπ]. τι. 7. 5b 12, p. 67, 16, εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικήν φασιν 
ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων 
πρὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Substantially the 
same in Sext. Math. rx. 132. 

εἰ καί. Others read ἡ καί, reversing the argument: in 
fact, the Stoics seem to have appealed to the truth of 
μαντική as a proof of the existence of God, no less than 
vice versa. See the references in Zeller, pp. 175, 3; 
372, 2 and 3. 

τέχνη. They prove that it is an art by the truth of 
certain results, cf. Cic. de Divin. 1. 23, Quid? quaeris, 
Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint ? 

H. P. 11 


Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. 
That its professors are sometimes deceived does not in- 
validate the title of divination as an art (ib. § 24), 
ef, N. D. mu. 12. 


119. Diog. L. vir. 84, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλο- 
σοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ 
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ 
ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν 
πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ 
ἀποτροπῶν᾽ καὶ οὕτω δ᾽ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον 
καὶ ᾿Αρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα κιτιλ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ 
Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέσ- 
τερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. 

There is a full discussion of this passage in Zeller, 
p. 223, 1: its difficulties, however, do not affect Zeno or 

120. Diog. L. vu. 87, διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ 
περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ 
φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν" ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς 
ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Lactant. Inst. ut 7, Zenonis 
(summum bonum) cum natura congruenter vivere. id. 
ΠῚ. 8, audiamus igitur Zenonem; nam is interdum vir- 
tutem somniat. Summum, inquit, est bonum cum natura 
consentanee vivere. Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 6", p. 75, 11, τὸ δὲ 
τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε ‘7d ὁμολογουμένως 
ζῆν" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι καθ᾽ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς 
τῶν μαχομένως ξώντων κακοδαιμονόυντων. Plut. Comm. 
Not. 23, 1, οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτους (scil. Peripatetics) 
ἠκολούθησεν ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν 
φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. (Cf. Οἷο. Fin. rv. 72, videsne 
igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis consistere, 


re dissidere; cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis 
discrepare? ib. v. 88.) Clem. Alex. Strom. In 21. 129, 
p. 496 P., 179 S., πάλιν δ᾽ αὖ Ζήνων μὲν 6 Στωικὸς τέλος 
ἡγεῖται τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, cf. Cic. Fin. Iv. 14, hune ipsum 
Zenonis aiunt esse finem, declarantem illud, quod a te 
dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere (where see Madv.): 
ib. 1. 21, summum...bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, 
quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, etc. 

There is a conflict of testimony here between Diog. 
and Stob. as to whether Cleanthes added the words τῇ 
φύσει to Zeno’s definition or found them there already. 
On the whole the fact that Diogenes quotes from a 
named book of Zeno’s makes his authority the more trust- 
worthy. So Wellmann, |. c. pp. 446—448, cf. Krische, 
p. 372, 3. Ueberweg, p. 199, adds that Diog.’s state- 
ment is all the more credible, because Speusippus, 
Polemo, and Heraclitus had enounced similar principles. 
Zeller, p. 228, 2, does not decide the point. Hirzel, 1. 
p. 105—112, argues the question at some length and 
decides in favour of Stobaeus, but his arguments are 
always biassed by the desire to vindicate the originality 
of Cleanthes. See also Introd. p. 14. 

121. Plut. fragm. de an. ed. Wyttenb. ν΄. p. 899, καὶ 
οἰκειώσεως πάσης καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
εὐνοἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος. 

This frag. has been taken from Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie, p. 271. Although we cannot with certainty 
attribute to Zeno a statement, which is only expressed 
to belong to of ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος, yet there is no reason why 
he should not have taught this. The soul at birth is only 
open to the impressions of sensation, and its first impulse 
is towards self-preservation. Cf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 5, 
p. 1038 c, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτ᾽ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηδὲν αἰσθητόν, 



vi? > lf > a «ε » ν 
οὔτ᾽ οἰκείωσις οἷς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον" ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις 
ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι. 

122. Porphyr. de Abstin. πι. 19, τὴν δὲ οἰκείωσιν 
ἀρχὴν τίθενται δικαιοσύνης οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος. 

δικαιοσύνη is one of the four cardinal virtues (see infra. 
frag. 134) and is founded on οἰκείωσις in the same sense 
as ἀρετὴ generally, The natural impulse of every animal 
is towards self-preservation, so that it seeks after those 
things which are κατὰ φύσιν and shuns those which are 
παρὰ φύσιν. Diog. L. vu. 85; Cic. Fin. τπ. 16; Alex. 
Aphr. de an. p. 150, 28 ed. Bruns. of μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ οὐ 
πάντες δὲ λέγουσιν πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι τὸ EGov αὑτῷ" 
ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕῷον εὐθὺς γενόμενον πρός τε αὑτὸ οἰκει- 
οὔσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον" οἱ δὲ χαριέστερον 
δοκοῦντες λέγειν αὐτῶν καὶ μᾶλλον διαρθροῦν περὶ τοῦδέ 
φασιν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τήρησιν φκειῶσθαι εὐθὺς 
γενομένους ἡμᾶς τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 13, 
p- 118, 11 (where the doctrine is attributed to the Peri- 
patetics). For τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, see Madv. de Fin. 
Exe. Iv, and especially p. 818", “ Stoici...ita disputabant, 
ut, quae postea demum, orto subito rationis lumine, quod 
in infante nondum esset accensum, et animadversa con- 
stantia convenientiaque naturae, nasceretur voluntas cum 
natura consentiendi, in qua et virtus et perfectio rationis 
esset, eam omnino a prima conciliatione dirimerent, 
bonumque constituerent, quod expeteretur, a primis, quae 
appeterentur, genere seiunctum,” 

123. Epict. diss. 1. 20. 14, καίτοι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προη- 
youpevos λόγος τῶν φιλοσόφων λίαν ἐστὶν ὀλέγος. εἰ 
θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀναγνῶθι τὰ Ζήνωνος, καὶ ὄψει" τί γὰρ 
ἔχει μακρὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τέλος ἐστι τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, οὐσία 

δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ χρῆσις οἵα δεῖ φαντασιῶν ; 


προηγούμενος λόγος, “leading doctrine”: not in the 
technical sense to be noticed on frag. 169. 

ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς is only another way of expressing ὁμολογία 
τῇ φύσει. This passage furnishes an argument in support 
of the view taken in the Introd. p. 14 as to the character 
of Zeno’s φύσις. 

φαντασιῶν. Zeno went back to the Socratic doctrine 
that virtue is knowledge, so that it is not surprising to 
find that his epistemology is brought into connection with 
practical morality. That particular class of impressions 
which is directed towards the performance of some moral 
action gives rise to corresponding ὁρμαὶ in the soul, cf. 
Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 9, p. 86. 17, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν 
ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ 
καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν. Virtue consists in the proper direction 
of these ὁρμαὶ in accordance with the dictates of ὀρθὸς 
λόγος: hence Diog. L. vil. 86 says of reason :—TEXVITNS 
yap οὗτος ἐπιγίγνεται τῆς ὁρμῆς, cf. Cleanth. frag. 66. 
The doctrine depends on the freedom of the assent: supra, 
frag. 19, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 9°, p. 88, 1, πάσας δὲ τὰς 
ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητι- 
κὸν περιέχειν, and see Windelband in Miiller’s Handbuch, 
ν. 295. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 166, 167, points 
out that the ethical application of φαντασίαι is very often 
mentioned by the younger Stoics, although not unknown 
in the earlier period, cf. Diog. vil. 48, ὥστε εἰς ἀκοσμίαν 
καὶ εἰκαιότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγυμνάστους ἔχοντας τὰς 

1924. Stob. Ἐπὶ. π.. 7. 6°, p. 77, 20, τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν 
ὁ Ζήνων ὡρίσατο τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον" εὐδαιμονία δ᾽ ἐστὶν 
εὔροια βίου. Sext. Math. x1. 30, εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν, ὡς 
οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀπέ- 
δοσαν, εὔροια βίου. Cf. Cleanth. frag. 74, Diog. VII. 88. 


M. Aurel. τι. 5, Vv. 9, X. 6. εὐδαιμονία is not identical with 
τέλος, which rather consists in τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. 

125. Diog. vil. 127, αὐτάρκη εἶναι ἀρετὴν πρὸς 
εὐδαιμονίαν, καθά φησι Ζήνων. August. contra Acad. 
i. 7. 16, clamat Zenon et tota illa porticus tumultuatur 
hominem natum ad nihil esse aliud quam honestatem ; 
ipsam suo splendore in se animos ducere, nullo prorsus 
commodo extrinsecus posito et quasi lenocinante mercede - 
voluptatemque illam Epicuri solis inter se pecoribus esse 
communem ; in quorum societatem et hominem et sapi- 
entem tendere nefas esse. August. de trin. xu. 5. 8, 
diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos 
maxime delectavit...ut virtus Zenonem. Cic. Fin. v. 79, a 
Zenone hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur : “ virtus 
ad bene vivendum seipsa contenta est.” Cf. Acad. 1. 7, 35; 
* IL 134, 135; Paradox. 1m. This position was borrowed 
from the ‘Cynics, Introd. p- 19. 

126. Cic. Fin. rv. 47, errare Zenonem, qui nulla in re 
nisi in virtute aut vitio propensionem ne minimi quidem 
momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret, 
et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera habe- 
rent, ad appetitionem tamen rerum esse in iis momenta 
diceret. ib. Iv. 60, Zeno autem quod suam quod propriam 
speciem habeat cum appetendum sit, id solum bonum 
appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam, quae cum 
virtute degatur. 

This point constitutes the main gist of Cicero’s argu- 
ment against the Stoic virtue in de Fin. Iv., viz. that 
while the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν are an object of desire, they 
have no weight in the explanation of virtue itself. Madvig 
points out (1) that Cicero has throughout confused the 
Stoic prima constitutio, which excludes virtue, with that 

ie a 


of Antiochus which includes it, (2) that throughout the 
Fourth Book he attributes far more importance to the 
doctrine of οἰκείωσις than the Stoics themselves did 
(pp. 820, 821), and (3) that he fails to notice the Stoic 
distinction between τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and 
τὸ πάντα ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν (Stob. Ecl. 
π. 7. 6°, p. 76. 13; Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 26; Cic. Fin. τι. 22). 
On the subject in general see Zeller, p. 278 foll. For the 
nature of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν cf. Stob. Bel 16-7: 3% 
p. 47. 12 f.; ib. 7%, p. 80. 9; 74, Ὁ. 82. 12. The position of 
Zeno will have to be considered with reference to the 
προηγμένα, Where the same inconsistency appears. 

aut vitio: these words were bracketed by some of the 
edd. and are, of course, logically indefensible, but see 

127. Cic. Tuse. τι. 29, Nihil est, inquit (Zeno), malum, 
nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est... Numquam quidquam, 
inquit (scil. doleas necne interest), ad beate quidem vi- 
vendum, quod est in una virtute positum, sed est tamen 
reiciendum. Cur? Asperum est, contra naturam, ditticile 
perpessu, triste, durum. ib. V. 27, si Stoicus Zeno diceret 
qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret. Cf. ib. 
i. 15. 

In Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. ὅν, p. 58, 14, we read ἀνάλογον δὲ 
τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, and the examples 
given of the latter class are λύπη and φόβος. This occurs 
in the course of a passage which Wachsmuth attributes 
to Zeno, but see on frag. 128. Just before this, in what is 
clearly Zeno’s classification of ἀγαθὰ and κακά, we find 
ἡδονὴ classed among the ἀδιάφορα, ef. Diog. L. vir. 103, 
and this agrees with the statement in the present passage 
that dolor is an ἀποπροηγμένον. So dolor is classed in 
Cie. Fin. 1. 51, where Zeno’s name appears in the 


immediate context, and it is to be observed that the 
corresponding προηγμένον in that passage is not ἡδονὴ 
but “doloris vacuitas.” The entire subject of the relation 
which the emotions bear to the classification of ἀγαθὰ 
and κακὰ is extremely obscure, and the ancient authorities 
are not only defective but, as we have seen, contradictory. 
See Introd. p. 46, where this passage should have been 
referred to. Zeller’s account is not clear on this point : 
at p. 253 he apparently asserts that the emotions are to 
be classed as κακά. 

128. Stob. Ἐπὶ]. 11. 7. 5%, p. 57, 18, ταῦτ᾽ εἶναί φησιν ὁ 
Ζήνων ὅσα οὐσίας μετέχει, τῶν δ᾽ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ 
δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα" φρόνησιν, 
σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ 
ἢ μετέχον ἀρετῆς" κακὰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα" ἀφροσύνην, ἀκο- 
λασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κακία ἢ μετέχον 
κακίας" ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα" ζωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν 
ἀδοξίαν, πόνον ἡδονήν, πλοῦτον πενίαν, νόσον ὑγίειαν, καὶ 
τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. 

Substantially the same account appears in Diog. Τὰ 
vil. 101, 102, where Hecaton, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus 
are referred to as authorities, 

τῶν δ᾽ ὄντων κτλ. This classification is attributed by 
Sext. Math. x1. 3, 4, to the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, 
and the Stoics in common: he quotes from Xenocrates, 
πᾶν τὸ ὃν ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν ἣ οὔτε ἀγαθόν 
ἐστιν οὔτε κακόν ἐστιν. In the same passage he states 
that the name ἀδιάφορον was applied to the third class 
by all three schools, but probably this is a mistake, as all 
the other evidence points to Zeno as having been the 
first to use the word in this special ethical sense. On 
the other hand, there is not much likelihood in Hirzel’s 
opinion (II. p. 45 n.) that Aristotle was the first to in- 


troduce the term ἀδιάφορον, and that Zeno spoke of 

φρόνησιν k.T.A. ef. frag. 134. 

πᾶν ὅ ἐστιν ἀρετή : cf. Sext. Math. ΧΙ. 77, ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, 
δ οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν "εἶναι δεδόξακεν. 10. 184, καθὸ 
καὶ ὁριζόμενοί τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν φασιν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἢ 
τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς. The meaning of μετέχον ἀρετῆς 18 
made clear by Diog. L. vit. 94, 95, where it is explained 
as including actions in accordance with virtue, and good 
men: the converse is true of μετέχον κακίας. 

ἡδονήν : cf. Aul. Gell. 1x. 5,5. Zeno censuit voluptatem 
esse indifferens, id est neutrum neque bonum neque malum, 
quod ipse Graeco vocabulo ἀδιάφορον appellavit. For the 
attitude of the Stoics towards the Epicurean summum 
bonum see Wellmann lc. pp. 449, 450. Heinze, de 
Stoicorum affectibus p. 37, doubts, without sufficient 
ground, whether Gellius’ statement is accurate, thinking 
that Zeno would rather have classed ἡδονὴ among the 
κακά. It will be observed that, omitting πόνον ἡδονήν, 
every pair of ἀδιάφορα here mentioned contains a 7pony- 
μένον and an ἀποπροηγμένον, and that, except in the case of 
νόσον ὑγίειαν (which Wachsm. transposes), the προηγμένον 
is mentioned first. We should naturally suppose the 
same to be the case with ἡδονὴ and πόνος, but which 
then is the mponyuévov? Wachsmuth evidently thinks 
ἡδονή, since he transposes the words, and at first sight 
Diog. L. vit. 102 is conclusive. But it should be observed 
that Hecaton is the main authority there cited, and there 
is reason to believe that this was one of the points on 
which the view of the School altered as time went on. 
With Zeno and Cleanthes, at least, it seems better to 
suppose that πόνος is the προηγμένον, and ἡδονὴ the 
ἀποπροηγμένον, and that ἡδονὴ is contrasted with πόνος 
rather than with λύπη, because the latter certainly belonged 


to the class of ἀποπροηγμένα (frag. 127). For πόνος οἵ. 
Diog. L. vit. 172, Λάκωνός τινος εἰπόντος ὅτι δ' πόνος 
ἀγαθόν, διαχυθείς φησιν (Κλεάνθης) αἵματος εἷς ἀγαθοῖο 
φίλον τέκος, Zeno, frag. 187, and for ἡδονή cf. Sext. Math. 

XI. 73, of δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον (5611. ἡδονὴν εἶναί — 

φασιν) καὶ ov προηγμένον. Cleanth. frag. 88. 
Wachsmuth would continue to Zeno the passage follow- 
ing this in Stobaeus down to p. 59. 3, but the evidence 
is against this. The prominence given to ἰσχὺς ψυχῆς 
rather points to an origin subsequent in date to Cleanthes, 
and λύπη and φόβος are here classed as κακά, which is 
inconsistent with frag. 127, not to speak of ἡδονὴ in the 
present fragment. : 

129. Senec. Epist. 82, 7, Zenon noster hac collec- 
tione utitur: “Nullum malum gloriosum esse; mors 
autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non est malum.” 

In the subdivision of the ἀδιάφορα death belongs 
to the ἀποπροηγμένα Diog. L. vit. 106; cf. Cic, Fin. ΠΙ. 
29, ut enim, qui mortem in malis ponit, non potest eam 
non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse 
decreverit, non curare idque contemnere. 

130. Cic. Acad. τ. 36, Cetera autem, etsi nec bona 
- nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat 
(Zeno), alia naturae esse contraria, His ipsis alia inter- 
iecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum natu- 
ram essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda 
dicebat, contraque contraria; neutra autem in mediis 
relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 

In this and the following §§ of Cicero it is unsafe to 
attribute entirely to Zeno the summary of Stoic doctrines 
there set forth, in the absence of other testimony pointing 
in the same direction. At the same time there is no 



reason a priori why Zeno should not have sub-divided 
ἀδιάφορα into (1) τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, (2) τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, and 
(3) τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα -- ηθᾶϊα, or have identified τὰ 
κατὰ φύσιν with ληπτὰ or τὰ ἀξίαν ἔχοντα, and τὰ παρὰ 
φύσιν with ἄληπτα or τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. Cf. Stob. Ecl. 
Tt. 14, ps 82105 7 pe 84, 3. 

131. Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 7%, p. 84, 21, τών δ᾽ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων 
τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ 
βραχεῖαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα 
λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος 5 
ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς πράγμασι. 
προηγμένον δ᾽ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον «ὃν; ἐκλεγόμεθα 
κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον. τὸν δὲ ὅμοιον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ 
ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν 
ἀναλογίαν ταὐτά. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι πρροηγμένον 10 
διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, 
τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ 
τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τῶν προηγμένων 
εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν τεταγμένους. 
προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι οὐ τῷ πρὸς ἐυδαιμονίαν τινὰ συμ- 15 
βάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον 
εἶναι τούτων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ ἀποπροηγμένα. 
Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 1. Some of the πρεσβύτεροι said that 
Zeno’s προηγμένον was in as bad a way as the sour wine, 
which its owner could not dispose of as wine or vinegar : 
so the προηγμένον is neither an ἀγαθὸν nor an ἀδιά- 

4, πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν. In Stob. Eel. τὰς 7. 7', p. 83, 10 
every thing which is in accordance with nature is said 
ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Diog. L. vil. 105 identifies προηγμένα with 
τα ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, Sext. Emp. Math. ΧΙ. 62 with τὰ ἱκανὴν 
ἀξίαν ἔχοντα, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 7, p. 80, 17. Cicero's 


phrase, Acad. 1, 37 (sed quae essent sumenda ex iis alia 
pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris), is of doubtful import : 
see Reid in loc. In Fin. ΠΙ. 51 we have :—quae autem 
aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quamob- 
rem quibusdam anteponerentur, where Madvig remarks 
that none of the authorities give examples of those things 
which are ληπτὰ without being προηγμένα. 

5. Ζήνωνος: apart from the evidence of Stob. and 
Plut. it is clear that the προηγμένα must have formed 
part of Zeno’s system from the fact that Aristo expressly 
dissented from him on this point (Οἷς. Acad. τι. 130), ef. 
Οἷς. Fin. 1m. 51. According to Hirzel p. 418 the word was 
discarded by the later Stoies, and εὔχρηστα substituted 
by Posidonius. 

8, προηγούμενον λόγον : 566 on frag. 169. 

τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ: SO Wachsmuth for τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον 
MSS. Heeren reads τῶν---ων. 

13. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν atdq: cf. Cic. Fin. m1, 52, ut enim, inquit 
(Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum 
esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγμένον---564 eos qui 
in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut 
secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, 
quae primario loco sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum 
obtinent, προηγμένα, id est, producta nominentur. 

τῶν mponypévov: SO Madv. ad de Fin. Le. for MSS. τὸν 
προαγόμενον : he is followed by Wachsmuth. Hirzel u. 
p. 823 prefers προηγουμένων. 

15. τινά : soMSS. τινὶ Davies. «μοῖράν; twa Hense. 

16. τε: Mein. τε MSS. 

ἀλλὰ τῷ «7d. On the subject of the προηγμένα in 
general consult Zeller, pp. 278—287. This sentence con- 
tains the gist of the Stoic position in the matter. Al- 
though sickness e.g. does not impede the happiness of the 
wise man, since he is secure in the possession of virtue, it 


ἴα at the same time impossible ceteris paribus not to 
prefer health to sickness, cf. Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 7, p. 79, 

132. Diog. L. vil. 120, ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι 
τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι...Ζήνων. Sext. Math, vu. 
422, κἀντεῦθεν ὁρμώμενοι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐδίδασκον 
ὅτι ἴσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. Cic. Mur. § 61, omnia 
peceata esse paria (among the sententiae et praecepta 
Zenonis). Lactant. Inst. ππ. 23, Zenonis paria peccata 
quis probat ? 

Cf. Οἷς, Paradox. mt. Hor. Sat. τ. 3. 120 foll. Both 
Sextus and Diog. give as the ground for this doctrine an 
argument from the relation of truth to falsehood. As one 
true thing cannot be more true or one false thing more 
false than another in respect of its truth or falsity, so one 
sin cannot be more sinful than another. ἁμάρτημα is the 
correlative of κατόρθωμα and is defined as τὸ παρὰ τὸν 
ὀρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ᾧ παραλέλειπταί τι 
καθῆκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζῴου, Stob. ἘΠῚ: τὸ 1. 115. τε 99; 16. 
See further Zeller, p. 267. 

133. Cic. Mur. § 61, omne delictum scelus esse 
nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum, qui gallum_ galli- 
naceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum, qui patrem 

This is quoted among the sententiae et praecepta 
Zenonis, but it is extremely unlikely that the illustration 
used is that of Zeno. Cicero attempts (Paradox. 11. 25) 
to answer this objection by the remark, doubtless borrowed 
from some Stoic source, that whereas the wrongful killing 
of a slave involves a single ἁμάρτημα, many ἁμαρτήματα 
are committed in the act of parricide. 

134. Plut. Sto. Rep. vi. 1, 2, ἀρετὰς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπο- 


λείπει πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον. 
φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ὡς ἀχωρίστους 
μὲν οὔσας, ἑτέρας δὲ καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων. πάλιν δὲ | 
ὁριζόμενος αὐτῶν ἑκάστην, τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν φησὶ φρόνησιν 
εἶναι ἐν ἐνεργητέοις" τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν 
ἀπονεμητέοις" ὡς μίαν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ 
πράγματα σχέσεσι κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν. 
Plut. de Virt. Mor. 2, ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων eis τοῦτό πως 
ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν 
ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην" ἐν δὲ διαιρετέοις σωφροσύνην" 
ἐν δὲ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν" ἀπολογούμενοι δὲ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν 
τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνο- 
μάσθαι. Diog. L. vir. 161, ἀρετάς τε οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν 
(scil. Aristo) ὡς ὁ Ζήνων. Οἷα. Acad. 1. 38, hic (Zeno) 
omnis (virtutes) in ratione ullo modo... 
(seiungi) posse disserebat, nec virtutis usum modo...sed 
ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem 
cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur. Of ib. τι. 31, 
Fin. Iv. 54, 

Cf. Stob. Ecl. π΄ 7. 5%, p. 60, 12, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν 
περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι" τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς 
ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου" τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς" 
τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. Diog. vir. 126. 
Zeno taught that virtue is one and indivisible, but that in 
different spheres it is manifested in different forms. He 
resumed the Socratic position (for which see Zeller, 
Socrates E. T. p. 140 foll., and especially Xen. Mem. m1. 9, 
Plat. Men. 88 0), that virtue is knowledge, but adopted 
the terminology of Aristotle by making use of the word 
φρόνησις instead of ἐπιστήμη, and thus indicated that 
moral insight is to be distinguished from intellectual 
research (cf. Ar, Eth. γι. 13), There is therefore high 
probability in Zeller’s suggestion (p. 258 n.) that “perhaps 
Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν 


nai κακῶν." At the same time he must have been in- 
fluenced by the Platonic doctrine of the four cardinal 
virtues (Rep. p. 441 foll.), but he traced the differences in 
virtue to the diversity of the objects with which it is 
concerned, while Plato treated them as arising from the 
distinct parts of the soul, which produce different mental 

ἀπονεμητέοις = the rendering every man his due (amrove- 
μητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ Stob. Le.), cf. the definition 
attributed to Simonides in Plat. Rep. i. p. 331 E, ὅτι τὸ τὰ 
ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι. It is more 
general in meaning than Aristotle’s τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς 
δίκαιον (Eth. N. v. 2. 12). 

διαιρετέοις : distinguishing between things with a view 
to choice: it deals with τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις (Cleanth. 
frag. 76). 

ὑπομενετέοις... «ἐνεργητέοις. Hirzel suggests that there 
is a lacuna in Plut. Sto. Rep. lc. and that we ought 
to read there φρόνησιν εἶναι ἐν «ὑπομενετέοις τὴν δὲ 
σωφροσύνην φρόνησιν ἐνὶ αἱρετέοις (in place of ἐνεργητέοις). 
For vou. cf. Ar. Eth. π|. 6, 6, ὁ ἀνδρεῖος... οὐδεὶς γὰρ 
ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν: for the general sense cf. 
Thue. τι. 40. 3, κράτιστοι δ᾽ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν 
οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ 
ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων. 

σχέσεσι. This word has a technical meaning with the 
Stoics, being opposed to κίνησις on the one hand (cf. Cic. 
Tuse. 1v. 30), and to ἕξις (non-essential)(essential) on the 
other (Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. ὅς, p. 73, 1). The virtues themselves 
are διαθέσεις, for which see on frag. 117. 

135. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, κοινῶς δὲ ἅπαντες οὗτοι 
(scil. Menedemus, Aristo, Zeno, Chrysippus) τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ 
ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενη- 


μένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογού- 
μενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται" καὶ 
νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ 
τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονι- 
, / / ‘ , ” a / 
xov), διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μετάβαλλον ἔν te τοῖς πάθεσι 

καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε 

γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ" 
λέγεσθαι δὲ ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάξοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς 
ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντε πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων 
παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται᾽ καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος 
εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρ- 
τημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβθόντα. 
τὴν ἀρετὴν κιτιλ. Cf. Stob, Ecl. τι. 7. 5", p. 64, 18, ἀρετάς δ᾽ 

εἶναι πλείους φασὶ καὶ ἀχωρίστους ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων καὶ τὰς 
αὐτὰς τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν. 

ὁμολογούμενον : frag. 120. 

ἀμετάπτωτον : cf. the definition of knowledge in frag. 17. 
Virtue is knowledge as applied to conduct. 

καὶ νομίζουσι «7.4. This is principally aimed at Plato 
(see e.g. Rep. 436 A), but partly also at Aristotle, although 
the latter denies that the soul is μεριστὴ in the Platonic 
sense (de An. 1. 5, 24, but ef. Eth. i. 13,10). With Zeno 
the local extension of the soul as a πνεῦμα throughout the 
body does not detract from its unity either on the physical 
or the moral side: πάθος and ἀρετὴ are alike affections of 
the ἡγεμονικόν : see on frag. 93. “The battle between 
virtue and vice did not resemble a war between two 
separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war 
carried on in one and the same country.” Reid on Acad. 
I, 38. 

διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. For the distinction between 
these two terms see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 132, 306. 

ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν: see on frag. 117. The πάθη are dis- 



tinguished, being neither ἕξεις nor διαθέσεις but κινήσεις, 
Cic. Tuse. Iv. 30. 

τῷ πλεονάζοντι. Zeno’s view of the πάθη will be con- 
sidered in the next following fragments. Cf. Stob. Kcl. 
τι. 7. 10, p. 88, 10, εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς 

186. Diog. L. vit. 110, ἔστε δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ 
Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὁρμὴ 
πλεονάζουσα. Cic. Tusc. Iv. 11, est igitur Zenonis haec 
definitio ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a 
recta ratione, contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam 
brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem. 
ib. 47, definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum 
puto; ita enim definit ut perturbatio sit aversa a ratione 
contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius ut pertur- 
batio sit appetitus vehementior. 

Cf. Cic. Off. τ § 136, perturbationes, id est, motus 
animi nimios rationi non obtemperantes. Stob. Ecl. 11. 7: 
2, p. 44, 4, πᾶν πάθος ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. ib. 7. 10, p. 88,8, 
πάθος δ᾽ εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ 
αἱροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς «ἄλογον» παρὰ φύσιν. 
Plut. in fragm. utr. anim. an corp. libid. et aegrit. c. VIL. 
Andron. περὶ παθῶν ec. 1. The comments in Stob. Le. 
10", p. 89, 3—90, 5, are important. They appear to belong 
to Chrysippus and show that, while defining the πάθη as 
κρίσεις, he did not give to that word the restricted inter- 
pretation which Galen (see infra, frag. 139) places upon it, 
and that he recognised the influence of the will in deter- 
mining the nature of emotion. We may also infer that 
the words ἀπειθὴς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ are a gloss of 
Chrysippus upon Zeno’s term ἄλογος. This is also clear 
from Galen, Hipp. et Plat. p. 368 K, 338 M, where the reason 
is given, namely, the desire to enforce the doctrine of the 

Η. Ρ. 12 


unity of the soul (frag. 135). In maintaining that every 
πάθος is essentially ἄλογον and παρὰ φύσιν, Zeno goes 
far beyond Plato and Aristotle, although he has much in 
common with the Platonic point of view. Thus in the 
Phaedo 83 B, we read ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ 
οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν 
καὶ φόβων καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται, although elsewhere Plato 
admits that certain pleasures and pains are allowable (see 
Zeller’s Plato, p. 444). Similarly Aristotle, while classing 
certain πάθη as ἄλογα, declares that under certain circum- 
stances wrath and desire are legitimate (Eth. N. um. 1. 
24- 26). 

137. Stob. Ecl. π|. 7. 1, p. 39, 5, ὡς δ᾽ ὁ Στωικὸς 
ὡρίσατο Ζήνων" πάθος ἐστὶν ὁρμὴ πλεονάξουσα. οὐ λέγει 
“πεφυκυῖα πλεονάζειν᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ἐν πλεονασμῷ οὖσα" οὐ 
γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ. ὡρίσατο δὲ κἀκείνως" 
πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πτηνῶν φορᾶς τὸ 
εὐκίνητον τοῦ παθητικοῦ παρεικάσας. 

Cf. ib. 11. 7. 10, p. 88, 11, διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος 
εἶναι «καὶ; πάλιν «πᾶν» πάθος πτοίαν. Wachsmuth 
refers to Chrysipp. ap. Galen. de Hipp. et Plat. plac. tv. 5, 
p. 364, 23, Miill. οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀπο- 
δίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ 
φερόμενον εἰκῆ, where the use of the word ὠποδίδοται 
points to Zeno’s authorship. ἀπὸ τῆς--παρεικάσας seems 
to be merely the comment of Didymus, although it is 
possible that Zeno derived πτοία from πέτεσθαι, as 
Wachsmuth thinks. 

138. Cic. Acad. 1. 38, Zeno omnibus his (perturbati- 
onibus) quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem...nam et 
perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque 
iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur 
matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. 


quasi morbis: see on frag. 144. ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, 
Diog. vil. 117. 

opinionisque iudicio: in view of what follows this is 
important, and the expression aptly illustrates Galen’s 
statement that Zeno regarded the πάθη as τὰ ἐπιγιγ- 
νόμενα κρίσεσιν. 

intemperantiam. The particular virtue which is con- 
cerned with regulating the ὁρμαὶ is σωφροσύνη : see on 
Cleanth. frag. 76, so that excess of impulse or πάθος is 
said to be produced by its opposite, ἀκολασία (ἄγνοια 
αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, Stob. Kel. π. 7. 5”, 
wm G0, Ὁ). cf. 1 80: IV. 22; Quemadmodum igitur νὴ βό: 
rantia sedat appetitiones et efficit, ut eae rectae rationi 
pareant, conservatque considerata iudicia mentis: sic huic 
inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat 
conturbat incitat; itaque et aegritudines et metus et 
reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea. 

139. Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. plac. v. 1, v. 429 K., 
Ζήνων ov τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ Tas ἐπυγυγνομένας 
αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ [τὰς] πτώσεις 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη, ib. τν. 3, V. 377 K. 
Chrysippus contradicts himself, Zeno, and other Stoics as 
to this of οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ [Kai] τὰς 
ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστὸολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δήξεις 
ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς 
ψυχῆς πάθη. Wachsmuth, Comm. 1. p. 7, adds ibid. Iv. 2, 
Vv. p. 367 K., τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν παθῶν (i.e. ὅτι 
αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ δια- 
χύσεις...τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεώς ἐστι παθήματα ταῖς δόξαις 
ἐπιγυγνόμενα) Ζήνων ὑπολαμβάνει. Galen 
distinguishes between three different views of the nature 
of πάθη, (1) that they have no connection at all with 
λογισμὸς or κρίσις, which is the view of Plato and 



Posidonius, and in which Galen himself concurs. He 
infers that Cleanthes was of the same opinion (but see 
on Cleanth. frag. 84) ; (2) that they are κρίσεις, ef. Diog. 
L, vu. 111. This is the view of Chrysippus and is in 
Galen’s opinion the worst of the three ; (3) between these 
two extreme views that of Zeno in identifying them with 
ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεσιν occupies a middle position. It 
would seem however that in this respect Galen has done 
Chrysippus an injustice: for it is clear from other evidence 
(see eg. on frag. 136) that Chrysippus did not confine 
himself to the view that πάθη are solely an intellectual 
affection (Zeller, p. 245, 246). At the same it is probably 
true that he made a distinct advance upon Zeno by 
identifying πάθη with κρίσεις and connecting them with 
συγκαταθέσεις : cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 198, 199. 

overohds. This refers to λύπη, which is defined as 
συστολὴ ἄλογος (Diog. L. vir. 111, cf. M. Aurel. π΄ 10) 
or ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ (Stob. Ecl. u. 7. 70°, p. 90, 14): in the 
same way ἔπαρσις refers to ἡδονή (Diog. L. vir. 114, Stob. 
l.c., 1. 16). 

λύσεις. For this word Miiller substitutes διαχύσεις, 
but this is perhaps’ questionable, cf. Cic. Tusc. m1. 61, 
ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus [quasi 
λύσιν id est] solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat. 

rds, delet Miiller. 

καὶ is expunged by Zeller, p. 246, and Miiller, but 
this corr. is by no means certain: see on frag. 143, 
and cf. Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus doctrina, p. 37. 

δήξεις. Zeller’s correction, accepted by Miiller, for 
δείξεις, is made almost certian by Cic. Tusc. Iv. 15, ut 
aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, cf. Το. 
111. 83, cited on frag. 158. 

διαχύσεις. In Diog. L. vit. 114 this word appears ‘as a 
subdivision of ἡδονὴ and is defined as ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς. 




In Suidas, col. 818, however ἡδονὴ itself is defined as 
ἄλογος διάχυσις, cf. deliquescat in Cic. Tuse. IV. 37. It is 
worthy of observation that all these words (excepting 
perhaps ταπεινώσεις) refer to λύπη and ἡδονή, and that 
ἐπιθυμία and φόβος are not so prominent. For ταπει- 
νώσεις, cf. exanimatione humili atque fracta connected 
with metus in Cic. Tuse. Iv. 13, and for πτώσεις demitti 
(of aegritudo) ib. 14, 37. In the face of the evidence 
already cited, Wellmann, p. 454,.seems to be wrong in 
supposing λύσεις and πτώσεις to be equivalent to ὄρεξις 
and ἔκκλισις in Diog. and Stob. ll. ce. 

μείωσις refers to λύπη, Chrysipp. ap. Galen, Iv. 2, 
p. 367. 

140. Themist. de An. 90 Ὁ, Spengel, 11. 197, 24, καὶ ov 
κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς 
τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὰς εἶναι τιθέμενοι καὶ λόγου κρίσεις 

In the face of Galen’s testimony this statement 15 
of no importance so far as Zeno is concerned and may be 

141. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. m1. ο. 5, v. p. 322 Ka 
ov μόνον Χρύσιππος ἀλλὰ καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ζήνων 
ἑτοίμως αὐτὰ τιθέασιν (τοὺς φόβους καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ 
πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάθη κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν συνίστασθαι). 
This passage is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. I. p. 7. 
The emotions are placed in the heart because it is the 
seat of the ἡγεμονικὸν (frag. 100), of which the πάθη are 
affections (frag. 135), Zeller, p. 213, Stein, Psych. n. 258. 

142. Diog. vil. 140, τῶν παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω (καθά 
φησιν...«Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ παθών) εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, 
λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν. 

Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 10, p. 88, 14, πρῶτα δ᾽ εἶναι τῷ γένει 


ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν, cf. 
Cic. Off. 1. 69, Tuse. m1 24, IV. 11, Jerome Epist. exxxiii. 
illi enim quae Graeci appellant πτάθη nos perturbationes 
possumus dicere, aegritudinem videlicet et gaudium, 
spem et metum, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura 
sunt, asserunt extirpari posse de mentibus et nullam 
fibram radicemque vitiorum in homine omnino residere, 
meditatione et assidua exercitatione virtutum. Plato had 
already recognised λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονὴ as 
the four chief πάθη, cf. Phaed. 83 B, cited on frag. 136. 
From τὰ ἀνωτάτω...γένη it is obvious that Zeno classed 
certain εἴδη under each of the principal πάθη, but how 
much of the exposition in Diog. L. vu. 111—116, Stob, 
Ecl. 11. 7, 10°“¢ is derived from him the evidence does not 
enable us to determine, nor can we tell whether the 
doctrine of the εὐπάθειαι belongs to him. 

143. Cic. Tusc. 11. 74, 75, Satis dictum esse arbitror 
aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opini- 
one illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. Ad- 
ditur ad hance definitionem a Zenone recte ut illa opinio 
praesentis mali sit recens. Galen de Hipp. et Plat. plac. 
IV. 7, p. 416, “ὁ γοῦν ὅρος οὗτος᾽, φησίν [Posidonius], ‘6 τῆς 
λύπης, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν παθῶν ὑπό τε 
Ζήνωνος εἰρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ Χρυσίππου γεγραμμένοι 
σαφῶς ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ. δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι 
πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναί φησι (1 φασι) τὴν 
λύπην. ἐν ᾧ καὶ συντομώτερον ἐνίοτε λέγοντες ὧδέ πως 
προσφέρονται" λύπη ἐστὶ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρου- 
σίας. λύπης is the necessary correction of Cornarius, 
Bake and I. Miiller for the MSS. ἄτης. The unfortunate 
currency, which Kiihn’s dons has obtained, has given rise 
to much perplexity. 

These passages, and especially that of Cicero, have been 




strangely neglected by the authorities. A difficulty arises 
here, because it is generally inferred from frag. 139 that 
the treatment of the πάθη by Zeno and Chrysippus was 
radically different, and it is strange that, if Zeno defined 
λύπη, for example, as ἄλογος συστολή, he should also 
have defined it as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας. 
(For the connection of Chrysippus with the latter defini- 
tion cf. Galen, op. cit. Iv. p. 336 K., 336, 9 ML, ἐν τοῖς 
ὁρισμοῖς τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν τελέως ἀποχωρεῖ τῆς γνώμης 
αὐτῶν [561]. his own writings] τὴν λύπην ὁριζόμενος δόξαν 
πρόσφατον κακοῦ παρουσίας τὸν δὲ φόβον προσδοκίαν 
κακοῦ τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν δόξαν πρόσφατον ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, 
but at the same time defines ἐπιθυμία as ἄλογος ὄρεξις.) 
For, in that case, how could Galen or Posidonius have 
treated Chrysippus as diverging from Zeno by explaining 
the πάθη as κρίσεις, especially as Posidonius is the 
ultimate authority on whom the attribution of the δόξα 
definition to Zeno rests ? 

Now the evidence of Galen establishes almost beyond 
a doubt that the definitions of λύπη as ἄλογος συστολὴ 
and of ἡδονὴ as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις (Diog. L, vit. 111, 114) 
were propounded by Zeno. From this it would seem to 
follow as a natural corollary that he also defined ἐπιθυμία 
as ἄλογος ὄρεξις (Diog. VIL. 113), and φόβος as ἄλογος 
ἔκκλισις (Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 10°, p. 90, 11, ἔκκλισιν ἀπειθῆ 
λόγῳ), οἵ. Andron. περὶ παθῶν, «. 1., λύπη μὲν οὖν ἔστιν 
ἄλογος συστολή, φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἔκκλισις, ἐπιθυμία δὲ 
ἄλογος ὄρεξις, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ; and see Kreuttner, 
p. 31. On other grounds it seems probable (see on frag. 
136) that Chrysippus is responsible for the substitution of 
ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ for ἄλογος in Stob. |. c., but we cannot tell 
who added the words ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι and ἐφ᾽ αἱρετῷ 
δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. Iv. 2, p. 367), 
which appear also in Diog. 114. It remains therefore to 


decide whether the definitions of which δόξα πρόσφατος 
κακοῦ παρουσίας is a type were introduced by Zeno or 
Chrysippus, The latter alternative would be the most - 
satisfactory solution and is generally adopted (eg. by 
Wellmann, p. 454, 455, Zeller, pp. 249, 250, Siebeck, 
Geschichte der Psychologie, II. 232, 233 and 504), but if 
Posidonius’ evidence is to be accepted in the one case, 
why is it to be discarded in the other, especially where it 
tells most strongly against himself? ef Galen, p. 390 K.,, 
(Ποσειδώνιος) πειρᾶται μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα προσάγειν. We must re- 
member that Posidonius was anxious to pick holes in 
Chrysippus, in order to excuse his own heresy. Hence 
he charges Chrysippus not merely with divergence from 
his predecessors but with inconsistency (τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς 
αὑτὸν ἐναντιολογίαν τοῦ Χρυσίππου, Galen, p. 390). It 
would seem therefore that he is less worthy of credence 
as a witness, when he affirms a discrepancy between Zeno 
and Chrysippus than when he testifies to the identity of 
their doctrine. Nor ought we to neglect the fact that 
in Diog. L. vir. 112 φόβος is defined as κακοῦ προσδοκία, 
being thus differentiated from the other πάθη, and that 
this definition is ultimately traceable to Plato (Protag. 
358 D, Lach. 1988). If however we suppose that Zeno 
made use of a double set of definitions, what was the 
nature of the contribution made by Chrysippus? Only 
two answers seem possible. If Zeno in his oral lectures 
(εἰρημένοι), and subsequently to the publication of the 
work περὶ παθῶν, put forward the δόξα definitions, it. 
would devolve on Chrysippus to reconcile as against 
opponents the written and the oral tradition of the 
school. Or again it is quite conceivable that Posidonius 
may have been misled by the desire of Chrysippus to 
represent his own developments as the natural out-growth 


of Zeno’s system. In any case the difference was com- 
paratively unimportant: ‘hanc differentiam levissimam 
esse quis est quin videat, cum uterque id semper docuerit, 
πάθη esse voluntaria ?’ (Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus 
doctrina, p. 10, and see also pp. 23, 24, 36, 37). 

144. Lactant. Inst. ui. 23, inter vitia et morbos 
misericordiam ponit (Zeno). id. Epist. ad Pentad. 38, 
Zeno Stoicorum magister, qui virtutem laudat, miseri- 
cordiam...tamquam morbum animi diiudicavit. 

It is probable that Zeno spoke of the πάθη in general 
terms as νόσοι and that Chrysippus is responsible for the 
distinction between νοσήματα and ἀῤῥωστήματα, as the 
passage in Cic. Tuse. Iv. 23 suggests. Cf. Zeller, p. 251, 
252, and Stein, Psych. n. 267. At the same time morbus 
may here be simply the translation of πάθος, which Cicero 
rejected (Tuse. 11. 7, Iv. 10). For ἔλεος, a subdivision of 
λύπη, cf. Diog. vit. 111, Stob. Ecl. m. 7. 10°, p. 92, 12, 
Cic. Tusce. Iv. 18. 

145. Diog. vit. 107, 108, ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι 
A \ wv: , >» ᾽ Rake oe ery: 
ὃ πραχθὲν εὔχλογόν τιν᾽ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμον᾽ οἷον TO aKo- 
χουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει. 
ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. κατωνομάσθαι δὲ 
ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας 
ἥκειν τῆς προσωνομασίας εἰλημμένης. Cf. ib. 25, φασὶ δὲ 
καὶ πρῶτον καθῆκον ὠνομακέναι καὶ λόγον περὶ αὐτοῦ 
πεποιηκέναι (referring to the treatise περὶ τοῦ καθή- 
κοντος, Introd. p. 29). 
Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 8, p. 85, 13, ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον" 
Aare eee > ae ON \ ” > , Μ é 
τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει 
παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς 
τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ 
ἐξ a , Ἂν ’ \ \ a a / [ 5 
ἑαυτῶν φύσει" ἐπὶ «δὲ; τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως aTrO- 


δίδοται" τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Οἷς. de Fin. τπ|| 58, est 
autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis 
ratio reddi possit (where see Madv.). 

καθῆκον is, according to Zeno, any action for the 
performance of which a sufficient reason can be given 
and it is entirely distinct from virtuous action, which is 

described as κατόρθωμα. That Zeno must have treated of - 

κατόρθωμα is a supposition which is rendered necessary 

by the circumstances of the case, but the evidence to | 

connect him with it is wanting. The doctrine of καθῆκον 
is closely connected with that of προηγμένον (ἀκόλουθος 
δ᾽ ἔστι τῷ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος 

τόπος, Stob. |. 6.) inasmuch as in the ordinary course of 
life we are forced to regulate our conduct with regard to — 
external circumstances, which are strictly speaking ἀδια- — 

dopa. Hence we must explain κατά τινας where κατὰ 
means “over against ” (die jenige Pflicht, die von aussen 
an uns herantritt, von der unterschieden werden soll, 
die in unserem eigensten Wesen, in der Vernunft selber 
ihren Ursprung hat), as Hirzel has shown by a com- 
parison of Epict. Enchir. 15, μέμνησο ὅτι ὡς ἐν συμποσίῳ 
δεῖ σε ἀναστρέφεσθαι. περιφερόμενον γέγονέ τι κατά σε; 
ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε: παρέρχεται; μὴ 
κάτεχε. οὔπω ἥκει; μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόῤῥω τὴν ὄρεξιν" 
ἀλλὰ περίμενε, μέχρις ἂν γένηται κατά σε. οὕτω πρὸς 
τέκνα, οὕτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, οὕτω πρὸς ἀρχάς, οὕτω πρὸς 
πλοῦτον, καὶ ἔσῃ ποτὲ ἄξιος τῶν θεῶν συμπότης. καθῆκον, 
therefore, in Zeno’s system is not a general term of which 
κατορθώματα and μέσα καθήκοντα are subdivisions, but 
rather καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα are mutually ex- 
clusive, so that the distinctions between ἀεὶ καθήκοντα 
and οὐκ ἀεὶ καθήκοντα, and μέσα καθήκοντα and τέλεια 
καθήκοντα belong to later Stoics: see Hirzel, Unter- 
suchungen, IL pp. 403—410. εὔλογον does not imply 



action in accordance with right reason, ie. virtue, as 
Zeller and Ueberweg suppose, for reason in this sense 
cannot be attributed to φυτὰ and ἄλογα ζῷα, which are 
nevertheless capable of καθήκοντα according to the 
authorities. (The use of εὔλογος in this narrower sense is 
justified by Hirzel, τι. 341, 1, from a comparison of Diog. 
vit. 76. Seneca, de Benef. Iv. 33, sequimur qua ratio non 
qua virtus trahit; Diog. vil. 130, εὐλόγως ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν 
τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφόν.) If Hirzel’s explanation is correct, 
it follows that in Sext. Math. vi. 158, where κατόρθωμα 
is defined as ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν, 
Arcesilas adopts the Stoic definition of καθῆκον as the 
true basis of κατόρθωμα. Wellmann, p. 461, believes that 
κατόρθωμα belongs solely to the later Stoics, but surely 
Zeno must have given some name to virtuous action, and 
it is most reasonable to assume that this was κατόρθωμα. 
It is unnecessary to observe that Zeno was not the first 
to use καθῆκον in the sense of “duty”: all that is meant 
is that he gave the word its special technical sense, ef. 
κατάληψις. As to the divergence of Stobaeus from 
Diogenes we should note (1) that τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ 15 
made the main point in the definition, which is probably 
a mistake, cf. Cic., (2) the distinction between βίος and 
ζωή, for which cf. Arist. ap Ammon. in Steph. Thes. Bios 
ἐστὶ λογικὴ ζωή (quoted by Hirzel). 

146. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 1, p. 38, 15, of δὲ κατὰ Δήνωνα 
τὸν Στωικὸν τροπικῶς" ἦθός ἐστι πηγὴ βίου, ἀφ᾽ ἧς αἱ 
κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ῥέουσι. 

The Stoics regarded not so much the act itself as the 
character of the agent (cf. σπουδαία διάθεσις). For 
πηγὴ cf. Plat. Leg. 808 c, who says that a young boy ἔχει 
πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην. 





147. Diog. L. vu. 173, κατὰ Ζήνωνα καταληπτὸν 
εἶναι τὸ ἦθος ἐξ εἴδους. 

Cf. Stob. Ecl. τ. δ0. 34, οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν σοφὸν αἰσθήσει 
καταληπτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τεκμηριωδῶς. Euripides 
regrets that it is impossible to distinguish men in this 
manner. Med. 516—520, 

ὦ Zed, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ μὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ἡ 
Texunpe ἀνθρώποισιν ὥπασας σαφῆ, 
ἀνδρῶν δ᾽ ὅτῳ χρὴ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι, 
οὐδεὶς χαρακτὴρ ἐμπέφυκε σώματι; 
ef. Hippol. 924 foll. Οἷο. Lael. 62. So Shaksp. Mach. 1. 4. 
11, There’s no art to find the mind’s construction in the face. 

148. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 11%, p. 99, 3, ἀρέσκει yap τῷ τε 
Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν 
φαύλων" καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου 
χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις" 
ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ 
δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον 
ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν, καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ 
κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς" τὸν δὲ φαῦλον κατὰ τοὐναντίον 
κακῶς. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον μέγαν καὶ ἁδρὸν καὶ 
ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν. μέγαν μὲν ὅτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι 
τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων" ἁδρὸν 
δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ηὐξημένος πάντοθεν: ὑψηλὸν δ᾽, ὅτι μετεί- 
ληφε τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ὕψους ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῷ. 
καὶ ἰσχυρὸν δ᾽, ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἰσχὺν περιπε- 
ποίηται, ἀήττητος ὧν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος. παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ 

wv ν᾽ , ε΄ , wv > Ul wv 
ovte ἀναγκάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει τινα, οὔτε 

κωλύεται οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε βιάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς 
βιάζει τινα, οὔτε δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπόζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ 
τινα οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς περιπίπτει «οὔτ᾽ 



ἄλλον ποιεῖ κακοῖς περιπίπτειν», οὔτε ἐξαπατᾶται οὔτε 
ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον, οὔτε διαψεύδεται οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ οὔτε λαν- 
θάνει ἑαυτόν, οὔτε καθόλου ψεῦδος ὑπολαμβάνει" εὐδαίμων 
δέ ἐστιν μάλιστα καὶ εὐτυχὴς καὶ μακάριος καὶ ὄλβιος καὶ 
εὐσεβὴς καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀξιωματικός, βασιλικός τε καὶ 
στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ οἰκονομικὸς καὶ χρηματισ- 
τικός. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ἅπαντα τούτοις ἐναντία ἔχειν. 

It is a matter of doubt how much of this extract can 
be reasonably regarded as derived from Zeno, but if the 
whole of it is to be traced to a single source, that source 
may be Zeno, as there is some evidence for connecting 
him with the statements appearing at the end of the 
passage. On the doctrine of the wise man in general see 
Zeller, p. 268 foll., Cie. Fin. m1. 75, 76. 

9. πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιάν: cf infra frag. 156. Ambrosius, de 
Abraham IL. 7. 328, 37, cites Gen. x1I. 14 and 15 and 
continues, hine tamquam a fonte hauserunt Stoici philo- 
sophi dogmatis sui sententiam : omnia sapientis esse... 
unde et Salomon in Proverbiis ait: eius qui fidelis sit 
totus mundus divitiarum (Prov. XVI. 6). Quanto prior 
Salomon quam Zenon Stoicorum magister atque auctor 
sectae ipsius. 

12. μέγαν. Physical excellence can only be predicated 
of the wise man, even if in the popular sense of the term 
he does not possess it, for no kind of excellence can be 
attributed to the φαῦλος. Further, inasmuch as the only 
good is ἀρετὴ or τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, physical advantages 
only have value when found in conjunction with virtue. 

17. ἀήττητοςς Cf. frag. 157, the parallelism of which 
is perhaps a circumstance of some weight in favour of 
Zeno’s authorship here. 

19. βιάζεται: for this verb, see Shilleto on Thue. 1. 

20. δεσπόζει: cf. Diog. L. vir. 122, ἡ (δουλείᾳ) ἀντι- 


τίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὕτη. Stob. Ἐπὶ. 
1. 7. 11*, p. 104, 5. 

23. διαψεύδεται : because falsehood consists not merely 
in stating something contrary to fact but in doing so 
advisedly in order to deceive others (Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 11% 
p. 111, 10; Sext. Math. vi. 44, 45). So, on the other 
hand the φαῦλος may speak ἀληθές τι but is devoid οὔ 

26. ἐυσεβὴς καὶ θεοφ. Similar assertions in an amplified 
form occur in Diog. L. vir. 119. 

ἀξιωματικός : this appears to mean “high in rank,” see 
Plut. Mor. 617 D, and ef. the use of ἀξίωμα in Thue. as 
applied to Pericles. It can hardly mean “ speaking axioms” 
as when used of Arcesilas in Diog. rv. 31. | 

βασιλικός. Among the sententiae et praecepta Zenonis 
cited by Cic. Mur. § 61 occurs solos sapientes esse si 
servitutem serviant reges. It is extremely probable that 
this paradox was asserted by Zeno from Diog. L. vir. 122, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας (εἶναι τοὺς σοφούς) τῆς βασιλείας 
οὔσης ἀρχῆς ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς 
σοφοὺς σταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ 
κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. ΟἹ Hor. Sat. 1. 
3. 125, Stob. Eel. 11. 7. 11", p. 108, 26. 

27. στρατηγικός. Plut., vit. Arat, 23, 3, quotes μόνον 
στρατηγὸν εἶναι τὸν σοφόν as a δόγμα Ζήνωνος. 

149. Diog. vil. 33, πάλιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παρίσταντα 
(Ζήνωνα) πολίτας καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἐλευθέρους 
τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον. Clem. Alex. Strom. vy. 14. 95, p. 703 
P, 253 8, Ζήνων τε ὁ Στωικὸς παρὰ Πλάτωνος λαβών, ὁ 
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πάντας 
ἀλλήλων εἶναι φίλους λέγει. The same in Euseb. P. E. 
ΧΠΙ. 13, p. 671. 

πολιτείᾳ. Introd. p. 29, 


πολίτας: the question naturally arises, how is this 
statement to be connected with the cosmopolitanism which 
Zeno in the same treatise advocated (see frag. 162, iva... 
πέντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας Kat πολίτας): Zeno’s 
ideal state is not a community of the wise alone, but of 
all mankind. He seems to be arguing here against the 
ordinary civic distinctions, which are utterly valueless as 
compared with the broad line drawn between σοφοὶ and 
φαῦλοι. Presumably in the ideal state everyone would 
be so trained in Stoic precepts as to become thereby 

irous: cf. Diog. L. vil. 124, Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 11”, p. 
138, 15, where friendship is based upon ὁμόνοια which can 
only be found among the wise. Cic. Off. 1. 56, N. D. 1. 121. 
A full discussion of the subject is given by Zeller, p. 317 
foll. This is one of the doctrines borrowed by Zeno from 
the Cynics, see Introd. p. 19; it had already been taught 
by Socrates (Xen. Mem. τι. 6. 14 foll.). The view is 
rejected as inadequate by Plato in the Lysis (p. 214), but 
no doubt Clement is thinking rather of the Phaedrus and 
Symposium: he adds his usual comment that Plato’s views 
are borrowed from the Jews. 

ἐλευθέρους. Stob: ΘΙ ἢ pc DOL, 13; Diog. ΤΠ: 
191, Cic. Parad. v. This again is derived from the 
Cynics: see Zeller, Socrates, p. 322. 

150. Cic. Mur. § 61, solos sapientes esse, si dis- 
tortissimi, formosos. This occurs among the “Sententiae 
et praecepta Zenonis” cited by Cicero in his banter 
against Cato, so that the evidence is not very trustworthy, 
a remark which also applies to frags. 152, 153 and 155. 
The wise man is beautiful because virtue alone is 
beautiful and attractive: Zeller, p. 270 and n. 4, to whose 
references add Cic. Fin. 11. 75, recte etiam pulcher ap- 


pellabitur: animi enim lineamenta sunt pulcriora quam 

151. Cic. Fin. v. 84, Zeno sapientem non beatum 
modo sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. Cic. Mur. § 61, 
solos sapientes esse, si mendicissimi, divites. 

For the sense ef. Cic. Paradox. vi., Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 11" 
Ρ. 101, 18, and further references ap. Zeller p. 270, nn. 5 
and 6. 

152. Cic. Mur. § 61, sapientiam gratia nunquam 
moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem 
misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse 
neque exorari neque placari. 

The reasons for this opinion are given by Diog. vu. 
123, ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι, συγγνώμην τε ἔχειν μηδενί" 
μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις: 
ἐπεὶ τό γε εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτή τε ἡ ἐπιείκεια οὐδένειά 
ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένης χρηστότητα 
μηδὲ οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. The same at 
greater length in Stob. Ecl. 1.7. 114, p. 95, 25—96, 9; see 
also Zeller, p. 254. It should be remembered that ἔλεος 
is a subdivision of λύπη (ἐπὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι ἀναξίως κακο- 
παθεῖν Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 10°, p. 92, 12) and therefore one of 
the πάθη : possibly this is all that is meant by Lactant. 
Inst. U1. 23 (frag. 144). 

153. Cic. Mur. ὃ 61, sapientem nihil opinari, nullius 
rei poenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare num- 
quam. Lact. Inst. m1. 4, ergo si neque sciri quidquam 
potest, ut Socrates docuit, nec opinari oportet, ut Zeno, 
tota philosophia sublata est. Cic. Acad. τι 113, sapientem 

nihil opinari...horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno | 

opere defensum est. August. contra Acad. m1. 11, cum 


ab eodem Zenone accepissent nihil esse turpius quam 

The Greek authorities for this fall partly under frag. 
148, 1. 22, οὔτε ἐξαπατᾶται οὔτε ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον, οὔτε 
διαψεύδεται οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ οὔτε λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καθ- 
όλου ψεῦδος ὑπολαμβάνει, and the rest may be supplied 
from Stob. Ecl. 1.7. 11", p. 112, 1, μηδὲν δ᾽ ὑπολαμβάνειν 
ἀσθενῶς ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς Kai βεβαίως διὸ Kai μηδὲ 
δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν... p. 113, 5, οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ᾽ ὑπο- 
λαμβάνουσι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα... οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ 
κατ᾽ οὐδένα τρόπον οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι. 
Diog. vit. 121, ἔτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν. For Zeno's 
definition of δόξα see on frag. 15. 

154. Diog. vir. 32, ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους καὶ δούλους 
καὶ ἀλλοτρίους λέγειν αὐτὸν (Ζήνωνα) ἀλλήλων εἶναι 
πάντας τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους καὶ γονεῖς τέκνων καὶ ἀδελ- 
φοὺς ἀδελφῶν, οἰκείους οἰκείων. 

This is the natural antithesis of frag. 149. Even 
parents are enemies to their children, if φαῦλοι, because 
natural relationship and parental love are absolutely 
ἀδιάφορα as compared with ἀρετή. On the subject of 
these paradoxes in general consult Ritter and Preller 
§ 420 with the notes. 

155. Cic. Mur. ὃ 61, nos autem, qui sapientes non 
sumus, fugitivos, exules, hostes, insanos. denique esse. 

But for the sake of uniformity this might have been 
omitted, as we can feel very little confidence that we have 
here the actual words of Zeno. For exules cf. Stob. Ecl. 
π. 7. 11, p. 103, 9, λέγουσι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον 
εἶναι, καθ᾽ ὅσον στέρεται νόμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν 

156. Athen. 1v. 158 Β, Στωικὸν δὲ δόγμα ἐστίν" ὅτι 
Hz P; 13 


Te πάντα εὖ ποιήσει ὁ σοφὸς καὶ φακὴν φρονίμως ἀρτύσει' 
διὸ καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἔφη 

καὶ [Ζηνώνειόν] ye φακῆν ἑψεῖν ὃς μὴ φρονίμως 

ὡς οὐκ ἄλλως δυναμένης ἑψηθῆναι φακῆς εἰ μὴ κατὰ 
τὴν Ζηνώνειον ὑφήγησιν ὃς ἔφη 

εἰς δὲ φακῆν ἔμβαλλε δυωδέκατον κοριάννου. 

ὅτι τε κτλ. This follows from the doctrine that all 
virtue is wisdom (φρόνησις): since φρόνησις is required 
in the preparation of a φακῆ, the wise man can alone 
prepare it properly. This applies even if the wise man 
has no experience in the particular practical task under 
consideration, because he alone possesses the necessary 
capacity, cf. frag. 148, 1.9. Diog. L. vi. 125, πάντα τε 
εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ πάντα φαμὲν τὰ αὐλήματα εὖ 
αὐλεῖν τὸν ᾿Ισμηνίαν, which furnishes a close parallel to 
Hor. Sat. 1. 3. 126 foll., ‘non nosti quid pater, inquit, 
‘Chrysippus dicat:’ ‘sapiens crepidas sibi numquam nec 
soleas fecit, sutor tamen est sapiens.’ qui? ‘ut quamvis 
tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque optimus est modu- 
lator ete.’ Cf. also Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 5°™, p- 66, 14 foll. 

157. Philo, liber quis virtuti studet, p. 880, ἄξιον τὸ 
Ζηνώνειον ἐπιφωνῆσαι ὅτι θᾶττον ἂν ἀσκὸν βαπτίσαις 
πλήρη πνεύματος ἢ βιάσαιο τὸν σπουδαῖον ὁντινοῦν 
ἄκοντα δρᾶσαί τι τῶν ἀβουλήτων" ἀνένδοτος γὰρ καὶ 
ἀήσσητος ψυχὴ ἣν ὀρθὸς λόγος δόγμασι παγίοις ἐ- 

βαπτίσαις... βιάσαι. So Mangey, followed by Wach- 
smuth, for the MSS. βαπτίσαι... βιάσαιτος The same 
editor suggests the alternative of inserting τίς, which is 
less probable. 

βιάσαιο : for the freedom of the wise man’s will ef. Cic. 
Tuse. Iv. 12, eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν 


appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem. Eam illi putant in 
solo esse sapiente ; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae 
quid cum ratione desiderat, and see Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie, p. 196. 

ἀνένδοτος : cf. supra frag. 148, ἐσχυρὸν δ᾽ (τὸν σοφόν) ὅτι 
τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἰσχὺν περιπεποίηται ἀήττητος ὧν καὶ 
ἀκαταγώνιστος. Μ. Aurel. 1. 16 fin. 

ὀρθὸς λόγος : see Introd. pp. 8, 9. 

158. Seneca, de Ira, 1. 16, 7, Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in 
sapientis quoque animo etiam quum vulnus sanatum sit 
cicatrix manet. Sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et 
umbras affectuum, ipsis quidem carebit. 

This is a concession to popular feeling, although at 
the same time the absolute ἀπάθεια (Diog. L. vu. 117, 
Cic. Acad. 1. 38) of the wise man is maintained. It would 
be a mistake to infer from this passage that Zeno is 
responsible for the doctrine of εὐπάθειαι. Further re- 
ferences are given by Zeller, p. 291. Cf. Diog. vi. 118, 
προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους, 
διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν «x.T.r., Where however the 
point is rather different. Remembering that Zeno de- 
scribed the effect of grief as δήξεις, we may compare 
Socrates’ description of the result of violent love in Xen. 
Symp. Iv. 28, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος τόν 
τε ὦμον πλεῖον ἢ πέντε ἡμέρας ὦδαξον καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ 
ὥσπερ κνῆσμά τι ἐδόκουν ἔχειν. Cic. Tusc. I. 83, hoe 
detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit 
sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula 
quaedam animi relinquetur. The best account of the 
sensibility of the wise man to pain is given by Heinze, 
Stoicorum de aff. doctr. pp. 14, 15. The wise man can- 
not resist the impact of the φαντασία, but will refuse 
συγκατάθεσις. See further on Cleanth. frag. 94. 



159. Seneca, Epist. 83. 8, Ebrio secretum sermonem 
nemo committit: viro autem bono committit: ergo vir 
bonus ebrius non erit. 

Seneca finds no difficulty in refuting this fallacy, in 
spite of the defence which he quotes from Posidonius. 
For the syllogistic form of the argument see Introd. 
Ρ. 33. Von Arnim, Quellen Studien p. 104, has pointed 
out the original in Philo de Plantatione Noé p. 350, εἰ τῷ 
μεθύοντι οὐκ ἄν τις εὐλόγως λόγον ἀπόῤῥητον παρακατά- 
θοιτο «τῷ δὲ σοφῷ παρακατατίθενται;» οὐκ ἄρα μεθύει ὁ 

ebrius non erit: cf. Diog. L. vi. 118, καὶ οἰνρωθήσεσθαι 
μέν (τὸν σοφόν), ov μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ. Stob. Ecl. π΄. 7, 
11™, p. 109, 5, οὐχ οἷον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα" 
τὴν γὰρ μέθην ἁμαρτητικὸν περιέχειν, λήρησιν εἶναι 
«γὰρ; παρὰ τὸν οἶνον, ἐν μηδενὶ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἁμαρ- 
τάνειν κιτιλ. Similarly Socrates in Xen. Symp. τι. 96. 
The Peripatetics held, on the contrary, according to 
Stobaeus, that the wise man μεθυσθήσεσθαι κατὰ συμ- 
περιφοράς, κἂν εἰ μὴ προηγουμένως (Ecl. τι. 7. 24, p. 144, 

160. Plut. de prof. in virt. 12, ὅρα δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ 
Ζήνωνος ὁποῖόν ἐστιν" ἠξίου yap ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων ἕκαστον 
ἑαυτοῦ συναισθάνεσθαι προκόπτοντος, εἰ μήτε ἡδόμενον 
αἰσχρῷ τινι ἑαυτὸν μήτε τι προσιέμενον ἢ πράττοντα τῶν 
δεινῶν καὶ ἀδίκων ὁρᾷ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἐν βυθῷ 
γαλήνης ἀκλύστῳ καταφανεῖ διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ 
φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυ- 

ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων : it was a popular Greek notion that the 
vision of the mind’s eye is clearer in sleep. Aesch. Eum. 
104. Pind. frag. 108 [96], Fennell. 

προκόπτοντος : Wellmann p. 462 argues that Zeno, while 


maintaining to the full the possibility of acquiring virtue, 
did not admit the practical non-existence of wise men or 
the consequent distinction between of προκόπτοντες and of 
σπουδαῖοι: these latter views, he thinks, may have 
originated with Chrysippus. On προκοπὴ in general see 
Zeller, p. 293 foll. 

προσιέμενον, “approving” (cf. Dem. Timocr. ὃ 156). The 
words αἰσχρῷ δεινῶν ἀδίκων point to the acquisition 
of the three leading virtues σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία and 

aX οἷον κτλ. The emotions are dispersed by reason 
in the mind of the προκόπτων, which remains clear and 
unsullied, like the transparent ocean on a calm day when 
shingle and sand settle down to the bottom: cf. Cleanth. 
frag. 66. 

φανταστικόν, has no objective reality but is merely 
διάκενος ἑλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν TH ψυχῇ ἀπ᾽ οὐδενὸς φαντασ- 
τοῦ γινόμενον (Plut. plac. IV. 12). Observe that it is 
described as a πάθος. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 156, n. 

161. Seneca, Epist. 104. 21, quod si convivere etiam 
Graecis juvat {cum Socrate, cum Zenone versare: alter 
te docebit mori, si necesse erit: alter, antequam necesse 
erit. . 

antequam necesse 6777. Suicide (é£aywy7) is justifiable 
under certain circumstances. It is important to re- 
member that life and death belong to the class of the 
ἀδιάφορα, and suicide therefore has no connection with 
ἀρετή, but is merely to be regarded as a matter of 
καθῆκον (τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον 
«παραξ μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον Stob. 
Ecl. u. 7. 11™ p. 110, 18 and see on frag. 145). This 
point is emphasised by Zeller p. 338. 


162. Plut. Alex. virt. 6, καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαξζξομένη 
πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος 
εἰς ἕν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ 
κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, 
ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, 
εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νομῷ 
κοινῷ συντρεφομένης. τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὥσπερ 
ὄναρ ἢ εἴδωλον εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνα- 
τυπωσάμενος : id. de Sto. Rep. 11. 1, ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μέν, 
ὡς ἐν λόγοις αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι...γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ 
πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάξειν καὶ 
ῥητορεύειν. Chrysost. Hom. 1. in Matth. 4, οὐ yap καθάπερ 
Πλάτων ὁ τὴν καταγέλαστον ἐκείνην πολιτείαν συνθεὶς 
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ εἴ τις ἕτερος πολιτείαν ἔγραψεν ἢ νόμους 

πάντας ἀνθρώπους: see on frag. 149. The idea of cos- 
mopolitanism was largely developed by the later Stoics, 
especially Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. Zeno’s disregard 
of the fundamental distinction between Greeks and bar- 
barians may partly be due to the influence of his birth- 
place, as Zeller remarks, but at the same time he only 
carries out Cynic teaching (Diog. L. γι. 72, μόνην τε 
ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ). As to Socrates, see 
Zeller’s Socrates p. 167 n. 8, R. and P. § 219° 

ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμουν. As Zeno is generally admitted to 
have written the πολιτεία when he was still under the 
Influence of the Cynie school, Zeller (Socrates p. 325) 
treats this passage as being typical of Cynicism, and 
suggests that Plato, in the Politicus (267 D, οὐκοῦν τῶν 
νομευτικῶν ἡμῖν πολλῶν φανεισῶν ἄρτι τεχνῶν μία τις ἦν ἡ 
πολιτικὴ καὶ μιᾶς τινὸς ἀγέλης ἐπιμέλεια; «.T.X.) and in his 
description of the ὑῶν πόλιες in Rep. $72 A. foll. is referring 
to Antisthenes. The reference is however extremely 
doubtful (see Ueberweg p. 93), and it is worth noticing 



that the comparison of the ruler of a state to a herdsman 
was a favourite one with Socrates. Xen. Mem. 1. 2,32, εἶπέ 
που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴτις 
γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε 
καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἷναι" ἔτι 
δὲ θαυμαστότερον εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως 
«.7.d., with which ef. Plat. Gorg. 516 a. See also Newman, 
Politics of Aristotle, vol. 1. p. 30. 

163. Athen. xt. 561 ©, Ποντιανὸς δὲ Ζήνωνα ἔφη 
τὸν Κιτιέα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν "ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι φιλίας 
καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁμονοίας παρασκευαστικόν, 
ἄλλου δ᾽ οὐδενός. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη “ τὸν Ἔρωτα 
θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως 
σωτηρίαν. Plut. vit. Lycurg. 31. Lycurgus’ object was 
not to leave Sparta with a large empire, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἑνὸς 
ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ᾽ 
ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτήν, πρὸς 
τοῦτο συνέταξε καὶ συνήρμοσεν, ὅπως ἐλευθέριοι καὶ 
αὐτάρκεις γενόμενοι καὶ σωφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον 
διατεχῶσι. ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαβε τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπό- 
θεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων κ.τ.λ. 

τὸν Ἔρωτα. [ΟΥ̓́Θ is in Hesiod to be regarded as an 
allegorical presentment of fire, frag. 113. In the ideal 
state Love is taken as a presiding deity, because all 
discord and party strife are to be banished from it, and the 
wise men, who are its citizens, are to be united by friend- 
ship and eencord. Ce Stob: Hel. 11. 7.. 11", p. 108; 15, ἐν 
μόνοις τε τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπολείπουσι φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐν μόνοις 
τούτοις ὁμόνοια γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, τὴν δ᾽ 
ὁμόνοιαν εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην. Chrysipp. ap. 
Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 12, p. 79, Gomp., καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι 
καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ ᾿Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ 
᾿Αφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν. It is probabie that 


Zeno took the same objection, that of want of unity, to 
Plato’s Republic as is taken by Aristotle Pol. m. 5, p. 
1264 a 24, ἐν μιᾷ yap πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, 
καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας ἀλλήλαις. Of. also ib. 1. 4 1262 
Ὁ 7, Xen. Mem. trv. 4. 16, and contrast Ar. Pol, m. 2. 
1261610. Hirzel, πὶ. p. 36, finds here a divergence from 
Antisthenes, comparing Clem. Alex. Strom. m1. 485 P., but 
he apparently forgets Diog. L. vi. 12, which shows that the 
inconsistency, if it exists, is with Antisthenes himself. 

164. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 12, 76, p. 691 P. 249 S., 
λέγει δὲ καὶ Ζήνων, ὁ τῆς Στωικῆς κτίστης αἱρέσεως, ἐν 
τῷ τῆς πολιτείας βιβλίῳ μήτε ναοὺς δεῖν ποιεῖν μῆτε 
ἀγάλματα: μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν θεῶν ἄξιον κατασκεύασμα, 
καὶ γράφειν οὐ δέδιεν αὐταῖς λέξεσι τάδε" ἱερά τε οἰκοδο- 
μεῖν οὐδὲν δεήσει" ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, καὶ ἅγιον 
οὐδὲν χρὴ νομίξειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον 
οἰκοδόμων ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων. The same in Orig. c. 
Cels. 1. 5, p. 324. Plut. Sto. Rep. vi. 1, ἔτι δόγμα Ζήνωνος 
ἔστιν ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἰκοδομεῖν" ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ 
ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οὐκ ἔστιν: οἰκοδόμων δ᾽ ἔργον καὶ βαναύ- 
σων οὐδέν ἐστι πολλοῦ ἄξιον. Theodoret, Gr. Aff. Cur. 
ΠῚ. p. 780=p. 49, 45, ταῦτα συνορῶν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ 
Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ τῆς Πολιτείας ἀπαγορεύει βιβλίῳ καὶ ναοὺς 
οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ ἀγάλματα τεκταίνειν' οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι 
τούτων φησὶν θεῶν ἄξιον κατασκεύασμα. Epiphan. 
Haeres. 111. 36, Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ Στωικὸς ἔφη μὴ δεῖν 
θεοῖς οἰκοδομεῖν ἱερά. 

The Cynics also deny the sanctity of temples: Diog. 
L. VL 73, μηδέν τε ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβεῖν. 
Zeno’s language in some particulars recalls St Paul's 
address to the Athenians, Acts xv. 24, ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας 
τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς 
Κύριος ὑπάρχων οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ. 


165. Stob. Floril. 43, 88, Ζήνων ἔφη δεῖν τὰς πόλεις 
κοσμεῖν οὐκ ἀναθήμασιν ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρεταῖς. 
In a similar spirit Crates promised to honour Hermes 
and the Muses οὐ δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς ἀλλ᾽ ἀρεταῖς ὁσίαις 
(Julian Or. vi. 200 A, quoted by Zeller, Socrates p. 329 n. 1). 

166. Diog. L. vu. 33, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους 
στίχους μήθ᾽ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς 
πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. 

κατὰ.. «στίχους. Prose writings were cited according to 
the number of lines, ef. Diog. L. vit. 187, (Chrysippus) ἐν 
τῷ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων συγγράμματι λέγων 
κατὰ τοὺς ἑξακοσίους στίχους. Dion. Hal. de Thue. hist. 
jud. c. 19, προοίμιον τῆς ἱστορίας μέχρι πεντακοσίων 
ἐκμηκύνει στίχων. 

δικαστήρια: “wozu Gerichtshéfe, wo tiberall Gerechtigkeit 
waltet? wozu Gymnasien, wenn Korperkraft und Gewandt- 
heit ohne Wert sind?” Wellmann p. 438. The reference 
to γυμνάσια confirms the statement of Plutarch (Sto. 
Rep. 8, 2) that Zeno wrote against Plato’s Republic: with 
Plato γυμναστική forms an important element in the 
training of the φύλακες (Rep. ul. p. 410—411). 

167. Diog. vil. 32, ἔνιοι μέντοι...ἐν πολλοῖς κατη- 
γοροῦντες τοῦ Ζήνωνος τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἄχρηστον 
ἀποφαίνειν λέγουσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς πολιτείας. 

ἐγκύκλιος παιδέα. The ordinary course of Greek educa- 
tion comprised the three branches of γράμματα, μουσική, 
and γυμναστική (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 231 foll.). 
Zeno intended to imply, probably again in opposition 
to Plato, that, as compared with the acquisition of virtue 
or true wisdom, the wisdom which education proposes 
to supply is worthless (cf. Wellmann p. 437, 8). Such at 
least seems to be the ground on which the Cynics put 
forward a similar opinion, Diog. L. vi. 11, τήν τε ἀρετὴν 


τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλειόνων δεομένην, μήτε 
μαθημάτων. 73, μουσικῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρο- 
λογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν ὡς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ 
ἀναγκαίων. 103, παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθή- 
ματα. γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν 6 ᾽Αντισ- 
θένης τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοιντο 
τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Epicurus agreed with Zeno on this 
point (see Prof. Mayor on Cie. N. D. 1. 72), while Aristotle 
considered that τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα are useful for the 
acquisition of virtue (Diog. L. v. 31). It is important to 
observe that Chrysippus held εὐχρηστεῖν τὰ ἐγκύκλια 
μαθήματα (Diog. L. vit. 129, cf. Stob. Ecl. τι. 7, 5°, p. 67, 5), 
and it is possible that Zeno may at a later period of his 
life have modified his conclusion on this point, just as he 
diverged from the Cynics in recommending Dialectic and 
Physics as well as Ethics, Zeller p. 68, 3, Hirzel π΄. p. 528, 
4, cf. Cleanth frag. 106. 

168. Diog. vit. 33, περί τε νομίσματος οὕτως γράφειν 
(Ζήνωνα), νόμισμα δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν 
κατασκευάζειν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδημίας ἕνεκεν. 

νόμισμα. “Diogenes in the πολιτεία proposed a coinage 
of bones or stones (ἀστράγαλοι) instead of gold and silver, 
Athen. Iv. 159 £.” Zeller, Socrates, p- 325 n. 

ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν. This again is pointed at Plato Rep. 11. 
371 B, ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς 
ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. Aristotle’s statement is more 
exact, explaining that money is a security with a view to 
future exchange: ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν 
μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτε ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγ- 
γυητής ἐσθ᾽ ἡμῖν. Eth. v. ὅ. 14. Cf. especially Ar. Pol. 1. 
9. 1257 a 32 foll. and Newman on ib. 1257 Ὁ 11. 

169. Athen. vi. 233 B, ο, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς 


Srods πάντα τἄλλα πλὴν TOD νομίμως αὐτοῖς (1.6. gold 
and silver) καὶ καλῶς χρῆσθαι νομίσας ἀδιάφορα, τὴν μὲν 
αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ φυγὴν ἀπειπών, τὴν χρῆσιν δὲ τῶν λιτῶν 
καὶ ἀπερίττων προηγουμένως ποιεῖσθαι προστάσσων" 
ὅπως aden καὶ ἀθαύμαστον πρὸς τἄλλα τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἔχοντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσα μήτε καλά ἐστι μήτε 
αἰσχρά, τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ χρῶνται, τῶν δ᾽ 
ἐναντίων μηδὲν ὅλως δεδοικότες λόγῳ καὶ μὴ φόβῳ τούτων 

The opinions professed with regard to money bear 
the same relation to the last frag. as frag. 171 bears to 
frag. 176. This passage affords another good illustration 
of the doctrine of the καθήκοντα as applied to those 
things which are morally indifferent. The σπουδαῖος, 
who is unaffected either by fear or desire (ἀπαθής), and 
whose ὁρμαὶ are properly directed by right reason, will 
know how to discriminate between ta κατὰ φύσιν and τὰ 
παρὰ φύσιν, so as to cling to the former and avoid the 
latter. Thus πλοῦτος is a προηγμένον (Diog. L. vir. 106), 
and possesses value as being of advantage for life in 
accordance with nature (ib. 105), while ἡ ὀρθὴ χρῆσις 
πλούτου which is characteristic of the σπουδαῖος is sharply 
distinguished from the φιλοπλουτία (Stob. Rol 10); 
Ῥ. 91; 18) of the φαῦλος. 

αἵρεσιν: suggested by Schweighiiuser and adopted by 
Kaibel for the MSS. ἀρχήν. After τὴν χρῆσιν dé Schweig. 
thought some words had fallen out such as τὴν μὲν 
ὀρθὴν εἴα. 

χιτῶν. Cf Μ. Aurel. τ. 8, τὸ λιτὸν κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν. 

ἀπερίττω. So Casaubon in place of MSS περιττῶν. 
Contrast M. Aurel. v. 5 with id. Ix. 32. 

προηγουμένως. This word is difficult. In Sext. Emp., with 
whom it occurs at least eight times, it always means 
“principally” or “in the first place,” being often opposed 


to ἀκολούθως. cf. προηγούμενος λόγος frag. 123 = leading 
doctrine. Here however it seems to have the special 
Stoic sense=in the absence of overriding circumstances 
Χκατὰ περίστασιν, cf. Epict. diss. m1. 14, 7, Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 
24. p. 144, 19, frag. 131. In this connection we may 
compare Diog.’s division of καθήκοντα into τὰ ἄνευ περι- 
στάσεως, such as ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαί (or καλῶς χρῆσθαι 
πλούτῳ as here), and τὰ κατὰ περίστασιν, such as τὴν 
κτῆσιν διαρρίπτειν (VII. 109). Hirzel, p. 825, denies that 
προηγουμένως belongs to the elder Stoics, thinking that 
it was taken over subsequently from the Academics and 
Peripatetics. He would substitute here ὡς προηγμένων. 
ἀδεῆ points to the purging of the soul from the in- 
fluence of the πάθη: δέος is a subdivision of φόβος not 
very explicitly defined ap. Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 10° p. 92, 5. 
ἀθαύμαστον. Cf. Hor. Epist. 1. 6. 1, 2, nil admirari prope 
res est una Numici solaque quae possit facere et servare 
beatum ; where see Orelli, who properly observes that τὸ 
θαυμάζειν, which Plato and Aristotle speak of as the 
starting point of philosophy, is something quite different. 
Cf. Mare. Aurel. 1.15, Cic. Tuse. m1. 30. Hence Arr. Epict. — 
Diss. 1. 18, 11, μὴ Oavpate τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ 
μοιχῷ οὐ χαλεπανεῖς. For διάθεσιν see on frag. 117. 

170. Seneca de Otio 80, 2, Zenon ait: accedet ad 
rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit. id. Tranq. 
An. I. 7, Promptus compositusque sequor Zenonem, Clean- 
them, Chrysippum ; quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam 
accessit, nemo non misit. 

The same doctrine is attributed to Chrysippus in 
Diog. L. vil. 121, πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφόν, ἂν μή τι 
κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων: cf. Cic. 
Fin. m1. 68, Schol. on Lucan τι. 380, Stoicorum sapiens 
erit civilis, hoc est, in administratione rei publicae. 


τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι is another instance of καθῆκον which 
is to be undertaken κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον (Stob. 
Ecl. τι. 7. 11", p. 111, 5) = προηγουμένως (see on last frag.). 
We may say then that, while τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι 15 καθῆκον 
προηγουμένως Or ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὸ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι 15 
καθῆκον κατὰ περίστασιν, just as a careful use of wealth 
is contrasted with the condition of the spendthrift. 

171. Diog. vil. 121, καὶ γαμήσειν, ws ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν 
ἐν πολιτείᾳ, (τὸν σοφόν) καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. 

Cf Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 11", p. 109, 16, Cic. Fin. 111.68. The 
statement refers to the duty of a wise man under existing 
circumstances, and while living in an ordinary civil com- 
munity. It has no reference to the ideal state in which 
wives are to be held in common (frag. 176): γάμος clearly 
belongs to the ἀδιάφορα and γαμεῖν is a κωθῆκον. This 
seems better that Wellmann’s view p. 439, who strains 
the meaning of γάμος to bring this passage into con- 
formity with frag. 176, and is strongly supported by the 
analogous case of the duty of the wise man to enter public 
life. The latter clearly refers to existing political in- 
stitutions, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 11°, p. 94, 9, πολιτεύεσθαι 
τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς 
ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας. 
The same explanation will account for the two passages 
in Diog. vi. 11 and 72, where similar views are attributed 
to the Cynics, without supposing (with Zeller, Socrates 
p. 320) a divergence of opinion between Antisthenes and 

172. Diog. L. vit. 129, καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν 
σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς 
᾽ Ν ᾽ ἊΝ ¢, 7, / ’ an , 
ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Anveov ev τῇ πολιτείᾳ. 

For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. This passage is no 


doubt inspired by the influence of the Phaedrus and 
Symposium. Speaking of the ἔρως of Socrates Dr 
Thompson remarks (Phaedrus App. 1. p. 152):—“It was 
not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental 
endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which 
excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates,” 
Cf. Symp. 208 B foll. and for εὐφυΐαν ib. 209 8, ψυχῇ 
καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, cf. frag. 147, καταληπτὸν 
εἶναι τὸ ἦθος ἐξ εἴδους. We must distinguish between 
the ἔρως of the σπουδαῖος and the φαῦλος. τὸ ἐρᾶν 
itself belongs to the class of ἀδιάφορα, and implies, 
therefore, a corresponding καθῆκον, the duty, that is, 
τοῦ καλῶς ἐρᾶν, Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 5°°, p. 66,3—10. If then 
the objection is raised that the σπουδαῖος should avoid 
ἔρως, if he is to retain his ἀπάθεια, since ἔρως is a sub- 
division of ἐπιθυμία and a πάθος, the answer is that this 
is untrue of that particular form of ἔρως which is defined 
as ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον (Stob. 1. ο. 
L 12, ib. 10° p. 91, 15, 11" p. 115, 1, Diog. L. viz. 113, 120, 
Sext. Emp. Math. vit. 239), and which is not an ἐπιθυμία. 
Under ἐπιθυμία are to be classed ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ only, 
and in Diog. vil. 113 the distinction between the two 
classes of ἔρως is clearly indicated. Cic., Fin. 111. 68, speaks 
of amores sanctos. 

173. Athen. x1. 563 E, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐξηλωκότες 
τὸν ἀρχηγὸν ὑμῶν τῆς σοφίας Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, ὃς 
οὐδεπώποτε γυναικὶ ἐχρήσατο παιδικοῖς δ᾽ ἀεί" ὡς ᾿Αντί- 
yovos ὁ Καρύστιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτοῦ" 
θρυλλεῖτε γὰρ ὅτι “ δεῖ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς 

δεῖ μὴ «rd. It is most natural to suppose that these 
are Zeno’s words from the position of his name in the 
context. For the sense see on frag. 172. 


174. Clem. Alex. Paedag. 111. 11. 74, p. 296 P. 109 S., 
ὑπογράφειν ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἔοικε Ζήνων εἰκόνα νεανίου καὶ 
οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνδριαντουργεῖ᾽ ἔστω, φησί, καθαρὸν τὸ 
πρόσωπον, ὀφρὺς μὴ καθειμένη, μηδ᾽ ὄμμα ἀναπεπταμένον, 
μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον, μὴ ὕπτιος ὁ τράχηλος, μηδ᾽ ἀνιέ- 
μενα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέλη, ἀλλὰ [τὰ] μετέωρα ἐντόνοις 
ὅμοια" ὀρθὸς νοῦς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὀξύτης καὶ κατοκωχὴ 
τῶν ὀρθῶς εἰρημένων, καὶ σχηματισμοὶ καὶ κινήσεις μηδὲν 
ἐνδιδοῦσαι τοῖς ἀκολάστοις ἐλπίδος. αἰδὼς μὲν ἐπανθείτω 
καὶ ἀρρενωπία: ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ 6 ἀπὸ τῶν μυροπωλίων 
καὶ χρυσοχοείων καὶ ἐριοπωλίων ἄλυς καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἐργαστηρίων, ἔνθα καὶ ἑταιρικῶς κεκοσμημένοι, 
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέγους καθεζόμενοι, διημερεύουσιν. 

This remarkable fragment was first restored by Cobet 
in Mnemos. Ο. 8S. vi. p. 339, who saw that the writer was 
necessarily speaking of young men and not of young 
women, as the word ἀρρενωπία of itself shows. It seems 
probable, as Wachsmuth suggests, that this frag. comes 
from the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Introd. p. 30). 

νεανίου. So Cobet Le. for veavida. Dind. with two MSS. 
reads veavia. 

καθαρόν. Cf. Plut. de Audiendo 13, p. 45 σ, προσώπῳ 
κατάστασις καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέμφατος. 

ἀναπεπταμένον : barefaced, impudent, cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1. 
22, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, of the woman 
representing Vice in Prodicus’ fable. See Aesch. Suppl. 
198, 9 and the comm. μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον is an emen- 
dation of Cobet’s (Mnemos. x1. 387) for the MSS. μηδ᾽ 
ἀνακεκλασμένον, the meaning of which is not clear. 
With the alteration avaz. est hominis protervi et petu- 
lantis, dvax. mollis et impudici. 

τά is rejected by Wachsm. with great improvement to 
the sense. 

ὀρθὸς νοῦς, so Wachsm. for vulg. ὀρθόνου" πρὸς K.T.2. 


Perhaps it would be better to place a comma after νοῦς, 
and connect πρὸς τὸν λόγον with ὀξύτης. Dind. brackets 

κίνησις.. «ἐνδιδοῦσα Dind. with some MSS. 

μυροπωλίων : these shops are mentioned as the lounges 
frequented by young men. Ar, Eq. 1375, τὰ μειράκια 
ταυτὶ λέγω, τάν τῷ μύρῳ. Τ,γ8. Or. 234 ὃ 20, ἕκαστος γὰρ 
ὑμῶν εἴθισται προσφοιτᾶν ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπωλεῖον, ὁ δὲ 
πρὸς κουρεῖον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον, ὁ δ᾽ ὅποι ἂν τύχῃ: 
id. Or. 23. § 3, Isoc. Or. 7. § 48, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σκιραφείοις οἱ 
νεώτεροι διέτριβον οὐδ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὐλητρίσιν οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς 
τοιούτοις συλλόγοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἔμενον ἐν 
οἷς ἐτάχθησαν. In Homer's time the smith’s shop was 
used for this purpose: Od. xvii. 38, Hes. Op. 491: later 
the barber’s shop is most frequently mentioned: see 
the comm. on Hor. Sat. 1. 7. 3. Other authorities are 
collected by Becker, Charicles E. T. p. 272. 

κεκοσμημένοι... .καθεζόμενο. So Cobet for κεκοσμημέναι... 
καθεζόμεναι. For the former word cf. Xen. Mem. ut 11. 
4 where Theodota is spoken of as πολυτελῶς κεκοσμη- 
μένην, and Lucian, Ver. Hist. π᾿. 46, γυναῖκας πάνυ ἕται- 
ρικῶς κεκοσμημέναι (quoted by Becker, Charicles E. T. 
Ῥ. 249); and for the latter Aeschin. Timarch. § 74 τοὺς ἐπὶ 
τῶν οἰκημάτων καθεζομένους (referred to by Wachsm.), and 
Catull. xxxvir. 8, 14. 

175. Diog. L. vil. 22, δεῖν τε ἔλεγε τοὺς νέους πάσῃ 
κοσμιότητι χρῆσθαι καὶ πορείᾳ καὶ σχήματι καὶ περι- 

Possibly this is only a reference to the preceding 
frag. For πορείᾳ see on frag. 31. περιβολῇ = clothing. 

176. Diog. L. vit. 131, ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰς 
εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὥστε τὸν ἐν- 
τυχόντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ 


πολιτείᾳ. ib. 88, owas τε τὰς γυναῖκας δογματίζξειν 
ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. 

For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. Observe, however, 
_that Chrysippus concurred in this opinion, which must 
not therefore be treated as merely Cynical. 

171. Diog. L. vit. 33, καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει 
(Ζήνων) χρῆσθαι ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον 

The same view seems to have been advocated by the 
Cynics. Hence the point of Menander’s lines quoted by 
Diog. L. vi. 93, συμπεριπατήσεις yap τρίβων᾽ ἔχουσ᾽ ἐμοί, 
ὥσπερ Κράτητι τῷ Κυνικῷ ποθ᾽ ἡ γυνή. Socrates in 
Xen. Symp. IL. 3 5808 :--ἐσθὴς ἄλλη μὲν γυναικὶ ἄλλη δὲ 
ἀνδρὶ καλή. With regard to the words μηδὲν μόριον 
ἀποκ. Zeller, p. 808 ἢ. 2, remarks :—“The latter act 15 
only conditional and allowed in certain cases, such as for 
purposes of gymnastics.” But the limitation is Plato’s 
(Rep. v. 452 a, 457 A) and we have already seen that 
Zeno proposed to abolish γυμνάσια: it may well be that 
Zeno, like the Cynics, disclaimed the theoretical propriety 
of the ordinary rules of modesty in dress. There is no 
question here of the καθήκοντα of ordinary life, and 
Zeno’s departure from the Cynical point of view is largely 
to be found in this direction. 

178. Origen c. Celsum, Vu. 63, p. 739, ἐκκλίνουσι 
\ , e Ν la) / / a 

TO μοιχεύειν οἱ Ta TOD Κιτιέως Zynvovos φιλοσοφοῦντες... 
διὰ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι TO λογικῷ Sow 
νοθεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἑτέρῳ προκαταληφθεῖσαν 

lal ¥ / \ Μ ’ Ld Φ 
γυναῖκα καὶ φθείρειν τὸν ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου οἶκον. 

Since strictly speaking marriage is an ἀδιάφορον, τὸ 
μοιχεύειν cannot be contrary to virtue, and such an 
offence would be impossible in the ideal state. Still, with 

H. P. 14 


society constituted as it is, μὴ μοιχεύειν is καθῆκον ἄνευ 
περιστάσεως and therefore κατὰ φύσιν. The wise man 
will recognise the laws of the state in which he lives in 
the same spirit in which he takes part in its public affairs . 
(Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 11° 94, 8 foll.). In Sext. Pyrrh. m1. 209 
we find τούς ye μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νόμος, 
παρὰ δέ τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς τῶν ἑτέρων γυναιξὶ 
μίγνυσθαι: καὶ φιλοσόφων δέ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι 
τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι. The Stoics are probably 
indicated, and the passage is in no way inconsistent with 
the present, cf. Theoph. ad Autol. m1. 3 p. 118 p, οὐχὶ 
καὶ περὶ σεμνότητος πειρώμενοι γράφειν ἀσελγείας καὶ 
πορνείας καὶ μοιχείας ἐδίδαξαν ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ἔτι μὴν καὶ 
τὰς στυγητὰς ἀῤῥητοποιΐας εἰσηγήσαντο ; 

119. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 111, 245, οἷον γοῦν ὁ α͵ρεσι- 
άρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησι περὶ παίδων 
ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε" “ διαμηρίξειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον 
μηδὲ ἧσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θηλέα ἢ ἄρρενα" 
οὐ γάρ [ἐστι] παιδικοῖς ἄλλα ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις 
ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντα ἐστίν." 
The same fragment is preserved by Sext. Emp. adv. 
Math, x1. 190, introduced by the words καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν 
παίδων ἀγωγῆς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ὁ αἱρεσιάρχης Ζήνων 
τοιαῦτά τινα διέξεισιν, and with the variant ἄλλα παι- 
δικοῖς for ἐστὶ παιδικοῖς ἄλλα. 

ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς. For this book see Introd. Ρ. 30. 
The true aspect from which to regard this and the 
four next following fragments is very clearly set forth 
in a passage of Origen, c. Cels. Iv. 45 (quoted by Zeller, 
p. 310, π. 1). “The Stoics made good and evil depend 
alone on the intention, and declared external actions, 
independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν 
τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action 


taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορον ἐστίν, 
εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν, 
καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν... παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ 
τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένου, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθη- 
κόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ 
ἀπολέσθαι...τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος." This also illus- 
trates frag. 178. 

180. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 11. 246, περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς 
γονεῖς ὁσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ (Ζήνων) φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ 
» ες / \ Ἂν 2 if (v4 b Φ ον if 
τὴν ᾿Ιοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τρίβειν 
τὴν μητέρα καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ 
, , a N ΠΝ OV > Date > 
σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν" εἰ 
δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὔφραινεν, ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ 
παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν. Sext. 
Emp. Math. x1. 191, καί γε ὁ μὲν Ζήνων τὰ περὶ τῆς 
7 , X; IG. © , tf cs ’ * 
Ἰοκάστης καὶ Οἰδίποδος ἱστορούμενά φησιν oT’ οὐκ HV 
δεινὸν τρῖψαι τὴν μητέρα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν τὸ 
an r a / ἊΨ / a] X. > U4 - 7 \ 
σῶμα ταῖς χερσὶ τρίψας ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν" εἰ δὲ 
ἑτέρῳ μέρει τρίψας ἐφ᾽ ᾧ εὗρεν ὀδυνωμένην παύσας καὶ 
παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ποιήσας τί ἦν αἰσχρόν; 
ib. Pyrrh. m1. 205, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων φησὶ μὴ 
ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρῖψαι 
καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῇ χειρὶ 
τρῖψαι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι. Plut. Quaest. Conv. II. 
6. 1, § 6, ὡς ἔγωγε νὴ τὸν κύνα καὶ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ἂν 
3 f » x 3 / \ \ a 
ἐβουλόμην ἔφη διαμηρισμοὺς ἐν συμποσίῳ τινὶ καὶ παιδιᾷ 
an lal if a 
μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδῆς τοσαύτης ἐχομένῳ συγγράμματι TH 
πολιτείᾳ κατατετάχθαι. 

It should be observed that Sextus does not state that 
this extract as well as the last comes from the διατριβαί, 
so that we may perhaps refer Plutarch’s words to this 
passage: Wellmann however, p. 440, thinks that both the 



Sextus passages come from the διατριβαί, in which case 
Plutarch’s statement should form a separate fragment. 
Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Sext. Pyrrh, 11, 246, id. ap. Epiphanius 
adv, Haeres, 111. 2. 9 (III. 39), Diels, p. 598, ἔλεγε yap δεῖν 
μίγνυσθαι ταῖς μητράσι τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς δὲ πατράσι τὰς 
θυγατέρας. Diog. L. vit. 188, Theoph. ad Autol. m1, 6, 
120 D. 

181. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x1. 190, καὶ πάλιν (ὁ 
Ζήνων) " * διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον ; οὐκ ἔγωγε. πότερον 
οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπε- 
θύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ 
Δί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ᾽ οὐκ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; 
οὐ γάρ." 

The line taken here is that the intention is all impor- 
tant, and not the act in itself: hence virtue belongs only 
to σπουδαία διάθεσις, cf. Cleanth. frag. 95, 

ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ᾽ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος 
Φ , a 9% ᾽ν" \ / 
οὗτος ποιήσει TOUT ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ. 

Bekker suggests ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθυμήσας... εἶτ᾽ ἐφοβήθης. 

182. Sext, Emp. Pyrrh. mt, 200, καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, 
ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ 
τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιά- 
φορον τοῦτο (i.e, ἀρρενομιξίαν) εἶναί φασιν ; 

188. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh, IIL, 206, τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν 

ἐπάρατον ὃν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει. 

184. Theoph, ad Autol, m1 5, p. 119 ©, τί σοι ἔδοξε 
τὰ Ζήνωνος ἢ τὰ Διογένους καὶ Κλεάνθους, ὁπόσα περι- 
éxovow ai βίβλοι αὐτῶν διδάσκουσαι ἀνθρωποβορίας, 
πατέρας μὲν ὑπὸ ἰδίων τέκνων ἕψεσθαι καὶ βιβρώσκεσθαι 


καί, εἴ τις οὐ βούλοιτο ἢ μέρος τι τῆς μυσερᾶς τροφῆς 
ἀπορρίψειεν, αὐτὸν κατεσθίεσθαι τὸν μὴ φαγόντα; 

Cf. Diog. L. vil. 121, γεύσεσθαί τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων 
σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν, ib. 188 (Chrysippus) ἐν δὲ τῷ γ΄ 
περὶ δικαίου κατὰ τοὺς χιλίους στίχους, καὶ τοὺς ἀπο- 
θανόντας κατεσθίειν κελεύων. Sext. Pyrrh. 111. 207, 24 
foll., Math. χι. 192—194, Mayor on Juv. XV. 107. Canni- 
balism was also recommended by the Cynics, Diog. VI. 73, 
μηδ᾽ ἀνόσιον εἶναι TO καὶ ἀνθρωπείων κρεῶν ἅψασθαι, ὡς 
δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐθῶν, with which ef. an amusing 
summary of the various modes of disposing of the dead 
prevalent in different countries, ap. Sext. Pyrrh. UL 
996. 299, It should be observed however that the Stoics 
only enjoined this practice κατὰ περίστασιν. 

185. Epiphan. Haeres. ul. 36, τοὺς δὲ τελευτῶντας 
ζῴοις παραβάλλειν χρῆναι ἢ πυρί. καὶ τοῖς παιδικοῖς 
χρῆσθαι ἀκωλύτως. 

Chrysippus, ap. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 111. 248, Math. ΧΙ. 
194, recommends that the flesh of deceased relations 
should be eaten if suitable for food, but, if useless for that 
purpose, ἢ κατορύξαντες τὸ μνῆμα ἐποίσουσιν ἢ κατα- 
καύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν. The meaning of these 
obscure words of Epiphanius appears to be similar, and 
παραβάλλειν is certainly commonly used in this sense 
(see 1. and S.). Others however have explained the 
words very differently. Thus Stein, Psychol. p. 161, n. 314, 
finds some allusion in them to the doctrine of metem- 
psychosis. In the same spirit Diogenes ordered his body 
to be cast forth unburied (Diog. L. vi. 79, Cic. Tusc. 
τ. 104). Chrysippus proved the absolute unimportance of 
any particular form of burial from a comparison of the 
varying practice of different nations (Cic. Tuse. 1. 108, 
Sext. Pyrrh. 111. 226—9). 


186. Cic. Ep. Fam. 1x. 22. 1, Atqui hoe (libertas 
loquendi) Zenoni placuit...sed ut dico placet Stoicis suo 
quamque rem nomine appellare. 

Cf. Cic. Off. 1. 128, nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut 
ei qui fuerunt Stoici poene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et 
invident, quod ea quae re turpia non sunt nominibus 
ac verbis flagitiosa ducamus: and see Zeller, Socrates, 
p. 326. 

187. Clem. Alex. Strom. τι. 20. 125 P. p. 494, 5. p- 
178, καλῶς ὁ Ζήνων ἐπὶ τῶν ᾿Ινδῶν ἔλεγεν ἕνα ᾿Ινδὸν 
παροπτώμενον ἐθέλειν «ἂν; ἰδεῖν ἢ πάσας τὰς περὶ πόνου 
ἀποδείξεις μαθεῖν. 

The allusion to the Indians is explained by the words 
the Indian philosophers are said to have used to Alexander: 
σώματα μὲν μετάξεις ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ψυχὰς δ᾽ ἡμετέρας 
οὐκ ἀναγκάσεις ποιεῖν ἃ μὴ βουλόμεθα. πῦρ ἀνθρώποις 
μέγιστον κολαστήριον, τούτου ἡμεῖς καταφρονοῦμεν. Clem. 
Alex. Strom. Iv. 7. ὅθ. Similarly Philo, in telling the 
same story: quod omnis probus sit liber, p. 879, πῦρ 
μεγίστους τοῖς ζῶσι σώμασι πόνους καὶ φθορὰν ἐργάξεται, 
τούτου ὑπεράνω ἡμεῖς γινόμεθα, ζῶντες καιόμεθα. The 
historians attest the custom of burning themselves alive 
said to have been practised by the Brahmans. Strabo, 
XV. 1. 65, αἴσχιστον δ᾽ αὐτοῖς νομίζεσθαι νόσον σωμα- 
τικήν' τὸν δ᾽ ὑπονοήσαντα καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ τοῦτο ἐξάγειν 
ἑαυτὸν διὰ πυρὸς νήσαντα πυράν, ὑπαλειψάμενον δὲ καὶ 
καθίσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὰν ὑφάψαι κελεύειν, ἀκίνητον δὲ 
καίεσθαι. Curt. vil. 9. 32, apud hos occupare fati diem 
pulcrum, et vivos se cremari iubent, quibus aut segnis 
aetas aut incommoda valitudo est:...inquinari putant 
ignem nisi qui spirantes recipit. Cic. Tuse. um. 40, 
(Mueller) uri se patiuntur Indi. The case of Calanus is 
particularly recorded, Cic. Tuse. 11. 52 ete, . 


ἂν, added by Cobet, Ἕρμῆς λόγιος, 1. p. 487. 

rds...dmobdfes. There is no doubt some particular 
reference in this, the point of which it is difficult now to 
ascertain. May it refer to Antisthenes ? In Diog. L. vi. 2, 
we read of him: ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ 
μεγάλου Ἣρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, and in the list of his 
works preserved by the same writer (vi. 15—18) we find 
three with the title Ἡρακλῆς, two of which bear the 
alternative title ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος. 

188. Galen de cogn. animi morbis, v. 13, οὕτω γοῦν 

ΑΖ ἢ 9 ͵ / , i an > a €: > 
καὶ Ζήνων ἠξίου πάντα πράττειν ἡμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς, ὡς ἀπο- 
χογησομένους ὀλίγον ὕστερον παιδαγωγοῖς" ὠνόμαζε γὰρ 
οὕτως ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑτοίμους 
ὄντας τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτιμᾶν κἂν μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς παρακαλῇ. 

παιδαγωγοῖς : for their duties see Becker, Charicles, E. T. 
p. 226. 

189. Stob. Flor. 14, 4= Anton. Meliss. 1. 52, 

» 4 3 x \ ti 
ἔλεγχε σαυτόν, ὅστις εἰ, μὴ πρὸς χάριν 
BA > ’ n Ν᾿ / / 
ἄκου᾽, αφαιροῦ δὲ κολάκων παρρησίαν. 

ἔλεγχε σαυτόν recalls γνῶθι σεαυτόν, for which see the 
authorities ap. Mayor on Juv. XI. 27. 

πρὸς χάριν ἄκον᾽ = do not listen to flatterers, is the 
passive form of πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν (Thue. τι. 65), πρὸς 
ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν (Dem. Phil. 1. ὃ 38), πρὸς χάριν ἐρεῖς 
(Soph. O. T. 1152). The best illustration however is 
Stob. Ἐπὶ. τι. 7. 11%, p. 114, 28, the wise man οὔτε προσ- 
φέρει τινὶ οὔτε προσίεται τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον, Diog. L. 
ὙΠ 117: 

Meineke would also ascribe to Zeno the couplet 
quoted by Stob. Flor. 1. 12, where the lemma in the MSS. 
is Ζηνοδότου. 


190. Maxim. Floril. c. 6, ed. Mai, ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς ἀφ᾽ 
ὧν av πολὺν καὶ καλὸν θέλοι καρπὸν λαβεῖν ὠφέλιμον 
ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνοις παρέχεται καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖται 
καὶ θεραπεύει" πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ὠφελίμοις 
πεφύκασι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους μάλιστα 
σπουδάζειν" καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μερῶν 
τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνων ἐπιμελούμεθα μᾶλλον ἅπερ ὠφελι- 
μώτερα ἑαυτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν νομίζομεν εἶναι, ὅθεν 
ὁμοίως ὑφ᾽ ὧν εὖ πάσχειν ἀξιοῦμεν, ὠφελίμους αὐτοῖς 
ἔργοις, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἶναι δεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐλαία 
τῷ θεραπεύοντι αὐτὴν ἐπαγάλλεται, ἀλλ᾽’ ἐκφέρουσα 
πολλούς τε καὶ καλοὺς καρποὺς ἔπεισεν ἑαυτῆς ἐπι- 
μελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. 

This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. I. 
p. 6): see Introd. p. 31. 

θέλοι: unless θέλῃ be read, av belongs to the verb. 
Cf. Dem. de Cor. ὃ 246, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν ὃ ῥήτωρ 
ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε. But it is often 
difficult to determine whether the optative is really 
potential. See Fennell on Pind. Nem. Iv. 8, Goodwin 
§ 557, Madvig § 137. 

ὠφέλιμον, cf. Cleanth. frags. 75 and 77. 

ἄνθρωποι, “ οἱ addendum ?” Wachsm. 

ἑαντοῖς: Jelf § 654 b. 

191. Athen. xi. 565 D, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἐκεῖνος Ζήνων, ὥς 
φησιν ᾿Αντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος, προμαντευόμενος ὑμῶν ὡς 
τὸ εἰκὸς περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς προσποιήτου ἐπιτηδεύσεως, 
ἔφη ὡς οἱ παρακούσαντες αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων καὶ μὴ συνέντες 
ἔσονται ῥυπαροὶ καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι᾽ καθάπερ οἱ τῆς ᾿Αρισ- 
τίππου παρενεχθέντες αἱρέσεως ἄσωτοι καὶ θρασεῖς. 

Cic., N. D. 1. 77, attributes this remark to Aristo: 
si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere 
audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene dicta male interpre- 


tarentur: posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis 
schola exire. It should be observed, however, that Athe- 
naeus specifies Antigonus of Carystus as the source of his 
information, so that he is at least as much entitled to 
credit as Cicero. 

192. Stob. Floril. 6. 62, εὖ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἔφη, τὸ τοῦ 
Ζήνωνος ὅτι τούτου ἕνεκα καρτέον οὗ καὶ κομητέον, τοῦ 
κατὰ φύσιν, ἵνα μὴ βαρούμενός τις ὑπὸ τῆς κόμης μηδ᾽ 
ἐνοχλούμενος ἢ πρὸς μηδεμίαν ἐνέργειαν. 

τοῦ κατὰ φύσι. Conformity to nature, ie. external 
environment, is taken as the basis of all those actions, 
which, although unconnected with virtue, yet constitute 
the objects of καθήκοντα, Diog. L. VII. 108, ἐνέργημα δὲ 
αὐτὸ (καθῆκον) εἶναι, ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον, 

Stob. ἘΠῚ. 11. 7. 85, p. 86, 13; Diog. L. vit. 105. 

193. Diog. L. vu. 48, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν 
πρῶτον (1.6. Pythagoras) ὀνομάσαι κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν 
στρογγύλην ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδην" ὡς δὲ Ζήνων 

The lines of Hesiod supposed to be referred to are 
Theog. 126—128, Tata δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἶσον 
ἑαυτῇ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ᾽ ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι 
ὄφρ᾽ εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, which are 
a very poor basis for the two assertions. For the limited 
sense in which κόσμος is used, cf. Diog. VII. 138, καὶ 
αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι 

λέγουσιν, Krische, p. 396, 397. 

194. Diog. L. v1. 91, Ζήνων δ᾽ αὐθ᾽ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν ταῖς 
χρείαις καὶ κώδιον αὐτὸν (Crates) φησί ποτε προσράψαι 
τῷ τρίβωνι ἀνεπιτρεπτοῦντα. 

ἐν ταῖς χρείαις. Introd. p. 31. 


τῷ τρίβωνι. The Cynics adopted this as their charac- 
teristic dress, following Socrates (Zeller, Socrates p. 316. 
Becker, Charicles, E. T. p. 419). Zeno himself wore the 
τρίβων (cf. apoph. 8). 

ἀνεπιτρεπτοῦντα 1.6, “nec curavisse deformitatem.” The 
word is omitted in L. and S. and also in Steph. Th. 

195. Dio. Chrysost. Lim. 4, γέγραφε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων ὁ 
φιλόσοφος εἴς τε τὴν ᾿Ιλιάδα καὶ τὴν ᾿Οδυσσείαν καὶ περὶ 
᾿ τοῦ Μαργίτου δέ δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ποίημα ὑπὸ 
Ὁμήρου γεγονέναι νεωτέρου καὶ ἀποπειρωμένου τῆς αὑτοῦ 
φυσέως πρὸς ποίησιν. ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου 
ψέγει ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ 
δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται 
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι. 
ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ᾿Αντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον ὅτι τὰ μὲν 
δόξῃ τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ" ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν οὐκ 
ἐξειργάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. 

For the object of Zeno’s Homeric studies cf. Krische | 
p. 393, 394, who points out that, although Zeno may have © 
incidentally controverted some of the Chorizontes of his _ 
time, yet his main object was to fortify Stoic precepts by 
appealing to Homer's authority. For Antisthenes see 
Zeller, Socrates p. 330. 

Mapyirov. This work seems to have resisted the dis- 
integrating process, which from early times was applied 
to Homer's works, better than any other of the poems 
ascribed to him, except the Iliad and Odyssey. Aristotle 
(Poet. Iv. 10) does not question Homer’s authorship. 

196. Plut. comm. Hesiod. 1x., Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς 
ἐνήλλαττε τοὺς στίχους λέγων 

κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται' 
> Ὶ :] ..2 > a Δ | Ul / 
ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, 


τῇ εὐπειθείᾳ τὰ πρωτεῖα διδούς, τῇ φρονήσει δὲ τὰ 
δευτερεῖα. The same in Proclus on Hesiod, Op. 291, 
Gaisf. Poet. Gr. Min. π. p. 200, ef. Diog. L. vit. 25, 26, 
whose comment on the change of place in the lines is 
as follows:—xpeittova yap εἶναν τὸν ἀκοῦσαι καλῶς 
δυνάμενον τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, τοῦ δι’ αὑτοῦ 
τὸ πᾶν συννοήσαντος. τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον τὸ συνεῖναι. 
τῷ δ᾽ εὖ πεισθέντι προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Themist. 
Or. VIII. 108 ο, ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς λίαν ἀρεστὸς 
τὴν εὐπείθειαν ἀποφηνάμενος τῆς ἀγχινοίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι 
βασιλικωτέραν καὶ τὴν τάξιν τὴν “Hovodov μεταθεὶς κ.τ.λ. 
id. Or. XII. 171 D, ὀρθῶς γὰρ ὑπελάμβανε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς 
βασιλικωτέραν εἶναι τῆς ἀγχινοίας τὴν εὐπείθειαν. 

The lines of Hesiod (Op. 291) are often quoted or 
imitated: cf. Ar. Eth. 1. 4, 7, Liv. xxu. 29, 8, Soph. Ant. 
720 φήμ᾽ ἔγωγε πρεσβεύειν Tord φῦναι Tov ἄνδρα πάντ᾽ 
ἐπιστήμης πλέων᾽ εἰ δ᾽ οὖν... καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὖ καλὸν 
τὸ μανθάνειν. 

197. Plut. de aud. poet. p. 33 Ε, καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορ- 
θούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, 
ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται 
κείνου ᾽στι δοῦλος κἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ, 
οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος ἂν (1 ἢν) ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ, 
τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀδεῆ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα 
καὶ ἀταπείνωτον. 
The fragm. is no. 711 (Dind.). This was also given to 
Aristippus or Plato by other authorities: see Diog. | ry 
82. For ἐλεύθερος cf. frag. 149. 

198. Strabo vu. 3. 6, Homer never mentions Arabia 
εἰ μὴ Ζήνωνι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ προσεκτέον ypadovte’ 

Αἰθίοπας δ᾽ ἱκόμην καὶ Σιδονίους "Αραβάς τε. 
μη ρ 


Hom. Od. tv. 83 where the edd. now adopt καὶ Ἔρεμ- β 
βοὺς the reading of Posidonius: Crates of Mallus pre- 
ferred ’Epeuvovs (Krische p. 398). 

199. Stob. Floril. 95. 21, Ζήνων ἔφη Κράτητα 
ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἐν σκυτείῳ καθήμενον τὸν ᾿Αριστοτέλους 
προτρεπτικὸν ὃν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμίσωνα τῶν Κυπρίων 
βασιλέα λέγων ὅτι οὐδενὶ πλείω ἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὸ 
φιλοσοφῆσαι, πλοῦτόν τε γὰρ πλεῖστον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ὥστε 
δαπανᾶν εἰς ταῦτα ἔτι δὲ δόξαν ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ. ἀναγυγνώ- 
σκοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν σκυτέα ἔφη προσέχειν ἅμα ῥάπτοντα, 
καὶ τὸν Kparnra εἰπεῖν ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Φιλίσκε, γράψειν 
πρὸς σὲ προτρεπτικόν' πλείω γὰρ ὁρῶ σοι ὑπάρχοντα 
πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι ὧν ἔγραψεν ᾿Αριστοτέλης. 

This passage belongs to the work entitled Κράτητος 
ἀπομνημονεύματα : Introd. p. 31. 

200. Stob. Floril. 36. 26, Ζήνων τῶν μαθητῶν ἔφασκε 
τοὺς μὲν φιλολόγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ λογοφίλους. 

The meaning is made clear by Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 115 Ρ. 
105, 4, where it is said of the φαῦλος :---μηδὲ εἶναι φιλό- 
Aoyov, λογόφιλον δὲ μᾶλλον, μέχρι λαλιᾶς ἐπιπολαίου 
προβαίνοντα, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκβεβαιούμενον 
τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον. 

201. Stob. Floril. 6. 84, ὁ Ζήνων ἠτιᾶτο τοὺς πλείσ- 
τοὺς λέγων, ἐξὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἡδονὰς φέρειν, ἀπὸ 
τῶν μαγειρείων λαμβάνοντας. 

πόνων. This passage should have been quoted in the 
note on frag. 128. 

202. Stob. Floril. 4. 107, Ζήνων δὲ ἔφη γελοῖον 
ἑκάστους μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς δεῖ ζῆν μὴ προσέχειν ὡς 
οὐκ εἰδότων, τὸν δὲ παρὰ πάντων ἔπαινον θαυμάζειν ὡς 


ἐχόμενον κρίσεως. πράγμασιν is clearly corrupt and 
Wachsmuth reads παραγγείλασιν, but Mr R. D. Hicks 
suggests τοῖς παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν παραγγέλμασιν which 
restores the balance of the sentence. 

For the sense οἵ, Cleanth. frag. 100. 


1. Diog. L. vil. 2, χρηστηριαζομένου αὐτοῦ (Ζήνωνος) 
τί πράττων ἄριστα βιώσεται, ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν εἰ 
συγχρωτίζοιτο τοῖς νεκροῖς. ὅθεν ξυνέντα, τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων 
ἀναγιγνώσκειν. The same in Suid. 5. v. συγχρωτίζεσθαι 
col. 938. 

2. Diog. L. vil. 3, πορφύραν ἐμπεπορευμένος ἀπὸ 
τῆς Φοινίκης πρὸς τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἐναυάγησεν. ἀνελθὼν δὲ 
εἰς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας ἤδη τριακοντούτης, ἐκάθισε παρά τινα 
βιβλιοπώλην, ἀναγιγνώσκοντος δὲ ἐκείνου τὸ δεύτερον τῶν 
Ξενοφῶντος ἀπομνημονευμάτων ἡσθεὶς ἐπύθετο ποῦ δια- 
τρίβοιεν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. εὐκαίρως δὲ παριόντος 
Κράτητος, ὁ βιβλιοπώλης δείξας αὐτόν φησι, τούτῳ παρα- 
κολούθησον. Cf. Themist. Or. xxl. 295 D, τὰ δὲ ἀμφὶ 
Ζήνωνος ἀρίδηλά τε ἐστι καὶ ἀδόμενα ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι 
αὐτὸν ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία ἐκ Φοινίκης εἰς τὴν Ποικιλὴν. 

8. Plut. de Inimic. Util. 2, Ζήνων δέ, τῆς ναυκληρίας 
αὐτῷ συντριβείσης, πυθόμενος εἶπεν, εὖ γε, ὦ τύχη, ποιεῖς 
εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα συνελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς. Plut. de Trang. An. 
6, Ζήνωνι τῷ Κιτιεῖ μέα ναῦς περιῆν φορτηγός" πυθόμενος 
δὲ ταύτην αὐτόφορτον ἀπολωλέναι συγκλυσθεῖσαν, εὖ γε, 
εἶπεν κιτιλ. With καὶ τὴν στοὰν added after τρίβωνα. 
Substantially the same account in Plut. de Exilio 11, with 


καὶ βίον φιλόσοφον in place of καὶ τὴν στοάν. Suidas 
col. 1023 5. v. νῦν εὐπλόηκα ὅτε νεναυάγηκα. ἐπὶ τῶν 
παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα εὐτυχησάντων. Ζήνων γὰρ ὁ Κιτιεὺς καταλιυ- 
πὼν τοὺς πρὶν διδασκάλους καὶ Κράτητος τοῦ φιλοσόφου 
φοιτητὴς γενόμενος τοῦτο εἴρηκε, ναυαγίῳ περιπεσὼν καὶ 
εἰπών, εὖ γε ποεῖ ἡ τύχη προσελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφίᾳ 
* * * ρὕτω τραπῆναι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. That the story 
was given in various forms appears from the account 
in Diog. L. vir. 4,5. Senec. de Trang. An. 14, 2, Nun- 
tiato naufragio Zeno noster, quum omnia sua audiret 

submersa, “ Iubet” inquit “me fortuna expeditius philoso- 

4 Diog. L. vil. 19, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ 
\ ’ a 
πολλὰ αὐτῷ ᾿Αντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκει, χρείαν Σοφοκλέους 
, a 
προενεγκάμενος, ἠρώτησεν εἴ τινα Kal Kaha ἔχειν αὐτῷ 
δοκεῖ. τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, εἶτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, 
Μ > , Ν > > / ¢ >? 3 ΤΑ 
ἔφη, εἰ μέν τι κακὸν ἦν εἰρημένον ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αντισθένους 
ον ἦν 3 , Ἂν, , ed [4 / 999 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐκλεγόμενος Kal μνημονεύων, εἰ δέ TL καλόν, οὐδ 
ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν; 

δ. Diog. L. vit. 20, λέγοντος δέ τινος αὐτῷ περὶ 
Πολέμωνος, ὡς ἄλλα προθέμενος ἄλλα λέγειν σκυθρωπάσας, 
ἔφη, πόσου γὰρ ἠγάπας τὰ διδόμενα; 

The explanation is thus given by Aldobrand: videbatur 
ergo cupiditatis Polemonem accusare, ac si illa ita docere 
consuevisset, quomodo a discipulis tractaretur. 

6. Plut. de prof. in virt. c. 6, ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ὁρῶν τὸν 
Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ τῷ πολλοὺς ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον, 
ὁ ἐκείνου μὲν χορός, ἔφη, μείζων, οὑμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος. 
Plut. de seips. citra inv. laud. ο. 17, οὕτω γὰρ ὁ Ζήνων 
πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεοφράστου μαθητῶν, ὁ ἐκείνου χορός, 
ἔφη, μείζων, ὁ ἐμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος. 


7. Diog. L. vit. 24, φησὶ δ᾽ ᾿Απολλώνιος ὁ Τύριος 
ἕλκοντος αὐτὸν Κράτητος τοῦ ἱματίου ἀπὸ Στίλπωνος 
εἰπεῖν, ὦ Κράτης, λαβὴ φιλοσόφων ἐστὶν ἐπιδέξιος ἡ διὰ 
τῶν ὥτων' πείσας οὖν ἕλκε τοῦτον. εἰ δέ με βιάζῃ, τὸ 
μὲν σῶμα παρά σοι ἔσται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ παρὰ Στίλπωνι. 

Cf. Cleanth., frag. 108, and for the concluding words 
of the anecdote Arist. Ach. 398, 6 νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ξυλλέγων 
ἐπύλλια οὐκ ἔνδον αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἔνδον «.7.r. Plaut. Aulul, 
179, nunc domum properare propero: nam egomet sum 
hic, animus domist. Pseudol. 32, nam istic meus animus 
nunc est non in pectore, and Lorenz ad loc. 

8. Diog. L. vit 21, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς 
πλείστους, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἀσόφους εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ καὶ 
τυχηρὰ ἀμαθεῖς. 

Wilamowitz(Antigonos p. 117) says:—“ die Philosophen 
sind in den meisten Dingen ungeschickt, von den gewohn- 
lichen begreifen sie nichts: sie wissen nur das eine was 
Not tut,” but probably we should read εὐμαθεῖς, with — 
Meric Casaubon. 

9. Diog. L. vit. 20, εἰπόντος δέ τινος ὅτι μικρὰ αὐτῷ 
δοκεῖ τὰ λογάρια τῶν φιλοσόφων, λέγεις, εἶπε, τἀληθῆ. 
δεῖ μέντοι καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς αὐτῶν βραχείας εἶναι, εἰ 

10. Diog. L. vir. 25, καὶ πρὸς τὸν δείξαντα δὲ αὐτῷ 
διαλεκτικὸν ἐν τῷ θερίζοντι λόγῳ ἑπτὰ διαλεκτικὰς ἰδέας 
πυθέσθαι πόσας εἰσπράττεται μισθοῦ: ἀκούσαντα δὲ 
ἑκατὸν διακοσίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι. 

The fallacy known as θερίζων was concerned with the 
nature of the possible. “According to Ammon. de Inter. 
106 a [§3 p. 160 ed. Or.], Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22 the θερίζων 
was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: 


it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.” 
Zeller, p. 182. 

11. Suidas col. 1202 s.v. δέλτος = Diog. L. vil. 37, 
Κλεάνθης, dv καὶ ἀφωμοίου τοῖς σκληροκήροις δέλτοις, αἱ 
μόλις μὲν γράφονται, διατηροῦσι δὲ τὰ γραφέντα. Cf. Plut. 
de Audiendo c. 18, ὥσπερ ὁ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ἐξνοκράτης, 
βραδύτεροι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν συσχολαστών, οὐκ ἀπεδί- 
δρασκον ἐκ τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδὲ ἀπέκαμνον, adda φθάνοντες 
εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἔπαιζον, ἀγγείοις τε βραχυστόμοις καὶ πινακίσι 
χαλκαῖς ἀπεικάζοντες, ὡς μόλις μὲν παραδεχόμενοι τοὺς 
λόγους ἀσφαλῶς δὲ καὶ βεβαίως τηροῦντες. For πίνακες 

see Becker, Charicles, Eng. Tr. p. 162. 

12. Diog. L. vit. 18, ᾿Αρίστωνος δὲ τοῦ μαθητοῦ 
πολλὰ διαλεγομένου οὐκ εὐφυῶς, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προπετώς 
καὶ θρασέως, ἀδύνατον, εἶπεν, εἰ μή σε ὁ πατὴρ μεθύων 
2 / e 3 \ A / 2 / tA 
ἐγέννησεν. ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ λάλον ἀπεκάλει, βραχυλόγος 

ὦν. Attributed to Diogenes by Plut. de Educ. Puer. 3. 
13. Stob. Floril. 36, 23, τῶν tus ἐν ᾿Ακαδημείᾳ 

νεανίσκων περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων διελέγετο ἀφρόνως" ὁ δὲ 
Ζήνων ἐὰν μὴ τὴν γλῶτταν, ἔφη, εἰς νοῦν ἀποβρέξας 
διαλέγῃ, πολὺ πλείω ἔτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πλημμελήσεις. 
Plut. Phoc. v. 2, Ζήνων ἔλεγεν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον εἰς 
νοῦν ἀποβάπτοντα προφέρεσθαι τὴν λέξιν. Cf. Suidas I. p. 
328 (of Aristotle), τῆς φύσεως γραμματεὺς ἦν τὸν κάλαμον 
ἀποβρέχων εἰς νοῦν. Some have regarded these words as 
the original of Quintilian’s sensu tincta (frag. 27, where 
see note). Cf. M. Aurel. v. 16. 

14. Diog. L. vit. 20, δεῖν δὲ ἔφη τὸν διαλεγόμενον, 
ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, THY μὲν φωνὴν Kal τὴν δύναμιν 
μεγάλην ἔχειν᾽ τὸ μέντοι στόμα μὴ διέλκειν᾽ ὃ ποιεῖν 
τοὺς πολλὰ μὲν λαλοῦντας, ἀδύνατα δέ. 

HP) 15 


15. Diog. L. vit. 20, τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν 
καταλείπεσθαι τόπον, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τεχνίταις εἰς 
τὸ θεάσασθαι" τοὐναντίον δὲ τὸν ἀκούοντα οὕτω πρὸς 
τοῖς λεγομένοις γίνεσθαι, ὥστε μὴ λαμβάνειν χρόνον εἰς 
τὴν ἐπισημείωσιν. 

τόπον : perhaps we should read χρόνον, ὥσπερ τόπον. 

10. Diog. L. vit. 22, μὴ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰς λέξεις 
δεῖν ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς χρείας 
τὸν νοῦν ἀσχολεῖσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ ἕψησίν τινα ἢ σκευασίαν 

For the distinction between φωνὴ and λέξις cf. Diog. 
L. vit. 56, λέξις δ᾽ ἔστε φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος. The meaning 
is:—we ought not to commit to memory the words and 
expressions of a maxim (χρείας as in apoph. 4), but to 
exercise our mind as to its arrangement, without learning 
it by heart like a cookery recipe. For ἀναλαμβάνειν cf. 
Plut. Agesil. 20, 3. Cobet, however, translates otherwise. 

17. Diog. L. VIL. 23, τὸ κάλλος εἶπε τῆς σωφροσύνης 
ἄνθος εἶναι. 

So Cobet, followed by Wilamowitz, for MSS. φωνῆς... 
φωνήν, cf. Diog. L. vit. 180, dpa ἄνθος ἀρετῆς. Zeno, 
frag. 147, καταληπτὸν εἶναι τὸ ἦθος ἐξ εἴδους. 

18. Stob. Floril. Monac. 196, Ζήνων ὁ φιλόσοφος, 
λεγόντων τινῶν ὅτι παράδοξα λέγει, εἶπεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρά- 
νομα. Cf. Cleanth. frag. 107. 

19. Plut. de Virt. Mor. 4, καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνά φασιν 
eis θέατρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδοῦντος ᾿Αμοιβέως πρὸς τοὺς 
μαθητάς, ἴωμεν, εἰπεῖν, ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οἵαν ἔντερα 
καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀστᾶ λόγου καὶ ἀριθμοῦ μετασ- 
χόντα καὶ ταξέως ἐμμέλειαν καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν. 

Cf. Plut. Arat. ο. 17, 2, ἄδοντος ᾿Αμοιβέως ἐν τῷ 
θεάτρῳ, a passage which also fixes Amoebeus as a con- 
temporary of Antigonus. 


20. Stob. Floril. 36,19, Ζήνων πρὸς τὸν πλείω λαλεῖν 
θέλοντα ἢ ἀκούειν “νεανίσκε, εἶπεν, “ἡ φύσις ἡμῖν 
fal Ν , if \ 3 VA “ / 
γλῶτταν μὲν μίαν δύο δὲ ὦτα παρέσχεν, iva διπλασίονα 
ὧν λέγομεν ἀκούωμεν. Diog. L, VIL. 23, πρὸς τὸ φλυαροῦν 
μειράκιον, διὰ τοῦτο, εἶπε, δύο ὦτα ἔχομεν, στόμα δὲ ἕν, 
ἵνα πλείονα μὲν ἀκούωμεν, ἥττονα δὲ λέγωμεν, cf. Plut. de 


Garrul. 1, κωφότης γὰρ αὐθαίρετός ἐστιν (scil. ἡ ἀσυγησία) 
ἀνθρώπων, οἶμαι, μεμφομένων ὅτι μίαν μὲν γλῶτταν δύο 
δ᾽ ὦτα ἔχουσιν, id. de audiendo, 3, καὶ yap τὸν “Emapu- 

, i? f > “Ὁ Μ Ἄ / 2 
νώνδαν ὁ Σπίνθαρος ἐπαινῶν ἔφη μήτε πλείονα YLYWOKOVTL 
μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ ῥᾳδίως ἐντυχεῖν ἑτέρῳ. καὶ 
τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἑκάστῳ λέγουσι δύο μὲν ὦτα δοῦναι 

/ ‘ a ¢ > , / x 3 , 3 / 
μίαν δὲ γλῶτταν ὡς ἐλάττονα λέγειν ἢ ἀκούειν ὀφειί- 

21. Diog. L. vit. 21, νεανίσκου πολλὰ λαλοῦντος, 
ἔφη, τὰ ὦτά σου εἰς τὴν γλῶτταν συνεῤῥύηκεν. 

22. Diog. L. vil. 26, ἔλεγέ τε κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῖς 
ποσὶν ὀλισθεῖν ἢ τῇ γλώττῃ. 

This is found several times in the collections οἵ γνῶμαι, 
and is sometimes attributed to Socrates (cf. Stein, Psych. 
p. 7, n. 5): the references are given by Wachsmuth in 
Sauppe’s Satura Philologa, p. 29. 

23. Diog. L. vit. 14, πλειόνων τε περιστάντων αὐτὸν 
δείξας ἐν τῇ στοᾷ κατ᾽ ἄκρου τὸ ξύλινον περιφερὲς τοῦ 
βωμοῦ ἔφη, τοῦτό ποτε ἐν μέσῳ ἔκειτο᾽ διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐμπο- 
δίξειν ἰδίᾳ ἐτέθη. καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου βαστάσαντες 
αὑτοὺς ἧττον ἡμῖν ἐνοχλήσετε. 

Kohler in Rhein. Mus. xxx1x. 297 proposes βἀθρδὺ 
for βωμοῦ. 

24. Diog. L. vil. 24, ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἔχει πρὸς λοι- 
δορίαν, καθάπερ, εἶπεν, εἰ πρεσβευτὴς ἀναπόκριτος ἀπο- 



The point of this bon mot appears to have been lost 
in the tradition: it must originally have stood :—*The 
man who abuses me I send away like an ambassador 
without an answer (καθάπερ ef πρεσβευτὴν ἀναπόκριτον 
ἀποστέλλοιμι)": so Wilamowitz. 

25. Diog. L. vil. 24, ἐν συμποσίῳ κατακείμενος σιγῇ, 
τὴν αἰτίαν ἠρωτήθη. ἔφη οὖν τῷ ἐγκαλέσαντι ἀπαγγεῖλαι 
πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, ὅτι παρῆν τις σιωπᾶν ἐπιστάμενος. 
ἦσαν δὲ οἱ ἐρωτήσαντες παρὰ Πτολεμαίου πρέσβεις ἀφι- 
κόμενοι, καὶ βουλόμενοι μαθεῖν τί εἴποιεν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Stob. Floril. 33, 10, Ζήνων, ᾿Αντιγόνου 
πρέσβεις ᾿Αθήναζε πέμψαντος, κληθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν σὺν 
ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, κἀκείνων παρὰ πότον 
σπευδόντων ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν αὑτῶν ἕξιν, αὐτὸς ἐσίγα. 
τῶν δὲ πρεσβέων ζητούντων τί ἀπαγγείλωσι περὶ αὐτοῦ 
πρὸς ᾿Αντίγονον, “ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό," ἔφη, “ὃ βλέπετε." δυσ- 
κρατέστατον γὰρ πάντων ὁ λόγος. Plut. de Garrul. rv. 
᾿Αθήνῃσι δέ τις ἑστιῶν πρέσβεις βασιλικούς, ἐφιλοτιμήθη 
σπουδάζουσιν αὐτοῖς συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοὺς φιλο- 
σόφους, χρωμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κοινολογίᾳ καὶ τὰς 
συμβολὰς ἀποδιδόντων τοῦ δὲ Ζήνωνος ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος, 
φιλοφρονησάμενοι καὶ προπιόντες οἱ ξένοι, περὶ σοῦ δὲ 
τί χρὴ λέγειν, ἔφασαν, ὦ Ζήνων, τῷ βασιλεῖ; κἀκεῖνος, 
ἄλλο μηδέν, εἶπεν, ἢ ὅτι πρεσβύτης ἐστὶν ἐν ᾿Αθήναις 
παρὰ πότον σιωπᾶν δυνάμενος. Also in an expanded 
form ap. Theodor. Metoch. p, 334, Kiessling. 

The anecdote in the form related in Diog. Laert. rests 
on the authority of Antigonus of Carystus, and hence 
Wilamowitz (Antig. p. 114) concludes that the king who 
sent the embassy was Ptolemaeus and not Antigonus 
Gonatas, It was natural that in later times, when the 
friendly relations subsisting between Antigonus and Zeno 
were remembered, the country of the ambassadors should 


have been transferred from Egypt to Macedonia. Diogenes, 
however, has misconceived the object of the embassy, 
which appears in a less corrupted form in Plutarch. The 
ambassadors were sent to Athens, not to Zeno, and the 
assembly was not one of philosophers but of Macedonian 
partisans. These the ambassadors were instructed to sound, 
but they seem to have missed the mark in Zeno’s case. 

96. Aelian, Var. H. 1x. 26, Ζήνωνα τὸν Κιτιέα δι᾿ 

’ “ Μ \ a 5 >? , ε , ͵ 
αἰδοῦς ἄγαν καὶ σπουδῆς ἦγεν ᾿Αντίγονος ὁ βασιλεὺς. Kat 
ποτε οὖν ὑπερπλησθεὶς οἴνου ἐπεκώμασε τῷ Ζήνωνι, καὶ 
φιλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ περιβάλλων ἅτε ἔξοινος ὦν, ἠξίου τί 

Ψ , 
αὐτὸν προστάξαι, ὀμνὺς καὶ νεανιευόμενος σὺν ὅρκῳ μὴ 

a if lal \ 

ἀτυχήσειν τῆς αἰτήσεως. ὁ δὲ λέγει αὐτῷ, πορευθεὶς 
" Ε a 4 \ ! \ , τ τ, 
ἔμεσον᾽ TEMVOS ἄμα KAL μεγαλοφρόνως τὴν μέθην ἐλέγξας 
καὶ φεισάμενος αὐτοῦ μή ποτε διαῤῥαγῇ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς. 

27. Athen. π|. 55 F, διὸ καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς, σκληρὸς 
Ov καὶ πάνυ θυμικὸς πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίμους, ἐπὶ πλεῖον 
τοῦ οἴνου σπάσας ἡδὺς ἐγίνετο καὶ μείλιχος᾽ πρὸς τοὺς 
πυνθανομένους οὖν τοῦ τρόπου τὴν διαφορὰν ἔλεγε τὸ 
αὐτὸ τοῖς θέρμοις πάσχειν, καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους πρὶν δια- 
βραχῆναι πικροτάτους εἶναι, ποτισθέντας δὲ γλυκεῖς καὶ 
προσηνεστάτους. Galen, de Anim. Mor. 3. Iv. 777 K., καὶ 
Ζήνων, ὥς φασιν, ἔλεγεν ὅτι, καθάπερ οἱ πικροὶ θέρμοι 
βρεχόμενοι τῷ ὕδατι γλυκεῖς γίνονται, οὕτω καὶ αὑτὸν ὑπ᾽ 
οἴνου διατίθεσθαι. Eustath. on Hom. Od. ¢, 293, p. 1910, 
42, Ζήνων οὖν, φασίν, ὁ Κιτιεὺς σκληρὸς ἄλλως ὧν πρὸς 
τοὺς συνήθεις, ὅμως εἰ πλεῖον οἴνου πάσειε (leg. σπάσειε) 
ἡδὺς ἐγίνετο καὶ μείλιχος, λέγων ταὐτόν τι τοῖς θέρμοις 
πάσχειν, οἱ πικρότεροι ὄντες πρὶν διαβραχῆναι ποτισθέντες 
γλυκεῖς γίνονται καὶ προσηνέστεροι. Similarly Diog. L. 
VII. 26. 

98. Athen. vil. 3450, Ζήνων δ᾽ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆς 
Στοᾶς κτίστης, πρὸς τὸν ὀψοφάγον ᾧ συνέζη ἐπὶ πλείονα 


χρόνον, καθά φησιν ’Avriyovos ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Ζήνωνος 
βίῳ (p. 119 Wil), μεγάλου τινὸς κατὰ τύχην ἰχθύος 
παρατεθέντος, ἄλλου δ᾽ οὐδενὸς παρεσκευασμένου, λαβὼν 
ὁ Ζήνων ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνακος οἷος ἦν κατεσθίειν. τοῦ δ᾽ 
ἐμβλέψαντος αὐτῷ" τί οὖν, ἔφη, τοὺς συξῶντάς σοι οἴει 
πάσχειν, εἰ σὺ μίαν ἡμέραν μὴ δεδύνησαι ἐνεγκεῖν ὀψο- 
φαγίαν ; The same in Diog. L. vu. 19. 

29. Athen. v. 186 D, ὁ δὲ Ζήνων, ἐπεί τις τῶν 
παρόντων ὀψοφάγων ἀπέσυρεν ἅμα τῷ παρατεθῆναι τὸ 
ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰχθύος, στρέψας καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν ἰχθὺν ἀπέσυρεν 
ἐπιλέγων" (Eur. Bacch. 1129) 

Ἰνὼ δὲ τἀπὶ θάτερ᾽ ἐξειργάξετο. 

The same story is told of Bion Borysthenites, id. vim. 
344 4. Schweighiuser (Ind.) thinks it is rightly attri- 
buted to Zeno. 

80. Diog. L. vir. 17, δυοῖν δ᾽ ὑπανακειμένοιν ἐν πότῳ, 
\ me 4 O29 > \ € 23° © \ a , 
καὶ τοῦ UT αὐτὸν τὸν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν σκιμαλίξοντος τῷ ποδί 
αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνον τῷ γόνατι. ἐπιστραφέντος δέ, τί οὖν οἴει 
τὸν ὑποκάτω σου πάσχειν ὑπὸ σοῦ ; see also Suidas, col. 
792, 5. v. σκιμαλίσω. Vulgo ὑπερανακ. and ὑπὲρ αὑτόν: 

corrected by Menage, 
31. Stob. Floril. 57, 12, Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς φιλόσοφος 

ὁρῶν τινα τῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγροῦ περισπώμενον 
εἶπεν" ἐὰν μὴ σὺ τοῦτον ἀπολέσῃς, οὗτος σὲ ἀπολέσει. 

32. Boissonade, Anecd. Gr. vol. 1. p. 450, Ζῆθι, ὦ 
ἄνθρωπε, μὴ μόνον ἵνα φώγῃς καὶ πίῃς ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τὸ Shp 
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καταχρήσῃ, attributed to Zeno in Cod. 
Reg. Paris, 1168, seems to be another form of the well- 
known saying of Socrates, ap. Stob. Floril. 17, 22, ζῶμεν 
οὐκ ἵνα ἐσθίωμεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐσθίωμεν ἵνα ζῶμεν. This forms 
frag. eth. 10 in Wachsmuth’s collection (Comm. 1. Ρ. 8), 
who refers to other passages giving the saying to Zeno. 


33. Diog. L. vil. 21, καὶ προεφέρετο τὰ τοῦ Καφησίου". 
ὡς, ἐπιβαλομένου Ttivds τῶν μαθητῶν μεγάλα φυσᾶν, 
πατάξας εἶπεν, ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ εὖ κείμενον εἴη, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ μέγα. 

The saying of Caphesias is recorded also by Athen. 
XIV. 629, A. 

34. Diog. L. vil. 26, τὸ εὖ γίνεσθαι παρὰ μικρόν, ov 
μὴν μικρὸν εἶναι. 

35. Plut. de vit. pud. 13, τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς ἀπαν- 
/ 4 , a “Ὁ \ ᾿ -“ 6 A 
τήσας τινὶ νεανίσκῳ τῶν συνηθῶν Tapa TO τεῖχος ἡσυχῆ 
βαδίζοντι, καὶ πυθόμενος, ὅτι φεύγει φίλον ἀξιοῦντα μαρ- 
τυρεῖν αὐτῷ τὰ ψευδῆ: τί λέγεις, φησίν, ἀβέχλτερε; σὲ 
μὲν ἐκεῖνος ἀγνωμονῶν καὶ ἀδικῶν οὐ δέδιεν οὐδ᾽ aic- 
χύνεται" σὺ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων οὐ θαῤῥεῖς ὑὕπο- 

86. Diog. L. vit. 16, 17, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλωπιζομένου 
ποτὲ ἔφη. ὀχέτιον γάρ τι ὀκνηρῶς αὐτοῦ ὑπερβαίνοντος, 
δικαίως, εἶπεν, ὑφορᾷ τὸν πηλόν' οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ 

37. Diog. L. vil. 19, μειρακίου δὲ περιεργότερον παρὰ 

τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐρωτῶντος ζήτημά τι, προσήγαγε πρὸς κάτοπ- 

Ν 2 / 3 fa » 2 3 / 3 rf 

Tpov, Kal ἐκέλευσεν ἐμβλέψαι. ἔπειτ᾽ ἠρώτησεν εἰ δοκεῖ 
αὐτῷ ἁρμόττοντα εἶναι ὄψει τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητήματα. 

38. Diog. L. vit. 21, νεανίσκου δέ τινος θρασύτερον 
διαλεγομένου, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι, ἔφη, μειράκιον, ἃ ἐπέρχεταί 

39. Diog. L. vil. 21, πρὸς τὸν καλὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι οὐ 
δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐρασθήσεσθαι ὁ σοφός, οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὑμῶν 
ἀθλιώτερον ἔσεσθαι τῶν καλῶν (εἰ μὴ ἡμεῖς ἐρασθησό- 
μεθα, added by Menage from Hesych. Mil.). Cf. frag. 172. 
Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Floril. 63. 21. 


40. Diog. L. vit. 22, πάντων ἔλεγεν ἀπρεπέστερον 
εἶναι τὸν τῦφον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν νέων. 

41. Ῥίορ. L. viz. 23, πρὸς τὸν κεχρισμένον τῷ μύρῳ, 
τίς ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὁ γυναικὸς ὄξων ; cf. Xen. Symp. 11. 3. 

42. Stob. Ecl. π. 31, 81, p. 215, 13 = Exe. e MS. Flor. 
Ton Damase. p. I. ¢. 13, 81, Ζήνων ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἄν τις 
νέος ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνοι, εἰ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχει, ἔφη, ods 
μάλιστα τιμᾷ καὶ αἰσχύνεται. 

48. Stob. Floril. 15, 12, Ζήνων πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολογου- 
μένους ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν ἀσωτίας καὶ λέγοντας ἐκ πολλοῦ 
τοῦ περιόντος ἀναλίσκειν ἔλεγεν, ἦ που καὶ τοῖς μαγείροις 
συγγνώσεσθε, ἐὰν ἁλμυρὰ λέγωσι πεποιηκέναι τὰ ὄψα, 
ὅτι πλῆθος ἁλῶν αὐτοῖς ὑπῆρχεν; 

44. Diog. L. vit. 17, ἐρωτικῶς δὲ διακείμενος Χρε- 
μωνίδου, παρακαθιζόντων αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Κλεάνθους, ἀνέστη. 
θαυμάξοντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεάνθους, ἔφη, καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούω 
τῶν ἀγαθῶν κράτιστον εἶναι φάρμακον πρὸς τὰ φλεγμαί- 
νοντα ἡσυχίαν. 

For Chremonides οἵ Introd. p. 6. 

45. Diog. L. vit. 18, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φιλόπαιδα, οὔτε τοὺς 
διδασκάλους ἔφη φρένας ἔχειν, ἀεὶ διατρίβοντας ἐν παι- 
δαρίοις, οὔτε ἐκείνους. 

46. Stob. Floril. 17, 43, Ζήνων δὲ 6 Κιτιεὺς οὐδὲ 
νοσῶν wero δεῖν τροφὴν προσφέρεσθαι τρυφερωτέραν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπεὶ ὁ θεραπεύων ἰατρὸς ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν φαγεῖν νεοττὸν 
περιστερᾶς, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος, “as Μανὴν;" ἔφη, “ μὲ 

Manes was a common slave’s name, οὗ, Ar. Ay. 522, 


οὕτως ὑμᾶς πάντες πρότερον μεγάλους ἁγίους τ᾽ ἐνόμιζον, 
νῦν δ᾽ ἀνδράποδ᾽, ἠλιθίους, Μανᾶς. See also Sandys on 
Dem. Or. 45 § 86, Or. 53 § 20. There is a reference here 
to the Stoic cosmopolitanism (frag. 162): for their views 
of slavery see Zeller p. 329. 

47. Diog. L. VIL. 17, ὡς δὲ Kuvixos τις οὐ φήσας ἔλαιον 
» + n ΙΑ ν \ ’ » fd 
ἔχειν ἐν TH ληκύθῳ προσήτησεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔφη δώσειν. 
| / ͵7ὔ 5 ΄ / δ / vv > 
ἀπελθόντα μέντοι ἐκέλευε σκέψασθαι ὁπότερος εἴη avat- 


48. Athen. Ix. 370 ©, καὶ οὐ παράδοξον εἰ κατὰ τῆς 
κράμβης τινὲς ὦμνυον, ὁπότε καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆς 
Στοᾶς κτίστωρ μιμούμενος τὸν κατὰ τῆς κυνὸς ὅρκον 
Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸς ὦμνυε τὴν κάππαριν, ὡς "Εμποδός 

> > , μ᾿ 
φησιν ἐν ᾿Απομνημονεύμασιν, ct. Diog. L. vil. 32. 

ἜΜμποδος : on this very doubtful name see Miiller, Frag. 

Hist. Gr. 1v. 403, after whom Kaibel reads "Epredos. 

49. Stob. Floril. 98, 68, Ζήνων ἔλεγεν οὐδενὸς ἡμᾶς 
οὕτω πένεσθαι: ὡς χρόνου. βραχὺς γὰρ ὄντως ὁ Bios, ἡ 
δὲ τέχνη μακρή, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους 
ἰάσασθαι δυναμένη, cf. Diog. L. vil. 28, μηδενός τε ἡμᾶς 
οὕτως εἶναι ἐνδεεῖς ὡς χρόνου. 

So Theophrastus ap. Cic. Tusc. 11. 69. 

50. Stob. Floril. Monac. 197, ὁ αὐτὸς (Ζήνων) ἐρωτη- 
θεὶς τί ἔστι φίλος, ἄλλος οἷος ἐγώ. Diog. L. VII. 23, 
ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ἔστι φίλος ; ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἐγώ. 

So Arist. Eth. N. ix. 4, 5, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος adXos 
αὐτός, cf. Cic. Lael. § 80 verus amicus...est tamquam 
alter idem, ib. § 23 and Reid’s note. 

51. Origen adv. Cels. vill. 35, p. 768, Ζήνων δὲ πρὸς 
τὸν εἰπόντα, ἀπολοίμην ἐὰν μή σε τιμωρήσωμαι, ἐγὼ δέ, 
εἶπεν, ἐὰν μή σε φίλον κτήσωμαι. 


52. Diog. L. vir. 23, Διονυσίου δὲ τοῦ Μεταθεμένου 
εἰπόντος αὐτῷ διὰ τί αὐτὸν μόνον οὐ διορθοῖ ; ἔφη, οὐ γάρ 
σοι πιστεύω. 

For Dionysius cf. Diog. L. vi. 37, 166, 167. Οἷο. Fin. 
v. 94. Athen. vil 281 Ὁ. 

53. Seneca de Benef. Iv. 39. 1, Quare ergo, inquit, 
Zeno vester, quum quingentos denarios cuidam promisisset 
et illum parum idoneum comperisset, amicis suadentibus 
ne crederet, perseveravit credere quia promiserat? Perhaps 
the same circumstance is alluded to in Themist. Or. XX. 
252 B, πότε ἀφῆκας τῷ δεδανεισμένῳ, καθάπερ Ζήνων 6 

δ4. Diog. L. VIL. 23, δοῦλον ἐπὶ κλοπῇ, φασίν, ἐμαστί- 
γου" τοῦ δ᾽ εἰπόντος, εἵμαρτό μοι κλέψαι" καὶ δαρῆναι, 

Seneca however says:—nullum servum fuisse Zenoni 
satis constat (Cons. Helv. 12. 3). To have no slave was a 
sign of abject poverty: see the comm. on Catull. xx. 1. 

55. Diog. L. vil. 23, τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς παιδάριον 
μεμωλωπισμένον θεασάμενος, πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁρῶ cov, ἔφη, 
τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰ ἴχνη. 

56. Diog. L. vil. 28, 29, ἐτελεύτα δὴ οὕτως. ἐκ τῆς 
σχολῆς ἀπιὼν προσέπταισε καὶ τὸν δάκτυλον περιέρρηξε. 
παίσας δὲ τὴν γῆν τῇ χειρί, φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης, 

ἔρχομαι, τί μ᾽ avers ; 
καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτόν. Stob. 
Floril. vu. 45, Ζήνων, ὡς ἤδη γέρων ὧν πταίσας κατέπεσεν, 
“ ἔρχομαι, εἶπε, “τί με αὔεις ;" καὶ εἰσελθὼν ἑαυτὸν 
ἐξήγωγεν. Lucian Macrob. (1,Χ11.) 19, Ζήνων δέ.. ὅν φασιν 
εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ προσπταίσαντα ἀνα- 


φθέγξασθαι, τί με Bods; καὶ ὑποστρέψαντα οἴκαδε καὶ 
ἀποσχόμενον τροφῆς τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον. 

Νιόβης: the author of the play is uncertain. Both 
Aeschylus and Sophocles wrote plays with this title, but 
Nauck thinks the words belong to the Niobe of Timo- 
theus: cf. Soph. frag. 395 (Dind.). The situation must 
have been similar to the concluding scene of the Oedipus 
Coloneus, where Oedipus is summoned by a mysterious 
voice: O. C. 1626 ἢ 

57. Theodor. Metoch. p. 812, Kiessling, καὶ ὁ μὲν 
Ζήνων ἔλεγεν, ἦλθε, παρῆλθεν, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμὲ καθόλου, 
περὶ τῶν ἐνταῦθα πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ βίου φιλοσοφῶν. 

This recalls Marcus Aurelius, e.g. VI. 15. 


1. Diog. L. vit. 41, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἕξ μέρη φησί 
διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεο- 

ἕξ μέρ. These are only subdivisions of the triple 
Zenonian division: thus διαλεκτικὸν and ῥητορικὸν to-— 
gether occupy the same ground as λογικόν (Diog. L. vir. 41 
cited in Zeno frag. 6, where Cleanthes is probably meant). 
For his rhetorical writings see Introd. p. 50. Hirzel ΤΙ. 
p. 170—178 tries to establish two points in connection 
with this statement, (1) that Cleanthes, unlike the other 
Stoics, believed in the unity and indivisibility of philosophy 
itself, but adopted six divisions for the purpose of exposi- 
tion merely, and, (2) that the sixfold division is taken 
from Heraclitus, cf. Diog. L. 1x. 5, εἰς τρεῖς λόγους εἴς τε 
τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς Kal τὸν πολιτικὸν Kal τὸν θεολογικόν. 
But see Stein, Psych. n. 95, Erkenntnistheorie n. 306. 

πολιτικόν. Similar is Aristotle’s distinction between 
φρόνησις (practical thought) and πολιτική (Eth. vi. 8), in 
which chapter φρόνησις appears both as the general term 
and as a special subdivision dealing with the individual. 
The same may be said of ἠθικόν here. 

θεολογικόν. Aristotle divides Speculative (θεωρητική) 
Philosophy into φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική (Metaph. 
v. 1,10). The last-named branch is identical with πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία and is the best of the three, because its subject- 


matter is the most honourable (id. x. 7. 9). In the Stoic 

system it would have been impossible to follow out this 
distinction in practice, since their materialism was de- 
structive of metaphysic, and it may be doubted whether 
θεολογικὸν does not simply refer to the treatment of 
popular religion appearing in the book περὶ θεῶν. The 
hymn to Zeus belongs to θεολογικόν rather than to 



2. Epict. Diss. 1. 17. 11, τὰ λογικὰ ἄλλων ἐστὶ δια- 
κριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καί, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, μετρητικὰ 
καὶ στατικά. τίς λέγει ταῦτα ; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ 
Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης ; See Zeno frag. 4. 

8. Sext. Emp. Math. vit. 228, (τύπωσις) περὶ ἧς εὐθὺς 
καὶ διέστησαν: Κλεάνθης μὲν yap τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ 
εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχήν, ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γιυ- 
γνομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. ib. 572, εἰ γὰρ τὐπωσίς ἐστιν 
ἐν ψυχῇ ἡ φαντασία, ἤτοι κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν τύπωσίς 

ς ς 
ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην νομίζουσιν, ἢ κατὰ ψιλὴν 

ἑτεροίωσιν γίνεται «.7.r. ib. VIL 400, Κλεώνθους μὲν 
κυρίως ἀκούοντος τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς νοουμένην 
(τύπωσιν). id. Pyrrh. τι. 70, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ 
ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν τι πνεύματος, 
ὥς φασιν, οὐ δυνήσεταί τις τύπωσιν ἐπινοεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε 
κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχήν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σφραγίδων ὁρῶμεν, 
οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τερατολογουμένην ἑτεροιωτικήν. 

Zeno’s definition of φαντασία (frag. 7) became a battle 
ground for his successors: Cleanthes explained τύπωσις 
as referring to a material impression like that made upon 
wax by a seal, cf. Philo de mund. opif. p. 114, Pfeiff, ᾧ 

εν a \ 2 \ Yj , 
(scil. νῷ) τὰ φανέντα ἐκτὸς εἴσω κομίζουσαι, διωγγέλλουσι 


καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται τοὺς τύπους ἑκάστων, ἐνσφραγιζόμεναι τὸ 
ὅμοιον πάθος. κηρῷ γὰρ ἐοικώς, δέχεται τὰς διὰ τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων φαντασίας, αἷς τὰ σώματα καταλαμβάνει. 
Chrysippus however objected that, on this view, if the soul 
received at the same time the impression of a triangle and 
a square, the same body would at the same time have 
different shapes attached to it, and would become at the 
same time square and triangular (Sext. Le., Diog. L. vi. 
45—50); and he accordingly interpreted τύπωσις by 
ἑτεροίωσις and ἀλλοίωσις, cf. Cic. Tuse. 1. 61 an imprimi, 
quasi ceram, animum putamus, et esse memoriam sig- 
natarum rerum in mente vestigia? Hirzel 11. pp. 160—168 
finds here also the influence of Heraclitus, who, he believes, 
is pointed at in Plat. Theaet. p. 191 foll., θὲς δή μοι λόγου 
ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον K.T.r. 
He relies however entirely on the disputed frag. κακοὶ 
μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποις ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβαροὺς ψυχὰς 
ἐχόντων, which Zeller interprets in exactly the opposite 
sense to that of Schuster and Hirzel. The point cannot 
therefore be regarded as established : see Stein, Erkenntnis- 
theorie ἢ. 734, 

εἰσοχὴν. . «ἐξοχήν = concavity...convexity. Cf. Sext. Pyrrh. 
1, 92, ai γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ 
ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ, ib. τ. 120. Plat, Rep. 
602 D, καὶ ταῦτα καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδασί τε 
θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν 
περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὖ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως. . 

δακτυλίων. For ancient Greek rings see Guhl and 
Koner, E. T. p. 182, with the illustrations, and for κηροῦ 
see on Zeno frag. 50. Hirzel lc. shows that the metaphor 
was common, even apart from philosophic teaching: ef. 
Aesch. P. V. 789, δέλτοι φρενῶν, ete. 

4. Plut. Plac. tv. 11, of Στωικοί φασιν" ὅταν γεννηθῇ 


ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ 
χάρτην εὔεργον (or ἐνεργόν) εἰς ἀπογραφήν᾽ εἰς τοῦτο μίαν 
ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. 

The grounds upon which this is referred to Cleanthes 
have been stated in the Introduction, p. 38, 39. For 
the further illustration and exposition of the passage the 
reader is referred to the exhaustive and interesting note 
of Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 112, π. 230; but it may be 
as well here to set out two quotations from Philo, which 
make strongly in favour of the hypothesis that Cleanthes 
was the originator of the “ tabula rasa” theory: cf. Philo, 
quod Deus sit immut.,1. 9, p. 279 Mang., φαντασία δ᾽ ἔστι 
τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, ἃ γὰρ εἰσήγαγεν ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, 
ὥσπερ δακτύλιός τις ἢ σφραγίς, ἐναπεμάξατο τὸν οἰκεῖον 
χαρακτῆρα" κηρῷ δὲ ἐοικὼς ὁ νοῦς. quis rer. div. haer. 6. 
37, p. 498 Mang., ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τὸ κήρινον, ὡς εἶπέ τις TOV 

δ. Olympiodorus lc. on Zeno frag. 12, Κλεάνθης 
τοίνυν λέγει ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῷ πάντα ἀνύουσα. 
Quintil. Inst. Or. 11. 17. 41, nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, 
ars est potestas, via, id est, ordine efficiens. 

Cf. also Cic. Fin. mr. 18, quoted on Zeno frag. 12. 
Olympiodorus objects that the definition is too wide, and 
that it would include φύσις which is not a τέχνη (cf Cie. 
N.D. τι. 81), but Cleanthes might have replied that neither 
is φύσις an ἕξις. For ἕξις cf. on διάθεσις Zeno frag. 717: 
and Stob. Ecl. τι. 7, ὅξ p. 73, 7, ἐν ἕξει δὲ οὐ μόνας εἶναι 
τὰς ἀρετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τέχνας Tas ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ 
ἀνδρὶ ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ὠμετα- 
πτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίνεσθαι. 

6. Syrian. ad Ar. Metaph. 892 b 14—23, ὡς ἄρα τὰ 
εἴδη παρὰ τοῖς θείοις τούτοις ἀνδράσιν (i.e. Socrates Plato 


Parmenides and the Pythagoreans) οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν 
τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ 
᾿Αρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωικῶν ὕστερον φήθησαν... 
οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐννοήματά εἰσι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς αἱ ἰδέαι, ὡς 
Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκεν. 

This difficult fragment has been variously interpreted. 
Wellmann, p. 480, and Krische, p. 421, think that Cleanthes 
described the ideas as “subjective Gedanken,” in which 
case the fragment is a restatement of Zeno’s view: cf. 
Zeno frag. 23. Stein discusses the passage at length 
(Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 293—295): reading νοήματα, he 
supposes that Cleanthes’ words were οὔκ εἰσιν ai ἰδέαι 
νοήματα. Zeller also p. 85 has vonyara. However 
ἐννοήματα appears in the Berlin Aristotle edited by 
Usener, and so Wachsmuth (Comm. 11. p. 8) reads. Stein 
explains as follows:—vonuyata represent abstract ra- 
tionalised knowledge resulting from our experience by 
the agency of ὀρθὸς λόγος. By such νοήματα are we 
made aware of the existence of the gods (frag. 52), and 
from these we must distinguish the class conceptions 
(Gattungsbegriffe) which have no scientific value. Class 
conceptions (ἐννοήματα) can never be the criterion of 
knowledge, since they have no real existence. Cf. Simpl. 
in Cat. f. 26 C: οὔτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. 
But, even assuming that the distinction between νόημα 
and ἐννόημα is well founded, which is by no means clear, 
and that νοήματα is to be read here, the context in 
Syrian is conclusive against Stein. The meaning simply 
is, “nor again are the ideas in Plato etc. to be treated as 
évvojpata”: in other words, the negative οὐδὲ is no part 
of Cleanthes’ statement, but belongs to the commentator. 
This is abundantly clear from the following words :—ov& 
ὡς ᾿Αντωνῖνος, μιγνὺς τὴν Λογγίνου καὶ Κλεάνθους δόξαν, 
τῷ νῷ παρυφίσταντο κατὰ τὰς ἐννοητικὰς ἰδέας. 


7. Clem. Alex. Strom. vu 9. 26, 980 P, 332 5, λεκτὰ 
yap Ta κατηγορήματα καλοῦσι Κλεάνθης καὶ ᾿Αρχέδημος. 

λεκτά: the abstractions contained in thoughts as ex- 
pressed in speech, as opposed to thoughts on the one hand 
and the things thought of on the other (μέσον τοῦ τε 
νοήματος Kal τοῦ πράγματος). Neither again are they 
identical with the spoken words, which are corporeal (Sext. 
Math. vu. 75). Being incorporeal they can have no real 
existence, and yet the Stoics seem to have hesitated to 
deny their existence altogether. In the ordinary termino- 
logy of the school κατηγόρημα is a subdivision of λεκτὸν, 
and is described as λεκτὸν ἐλλυπές (Diog. vu. 64). From 
this passage, then, we must infer that Cleanthes was the 
first to restrict κατηγόρημα to its narrower sense by the 
introduction of the new term λεκτόν. An example of 
κατηγόρημα given by Sextus is ἀψίένθιον πιεῖν (Pyrrh. I. 
230), but a new term was required to denote the abstrac- 
tion of a complete assertion (e.g. Cato ambulat), for which 
κατηγόρημα was obviously insufficient. For λεκτὸν gene- 
rally see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 219—222. 

᾿Αρχέδημος : Zeller p. 50. The most important fact 
recorded about him is that he placed the ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ 
κόσμου in the centre of the earth (Zeller p. 147). 

. . Ἂ / 
8. Epict. Diss. τι. 19. 1—4, ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ 
τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται" κοινῆς yap 
" , al , X / Ὁ r 
οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ πᾶν 
% % \ ’ an a \ na col 
παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τῷ δυνατῷ 
3 , % ’ ἴω \ lel \ 3 «Δ see 
ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι ὃ OVT ἔστιν 
᾽ \ vo» 7 \ \ , ͵ « , 
ἀληθὲς οὔτ᾽ ἔσται' συνιδὼν THY μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος 
lal a , lal , / 
τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυοῖν πιθανότητι συνεχρήσατο πρὸς 
td a \ 7 Ν “δ 5 eee Smee A 2 \ 
παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατὸν ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς 
y a n / a fal 
οὔτ᾽ ἔσται. λοιπὸν 6 μέν τις ταῦτα τηρήσει τῶν δυοῖν, 
Ὁ“ ” / / A 95 » 3 \ αν; ΝΜ ΓΞ 
ὅτι ἔστι τέ τι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτ᾽ ἔσται 

Η. Ρ. 16 


καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ" οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρελη- 
λυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι" καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην 
φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν ᾿Αντίπατρος. 
οἱ δὲ τἄλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν 7 ἐστὶν ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς 
οὔτ᾽ ἔσται" καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν" 
δυνατῷ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ. τὰ τρία δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τηρῆσαι 
ἀμήχανον, διὰ τὸ κοινὴν εἶναι αὐτῶν μάχην. Cic. de Fato 
7. 14, omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut 
Chrysippo placet, dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia 
sunt immutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt 

Three propositions are here mentioned, which are 
inconsistent with each other in such a way that the 
acceptance of any two involves the rejection of the third:— 
(1) Every past truth is necessary. (2) That which is 
possible can never become impossible. (3) A thing may 
be possible which does not exist and never will exist, 
Diodorus asserted the truth of (1) and (2) and denied (3): 
thus Simplicius ad Cat. 65. 6—8 describes his followers 
as αὐτῇ τῇ ἐκβάσει κρίνοντες τὸ δυνατόν. Cic. Fam, ΙΧ. 
4 (writing to Varro) περὶ δυνατῶν me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον 
κρίνειν. Quapropter, si venturus es, scito necesse esse te 
venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. 
Cleanthes asserted the truth of (2) and (3) and denied (1). 
Chrysippus asserted the truth of (1) and (3) and denied 
(2), ef. Alexander ad An. Pr. 1. 15 p. 84 a 10 Χρύσιππος δὲ 
λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον ἕπεσθαι κιτιλ. 
Cleanthes maintained therefore that it is and was possible 
for past events to have happened differently. See further 
on this controversy Grote’s Plato vol. 11. p. 495 foll. On 
p. 499 Hobbes is quoted, who is in agreement with 
Diodorus. The dilemma itself was originally propounded 
by Diodorus the Megarian, on whom see Zeller Socratics 
p. 252. It went by the name of ὁ κυριεύων λόγος = 


argument getting the better of others: cf. Themist. Or. 11. 
30 Ὁ who mentions it together with ὁ κερατίνης as the 
discovery of Philo or Diodorus. In Lucian Vit. Auct. 
c, 22 Chrysippus professes his ability to teach it as well 
as the θερίζων ᾿Ηλέκτρα and ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. Aul. Gell. 
1. 2. 4, κυριεύοντας ἡσυχάζοντας καὶ σωρείτας. Cleanthes 
wrote a special treatise on the subject (Introd. p. 50). 

9. Quintil. Inst. Or. τι. 15, 33—35. huic eius sub- 
stantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetoricen esse bene 
dicendi scientiam. nam et orationis omnes virtutes 
semel complectitur, et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum 
bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. idem valet Chrysippi 
finis ille ductus a Cleanthe, scientia recte dicendi (scil. 

Kiderlin (Jahrb. f. Class. Phil. 131, p. 123) conjectures 
that the word Cleanthis has fallen out after substantiae, 
so that, while Cleanthes defined rhetoric as ἐπιστήμη 
τοῦ εὖ λέγειν, the words Tod ὀρθῶς λέγειν would be an 
alteration of Chrysippus. See however Striller Rhet. 
Sto. pp. 7, 8. For the usual Stoic definition cf Diog. 
L. vil. 42, τήν τε ῥητορικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν Tod εὖ 
λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων where rhetoric is 
contrasted with dialectic, since dialectic was also defined 
as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν by the Stoics (Alex. Aphr. Top. 
3. 6, quoted by Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 210). Sext. 
Emp. Math. I. 6. 

10. Varro de L. L. v. 9, quod si summum gradum non 
attigero, tamen secundum praeteribo, quod non solum ad 
Aristophanis sed etiam ad Cleanthis lucubravi [secundum 
explained in § 7 quo grammatica escendit antiqua, quae 
ostendit quemadmodum quodque poeta finxerit verbum 
confinxerit declinarit]. 


11. Athen. x1. 467 d, Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τῷ 

περὶ μεταλήψεως ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκευασάντων φησὶν ὀνο- 
μασθῆναι τήν τε θηρίκλειον κύλικα καὶ τὴν δεινιάδα. ib. 
471 b, Κλεάνθης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ περὶ μεταλήψεως συγγράμματί 
φησι, τὰ τοίνυν εὑρήματα, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἔτι καὶ τὰ 
λοιπά ἐστι, οἷον θηρίκλειος, δεινιάς, Ἰφικρατίς, ταῦτα 
[γὰρ] πρότερον συνιστόρει τοὺς εὑρόντας, φαίνεται δ᾽ 
ἔτι καὶ νῦν" εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τοῦτο, μεταβεβληκὸς ἂν εἴη 
μικρὸν τοὔνομα. ἀλλά, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οὐκ ἔστι πιστεῦ- 
σαι τῷ τυχόντι. 
μεταλήψεως : the meaning of this word seems to be that 
explained by Quintil. vii. 6. 37, superest ex his, quae 
aliter significent, μετάληψις, id est, transumtio, quae 
ex alio in aliud velut viam praestat: tropus et varissimus 
et maxime improprius, Graecis tamen frequentior, qui 
Centaurum Chirona, et νήσους (? ναῦς) θοὰς ὀξείας dicunt. 
Nos quis ferat, si Verrem suem aut Laelium doctum 
nominemus? cf. Arist. Top. vi. 11, p. 149 a 6. 

θηρίκλειον: a kind of drinking cup, said to be named 
after Thericles, a Corinthian potter of some celebrity, and, 
according to Bentley on Phalaris § 8, a contemporary 
of Aristophanes. Welcker, however (Rhein. Mus. VI. 
404 foll.), maintains that these cups were so called because 
they were decorated with the figures of animals. 

Sands and Ἰφικρατὶς are the names given to particular 
kinds of slippers, the latter of which was so called after 
the celebrated Athenian general. Cf. Poll. vit. 89, ἀπὸ δὲ 
τῶν χρησαμένων ᾿Ιφικρατίδες, Δεινιάδες, ᾿Αλκιβιάδια, 
Σμινδυρίδια, Μυνάκια ἀπὸ Μυνάκου. Diod. Sic. xv. 44, 
τάς τε ὑποδέσεις τοῖς στρατιώταις εὐλύτους Kal κούφας 
ἐποίησε, τὰς μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἰφικρατίδας ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου καλου- 
μένας. Alciphr. Ep. πι. 57, ἔναγχος Κρονίων ἐνστάντων 
Ἰφικρατίδας μοι νεουργεῖς ἔπεμψε. Becker's Charicles 
E. T. p. 450, Miiller Handbuch tv. 428. 






γὰρ is expunged by Meineke, whom Wachsm. follows. 

συνιστόρει is read by Casaubon for συνιστορεῖν. It seems 
to mean “connoted.” 

εἰ δὲ μή tr. “if it does not do this, the word must have 
changed somewhat.” For the tense cf. Dem, xxx. 10. 
Timocrates and Onetor were both men of substance ὥστ᾽ 
οὐκ ἂν διὰ τοῦτο γ᾽ εἶεν οὐκ εὐθὺς δεδωκότες. 


12. Diog. L. vit. 134, δοκεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν 
ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον 
εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν 

2 Ἢ, , \ , a \ yh ” \ UY 
αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης 

αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. τίθησι δὲ TO δόγμα τοῦτο... 
Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀτόμων. See Zeno frag. 35. 

13. Tertull. Apol. 21, haec (quae Zeno dixit λόγον 
esse cf. Zeno frag. 44) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit 
quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat. 

spiritum = πνεῦμα. So far as the evidence serves, 
Cleanthes was the first to explam the Heraclitean πῦρ as 
πνεῦμα. While not refusing to admit that Zeno’s aether 
is an emanation from the Godhead (see on frag. 15), 
he differs from Zeno in identifying God with the sun, as 
the ruling part of the universe, and the ultimate source of 
the “Urpneuma.” Stein Psych. p. 68. Hirzel’s account 
is inconsistent: at p. 211 he attributes πνεῦμα to Chry- 
sippus and restricts Cleanthes to πῦρ, while at p. 216 he 
allows that Cleanthes introduced the conception of 

permeatorem. Gk. διήκειν Zeno frag. 37, probably 
indicates that Cl. accepted κρᾶσις δ ὅλων, cf. Alex. 
Aphrod. de Mixt. 142 a, ἡνῶσθαι τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν, 


πνεύματός Twos διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ᾽ οὗ 
συνάγεται καὶ συμμένει. 

14, Stob. Ecl. 1. 1. 29° p. 34, 20, Διογένης καὶ Κλεάν- 
θης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης (τὸν θεὸν) τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν. 
Οἷς, N. D. 1. 37, tum totius naturae menti atque animo 
tribuit hoc nomen. Minue. Octav. xrx. 10, Theophrastus 
et Zeno et Chrysippus et Cleanthes sunt et ipsi multi- 
formes, sed ad unitatem providentiae omnes revolvuntur. 
Cleanthes enim mentem modo animum modo aethera 
plerumque rationem Deum disseruit. 

Cleanthes teaches the exact correspondence between 
the microcosm of the individual and the macrocosm of 
the world: there is therefore in the world a ruling 
principle analogous to the soul of man. Sext. Math. 
IX. 120, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται 
πολυμερὴς καθεστώς, εἴη ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ τὸ 
προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κινήσεων. οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι 
τοιοῦτον ἢ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἥτις θεός ἐστιν. ἔστιν 
ἄρα θεός. 

15. Cic. N. Ὁ. τ 37, tum ultimum et altissimum 
atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cin- 
gentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, 
certissimum deum judicat. Lactant. Inst. 1. 5, Cleanthes 
et Anaximenes aethera dicunt esse summum Deum 
(quoting in support Verg. Georg. 11. 325). 

According to Krische, p. 428—430, Cicero has here 
made a blunder by importing an explanation of his own 
into the Greek original θεὸν εἶναι τὸν αἰθέρα, and by a 
confusion of the two senses in which ap is used in the 
Stoie School (1) -- πῦρ τεχνικόν, (2)=the fiery zone 

surrounding the world. Cleanthes, as will be presently — 

seen, disagreeing with the rest of the school, regarded the 



sun and not the belt of aether as the ἡγεμονικόν, or, in 
popular language, as the abode of God (Cic. Acad. π. 126). 
Cleanthes therefore only meant to affirm the identity 
of θεὸς and the πῦρ τεχνικόν. This may be true, but the 
reasoning is not conclusive. Apart from the word 
certissimum, which is not important, there is no reason 
why Cleanthes should not have attributed divinity to the 
ultimus omnia cingens aether, just in the same manner as 
he does to the stars, where Krische feels no difficulty. 
Similarly Stein, Psychol. n. 99: the aether emanates from 
the “Urpneuma” and is a divine power, but not God 

ultimum i.e. farthest removed from the earth which is 
in the centre of the universe. Zeno, frag. 67. Cie ND 
41.117. Diog. vil. 37. 

16. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 9, λόγον ἡγούμενον τῶν ἐν 
᾿ τῷ κόσμῳ. Cic. N. D.1. 37, tum nihil ratione censet esse 

This, it should be remembered, is in direct opposition 
to the teaching of Epicurus, who speaks of the world 
as φύσει ἀλόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα (Stob. Ἐπ]. 

τ. 91. 3° p. 183, 10). 

17. Οἷς, N. Ὁ. τ. 37, Cleanthes...tum ipsum mundum 
deum dicit esse. Cf. N. D. 11. 34. 45. 

See Krische p. 424—426, according to whom we are to 
interpret mundum here in the first of the three senses 
specified by Diog. L. vi. 137, 138, ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως 
ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. 
21d: ge 184, 11, λέγεται δ᾽ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ᾽ 
ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. In any case, we 
have here a distinct statement that Cleanthes was a 
pantheist, and identified God with matter. The different 
meanings given to κόσμος in effect amount to this that it 


may be regarded either as the sum total of all existence, 
or as the transitory and derivative part of existence: the 
distinction,- however, as Zeller observes, is only a relative 
one (see his remarks p. 159). For pantheism as advocated 
by Cleanthes see Hirzel 11. p. 206. Stein, Psychol. p. 67 
and ἢ. 98. 

18. Chalcid. in Tim. ο. 144, ex quo fieri ut quae 
secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint. eodem- 
que modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut Chry- 
sippus putat. alii vero quae quidem ex providentiae 
auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae 
fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes. 

Zeno had affirmed the identity of εἱμαρμένη and 
πρόνοια (frag. 45), but omitted to discuss the difficulties 
involved in so broad an explanation of fatalistic doctrine. 
Cleanthes felt the difficulty that κακὸν could not be said 
to exist κατὰ πρόνοιαν, even if it existed καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην. 
This point will recur in the Hymn to Zeus frag. 46, 1]. 17, 
οὐδέ τι γίνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα δαῖμον.. πλὴν 
ὁπόσα ῥέξουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις, where we shall 
have to discuss the nature of the solution which he 
offered. In support of the position here taken up by 
Chrysippus cf. id. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 34,3, κατὰ τοῦτον 
δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν Kal περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς 
ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν 
ἀτέχνων. ..οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γίγνεσθαι 
οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἀλλ᾽ ἡ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν 
ἐκείνης λόγον. id. Comm. Not. 84, 5, εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον 
ἔστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἣ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς 
βούλησιν. Chrysippus also defined εἱμαρμένη as λόγος 
τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων. The Sceptic 
objections on this head are put very clearly in Sext. Pyrrh. 
ΠΙ. 9---12, 

— ποι 


19. Philo de provid. τι. 74 p. 94 Aucher: (astra erratica) 
nota sunt non solum ratione verum etiam sensu ita movente 
providentia, quae, ut dicit Chrysippus et Cleanthes, nihil 
praetermisit pertinentium ad certiorem utilioremque dis- 
pensationem, quod si aliter melius esset dispensari res 
mundi, eo modo sumpsisset compositionem, qua tenus 
nihil occurreret ad impediendum deum. 

I have taken this fragment from Gercke (Chrysippea 
p. 708). 

quae nihil praetermisit...Much of the Stoic exposition 
in the 2nd book of Cicero’s de Natura Deorum is a 
commentary on this. Thus for astra erratica cf. § 108 
foll. and esp. ὃ 104, ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine 
ulla mutatione et varietate cetera labuntur...caelestia... 
quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus 
naturae constantiam videre cupientis. Generally cf. M. 
Anton. IL. 3, τὰ THs τύχης οὐκ ἄνευ φύσεως ἢ συγκλώσεως 
καὶ ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων" πάντα ἐκεῖθεν 
ῥεῖ: πρόσεστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ 
συμφέρον, οὗ μέρος él. 

qua tenus...At the same time we find elsewhere a 
chain argument of Chrysippus in Alex. de fato c. 37 p. 
118 οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ 
ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις 
κατὰ. But inconsistency was inevitable in this matter, 
when Chrysippus could account for the existence of evil 
by saying (Plut. Sto. Rep. 36. 1) κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἄραι 
οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. See Zeller’s 

lucid exposition pp. 176—193. 

20. Probus ad Verg. Ecl. 6. 31, p. 10, 33, Omnem 
igitur hanc rerum naturae formam tenui primum et 
inani mole dispersam refert in quattuor elementa con- 
cretam et ex his omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt 


Zenon Citiaeus et Speusippus (leg. Chrysippus) Soleus 
et Cleanthes Thasius (leg. Assius). See on Zeno frag. 52. 

21. Hermiae Irris. Gent. Phil. 14, Diels p. 654, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁ Κλεάνθης ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος ἐπάρας τὴν κεφαλὴν καταγελᾷ 
σοῦ τοῦ δόγματος καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνιμᾷ τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀρχὰς θεὸν 
καὶ ὕλην. καὶ τὴν μὲν γῆν μεταβάλλειν εἰς ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ 
ὕδωρ εἰς ἀέρα τὸν δὲ ἀέρα «εἰς πῦρ; φέρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ πῦρ 
εἰς τὰ περίγεια χωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δι᾿ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου 
διήκειν, ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς ἐμψυχοῦσθαι. , 

φρέατος. ‘This is explained by the anecdote related by 
Diog. VIL. 168, διεβοήθη δὲ ἐπὶ φιλοπονίᾳ, ὅς γε πένης ὧν 
ἄγαν ὥρμησε μισθοφορεῖν" καὶ νύκτωρ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κήποις 
ἤντλει, μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγυμνάξετο᾽ ὅθεν καὶ 
Φρεάντλης ἐκλήθη. The same idea is kept up by ἀνιμᾷ 
Le. “hauls up.” 

καὶ τὴν μὲν γῆν κτλ. This constant interchange of the 
various elements is not so strongly brought out in the 
Stoic system as it was by Heraclitus with his formula 
πάντα pei. Cf. Krische p. 387. It is however always 
implied, cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 10. 16° p. 129, 18, 
πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς 
ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ᾽ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης 
δὲ ἔτε μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος 
εἰς γῆν. πάλιν δ᾽ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης 
πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δ᾽ ἐξ ὕδατος 
εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. Cic. N. Ὁ. π΄. 84, et 
cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum 
mundi continuata natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex 
aqua oritur aér, ex aére aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim 
ex aethere aér, inde aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic 
naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursus deorsus, 
ultro citro commeantibus mundi partium coniunctio conti- 
netur. For Heraclitus see R. and P. § 29. 


εἰς πῦρ. Some words must be supplied here: Diels 
inserts ἄνω. 

τὸ δὲ πῦρ : the reverse process is concisely stated. 

ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας : for the divine origin of the human 
soul see Stein Psych. p. 96, n. 169. 

29. Stob. Ecl. τ. 20, 1° p. 171, 2, Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει 

Ny / 2 / x ’ / ld Φ ἣν 

καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσιᾶν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς 

σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι 
τὴν διακόσμησιν, οἵα πρότερον ἦν. See Zeno frag. 54. 

23. Philo, Incorr. Mundi p. 954, μεταβάλλειν yap ἢ 
εἰς φλόγα ἢ εἰς αὐγὴν ἀναγκαῖον" εἰς μὲν φλόγα, ὡς ῴετο 
Κλεάνθης, εἰς δ᾽ αὐγήν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος. 

Philo is arguing that when everything becomes fire, it 
must burn itself out and cannot be created anew, but 
there is no importance in his objection, as he is confounding 
the πῦρ τεχνικὸν with πῦρ ἄτεχνον. φλὸξ and αὐγὴ 
therefore alike express what Numenius, speaking of the 
school in general, calls πῦρ αἰθερῶδες Le. πῦρ TEXVLKOV 
(Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 1). What then is the meaning of the 
divergence? Stein believes that we have here a piece of 
evidence showing a substantial disagreement in the views 
taken by Cleanthes and Chrysippus of the ἐκπύρωσις and 
that φλὸξ is used with reference to the Sun (see on frag. 
24), and αὐγὴ as a representation of the finest aether. 
For the connection of φλὸξ with ἥλιος he quotes Diog. L. 
vit. 27, Aesch. Pers. 497, Soph. Trach. 693, O. T. 1425 
(Stein, Psychologie pp. 70, 71 and the notes). Hirzel’s 
explanation is similar (II. p. 211), except that he does not 
see any reference to the sun: according to him, Cleanthes 
spoke of a permeating πῦρ for which πνεῦμα was substi- 
tuted by Chrysippus: but see on frag. 19. For φλόγα cf. 
ἐκφλογισθέντος in frag. 24. 

24. Stob. Ecl. 1. 17. 3, p. 153, 7, Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω 

πώς φησιν" ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίξειν τὸ μέσον 
αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι Sv ὅλου. 
τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἀντι- 
τυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναν- 
τίον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεσ- 
θαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον" καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἰεὶ καὶ 
διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνον 
μὴ παύεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται 
ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ 
ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, 
ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι 
τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις 
διακρίνονται γινομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα 
γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ὃν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῷ καὶ 
συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. 

The explanation of the first part of this difficult frag- 
ment appears to be as follows :—When everything has been 
set on fire and the tendency of all things to become 
absorbed in the πῦρ ἀειξῷον has been satisfied, the reaction 
commences in the centre, and spreads towards the ex- 
tremities until everything except the outer rim is in a 
watery mass. Seneca, N. Q. m1. 13. 1, nihil relinqui... 
aliud, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoe futuri 
mundi spem latere. Then the remaining portions of the 
original fire, concentrated in the sun (Stein p. 71), in 
spite of resistance from the centre, begin to exert their 
creative influence, and by their ever-increasing activity, 
the elements and the world are formed. Phenomenal 
existence, then, is possible only when the tightening and 
slackening influences are in equilibrium or nearly so; the 
exclusive predominance of either destroys the balance of 
the universe. The centre of the σφαῖρος is always readier 
to admit the loosening of tension, while the bracing in- 

a συν 


vigorating vivifying power, which knits together the frame 
of the universe as of the individual, is in fullest sway in 
the parts at the circumference (hence ἄνω αὔξεσθαι). 
This is the theory of tension as applied to the διακόσ- 
μησις, and its statement constitutes the most important 
contribution made by Cleanthes to Stoicism. A difficulty 
in the above exposition remains to be stated:—Why is 
there no created world in the period between ἐκπύρωσις 
and ἐξύγρωσις, as there must then be a time when the 
two influences are of equal strength? The answer, perhaps, 
is that during the whole of this period there is an ever- 
increasing slackening of tension, as the fire of the ἐκπύ- 
pwors is gradually extinguished, and slackening of tension 
produces not life but death (Plut. plac. v. 24 etce.); the 
creation of the world only starts when τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ 
πυρὸς τρέπεται εἰς τοὐναντίον. There is also a divergent 
view, namely, that the destruction of the world may be 
compassed by κατακλυσμὸς as well as by ἐκπύρωσις. 
This implies that our world can exist during the tran- 
sition towards ἐξύγρωσις. Cf. Sen. N. Q. πι. 29. 1 and 
Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. ο. 25, p. 53, quoted by Zeller p. 169, 
1. Schol. on Lucan vu. 813 ἐκπύρωσις, quam secuturam 
κατακλυσμοὺς adserunt Stoici, seems to have been over- 
looked, but is of doubtful import. Stein’s account of the 
διακόσμησις (Psych. p. 32 foll.) is radically different, but I 
do not see how it can be reconciled with this passage : 
(1). the creation of the world is due to a slackening of 
tension in the original fiery substance, and (2) τὸ ἔσχατον 
τοῦ πυρὸς is what remains of the original “ Urpneuma” 
after the four elements have been formed, whereas ac- 
cording to Cleanthes the creation of the world only begins 
when this remnant of fire begins to exert its influence. 
Hirzel discusses the present passage at some length 
(Untersuchungen 11 p. 124—134). He strongly insists 


that τὸ ἔσχατον meansextremum (das Feuer des Umkreises) 
and not reliquum, and that Philo περὶ ἀφθ. κόσμου 18, 
(μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δη- 
μιουργεῖσθαι σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται ποσὴ δέ τις 
αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται) follows Chrysippus and not 
Cleanthes. It would seem, however, that the distinction 
is not important, as ἔσχατον must in this case be both 

extremum and reliquum. Further on he suggests that — 

Cleanthes did not maintain the doctrine of the four 
elements, but cf. frag. 21. Two possible anticipations of 
the tension theory have been noticed in Zeno’s fragments, 
but the passage in frag. 56 is probably spurious, while in 
frag. 67, even if τείνεσθαι is sound, Zeno is confessedly 
dealing with another point, viz. the explanation of how 
the separate parts of the κόσμος are kept in one solid mass 
and why they are not scattered into the void. Ogereau p. 
10 attributes the introduction of roves to Zeno, and 
depreciates the performances of Cleanthes (p. 19); but he 
insists throughout too strongly on the unity of the school, 
without considering its historical development. 

τὸ μέσον, cf. Stob. ἘΠ]. 1. 21, 3° p. 183, 3, ἀπὸ γῆς δὲ 
ἄρξασθαι τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κέντρου, 
ἀρχὴ δὲ σφαίρας τὸ κέντρον. 

ἐξυγρανθέντος, cf. Diog. L. vit. 135, 136 quoted on Zeno 
frag. 52. 

τρεπομένου. MSS. corr. Canter. 

τὸν... «τόνον. The MSS. have rod...révov. The reading 
in the text is due to Mein., whom Wachsm. now follows, 
although he formerly (Comm. 1, p. 11) kept the MSS. 
reading, removing. the colon after ὅλον and inserting 
commas after καὶ and τόνου There is some mistake 
in Stein’s note on this point, Psychol. π, 41. 

ἐκ σπερμάτων. Of. Zeno frag. 54 = Cleanth, frag. 22, and 
see Ritter and Preller § 402. 



λόγοι Was unnecessarily suspected by the older edd. of 
Stobaeus. The conj. τόνου is tempting, but Wachsm. 
quotes Mare. Aurel. 1x. 1, ὥρμησεν (ἡ φύσις) ἐπὶ τήνδε THY 
διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων 
«.7.. The best parallel is Zeno frag. 106, which puts 
the text beyond dispute. τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερών = 
certain proportions of the constituent parts of the soul. 

γινομένων P. γεινομένων F, whence γενομένων Mein. 
Wachsm. Diels: but the present, accepted by Hirzel 1. 
p. 126, seems preferable. 

εἰς is bracketed by Diels and Wachsm. 

25. Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 10, ἔτει τοίνυν ἐπαγωνιζόμενος 
ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην Kal τὰ λοιπὰ 
ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιώσειν πάντα ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μεταβαλεῖν 
εἰς ἑαυτόν. 

As the sun is, according to Cleanthes, the ἡγεμονικὸν 
τοῦ κόσμου, the πῦρ ἀειζῷον may be supposed to exist 
there in its purest form (cf. the authorities cited by 
Zeller, Stoics p. 204, 3, Krische p. 386), and to this the 
moon and the other stars will be assimilated at the 

ἐξομοιώσειν. MSS. have ἐξομοιῶσαι corr. Zeller, p. 165, 
n. 4. 

26. Stob. Ecl. τ. 15, 6* p. 146, 19, Κλεάνθης μόνος 
τῶν Στωικῶν τὸ πῦρ ἀπεφήνατο κωνοειδές. 

Presumably this refers to the fire of the revolving 
aether, for the doctrine appears to be borrowed from the 
Pythagoreans cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 15, 6" p. 146, 14, οἱ ἀπὸ 
Πυθαγόρου...μόνον τὸ ἀνώτατον πῦρ Kwvoedés. This is 
supposed to refer to the Milky Way (Zeller, pre-Socratics, 
I. p. 466 n. 2), cf. infra frags. 32, 33. 

27. Plut, de facie in orbe lunae c. 6, 3, ὥσπερ 


᾿Αρίσταρχον mero δεῖν Κλεάνθης τὸν Σάμιον ἀσεβείας 
προσκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς “Ελληνας, ὡς κινοῦντα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν 
ἑστίαν, ὅτε <td> φαινόμενα σώζειν ἁνὴρ ἐπειρᾶτο, μένειν 
τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑποτιθέμενος, ἐξελίττεσθαι δὲ κατὰ λοξοῦ 
κύκλου τὴν γῆν, ἅμα καὶ περὶ τὸν αὑτῆς ἄξονα δινουμένην. 

This comes from the treatise πρὸς ᾿Αρίσταρχον: 
Introd. p. 51. 

᾿Αρίσταρχον: the celebrated mathematician. For the 
theory here attacked cf. Sext. Math. x. 174, of ye μὴν τὴν 
- τοῦ κόσμου κίνησιν ἀνελόντες τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι δοξά- 
σαντες, ὡς οἱ περὶ ᾿Αρίσταρχον τὸν μαθηματικόν KT. 
Stob. Ecl. τ. 25, 3* p. 212, 2, ᾿Αρίσταρχος τὸν ἥλιον ἵστησι 
μετὰ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν ἡλιακὸν 
κύκλον. (This also illustrates κατὰ λοξοῦ κύκλου.) It 
appears however to be doubtful whether Aristarchus 
propounded this view otherwise than hypothetically: ef. 
Plut. quaest. Plat. vir. 1, 2, 3. | 

ἀσεβείας προσκαλεῖσθαι. For the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας see 
Attischer Process ed. Lipsius, pp. 366—375, and οὗ the 
case of Anaxagoras (ib. p. 370). Every γραφή, as well as 
an ordinary civil action, commenced with the πρόσκλησις 
or writ of summons (ib. p. 770 f.). 

ἑστίαν : alluding to the central position of the earth. 
Aesch. Ag. 1056 ἑστίας μεσομφάλου, Virg. Aen. I. 512 
aedibus in mediis nudoque sub aetheris axe ingens ara 
fuit. It is possible that Cleanthes had in his mind the 
Pythagorean description of the central fire as ἑστία τοῦ 
παντός: see Dr Thompson on Phaedr. 247 a, μένει yap 
“Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνη. 

τὰ φαινόμενα σώζειν : “to save appearances:” for which 
phrase see Prof. Mayor in Journ. Phil. vi. 171. 

28. Euseb. P. E. xv. 15. 7, Ar. Did. fr. 29 ap. Diels, 
p- 465, ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν 


ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ TO μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν Kal 
πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν wv διοίκησιν, 
ἡμέραν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ποιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὥρας. 
Censorin. frag. 1, 4, et constat quidem quattuor elementis 
terra aqua igne aere. cuius principalem solem quidam 
putant, ut Cleanthes. Diog. vil. 139. Stob. Ecl. τ. 21. 6° 
p. 187, 4, Κλεάνθης ὁ Στωικὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ 
ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. Οἷο. Acad. I. 126, Cleanthes, 
qui quasi majorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis auditor, 
solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. 

There is no warrant whatever for Krische’s suggestion 
(p. 435), that Cleanthes probably (“wahrscheinlich ἢ) 
adopted the Heraclitean theory of the daily renewal of 
the sun: everything points the other way. At the same 
time, the important position assigned to the sun was 
probably due to his Heraclitean studies (see Introd. 
p. 50), for, though Heraclitus himself did not maintain 
this doctrine, we read of the Heraclitean school in Plat. 
Cratyl. 418 B, τὸν ἥλιον. ..διαΐοντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν 

τὰ ὄντα. Cf. Pliny, N. H. 11 12 (cited by Hirzel, Π. p. 138). 

29. Stob. Ecl. τ. 25. 81 p. 211, 18, Κλεάνθης avappa 
νοερὸν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης τὸν ἥλιον. περὶ δὲ τῶν τροπῶν 
φασι κατὰ τὸ διάστημα τῆς ὑποκειμένης τροφῆς" ὠκεανὸς 
δ᾽ ἐστὶ * * * hs τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται. συγκαταφέρεσ- 
θαι δὲ τὸν ἥλιον κινούμενον ἕλικα ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ, ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἰσημερινοῦ ἐπί τε ἄρκτου καὶ νότου, ἅπερ ἐστὶ πέρατα 
τῆς ἕλικος. Cic. N. D. π|. 37, Quid enim? non eisdem 
vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere 
ullo modo posse, nisi alitur: ali autem solem, lunam, 
reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus, alia marinis? eamque 
causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius 
progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius 
discedat a cibo. Macrob. Sat. 1. 23, 2, ideo enim sicut et 

H. P. 17 


Posidonius et Cleanthes affirmant, solis meatus a plaga, 
quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus, 
qui terram ambit et dividit. 

Wachsmuth regards Cic. and Stob. 1]. cc. as containing 
two distinct fragments (Comm. 1. fr. phys. 7 and 8), but 
the passage in Cic. is only a verbal expansion of περὶ 
τροπῶν..-.τροφῆς. Wachsm. does not cite Macrob. 1]. «. 
This is one of the points which attest Cleanthes’ study of 
Heraclitus, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1, 25. 1% p. 239, 5. Hirzel con- 
cludes (11. p. 122) from the evidence, that Cleanthes, like 
Heraclitus, spoke only of the feeding of the sun by 
exhalations, and not also of that of the moon and stars. 

dvappa «rd. cf. Plut. plac. 1. 20. 3, περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου, 
of Στωικοὶ ἄναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάττης. Diog. vil. 145, 
τρέφεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἔμπυρα ταῦτα (1.6. the sun and moon) 
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα" τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάτ- 
της νοερὸν ὄντα ἄναμμα, whereas the moon is fed with 
fresh water, and is mixed with air. Chrysippus ap. Stob. 
Ecl. τ. 25. 5, τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι τὸ ἀθροισθὲν ἔξαμμα νοερὸν ἐκ 
τοῦ τῆς θαλάττης ἀναθυμιάματος. Wachsmuth adds Galen, 
hist. phil. c, Lv. p. 277 K., ὠκεανὸν δὲ καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν 
παρέχειν τῷ ἡλίῳ τροφὴν τὴν αὑτοῦ ὑγρότητα ἔχουσαν ἐν 
αὑτῷ καὶ τὴν γεώδη ἀναθυμίασιν. 

τροπῶν: a necessary correction by Bake for the Mss. 

φασι MSS. Wachsm. suggests φησι. 

ἐστί: there is a lacuna after this word. Wachsmuth 
formerly (Comm. I. p. 10) supplied καὶ γῇ coll. Plut. plac. 
π. 23, 3, but he now writes: “lacuna fuit in Aetii exemplo, — 
quod cum Ps. Plutarcho legit Stobaeus; Plut. ἢ yj add.; 
Aetius καὶ ἡ μεγάλη θάλασσα vel simile scripsit,” quoting 
the passages cited above. 

συγκαταφέρεσθαι 1.6. with the aether, which is itself in 


ἕλικα, cf. Diog. L. vu. 144, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον λοξὴν τὴν 
πορείαν ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου, ὁμοίως καὶ 
τὴν σελήνην ἑλικοειδῆ. The discovery of the inclination 
of the earth’s orbit to that of the sun is attributed by 
some to Anaximander, and by others to Pythagoras (Zeller, 
pre-Socratics 1. p. 455, 2). 

30. Cic. N. D. 11 40, atque ea (sidera) quidem tota 
esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes 
putat, tactus et oculorum. nam solis et candor illustrior 
est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui immenso mundo tam 
longe lateque colluceat, et is eius tactus est, non ut 
tepefaciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat. quorum 
neutrum faceret, nisi esset igneus. “ergo,” inquit, “cum 
sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur humoribus, quia nullus 
ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere, necesse est aut 
ei similis sit igni quem adhibemus ad usum atque ad 
victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantium continetur. 
atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector 
est et consumptor omnium idemque, quocumque invasit, 
cuncta disturbat ac dissipat. contra ille corporeus vitalis 
et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet sensu- 
que adficit.” negat ergo esse dubium horum ignium sol 
utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreant 
et Im suo quaeque genere pubescant. quare cum solis 
ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus 
animantium, solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et 
quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui 
aether vel caelum nominatur. 

testumonio: this passage illustrates two characteristics, 
which are specially prominent in Cleanthes: (1) his 
activity in the investigation of the problems of natural 
science, and (2) his confidence in the results of sense obser- 
vation. Stein, Psychol. p. 69, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 319. 



Oceani: ef. frag. 29. 

et...igni: for the two kinds of fire cf. Zeno frag. 71. 

corporeus: see on frag. 42. 

aether vel caelwm: hence in Zeno frag. 111 Zeus is 
identified with caelwm in place of the usual gloss aether. 

31. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 8. 48. 674 P. 243 S., οὐκ 
ἀνέγνωσαν δ᾽ οὗτοι Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὃς ἄντικρυς 
πλῆκτρον τὸν ἥλιον καλεῖ" ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς ἐρείδων 

τὰς αὐγὰς οἷον πλήσσων τὸν κόσμον, εἰς τὴν ἐναρμόνιον — 

/ A “Ὁ » > \ “ ¢ / / \ Ν 
πορείαν τὸ φῶς ἄγει, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου σημαίνει καὶ τὰ 
λοιπὰ ἄστρα. 

πλῆκτρον: Krische p. 400 connects this with the Stoic — 

identification of Heracles with the sun. Thus Heracles is 

τὸ πληκτικὸν Kal διαιρετικόν (Plut. de Iside c. 40), and — 

his name is derived from ἀὴρ and κλάσις by Porphyrius 
ap. Euseb. P. E. 1m. p. 112 ©, and Nicomachus ap. Laur. 
Lyd. de Mens. Iv. 46. πλῆκτρον is properly “any striking 
instrument”: hence lightning is described as πλῆκτρον 
διόβολον πυρὸς κεραυνόν (Eur. Alc. 128): ef. especially 
Plut. de Pyth. orac. c. 16 ad fin. ὕστερον μέντοι πλῆκτρον 
ἀνέθηκαν τῷ θεῷ χρυσοῦν ἐπιστήσαντες, ὡς ἔοικε, Σκυθίνῳ 
λέγοντι περὶ τῆς λύρας, ἣν ἁρμόζεται Ζηνὸς εὐειδὴς ᾿Απόλ- 
λων, πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος συλλαβών" ἔχει δὲ λαμπρὸν 
πλῆκτρον ἡλίου φάος (quoted by Hirzel, p. 181). Eur. 
Suppl. 650, λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτίς, ἡλίου κανὼν σαφής. 
Sandys on Bacch. 308, and Milton’s “ With touch ethereal 
of Heaven’s fiery rod.” 

32. Stob. Ecl. τ. 26. 1' p. 219, 14, Κλεάνθης πυροειδῆ 
τὴν σελήνην, πιλοειδῆ δὲ τῷ σχήματι. 

πυροειδῆ: but the fire of the moon is not so pure as that 
of the sun, being fed with grosser matter. Cf. Diog. L. vi. 
144, εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινὲς πῦρ...14ὅ, yewdeo- 
τέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην. 



πιλοειδῆ: the MSS. have πηλοειδῆ corrected by Lipsius 
(Phys. Stoic π΄ 13), who also suggests πολυειδῆ, to πὸ- 
χοειδῆ, in which correction he is followed by the editors 
of Stobaeus. But what is the meaning of this word as 
applied to shape? In this connection “like felt” (L. and 
S.) is nonsense. Zeller translates “ ball-shaped,” which 
is improbable because, apart from other considerations, it 
is almost certain that Cleanthes did not regard the moon as 
spherical. There remains Hirzel’s suggested rendering :— 
“shaped like a skull-cap.” The only justification for such 
an absurdity is to be found in the Heraclitean σκαφοειδής 
(Stob. Ecl. 1. 26. 1° p. 218, 8), for no support can be derived 
from πιλήματα ἀέρος (Anaximander) or νέφος πεπιλημένον 
(Xenophanes), which simply refer to densely packed clouds. 
Krische, p. 435, boldly reads κωνοειδῆ which gives the 
required sense, but is not close enough to the MSS. It is 
suggested therefore that the true reading is ἡλιοειδῆ, the 
II being due to dittography of the following H. There 
would be no obscurity in this, assuming Cleanthes or his 
epitomiser to have previously described the sun as κωνοειδής 
(cf. frag. 83). The other Stoics consistently describe the 
moon as σφαιροειδής (Stob. Hcl. 1. 26. 1* 1} p; 219; 20; 26): 

33. Stob. Ἐπ]. τ. 24 2% p. 205, 25, of μὲν ἄλλου 
«Στωικοὶ; σφαιρικοὺς αὐτούς, Κλεάνθης δὲ κωνοειδεῖς 
(8611. the stars). Plut. plac. m 14. 2. Galen, hist. phil. 
c. 13 (XIX. 271 K.), Κλεάνθης κωνοειδεῖς τοὺς ἀστέρας. 
Achill. Tat. p. 133° Κλεάνθης αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς ἀστέρας) 
κωνοειδὲς ἔχειν σχῆμά φησι. Theodoret, Gr. Cur. aff. Iv. 
20, p. 59. 16, κωνοειδεῖς δὲ Κλεάνθης 6 Στωικός. 

Cleanthes attributed a conical shape to fire, sun, moon, 
and stars. There is no direct evidence as to the sun and 
moon, but it is a fair inference from the authorities that 
they also were conical. It is probable, moreover, that 


Cleanthes was moved by the consideration that Heraclitus 
described sun, moon and stars as boat-shaped (σκαφοειδῆ), 
ef. Stob. Ecl. 1. 25. 16 26. 1°, Diog. L. 1x. 9. Krische is 
apparently right in inferring that the same is true of the 
world, cf. Plut. plac. 11. 2. 1, of μὲν Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ 
τὸν κόσμον, ἄλλοι δὲ κωνοειδῆ, οἱ δὲ φοειδῆ. 

84. Plut. plac. π. 16. 1, ᾿Αναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος 
καὶ Κλεάνθης ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς φέρεσθαι πάντας 
τοὺς ἀστέρας. Galen, hist. phil. ο. 18, xrx. 972 K.’A. 
καὶ A. καὶ Κλ. ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν eis δυσμὰς φέρεσθαι τοὺς 
ἀστέρας νομίζουσιν. 

πάντας in Plut. apparently includes ἀπλανῆ ἄστρα as 
well as the πλανώμενα: the former are said συμπερι- 
φέρεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα κατ᾽ ἰδίας 
κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις (Diog. vit. 144). Full information 
on the ancient theories as to the rising and setting of 
the stars will be found in Achill. Tat. Isag. cc. 37, 38. 

35. Gemin. elem. astrom. p.53 (in Petau’s Uranologia), 
ὑπὸ τὴν διακεκαυμένην ἕώνην τινὲς τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπεφή- 
ναντο, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Κλεάνθης ὁ Στωικὸς φιλόσοφος, ὑπο- 
κεχύσθαι μεταξὺ τῶν τροπικῶν τὸν ὠκεανόν. 

This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth’s collection 
(fr. phys. 27, Comm. τι. p. 14): ef. frag. 29 and Macrob. 1. 
23, 2 there cited. Krische, p. 393, refers this to the in- 
fluence of Zeno’s studies on Homer. “Hiernach michte 
ich glauben, dass Zenon dort auch den Homerischen Ocean 
aufgesucht und dadurch den Kleanthes und Krates auf- 
gefordert habe, dieselbe Betrachtung zu erneuern.” Cf. 
Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 29, p. 89:—There are five zones: Arctic, 
Antarctic, two temperate (εὔκρατοι), μία δὲ διακεκαυμένη. 
ἡ δὲ τούτων μέση πασῶν ἔστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερινοῦ τροπικοῦ 
μέχρι τοῦ χειμερινοῦ τροπικοῦ" τοσοῦτον γὰρ πλάτος ἔχει, 



ὅσον καὶ ὁ ἥλιος περιέρχεται. καλεῖται δὲ διακεκαυμένη 
διὰ τὸ πυρώδης εἶναι, τοῦ ἡλίου δι’ αὐτῆς τὴν πορείαν ἀεὶ 
ποιουμένου. Posidonius, as we learn from ib. 31, p. 90, 
made six zones, dividing the torrid zone into two. 

36. Tertullian de An. c. 5, vult et Cleanthes non 
solum corporis lineamentis, sed et animae notis simili- 
tudinem parentibus in filios respondere, de speculo scilicet 
morum et ingeniorum et adfectuum: corporis autem simi- 
litudinem et dissimilitudinem capere: et animam itaque 
corpus similitudini vel dissimilitudini obnoxiam. item 
corporalium et incorporalium passiones inter se non com- 
municare. porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso 
ictibus, vulneribus, ulceribus condolescit, et corpus animae, 
cui adflictae cura, angore, amore, coaegrescit, per detri- 
mentum scilicet vigoris, culus pudorem, et pavorem rubore 
atque pallore testetur. igitur anima corpus ex corporalium 
passionum commutatione. Nemesius, Nat. Hom. p. 32, 
ὁ Κλεάνθης τοιόνδε πλέκει συλλογισμόν. οὐ μόνον 
φησὶν ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ 
καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ψυχὴν τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι. 
σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου, 
σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. ..ἔτι δὲ ὁ Κλεάνθης φησίν οὐδὲν ἀσώ- 
μάτον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ 
σῶμα σώματι" συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι 
καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῆ; αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν 
ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν: σῶμα apa 7 
ψυχή. Tertullian de An. c. 25, unde oro te similitudine 
animae quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus secun- 
dum Cleanthis testimonium, si non ex animae semine 

The Nemesius passage is regarded as a distinct frag- 
ment from the two places in Tertullian by Wachsmuth 
(Comm. It. fr. phys. 20, 21), but, as Hirzel has observed, they 





obviously refer to the same original. Stein’s observations 
on this passage should be consulted (Erkenntnistheorie, 
n. 736). The mind is a tabula rasa at birth, in the sense 
that it possesses no definite knowledge. But through the 
seed a capacity for knowledge, and ethical tendencies in 
particular, are transplanted from father to son: see also 
Introd. p. 38 f. 

5. The ordinary punctuation of this passage puts a 
full stop at animam, with no stop after capere, but this 
gives no satisfactory sense. Mr Hicks would strike out 
the words capere et, remove the stop after animam, and 
alter obnoxium to obnoxiam. The latter change, which is 
a decided improvement, I have adopted, and, by putting 
the stop after capere, the required sense is obtained with- 
out further alteration. 

15. γονεῦσι: cf. Cic. Tuse. 1. 79, vult enim (Panaetius)... 
nasci animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui pro- 
creentur, quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus 
appareat. The child receives through the seed the 
same grade of tension in the soul as his father, and, as 
the activity of the soul depends on its inherent tension, 
the mental resemblance between children and parents 
is explained. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 130, 131. 

16. ἤθεσι: Wachsmuth reads ἔθεσι from the Oxf. ed. of 
1671, but cf. Zeno, frag. 147, καταληπτὸν εἶναι τὸ ἦθος ἐξ 

διαθέσεσι: cf. on Zeno, frag. 117. 

17. σώματος: agreeably to Stoic tenets, for likeness 
and unlikeness cannot be predicated of the non-existent, 
_ ef. Zeno, frags. 34 and 91. 

19. συμπάσχει: the συμπάθεια μερῶν is an indication to 
the Stoic of the ἕνωσις of a body: this is true of the cosmos 
no less than of the individual. Sext. Math. rx. 79, who 
continues (80), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν, 


el ye δακτύλου τεμνομένου TO ὅλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα. 
ἡνωμένον τοίνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος. id. V. 44, οὐδὲ 
γὰρ οὕτως ἥνωται τὸ περιέχον ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, 
ἵνα, ὃν τρόπον τῇ κεφαλῇ τὰ ὑποκειμένα μέρη συμπάσχει 
καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ κεφαλή, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις 
τὰ ἐπίγεια. Cic. N.D. 11. 28. The question as between 
body and soul is discussed in the pseudo-Aristotelian 
φυσιογνωμικά. Cf. Plat. Phaed. 83D. M. Aurel. rx. 9. 

37. Stob. Ecl. 1 48. 7, p. 317, 15, Πυθαγόρας, ’Avak- 
ayopas, Πλάτων, Ξενοκράτης, Κλεάνθης θύραθεν εἰσκρί- 
νεσθαι τὸν νοῦν. 

This is an obscure statement which cannot be under- 
stood in the same manner of the various philosophers 
mentioned. Thus, as regards Pythagoras, it is simply a 
deduction from the theory of metempsychosis (Zeller, pre- 
Socratics I. p. 479): while for Plato and Xenocrates we 
may understand a reference to the previous existence of 
the soul before its entrance into the body (Zeller, Plato, 
p. 596). The terminology however is Aristotle’s (de 
Generat. An. IL. 8, p. 736 Ὁ 27, λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον 
θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον" οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ 
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια), Whose doctrine is 
widely different from Plato’s. As regards Cleanthes, the 
Stoics in general do not distinguish between νοῦς and 
ψυχή (see on Zeno, frag. 43): the latter is transmitted in the 
seed, developed in the womb, and brought to maturity by 
the action of the outer air, so that it is hard to see in 
what sense ψυχὴ θύραθεν eicxpiverar. Perhaps the 
meaning is that the reasoning powers (νοῦς) are founded 
on external impressions, from which Knowledge is derived: 
ef. Zeno, frag. 82. Stein, however (Psychol. p. 168 foll.), 
believes that by θύραθεν is indicated the action of the 
outer air on the embryo at birth, whereby the ψυχὴ is 


developed out of a mere φύσις. In this case Cleanthes 
anticipated the Chrysippean doctrine of περίψυξις. Hirzel — 
(11. p. 156 foll.) uses this passage in support of his im- 
probable view that Cleanthes maintained ἃ tripartite 
division of the soul: he sees here also the influence of 
Heraclitus. Cic. N.D. 1m 18 might suggest a more 
general view, that the point referred to is the material 
nature of the soul as πνεῦμα, but the context in Stobaeus 
is against this. 

38. = Zeno, frag. 83. 

There is a curious contradiction in Stein’s Psychologie 
on this point. At p. 107 and p. 155 he cites and upholds 
the evidence which distinctly attributes to Zeno the 
doctrine of the soul being fed by exhalations from the 
blood. Yet at p. 165 he suggests that this innovation 
was made by Cleanthes. 

39. =Zeno, frag. 87. 
40. = Zeno, frag. 88. 

41. Diog. L. vit. 157, Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας 
ἐπιδιαμένειν (τὰς ψυχὰς) μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Xpv- 
σίππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον. 

Cf. R. and P. ὃ 409. Cic. Τυβο. 1. 77, Stoici diu 
mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant, cf. Zeno frag. 95. 
The teaching of Cleanthes is everywhere more materialistic _ 
than that of Chrysippus, who was no doubt anxious to 
vindicate the purity of the soul essence: see Stein Psychol. 
n. 279 and pp. 145—147, who compares their divergence 
as to the nature of τύπωσις and the “Urpneuma” (φλὸξ 
and αὐγή). Ar. Did. ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 3 follows 
the account of Chrysippus, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γεννητήν τε καὶ 
φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν" οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλα- 
γεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ᾽ 
ἑαυτήν" τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύ- 


a a τ 
σεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας 
if Ἂς \ A τὰ , \ 5 Ψ / \ 
xpovous...ras δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς 
συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν. 

42. Cic. Ν. D. 11. 24, quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam 
argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: 
negat enim ullum esse cibum tam gravem, quin is die et 
nocte concoquatur, cuius etiam in reliquiis inest calor lis, 
quas natura respuerit. 

This must be regarded as an argument in favour of the 
warmth of the vital principle: hence Zeno called the soul 
πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον (frag. 85). The excellence of the human 
soul consists peculiarly in a suitable mixture (evxpacia) of 
warmth and cold. Cf. Galen quod animi mores ete. Iv. 783 
K. (quoted at length by Stein, Psychol. p.105). Cleanthes 
no doubt was influenced by Heraclitus: cf. frag. 54, Byw. 
αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη, but substituted warmth for 
dryness. It is highly probable that the words immediately 
preceding this extract, which are of great importance for 
the τόνος theory, are ultimately derived from Cleanthes: 
they are as follows: sic enim res se habet, ut omnia, quae 
alantur et quae crescant, contineant in se vim caloris, sine 
qua neque ali possent neque crescere. Nam omne, quod 
est calidum et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo, quod 
autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et 
aequabili, qui quamdiu remanet in nobis, tam diu sensus et 
vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus 
ipsi et exstinguimur. Compare with this the remarks of 
Stein Psychol. p. 32, and Philo de incorr. mundi, p. 507, 
Mang. ἅπαν σῶμα ἀναλυόμενον εἰς πῦρ διαλύεταί τε Kai 
χεῖται, σβεννυμένης δὲ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ φλογὸς στέλλεται καὶ 
συνάγεται. This is one of the many points of contact , 
between the Stoics and the medical school of Hippocrates. 
We are reminded of the τόνος of Cleanthes when we read 


that Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic and musician, described 
the soul as ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (Cie. Tuse. 
I. 20), but the doctrines were totally dissimilar: see Munro 
on Lucr, 11. 100. 

43. Seneca, Epist. 113, 18, inter Cleanthem et dis- 
cipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio: 
Cleanthes ait, spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes 
permissum; Chrysippus ipsum principale. 

ambulatio: the Stoics were led to this extreme 
materialism by their insistence on the dogma that nothing 
exists but the corporeal. Cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 2, ἀλλὰ 
πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, 
τὸν περίπατον ζῷον, τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσ- 
αγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. 

spiritum: the Greek original of this would be πνεῦμα 
διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ποδῶν (cf. Plut. plac. 
Iv. 21). The deviation of Chrysippus from the teaching 
of his predecessor was probably caused by a desire to 
insist more strongly on the essential unity of the soul. Cf. 
Iambl. ap. Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 49. 33, p. 368, 12, πῶς οὖν δια- 
κρίνονται ; κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἔνιαι μὲν διαφορότητι 
«τῶν» ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων" πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὗτοι διατείνειν ἄλλα κατ᾽ ἄλλα, τὰ 
μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμούς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὦτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθη- 
τήρια᾽ ἔνιαι δὲ ἰδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκει- 
μένον' ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν 
γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν 
ἐν ταὐτῷ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμήν, λόγον συν- 
εἴληφε. Sext. Math. 1x. 102, πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ 
ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ 
ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὥστε πᾶσαν δύναμιν τὴν 
περὶ τὸ μέρος οὖσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαδίδοσθαι. The former passage 


is, I find, also cited by Stein for the same purpose (Psychol. 
p. 168). He points out that Cleanthes explained the 
different soul functions by means of a πνεῦμα διατεῖνον, 
and Chrysippus by ἃ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον. The former 
regarded only the grade, while the latter also distinguished 
the kind of tension. It is possible that this passage also 
points to the different treatment of φαντασία by Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus (cf. frag. 3), Cleanthes insisting more 
strongly on the immediate contact of the psychical air- 
current with the sense organ (Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, 
n. 728). Hirzel’s explanation (1. p. 201) is vitiated by his 
fundamental error as to Cleanthes’ view of the ἡγεμονικόν. 
See also on Zeno frag. 93. There is a certain affinity 
between the doctrine here mentioned and that attributed 
to Strato of Lampsacus by Sext. Emp. Math. vit. 350, οἱ 
δὲ αὐτὴν (scil. τὴν διάνοιαν) εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ 
διά τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἧς 
στάσεως ἦρξε Στράτων ὁ φυσικός. Cf. Οἷς: Tuse. 1. 40, 
viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a 
sede animi perforatae. 

44. Clem. Alex. Strom. vir. 6. 33. 849 P.304S., ὅθεν 
καὶ 6 Αἴσωπος οὐ κακῶς ἔφη τοὺς ὗς κεκραγέναι μέγιστον 
ὅταν ἕλκωνται. συνειδέναι γὰρ αὑτοῖς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
χρησίμοις ἢ πλὴν εἰς τὴν θυσίαν" διὸ καὶ Κλεάνθης φησὶν 
ἀνθ᾽ ἁλῶν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν, ἵνα μὴ σαπῇ τὰ κρέα. 
The same saying is attributed to Chrysippus by Cic. N.D. 
π. 160, sus vero quid habet praeter escam? cui quidem 
ne putesceret animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse 
Chrysippus: to which add Porphyry de Abstin. 111. 20, ἡ δὲ 
ὗς, ἐνταῦθα γάρ ἐστι τῶν χαρίτων τὸ ἥδιστον (8611. τοῦ 
Χρυσίππου), οὐ δι’ ἄλλο τι πλὴν θύεσθαι ἐγεγόνει, καὶ τῇ 
σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς οἷον ἅλας ἐνέμιξεν. Elsewhere 
the statement is ascribed to no definite author. Cic. Fin. 


V. 38, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum 

_ illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. Varro de R. R. 
IL 4, 10, suillum pecus donatum ab natura dicunt ad epu- 
landum. itaque iis animam datam esse proinde ac salem 
quae servaret carnem. Plut. Quaest. Conv. v. 10, 3, διὸ καὶ 
τῶν Στωικῶν ἔνιοι τὴν ὑϊνὴν σάρκα κρέα γεγονέναι λέγουσι, 
τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ἁλῶν παρεσπαρμένης ὑπὲρ τοῦ δια- 
μένειν. Lastly, we have two passages of similar import 
in which a suggested derivation of ds from θύειν is referred 
to: Clem. Alex. 1. 20. 105, p. 174 S. p. 484 P., λέγεται 
γοῦν τινα τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἐτυμολογοῦντα τὴν ὗν θῦν 
εἶναι φἄναι, ὡς εἰς θύσιν καὶ σφαγὴν μόνον ἐτιτήδειον᾽ δε- 
δόσθαι γὰρ τῷδε τῷ Law ψυχὴν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἕνεκα 
τοῦ τὰς σάρκας σφριγᾶν. Varro R. R. τι. 4, 9, sus Graece 
dicitur ὗς, olim θῦς dictus ab illo verbo, quod dicunt θύειν, 
quod est inmolare. ab suillo enim [genere] pecore inmo- 
landi initium primum sumptum videtur; cuius vestigia 
quod initiis Cereris porci inmolantur. 

Everything in the world is created for and adapted to 
a special end ; the existence of various animals is used as 
an argument to prove the government of the world by 
πρόνοια (cf. the context in Cic. N.D, 1. 6). In a similar 
spirit Epict. Diss. 1. 8.7 says that asses were intended to 
bear burdens, and that, as for this purpose they must 
walk, imagination has been given them to enable them to 

do 80. 

The passages here collected, as well as Zeno frag. 43, 
shew conclusively that Stein’s theory (Psych. p. 92 f.) that 
the vital principle of animals is not ψυχή, but something 
midway between φύσις and ψυχή, ought not to be accepted. 
He contends that Marcus Aurelius is the first Stoic who 
expressly gives Ψυχὴ to animals, but cf. Zeno frag. 50, 
spiritum...fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem 
rationabilem, which clearly points to the ἄλογος ψυχὴ of 


animals )( Ψυχὴ λόγον ἔχουσα of men. Zeno frag. 56, 
1. 41, ψυχὴν ἀφῃρημένον ζῷον, Ar. Did. ap. Euseb. P.E. Xv. 
20. 3, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων Kal ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχάς. To 
the passages cited by Stein from Marcus Aurelius add 
v. 16, vi. 14. 

45. Plut. de sollertia animalium ΧΙ. 2, 3, ὁ μὲν οὖν 
Κλεάνθης ἔλεγε, καίπερ οὐ φάσκων μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζῷα, 

, / i ΎΣ Uy lal aE 
τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ παρατυχεῖν" μύρμηκας ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ μυρμη- 

« , A / ’ , 5 > A 

κιὰν ἑτέραν μύρμηκα νεκρὸν φέροντας" ἀνιόντας οὖν ἐκ τῆς 
μυρμηκιᾶς ἑτέρους οἷον ἐντυγχάνειν αὐτοῖς καὶ πάλιν 

L ᾿ \ n ar \ C ὌΝ , \ 
κατέρχεσθαι: Kal τοῦτο δὶς ἢ τρὶς γενέσθαι" τέλος δέ, τοὺς. 
μὲν κάτωθεν ἀνενεγκεῖν ὥσπερ λύτρα τοῦ νεκροῦ σκώληκα, 
τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἀραμένους, ἀποδόντας δὲ τὸν νεκρὸν οἴχεσ- 
θαι. Aelian Nat. An. vi. 50, Κλεάνθην τὸν "Accor κατη- 
νάγκασε καὶ ἄκοντα εἶξαι καὶ ἀποστῆναι τοῖς ζῴοις τοῦ 
καὶ ἐκεῖνα λογισμοῦ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, ἀντιλέγοντα ἰσχυρῶς 
καὶ κατὰ κράτος, ἱστορία τοιαύτη, φασίν. ἔτυχεν ὁ Kre- 
ἄάνθης καθήμενος καὶ μέντοι καὶ σχολὴν ἄγων μακροτέραν 
ἄλλως: οὐκοῦν μύρμηκες παρὰ τοῖς ποσὶν ἦσαν αὐτῷ 

To pee ION: ἐν Ca ἘΣ > a ces \ 

πολλοί ὁ δὲ ἄρα ὁρᾷ ἐξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἑτέρας νεκρὸν 
μύρμηκα μύρμηκας ἄλλους κομίζοντας εἰς οἶκον ἑτέρων, 
καὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὐ συντρόφων καὶ ἐπί γε τῷ χείλει τῆς μυρ- 
μηκιᾶς ἑστῶτας αὐτῷ νεκρῷ, καὶ ἀνιόντας κάτωθεν ἑτέρους 
καὶ συνόντας τοῖς ξένοις ὡς ἐπί τινι, εἶτα κατιόντας τοὺς 
αὐτούς, καὶ πλεονάκις τοῦτο καὶ τελευτῶντας σκώληκα, 
[2 \ , / Fs ~ Ἂς 9 Lal \ lal / 
οἱονεὶ λύτρα, κομίσαι" τοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνον μὲν λαβεῖν, προέσθαι 
δὲ ὅνπερ οὖν ἐπήγοντο νεκρόν καὶ ἐκείνους ὑποδέξασθαι 
’ tf e ey , Δ 9. ᾿ 
ἀσμένως, ὡς υἱὸν κομιζομένους ἢ ἀδελφόν. 

μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζῷα: for animals possess indeed ψυχήν, 
but ποὺ ψυχὴν λόγον ἔχουσαν καὶ διάνοιαν: hence the 

ω Ὗ 

term ἄλογα Soa: cf. Sext. Math. x1. 99 foll:—the Stoics 
say that the courage of certain of the nobler (γενναῖα) 
animals proves that τὸ καλὸν is φύσει αἱρετόν, but only 


ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις can discern τὸ καλόν: hence 6 adex- 
τρύων καὶ 6 ταῦρος μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονίμης διαθέσεως 
οὐκ ἂν βλέποι τὸ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. Hermes ap. Stob. 
Ecl. 1. 41. 6, p. 284, 12, πῶς οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινα τῶν ἀλόγων 
ἐπιστήμῃ Kal τέχνῃ χρώμενα, οἷον τοὺς μύρμηκας Tas 
τροφὰς ἀποθησαυριζομένους τοῦ χειμῶνος. It was easier, 
however, for the Stoics than for those who separate the 
soul of man from that of animals by a sharp dividing line, 
to make the admission which circumstances forced upon 
Cleanthes. For the soul of man differs from that of 
animals in degree only and not in kind; it is the same 
substance, though varying in its degrees of purity, which 
permeates inorganic matter as ἕξις, plants as φύσις, and 
men and animals as yuy7 (Diog. L. vir. 139). Chrysippus 
believed that dogs possessed the power of inference (Sext. 
Pyrrh. 1. 69). Stein, Psychol. n. 165, is mistaken in quoting 
Ael. ΝΑ. Iv. 45 as an authority bearing on this subject. - 
The passage, when cited in full, is seen to have an entirely 
different application: Ὅμηρος μὲν οὖν φησὶν “ὡς ἀγαθὸν 
καὶ παῖδα καταφθιμένοιο λυπέσθαι,᾽ ἔοικε δὲ ἡ φύσις 
δεικνύναι, ὅτε καὶ φίλον ἑαυτῷ τιμωρὸν καταλιπεῖν, ὦ 
φίλε ὍὍμηρε, κέρδος ἐστίν, οἷόν τι καὶ περὶ Ζήνωνος καὶ 
Κλεάνθους νοοῦμεν εἴ τι (or εἴτε) ἀκούομεν, i.e. it was an 
advantage to Zeno to leave his friend Cleanthes behind 
him to uphold his doctrines. 

μύρμηκας: cf. Cic. N.D. 11. 21, num existimas formicam 
anteponendam esse huic pulcherrimae urbi, quod in urbe 
sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus sed etiam 
mens ratio memoria? Aristotle allowed that some animals, 
and especially bees, possessed νοῦς (cf. Grote’s Aristotle, 
p. 483). 

ἄλλως: “aimlessly”: so Eur. Hipp. 375, ἤδη ποτ᾽ ἄλλως 
νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ θνητῶν ἐφρόντισ᾽ 4h διέφθαρται 

po --- τὰν 


ἐξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἑτέρας: alluding to the practice of ants to 
use one narrow path in passing backwards and forwards 
between their hole and any other place. Cf. Verg. Aen. 
Iv. 404, praedamque per herbas convectant calle angusto. 
Georg. 1.379, angustum formica terens iter, where Forbiger 
refers to Arist. Hist. An. 1x. 88, del μίαν ἀτραπὸν πάντες 


46. Cic. Ν' ἢ. τ 37, idemque (Cleanthes) quasi 
delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, tum 
fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divini- 
tatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse 

quasi delirans: for the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς see Introd. 
p. 53. 

formam quandam: either (1) an allusion to the alle- 
gorical explanations of the popular deities, whereby they 
are identified with the powers of nature, or (2) referring 
to ἀνικήτοις ἐν χερσίν in the hymn to Zeus, as Prof. Mayor 

astris: this position is proved at length in N. 1). 1. 
40—44, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. 1. 21. 5. p. 185, 5, 
ἐν ᾧ (αἰθέρι) τὰ ἄστρα καθίδρυται...θεῖα τὴν φύσιν ὄντα 
καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν. 

47. Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 5, ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ 
Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεών 
τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν γῆν τὸν ἀέρα τὴν θάλατταν οὐδένα τῶν 
τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ᾽ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου 
τοῦ Διός, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους... 
ταῦτα δὲ οὐ...τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ie 
βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ προνοίας εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ 
Φυσέως γράμμασι διαῤῥήδην. λέγουσι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς 
ἅπαντας εἶναι yea Kal phapnrOHevas ὑπὸ πυρός, 
τηκτοὺς κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας. 

Η. Ρ. 18 


ἐμπεπληκότες: the Stoics would readily admit this: Cicero 
makes his Stoic say:—quidquid enim magnam utilitatem 
generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga 
homines fieri arbitrabantur (N.D. 1. 60). 

Avs: Zeus is here identified, as often, with the supreme 
Stoic God: see Zeller, p. 358. 

ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν «+A. Chrysippus wrote περὶ θεῶν 
(Diog. vil. 148), περὶ προνοίας (ib. 139), περὶ εἱμαρμένης 
(ib. 149), and φυσικά (ib. 39). For Cleanthes περὶ θεῶν 
see Introd. p. 51. 

φθαρησομένους: cf. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5. 
Plut. de def. Or. ο. 19, καίτοι τοὺς Στωικοὺς γινώσκομεν 
ov μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων ἣν λέγω δόξαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
θεῶν ὄντων τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος ἑνὶ χρωμένους ἀϊδίῳ καὶ 
ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι 

48. Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 1. 12. p. 25,3. Κλεάνθους. 

κύδιστ᾽ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεί, 
Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, 
χαῖρε' σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν. 
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ᾿ ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες 
μοῦνοι, ὅσα Swe τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ᾽ ἐπὶ γαῖαν' 5 
τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος ἀιὲν ἀείσω. 

\ \ a ¢ , ε ‘ \ a 
σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος, ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν, 
πείθεται, ἣ κεν ἄγῃς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται" 
τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ἐνὶ χερσὶν 
> , , i: t pe 
ἀμφήκη, Tupoevt , ἀειζώοντα κεραυνόν 10 
τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῇς φύσεως πάντ᾽ ἐρρίγα «σιν;" 
ᾧ σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων 
φοιτᾷ, μυγνύμενος μεγάλοις μικροῖς τε φάεσσι' 
[ὡς τόσσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός, 

0 ’ > a ἃ -" 
οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον, 15 
οὔτε κατ᾽ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ᾽ ἐνὶ πόντῳ, 


, ὝΕΣ 3 
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν avoiats 
’ , Lal 
ἀλλὰ σὺ Kal τὰ περισσά-- τ᾽ »ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, 
\ a Μ \ χὰ / \ I 3 / 
Kal κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα Kal ov φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν, 
ἃ ἣν a 
ὧδε yap εἰς ἕν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, 20 
WA > of , U , δ. ἦς ban 2 
ὥσθ᾽ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πιάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα, 
ε ᾿ A Ὁ / ᾿ 
ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσι, 
Ὁ A / 
δύσμοροι, of T ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες 
᾿ lal a εἶ ,} Yi / 
οὔτ᾽ ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν, 
A / \ , ἘΣ 
ᾧ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν. Za 
a 2) I 
αὐτοὶ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁρμῶσιν ἄνοι κακὸν ἄλλος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο, 
© x ic x , \ / ” 
οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδὴν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες, 
᾽ \ / 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, 
Μ > >’ ” \ / «ς 7 »Μ 
ἄλλοι δ᾽ εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα 
ve Aer eon yr eee tp ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοτε δ᾽ ἄλλα φέροντες, 90 
, ‘4 , > ie a / 
σπεύδοντες μάλα πάμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι. 
9 \ a , > , 
αλλὰ Zed πάνδωρε, κελαινεφές, ἀργικέραυνε, 
ΕῚ 7 \ \ a 
avOpatrous<pev>pvou ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς, 
“δ , / ‘4 a \ a 
ἣν ov, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι 
id - / \ a ~ 
γνώμης, 7 πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾶς, 35 
Μ » ΩΝ x > / / a 
ὄφρ᾽ av τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά oe τιμῇ, 
€ na \ ” 
ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ws ἐπέοικε 
fal \ 9: ἢ e | > q Mv an / » Lal 
νητὸν €ovT , ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον, 
Μ - Ν ᾽ ς an 
οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν. 

1. πολυώνυμε: not merely in the popular religion, but 
more particularly from the Stoic standpoint, cf. Diog. L. 
Vil. 147 δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων, Kal ὥσπερ πατέρα πάν- 
των κοινῶς τε, καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, 
ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνά- 
wets. See also Krische, p. 401; Stein, Psych. n. 74. 

2. νόμου: cf. Zeno, frag. 39. 

4. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν. Cf. Act. Apost. XVII. 28, 
where the words τοῦ yap καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν are quoted by 
St Paul. The divergence in reading points to the fact 



that these words were taken from the Phaenomena οὔ 
Aratus, 1. 5, rather than from the present passage. 

ἤχου: so MS. F, an unmetrical and senseless reading, 
not yet satisfactorily corrected. The vulg. ijs is a con- 
jecture of Brunck, and is destitute of authority. Meineke 
read γενόμεσθα λόγου ; Wachsm. (Comm. I. p. 18) sug- 
gested vod σοῦ (or ἃ δὴ cod) τμῆμα, and now proposes 
τίμημα for μίμημα; Usener ‘cum appareat ἤχου ex glos- 
semate natum esse’ vd75 (a word coined from ὑδεῖν). 
None of these are convincing, and all are inferior to 
Bergk’s ὅλου, which might have been adopted, had it 
satisfactorily accounted for the MS. reading. Wachs- 
muth indeed says that it introduces “sententiam a Stoicis 
alienam,” but he must have failed to remember frag. 24, 
which shows that it is a favourite thought with Cleanthes 
to represent the individual as a counterpart of the divine 
cosmos. It appears to me that an allusion to “speech” 
is not here appropriate, in spite of Zeller (p. 215). Mein- 
eke’s λόγου, if adopted, would mean “reason” (not 
“speech ἢ), cf. Euseb. P. E. xv. 15, p. 817 ἃ (quoted by 
Wachsm.) κοινωνίαν δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (scil. 
θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν. If γενόμεσθα 
is accepted for γένος ἐσμέν, perhaps μόνου or ἐκ σοῦ. 

5. ὅσα: for the omission of the antecedent cf. Soph. 
Ai. 1050, Trach. 350, and for the sense Hom. Il. 17. 447, 
Od. 18.131. Hirzel argues (11. 201—210), mainly relying 
on this passage, that Cleanthes was not a pantheist in the 
full sense of the term, and that he allowed only a limited 
extension to the divine πνεῦμα: but see Introd. p. 41. 

6. ἀείσω: ἀΐδω F, whence ἀείδω Wachsm.; but the 
present is very awkward after καθυμνήσω, and it is by no 
means clear that Cleanthes would have preferred ἀείσομαι 

» (see the evidence collected by Veitch 5. v.). 
7. "κόσμος is here used, as Krische, p. 425, has observed, 


in the less extended sense mentioned in Diog. vil. 188, 
καὶ ἀυτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι: 
hence ἑλισσόμενος = κυκλοφορητικός. 

9. at. So Brunck and Wachsm. ὑπό MS. F. μετά 
Mein. For the sense cf. Soph. O. C. 1515. 

10. ἀμφήκη: alluding to forked lightning, cf. Aesch. 
P. V. 1040 πυρὸς ἀμφήκης βόστρυχος. Hesych. ἄμφηκες δὲ 
ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους ἠκονημένον βέλος" ἢ κεραυνός, ἢ ξίφος. 

κεραυνόν : for the physical explanation cf. Zeno frag. 
74. But to Cleanthes κεραυνὸς is only another name for 
πληγὴ πυρός, which he identifies with τόνος, cf. Heraclit. 
frag. 28. Byw. τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός. 

11. ἐῤῥίγασιν: so Ursinus and most edd. for ἔρηγα F 
“in quo postea spatium 10 litt,” which might suggest 
ἔργα «δαμάσθη! : but there are similar spaces after vv. 
12 and 13, and the text at this point is generally sus- 
picious. Wachsm. formerly marked a lacuna after this 
line, but now agrees with Hirzel, 11. p. 118, n. 1, in referring 
ᾧ in v. 12 to κεραυνόν. 

13. μεγάλων μικροῖσι Ε΄, which Petersen tries to defend, 
was corrected by Brunck. The reference is to the sun, 
moon, and stars. For the general sense cf. Zeno frag. 45. 
A lacuna was marked after this line by Mein., who is 
followed by Wachsm. But it is equally possible that v. 
14 is a spurious or corrupt addition, for (1) the sense is 
complete without it, (2) διὰ παντὸς is suspicious after διὰ 
πάντων in v. 12, (3) it is difficult to imagine any context 
which would prevent ὡς τόσσος γεγαὼς from being frigid, 
if not obscure, (4) the excessive sigmatism is pointless. 

17—20, πλὴν ὁπόσα κτλ. The explanations given by 
the Stoics of this weak point in their system are hope- 
lessly confused and contradictory, as may be seen from 
an examination of the passages cited in the notes to 
Zeller, p. 189—193. We have had occasion to refer to 


this subject before (frag. 18), and, putting together that 
passage.and the present, we may perhaps suppose that 
Cleanthes accounted for the existence of moral evil some-' 
what as follows :—evil is not directly due to God, but is a 
necessary accompaniment of the process, whereby he 
created the world out of himself. At the same time, the 
omnipotence of God is vindicated by the consideration that 
evil is ultimately swallowed up in good, and that the 
apparent irregularity of nature is in reality only a phase 
in the working of a higher law. Chrysippus is incon- 
sistent here, as elsewhere (cf. Diog. L. vu. 180), but to 
some extent, at least, he agreed with Cleanthes: ὡς τῶν 
αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐστιν 
(Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2). We may compare Plato’s words 
Rep. π. 379 ©, οὐδ᾽ dpa ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν 
εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος" πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω 
τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν" καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλ- 
λον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα δεῖ ξητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν θεόν. See further Gercke Chrysippea, p. 699. 

24. κοινὸν νόμον. Of. infra frag. 73. No doubt Cle- 
anthes remembered Heracl. frag. 91. Byw. ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι 
τὸ φρονεῖν. 

25. κεν belongs to the verb, Madv. § 137. 

26. ἄνευ κακοῦ.. ἄλλα F, avo. Wachsm., caxdv...ddXo 

28, οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ: this phrase is used by Herod. and 
Thuc. as an equivalent for ἀτάκτως. Here it means 
“inordinately, recklessly.” Cleanthes was probably in- 
fluenced by Homer's fondness for way ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ 
κόσμον (Il. 2. 214 etc.) and the like. al. οὐδ᾽ ἐνὶ 

30, 31. ἄλλοτεν Usener, φέρονται Meineke, while in 31 
Wachsm. suggests πένεσθαι for γενέσθαι. The sense is 


unsatisfactory, but as the text is so mutilated conjecture 
seems hazardous. Mohnike (pp. 34—44) has a long dis- 
cussion on these lines, which he calls the hardest in 
the Hymn. As the text stands, 1. 31 must mean that 
the effect of the actions of the φαῦλοι is just the opposite 
to that which they intend. 

32. ἀργικέραυνε. Cf. Ζεὺς ἀργής, an expression used 
by Empedocles to denote fire (R. and P. § 131), Zeno 
frag. 116, "Apyny δὲ ἐπειδή φασι τὸν ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν. 

33. μέν: add. Scaliger, but perhaps we should read ἐκ- 
pvov. ἀπειροσύνης i.e. ἄγνοια, the condition of the φαῦλοι. 

86. γνώμης ἢ πίσυνος «7d. Another reminiscence of 
Heraclitus, frag. 19. Byw. ἕν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι 
γνώμην, ἣ κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων. 

49. Philodem. de Mus. col. 28, 1, εἰ μεκή γε πΡαρὰ 
Κλεάν«θ»ει λέγειν «αὐτὰ; Oednoova<i>v, ὅς φησιν 
’ / , *: \ Ν \ \ 
AMELVO<Va>YE εἰναι TA ποιητικὰ καὶ «μουσξικα Trapa- 
δείκγμξΡατα, καὶ, τοῦ «λόγξ;ρου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας 
ἱκανῶς«ς;» μὲν ἐξαγεγ;»έλλειτν δ»-υναμένου τὰ θεςῖξα καὶ 
a<v>0<p>e<mTiva, μὴ ἔχονετρος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων 

a , 9 Ψ' \ / AN δ rd ν ἢ \ 
μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας, τὰ wéT<pa> Kal τὰ μέλη Kal τοὺς 
€ \ ¢ U a \ Ἂν ᾽ ᾿ 
ῥυθμοὺς ὡς pad<i>aTa προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
τῆς τῶν θείων O<ew> pias. 

For the general sense, cf. Plat. Rep. x. 607 A, εἰδέναι 
ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς Kal ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 
ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν. The underlying thought 
is that it is impossible to define the nature of God: 
cf. Hermes, ap. Stob. Εἰ]. 1. 1. 26, θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν 
χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον. Plat. Tim. 280, 29 Ο, Ὁ. 
The construction is not quite clear. Zeller, in citing 
this passage (p. 342, 1), puts a full stop after οἰκείας, but 
this makes τὰ μέτρα x.7.d. very abrupt, and it is better 
to regard καὶ before tod λόγου as connecting εἶναι and 


προσικνεῖσθαι, although this leaves ἀμείνονα without an 

ψιλοῦ: bare prose, 1.6, stripped’ of the advantages of 
metre. The history of the word is well explained in 
Jebb’s Appendix to Oed. Col. 866. Cf. Plat. Menex. 
p. 239 B, C, ποιηταὶ...ἐν μουσικῇ ὑμνήσαντες. «ἐὰν οὖν 
ἡμεῖς ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὰ αὐτὰ λόγῳ ψιλῷ κοσμεῖν. Ψιλὸς 
λόγος also means “abstract reasoning ” (Dr Thompson on 
Phaedr. 262 0), and a “bare statement ” unsupported by 
evidence, Dem. Androt. § 22, Aphob. 1. ὃ 54. 

τῶν... «οἰκείας, “ expressions suitable to the divine majesty.” 

50. Senec. Epist. 108,10, Nam, ut dicebat Cleanthes, 
quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit, 
quum illum tuba, per longi canalis angustias tractum, 
potentiorem novissimo exitu effudit; sic sensus nostros 
clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit, 

tuba. Greek trumpets were long and straight, ending 
in a bell-shaped aperture (κώδων), cf. Aesch. Eum. 567, 
διάτορος Τυρσηνικὴ σάλπιγξ βροτείου πνεύματος πλη- 
ρουμένη ὑπέρτονον γήρυμα φαινέτω, and Soph. Ai. 17, 
where Odysseus compares the voice of Athene to the 
sound of a trumpet. 

clariorem: more distinct, cf. Cic. Div. in Q. Caecil. 
§ 48, clarius dicere (of an actor) γί multum summittere. 

sensus: signification, meaning: as in Ov. Fast. v. 484, 
hic sensus verbi, vis ea vocis erat. Of. Sen. Ep. 7 ad fin. 
114, 1. Hence Quintilian frequently uses the word for a 
‘sentence’ or ‘ period,’ 

arta necessitas: cf. Pind. N, Iv. 33, τὰ μακρὰ δ᾽ ἐξενέ- 
πειν ἐρύκει με τεθμός. 

51. Sext. Math, rx. 88, 6 δὲ Κλεάνθης οὕτως συνη- 
ρώτα" εἰ φύσις φύσεώς ἐστι κρείττων, εἴη ἄν τις ἀρίστη 


/ > \ a 2 , ν » +7 
φύσις" εἰ ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστι κρείττων, εἴη ἂν TLS ἀριστη 
ψυχή" καὶ εἰ ζῷον τοίνυν κρεῖττόν ἐστι ξῴου, εἴη av τι 
κράτιστον ζῷον. οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτειν πέφυκε τὰ ὅ 
τοιαῦτα, ὡσπεροῦν οὔτε ἡ φύσις ἐδύνατο ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον 

” \ \ lad Μ ξ \ » Ν a 
αὔξεσθαι κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον οὔθ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτε τὸ ζῷον. 
(89) ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῷον ζῴου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἵππος χελώνης, 
εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ταῦρος ὄνου καὶ λέων ταύρου. πάντων δὲ 

\ a 2 A , \ a ἊΝ ἫΝ 0 
σχεδὸν τῶν ἐπιγείων ἕῴων καὶ σωματικῇ καὶ ψυχικῇ 1 
διαθέσει προέχει τε καὶ κρατιστεύει ὁ ἄνθρωπος" τοίνυν 
κράτιστον ἂν εἴη ζῷον καὶ ἄριστον. (90) καὶ οὐ πάνυ τι 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος κράτιστον εἶναι δύναται ξῴον, οἷον εὐθέως 
ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, 
τὸν πλεῖστον (καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὀψὲ 1 
καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίγνεται), ἐπίκηρόν τ᾽ 
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ μυρίων δεόμενον βοηθημάτων, 
καθάπερ τροφῆς καὶ σκεπασμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τοῦ 
σώματος ἐπιμελείας, πικροῦ τινος τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεσ- 
τῶτος ἡμῖν καὶ τὸν πρὸς ἡμέραν δασμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντος, καὶ 20 

> x , ef , 4 Ἃ, ᾿ 3 A Ν 
εἰ μὴ παρέχοιμεν ὥστε λούειν αὐτὸ Καὶ ἀλείφειν καὶ 

/ \ 4 , \ / 2 a 

περιβάλλειν καὶ τρέφειν, νόσους καὶ θάνατον ἀπειλοῦντος. 

4 2 i ba ς ” > \ SA \ ‘; 
ὥστε ov τέλειον ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀτελὲς δὲ καὶ πολὺ 

Vd n / \ \ Xa 

κεχωρισμένον τοῦ τελείου. (91) τὸ δὲ τέλειον καὶ ἄριστον 
κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν ὑπάρχοι ἀνθρώπου καὶ πάσαις ταῖς 2ὅ 
ἀρεταῖς συμπεπληρωμένον καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον, 
τοῦτο δὲ οὐ διοίσει θεοῦ. ἔστιν ἀρα θεός. 

This argument for the existence of God is stated in 
different language and a somewhat amplified form by 
Cic. N. 1). 11. 8383—36 : cf. especially ὃ 35. 

2. iors: the vital principle of plants. Zeno frag. 43. 

εἰ..«ἐστι..«η ἄν: in this form of the conditional 
sentence the inference is stated less bluntly than if the 
indicative were used: see Madv. ὃ 185 ΒΕ, la. This is 
especially frequent with ἐθέλω or βούλομαι in the pro- 
tasis: cf, Stallb. ad Plat. Symp. 208 c. Eur. Alc. 1079. 


A close parallel to the use here is Dem, xxxvt. 44, 

> \ a ᾽ -“ , > 4 tal ; 
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν ἐστι 

μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν, πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας. 
11. διαθέσει : cf. Zeno frag. 117. 

12. καί: Bekker proposed to read ἀλλὰ or καὶ μὴν, 

but Wachsmuth’s καίτοι is preferable. 

15. περιγένοιτο : for the optative in protasis, see Jebb — 

on Soph. Ai. 521, Ant. 666. 

16. δυσμαῖς: cf. Ar. Poet. ο. 21,§ 18,1457 b 22, ἢ ὃ γῆρας 

\ ' δι 2 , Ee TEA: >: 2 ' \ ς ‘ 
πρὸς βίον καὶ ἑσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν" ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἑσπέ- 

ραν γῆρας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἑσπέραν βίου ἢ, ὥσπερ | 
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, δυσμὰς Biov. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1123, βίου 

δύντος αὐγαῖς. The difficulty of attaining ἀρετή, in the 
Stoic sense, is illustrated by the fact that even Socrates 
and Antisthenes were only regarded as προκόπτοντες 
(Diog. vil. 91); and Alexander says that they admit the 
existence of a good man here and there, ὥσπερ τι παρά- 
δοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ Φοίνικος 
(de Fato, c. 28). In Diog. 1. 6. the fact that φαῦλοι can 
become ἀγαθοὶ is given as a proof that virtue is teachable. 
Hirzel has traced the development of the doctrine of the 
wise man within the Stoa, and shews that by the earlier 
Stoics (Zeno and his immediate pupils) the ideal was 
regarded as attainable and as actually realised by them- 
selves (pp. 274—277). 

20. ἀπαιτοῦντος. The preposition conveys the idea of 
demanding as of right: cf. ἀποδοῦναι as used in the 
Halonnesus dispute (Aeschin. Ctes. § 83). 

22. περιβάλλειν, “to clothe,” cf. Zeno, frag. 175. 

52. Cic. N. D. 11. 13—15. Cleanthes quidem noster 
quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas 
deorum esse notiones. primam posuit eam, de qua modo 
dixi, quae orta esset ex praésensione rerum futurarum: 

i i li 


alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, 5 
quae percipiuntur caeli temperatione, fecunditate terrarum, 
aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia: tertiam 
quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, 
nivibus, grandinibus, vastitate, pestilentia, terrae motibus 

et saepe fremitibus, lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium 10 
quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum 
hiatibus, tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque 
portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus, tum stellis 118, 
quae Graeci cometas nostri cincinnatas vocant...tum sole 
geminato...quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse 15 
caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt. quartam caussam 
esse eamque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus, con- 
versionem caeli, solis, lunae, siderumque omnium dis- 
tinctionem, varietatem, pulcritudinem, ordinem, quarum 
rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita. 20 
Cic. N. Ὁ. τι. 16, nam Cleanthes, ut dicebas, quattuor 
modis formatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse 
notiones. unus is modus est...qui est susceptus ex 
praesensione rerum futurarum. alter ex perturbationibus 
tempestatum et reliquis motibus. _ tertius ex commoditate 25: 
rerum quas perspicimus et copia. quartus ex astrorum 
ordine caelique constantia. 

1. Cleanthes. Mr Bywater concludes (Journ. Phil. 
vu. 75 foll.) that Cleanthes was largely indebted to 
Aristotle’s dialogue wept φιλοσοφίας for his statement 
of the four reasons given for the origin of a belief in gods, 
and proves that the first and fourth in the series were 
derived from that work. 

2. informatas. It is to be observed that Cleanthes 
regards the idea of God’s existence as derived entirely 
from our experience of external objects, and not as an 
innate conception. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 737. 

4. praesensione: this argument depends on the exis- 


tence of μαντική, ἡ δι’ ὀνείρων πρόρρησις etc. (Sext. 
Math. 1x. 132), which are described as πλῆθος πραγμάτων 
πεπιστευμένων ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. Krische, 
p. 419, attributes some further arguments to Cleanthes, 
which the evidence does not warrant. 

7. tertiam: there does not appear to be any extant 
parallel to this in the Greek texts. Although there is no 
reason to suppose that we have not here a reproduction of 
the general argument of Cleanthes, at the same time it is 
probable that Cicero has enlarged the list of portents 

from Roman sources. The prodigies mentioned are those _ 

which constantly meet us in Livy, as requiring expiation 
by lustrationes, supplicationes, lectisternia ete. Lists of 
prodigies illustrating those mentioned here by Cicero will 
be found in Liv. xxi 62, xx. 1, XxIV. 44, ΧΧΥΙ. 23, ete. 
Tac. H. 1. 86, Juv. xm. 65—70, and above all in the 
exhaustive account of Lucan, 1. 525—583. 

8. quae terreret: Prof. Mayor quotes Democritus, ap. 
Sext. Emp. rx. 24. 

14. cometas: for the physical explanation, ef. on Zeno, 
frag. 75. 

16. quartam: for a fuller statement of the fourth 
argument, cf. Sext. Math. 1x. 111—118, ib. 1x. 26—27: 
in the last passage it is simply introduced by the term 
ἔνιοι, but from its position between an argument of 
Epicurus and one belonging to some “younger Stoics,” 
Mr Bywater (Journ. Phil. vir. 76) infers that its immediate 
source was one of the earlier Stoics, possibly Cleanthes. 

17. aequabilitatem. “Cicero is probably translating 
some such phrase as ὁμαλότητα κινήσεως, φορὰν οὐρανοῦ," 
Prof. Mayor. 

53. Epiphan. adv. Haeres m1. 2. 9 (111. 37), Κλεάνθης 
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν λέγει εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, καὶ ἄνθρωπον 




ἐκάλει μόνην τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μυστικὰ σχήματα 
ἔλεγεν εἶναι καὶ κλήσεις ἱεράς, καὶ δᾳδοῦχον ἔφασκεν εἶναι 
τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὸν κόσμον μύστας καὶ τοὺς κατόχους τῶν 
θείων τελετὰς ἔλεγε. 

τὸ ἀγαθόν.. «ἡδονάς. An obvious blunder. Krische, p. 
431 n. 1, suggests that the writer of the epitome has con- 
founded the statement by Cleanthes of his opponents’ 
position with his own teaching. 

ἄνθρωπον κιτιλ. Not much can be made of this mutilated 
statement; possibly it points to the doctrine of the soul 
regarded as the bond of union for the body. Stein, Psych. 
Ῥ. 209, finds here a trace of the correspondence between 
the macrocosm and the microcosm, and quotes frag. 106 
τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους μόνῃ TH μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν. 

τοὺς θεοὺς κτλ. These obscure words appear to repre- 
sent an explanation of the Eleusinian mysteries from the 
Stoic point of view, in which the sun as the ἡγεμονικὸν 15 
symbolised by the torechbearer who marches at the head 
of the procession of mystae, and (adopting Diels’ cor- 
rections, v. infra) the world itself corresponds to the mys- 
tery play, while those who are inspired with divine truth 
are the priests. Cf. Porphyr. ap. Euseb. P. E. ΠΙ. 12. 
p. 116, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ᾽ ᾿Ελευσῖνα μυστηρίοις ὁ μὲν ἱερο- 
φάντης εἰς εἰκόνα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐνσκευάξεται, δᾳδοῦχος 
δὲ εἰς τὴν ἡλίου. For the subject in general see Prof. 
Mayor on Οἷς. N. Ὁ. 1.119. Mr Bywater however (Journ. 
Phil. vit. 78) believes that we have here a mutilated 
argument, ultimately derived from Aristotle’s dialogue 
περὶ φιλοσοφίας, and explaining the belief in the gods 
as due to a feeling of awe and admiration consequent on 
the contemplation of the heavenly bodies. The allusion 
to the mysteries is brought in by way of comparison : “we 
seem introduced into a temple like that at Eleusis, only 
more august and solemn, because the figures [=the hea- 


venly bodies] we see circling around us are not lifeless or 
made with hands, and the celebrants are not men, but the 

immortal gods.” This explanation is fortified by a τὸ - 
ference to Dio. Chrys. x11. p. 387 B, Plut. de trang. 20, | 
p. 477 ©, D (also quoted by Diels). For μυστικὰ σχή- 
ματα see Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 180, and for κλήσεις iepas 

ib. p. 62. 

μύστας... «τελετάς. Diels, p. 592, who records other sug- 
gestions, has μυστήριον... .τελεστάς. Perhaps, from a 
comparison of Chrysipp. ap. Etym. M. 751, 16 id. Plut. 
Sto. Rep. 9, we ought to restore τοὺς κατόχους τῶν θείων — 

«λόγους; τελετάς. 

54. Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβ. ἔν. 13. ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέερῳ» 
(8611. περὶ θεῶν Χρύσιππος) τά τ-«ε; εἰς Ὀρφέα «καὶ M> 
ουσαῖον dvade<pou>e<v>a καὶ «τὰ παρ᾽ «Ὁ» μήρῳ καὶ 
Ἡσιόδῳ» καὶ Εὐρις-π;ίδῃ κααὶ; ποιηταῖς ἄλλοις -«ὠὧν»ς 
καςὶ» Κλεάνθης «πρειρᾶταςι συν;οικειοῦςν; ταῖς 
δόξαις αὐτῶς«ν;. 

Cicero’s paraphrase, which omits all mention of Cle- 
anthes, is as follows (N. D. 1 41):—in secundo autem vult 
Orphei, Musaei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accomodare 
ad ea, quae ipse primo libro de dis immortalibus dixerat, 
ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem 
sint, Stoici fuisse videantur. As far as Cleanthes is con- 
cerned the direct evidence only applies to Homer: see 
Introd. p. 51, but ef. frag. 111. This passage is included 
by Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 16) under the fragments of 
the book περὶ θεῶν. 

55. Plut. de audiendis poetis ¢ 11, δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τῶν 
ὀνομάτων ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν Κλεάνθους παι- 
διὰν παραιτεῖσθαι: κατειρωνεύεται γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε προσ- 
ποιούμενος ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸ 


Zed πάτερ ἤϊδηθεν μεδέων, 
Kal TO 

Zed ἄνα Δωδωναΐῖε, 
κελεύων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὑφ᾽ ἕν, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμ- 
ἰώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν ᾿Αναδωδωναῖον ὄντα. 
Wachsmuth cites Schol. BL Homer II 233 Zed ἄνα Δω- 
δωναῖε] τινὲς δὲ ἀναδωδωναῖε ὑφ᾽ ἕν Tapa τὴν avadoow 
τῶν ἀγαθών (3) 

This comes from the book περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ according 
to Krische, p. 433, and Wachsm., Comm. 1. p. 17. Zed 
πάτερ Ἴδηθεν μεδέων, 1]. 111. 276, 320: Zed ἄνα Awdwvaie, 
I]. XVI. 238. 

παιδιάν. It is worthy of observation that Plut. dis- 
tinctly suggests that Cleanthes was not serious in his 
etymologies: see Introd. p. 43, 44, and cf. Plat. Cratyl. 
406 B, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος 
τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς. 

ἀναθυμιώμενον : a reference to the feeding of the celestial 
bodies by exhalations of coarser material, cf. frag. 29 
ὠκεανὸς δ᾽ ἐστι.. ἧς THY ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται. Cornut. 
c. 17, p. 84 Osann. ἀὴρ κατὰ ἀνάδοσιν. It may be ob- 
served that the attribution of this doctrine to Thales by 
Stob. Ecl. 1. 10, 12, p. 122, 18 cannot be relied upon. 

56. Plut. de Is. et Osir. 66, Φερσεφόνην δέ φησί που 
Κλεάνθης τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον 

Diibner translates: spiritus qui per fruges dum fertur 
interimitur. Probably this, as well as the seven following 
fragments, comes from the treatise περὶ θεῶν (Wachsm. 
Comm. 1. p. 15). Cf Plut. de Is. c. 40, where Demeter 
and Persephone are explained as τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν 
καρπῶν διῆκον πνεῦμα. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. 
col. 12, p. 79 Gomp. καὶ τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ 


πνεῦμα. Cic. N. Ὁ. 11. 66, ea (Proserpina) enim est qu 
Φερσεφόνη Graece nominatur, quam frugum semen ess 
volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt. Plato’ 
derivations of the name will be found at Cratyl. 4040, p. 
For modern views see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 894. 

57. Macrob. Sat. 1. 18, 14, unde Cleanthes ita cogno- 
minatum scribit (Dionysum) ἀπὸ τοῦ διανύσαι, quia coti- 
diano impetu ab oriente ad occasum diem noctemque 
faciendo caeli conficit cursum. 

In the Orphic hymn, quoted just before the present 
passage, Dionysus is derived from δινεῖσθαι. He is else- 
where explained by the Stoics (1) as wine, Cic. N. Ὁ. τι. 
60, cf. Plato’s derivation from δίδωμι and οἶνος, the latter 
being resolved into οἴεσθαι and νοῦς, (2) as τὸ γόνιμον. 
πνεῦμα Kal τρόφιμον, Plut. de Is. c. 40. For the identifi- 
cation of Dionysus with the sun see the commentators 
on Verg. Georg. I. 5, vos, o clarissima mundi lumina, laben- 
tem caelo quae ducitis annum, Liber et alma Ceres. 

58. Macrob. Sat. 1. 17, 8, Cleanthes (Apollinem) ὡς 
am’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιούμενον, 
quod ab aliis atque aliis locorum declinationibus faciat 

Chrysippus (Macrob. 1. c.) derived the word ᾿Απόλλων 
from ὦ and πολύς, while Plato explains the various func- 
tions of the God by different etymologies of his name 
(Crat. p. 405A—k), so that he is at once ἀπλοῦ, ἀεὶ 
βάλλοντος, ἀπολούοντος, and ὁμοπολοῦντος (ib. p. 406 A). 

59. Macrob. Sat. τ. 17. 36, Cleanthes Lycium Apol- 
linem appellatum notat quod, veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, 
ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis. 

Antipater in the same passage derives the name dé 
τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου, a guess, which, 


so far as the etymology of Λύκειος is concerned, has found 
some favour in modern times (Miiller Dor. 11. 6 § 8). Pro- 
bably Cleanthes did not recognise a distinction between 
the two titles Λύκιος and Avxevos (Soph. El. 7), and the 
best modern opinion seems to agree with him to this 
extent: see Leaf on 1]. Iv. 101. ‘The connection of Apollo 
with wolves is indicated by the legends in Pausan. 11. 9. 7, 
u. 19.3. In Cornut. ο. 32 the name is explained in con- 
nection with the pestilences brought by Apollo on flocks, 
which were therefore entrusted to him as Apollo Lycius. 
humorem eripit: cf. frags. 29 and 55. 

60. Macrob. Sat. 1. 17. 31, Λοξίας cognominatur, ut 
ait Oenopides, ὅτε ἐκπορεύεται τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον ἀπὸ 
δυσμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀνατολὰς κινούμενος, id est quod obliquum 
circulum ab occasu ad orientem pergit: aut, ut Cleanthes 
scribit, ἐπειδὴ καθ᾽ ἕλικας κινεῖται, NoEal yap εἰσι καὶ 
αὗται, quod flectuosum iter pergit. 

Cf. Achill. Tat. βαρ. 169 A, ὁ ζῳδιακὸς καὶ λοξίας 
ὑπό τινων καλεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ἥλιος Tas ὁδοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ 
πορεύεται λοξός. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ ὁ ᾿Απόλλων ὃς καλεῖται 
Λοξίας ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἶναι πιστεύεται. Cornut. ο. 32 
gives two explanations: λοξῶν δὲ καὶ περισκελῶν ὄντων 
τῶν χρησμῶν οὗς δίδωσι Λοξίας ὠνόμασται: ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς 
λοξότητος τῆς πορείας ἣν ποιεῖται διὰ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου. 
For modern derivations of the name Loxias see Jebb on 
Soph. O.T. 854. 

ἕλικας : for the obliquity of the sun’s course cf. frag. 29 
and Diog. L. vit. 144 there quoted. 

61. Photius s.v. λέσχαι, p. 158 ed. Herm., Κλεάνθης 
δέ φησιν ἀπονενεμῆσθαι τῷ ᾿Απόλλωνι τὰς λέσχας, ἐξέ- 
Spais δὲ ὁμοίας γίνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν ᾿Απόλλω Tap’ 
ἐνίοις Λεσχηνόριον ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. So Suidas I. 541 s, v. 

Ἧ Ὁ: 19 


λέσχαι. In Harpocrat.s.v. we get the additional informa- 
tion that these remarks were contained in the treatise 
περὶ θεῶν. 

Cf. Plut. de εἰ ap. Delphos ο. 2: Apollo is called Λεσ- 
ynvopios, ὅταν ἐνεργῶσι καὶ ἀπολαύωσι χρώμενοι τῷ 
διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φιλοσοφέϊν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The inference 
drawn by Wachsmuth seems correct, viz., that Cornutus 
took from Cleanthes the words found in ο. 32, καὶ λεσχη- 
νόριον δ᾽ αὐτὸν (Ἀπόλλωνα) προσηγόρευσαν διὰ τὸ τὰς 
ἡμέρας ταῖς λέσχαις καὶ τῷ ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις συνέχεσθαι 
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ νύκτας καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἀναπαύεσθαι. 
He remarks that Cornutus appears to have devoted much 
attention to the study of Cleanthes. Cf. Pers. Sat. v. 63, 
cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures fruge Cle- — 

ἐξέδραι. These were recesses or alcoves sometimes 
branching out from an open air court, and fitted with 
stone seats; they were especially adapted for the con- 
versation of philosophers and rhetoricians. Cf. Cic. Fin. 
v. 4, ego illa moveor exedra; modo enim fuit Carneadis; 
quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa, 
tanta ingeni magnitudine orbata, desiderari illam vocem 
puto. “Vitruvius in his description of the palaestra, or 
gymnasium, such as were attached to Roman villas of the 
higher class, recommends that in three of the cloisters 
surrounding the court there should be exedrae spatiosae 
in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis 
delectantur sedentes disputare possint v. 11.” Prof. Mayor 
on Cic. N.D. 1. 15. See also Becker, Charicles, p. 303. 
Guhl and Koner, p. 403. 

ὁμοίας: the distinction between λέσχαι and ἐξέδραι 
seems to be that the former were separate buildings used 
entirely as lounges, whereas the latter were attached 
either to a private house or a public gymnasium. 


62. Cornut. c. 31 ad fin., τοὺς δὲ δώδεκα ἄθλους 
ἐνδέχεται μὲν ἀναγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, ὡς 
καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐποίησεν" οὐ δεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ εὑρεσί- 
λογον πρεσβεύειν. 

It seems clear from the account οἵ Cornutus that there 
were two current modes of allegorical interpretation of the 
myths which centre round Heracles. By one set of inter- 
preters Heracles was regarded as an ordinary mortal and 
by others as a god. Cleanthes apparently explained the 
twelve labours from the latter point of view. An illustra- 
tion of this line of interpretation may be seen in the 
explanation given by Cornutus of Heracles as an archer: 
καὶ τοξότης δ᾽ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρεισάγοιτο, κατά τε TO πανταχοῦ 
διϊκνεῖσθαι κιτιλ. But in the account of the twelve labours 
in Heraclitus, All. Hom. c. 33, Heracles is represented 
simply as a wise man who brought to light the hidden 
truths of philosophy: Ἡρακλέα δὲ νομιστέον οὐκ ἀπὸ 
σωματικῆς δυνάμεως ἀναχθέντα τοσοῦτον ἰσχῦσαι τοῖς 
τότε χρόνοις. ἀλλ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἔμφρων καὶ σοφίας οὐρανίου 
μύστης γεγονώς, ὡσπερεὶ κατὰ βαθείας ἀχλύος ὑποδε- 
δυκυῖαν ἐφώτισε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, καθάπερ ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ 
Στωικῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι. Zeller, pp. 368, 369, relying on 
the concluding words of the passage cited, thinks that the 
account is derived from Cleanthes, but, if so, there is a 
discrepancy with Cornutus. Krische (p. 400) on the other 
hand says:—“irre ich nicht, so fiihrte Kleanthes, gleichwie 
spater Porphyrius (bei Euseb. P.E. m1. 112 c), die zwolf Ar- 
beiten des Herakles auf die Bahn der Sonne durch die συν] 
Zeichen des Zodiakus zuriick (Cornut. de N. Ὁ. p. 91 αλ᾽ 

εὑρεσίλογον : “expectes tov,’ Lang. Osann interprets this 
to mean that Cornutus apologises for referring to the 
authority of Cleanthes by saying that such a trifler ought 
not to be respected in all cases. This derives a certain 
amount of support from Plutarch de aud. poet. p. 31 where 




Chrysippus is spoken of as εὑρεσιλογῶν ἀπιθάνως. But 
it seems strange that Cornutus should have alluded to 
Cleanthes in this manner. Why cannot the word be used 
in a good sense as in Diog. L.1v. 37? Mr Hicks suggests 


63. Schol. in Hom. Il. πι|. 64, ap. Bekker, p. 99 
b. 23, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἐν Λέσβῳ οὕτω τιμᾶσθαι χρυσῆν 

Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 15) classes this among the 
fragments of the work περὶ θεῶν, but there is more likeli- 
hood in Krische’s view (p. 433) that it belongs to the περὶ 
τοῦ ποιητοῦ, for there is no reason to separate it from 
frags. 55 and 65. Perhaps Cleanthes tried to explain the 
currency of the epithet χρυσέη by the existence of a gilded 
statue of Aphrodite at Lesbos. For the figurative mean- 
ing of χρυσοῦς = precious, which is perhaps all that is 
implied in the epithet, see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 699. 

64. Athen. xu. 572f., πόρνης δὲ ᾿Αφροδίτης ἱερόν 
ἐστι παρὰ ᾿Αβυδηνοῖς, ὥς φησι Πάμφιλος" κατεχομένης 
γὰρ τῆς πόλεως δουλείᾳ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ποτε 
θύσαντας, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν τοῖς Μυθικοῖς, καὶ 
μεθυσθέντας ἑταίρας πλείονας προσλαβεῖν" ὧν μίαν, κατα- 
κοιμηθέντας αὐτοὺς ἰδοῦσαν, ἀνελομένην τὰς κλεῖς καὶ τὸ 
τεῖχος ὑπερβᾶσαν, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τοῖς ᾿Αβυδηνοῖς. τοὺς δ᾽ 
αὐτίκα μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἀφικομένους, ἀνελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φύλακας, 
κρατήσαντας δὲ τῶν τειχών καὶ γενομένους ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς 
ἐλευθερίας χαριστήρια τῇ πόρνῃ ἀποδίδοντας ᾿Αφροδίτης 
Πόρνης ναὸν ἱδρύσασθαι. 

Πόρνης: cf. Aphrodite Pandemos, and the worship of 
Aphrodite Ourania at Corinth (Becker's Charicles, p. 246). 
The object of Cleanthes was doubtless to explain away the 
discreditable legends attaching themselves to the gods, 
and thus in the present instance the debased worship at 


Abydos is shown to be due to the accident of a historical 
circumstance, and not to the essential characteristics of 
the goddess. There is however considerable doubt as to 
the genuineness of this fragment, see Introd. p. 51. 

65. Schol. in Hom. Od. 1. 52, ap. Cramer, Anecd. 
Oxon. π|. 416, ὀλοόφρονος] Κλεάνθης δασύνει" τοῦ περὶ 
τῶν ὅχων φρονοῦντος. 

Wachsmuth also quotes Eustath. in Hom. p. 1389, 55, 
τὸν "Ἄτλαντα. ..οἱ μὲν ἀχλληγοροῦσιν εἰς THY ἀκάματον καὶ 
ἀκοπίατον πρόνοιαν τὴν πάντων αἰτίαν καὶ ὀλοόφρονα τὸν 
τοιοῦτον "Λτλαντα νοοῦσιν, ὡς τὸν ὑπὲρ ὅλων φρονοῦντα 
ἤγουν τῶν ὅχων φροντιστικὸν. διὸ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης, ὥς φασιν, 
ἐδάσυνε τὸ ὃ τῆς ἀρχούσης. Cf. Cornut. de nat. d. c. 26, 
ὀλοόφρονα δ᾽ αὐτὸν ΟΛτλαντα) εἰρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν 
ὅλων φροντίζειν καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τῆς πάντων αὐτοῦ τῶν 
μερῶν σωτηρίας. See also Flach Glossen u. Scholien zur 
Hes. Th. p. 76. Cleanthes identified Atlas with πρόνοια, 
as holding together the framework of the world (cf. ἕξις). 

66. Apollon. soph. lex. Homer, p. 114 ed. Bekk. v. 
μῶλυ (x. 305), Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀλληγορικώς 
φησι δηλοῦσθαι τὸν λόγον, δι’ οὗ μωλύνονται αἱ ὁρμαὶ καὶ 
τὰ πάθη. 

This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. 1. p. 18): 
ef, Zeno, frag. 160, διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν 
καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον. Stob. Ecl. 
I. 7. 105 p. 89, 16, πάντες δ᾽ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες 
ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον. In this connection we may 
observe that Odysseus was taken by the Stoic school as 
one of the few typical wise men (Sen. de Const. 2. 1, de 
Benef. 13. 3). This is the earliest known instance of the 
word ἀλληγορία. 

67. Certamen Homer. et Hesiod., p. 4, 18, ed. Nietzsch 
(in act. societ. philol. Lips. tom. 1. fase. 1), “Ἑλλάνικος μὲν 


yap καὶ Κλεάνθης Μαίονα (sic coni. Sturz, Hellanic. frg. 
p- 171 et Welcker ep. cycl. p. 149 pro Blova) λέγουσι 
(πατέρα Ὁμήρου). 

This frag. is taken from Wachsm. Comm, 1. p. 17. 
Cf. Procl. vit. Hom. ap. Gaisford Hephaestion, p. 516, oi 
μὲν οὖν Σμυρναῖον αὐτὸν ἀποφαινόμενοι Maiovos μὲν 
πατρὸς λέγουσιν εἶναι. ib. p. 517, Malova γάρ φασι (scil. 
Ἑλλάνικος καὶ Δαμαστὴς καὶ Φερεκύδης) τὸν Ὁμήρου 

68. Porphyr. vit. Pythag. 1, 2, Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ 
πέμπτῳ τῶν μυθικῶν Σύρον, ἐκ Τύρου τῆς Συρίας (scil. 
Mnesarchus, the father of Pythagoras). σιτοδείας δὲ κατα- 
λαβούσης τοὺς Σαμίους προσπλεύσαντα τὸν Μνήσαρ- 
χον κατ᾽ ἐμπορίαν μετὰ σίτου τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἀποδόμενον 

5 τιμηθῆναι πολιτείᾳ. Πυθαγόρου δ᾽ ἐκ παίδων εἰς πᾶσαν 
μάθησιν ὄντος εὐφυοῦς, τὸν Μνήσαρχον ἀπαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν 
εἰς Τύρον, ἐκεῖ δὲ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις συστάντα μετασχεῖν 
τούτων ἐπὶ πλεῖον ποιῆσαι, ἐπανελθόντα δ᾽ εἰς τὴν ᾿Ιωνίαν 
ἐντεῦθεν τὸν Πυθαγόραν πρῶτον μὲν Φερεκύδῃ τῷ Συρίῳ 

10 ὁμιλῆσαι δεύτερον δ᾽ “Eppodayavts τῷ Κρεωφυλίῳ ἐν 
Σάμῳ ἤδη γηράσκοντι. λέγει δ᾽ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἄλλους εἶναι 
ot τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Τυρηνὸν ἀποφαίνονται τῶν τὴν 
Λῆμνον ἀποικησάντων ἐντεῦθεν δὲ κατὰ πρᾶξιν εἰς Σάμον 
ἐλθόντα καταμεῖναι καὶ ἀστὸν γενέσθαι. πλέοντος δὲ τοῦ 
15 Μνησάρχου εἰς τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν συμπλεύσαντα τὸν Πυθα- 
γόραν νέον ὄντα κομιδῇ σφόδρα οὖσαν εὐδαίμονα καὶ τόθ᾽ 
ὕστερον εἰς αὐτὴν ἀποπλεῦσαι. καταλέγει δ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ 
ἀδελφοὺς δύο Ἑὔνουστον καὶ Τυρρηνὸν πρεσβυτέρους. 
Wachsmuth also quotes Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. p. 1298. 
ὡς δὲ Κλεάνθης (MSS. Νεάνθης) Σύριος ἢ Τύριος (fuit 
Pythagoras). Theodoret, Graec. aff. cur. p. 8, 43, ὁ δὲ 
Κλεάνθης (MSS. Νεάνθης) Τύριον (Πυθαγόραν) ὀνομάζει. 
This frag. must stand or fall with ἔταρ, θ4. The facts 


in the life of Pythagoras with which these statements are 
concerned will be found fully discussed by Zeller, pre- 
Socratics, 1. p. 324 foll. After εὐδαίμονα in 1. 16 some 
such word as αἰσθέσθαι seems wanted. 

69. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluviorum nominibus, V. 3, 
παράκειται δ᾽ [αὐτῷ] τὸ Καυκάσιον ὄρος" ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ 
τὸ πρότερον Βορέου κοίτη δι’ αἰτίαν τοιαύτην. Βορέας 
δι᾿ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Χιόνην ἁρπάσας, τὴν ᾿Αρκτούρου 
θυγατέρα, κατήνεγκεν εἴς τινα λόφον Νιφάντην καλού- 
μενον, καὶ ἐγέννησεν ἐκ τῆς προειρημένης υἱὸν Ὕρπακα, 5 
τὸν διαδεξάμενον ἩἩνιόχου τὴν βασίλειαν. μετωνομάσθη 
δὲ τὸ ὄρος κοίτη Βορέου. προσηγορεύθη δὲ Καύκασος διὰ 
περίστασιν τοιαύτην. μετὰ τὴν γιγαντομαχίαν Κρόνος 
ἐκκλίνων τὰς Διὸς ἀπειλάς, ἔφυγεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρώρειαν 
Βορέου κοίτης, καὶ εἰς κροκόδειλον μεταμορφωθεὶς «ἔλαθεν" 10 
6 δὲ Προμήθευς;» ἕνα τῶν ἐγχωρίων ποιμένα, Καύκασον, 
ἀναταμών, καὶ κατανοήσας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν 
σπλάγχνων, εἶπεν οὐ μακρὰν εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους. ὁ 
δὲ Ζεὺς ἐπιφανεὶς τὸν μὲν πατέρα δήσας πλεκτῷ ἐρίῳ, 
κατεταρτάρωσε᾽ τὸ δ᾽ ὄρος εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ ποιμένος Kav-15 
κασον μετόνομάσας, προσέδησεν αὐτῷ τὸν Προμηθέα καὶ 
ἠνάγκασεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ σπλαγχνοφάγου ἀετοῦ βασανί- 
ἕεσθαι, ὅτι παρηνόμησεν εἰς τὰ σπλάγχνα, ὡς ἱστορεῖ 
Κλεάνθης ἐν γ΄ θεομαχίας. : 

The treatise de Fluviis was composed perhaps in the 
reign of Hadrian or Trajan, but all or nearly all the 
authorities which the author cites are impudent fictions. 
For further information see the Preface to Hercher’s 
edition of the tract (Lips. 1851) and especially § 3. 

2. Βορέου κοίτη: cf. Pind. Nem. 1. 3, "Optuyla δέμνιον 
᾿Αρτεμίδος. Hom. 1]. XXIV. 615, ἐν Σιπύλῳ ὅθι φασὶ 
θεάων ἔμμεναι εὐνὰς νυμφάων. 

10. μεταμορφωθείς. Wyttenbach saw that some words 


had fallen out here, since a reference to Prometheus is 
required. He supplied therefore the words within brackets 
and substituted ἀναταμὼν for ἀναπαύων. For ἀναπαύων 
ἀναρπάξων (Reinesius) and ἀνασπῶν (Dodwell) have also 
been suggested. 

70. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluv. v. 4, γεννᾶται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ 
(Caucasus) βοτάνη Προμήθειος καλουμένη, ἣν Μήδεια 
συλλέγουσα καὶ λειοτριβοῦσα, πρὸς ἀντιπαθείας τοῦ 
πατρὸς ἐχρήσατο, καθὼς ἱστορεῖ ὁ αὐτός (scil. Cleanthes). 

Προμήθειος, cf. Ap. Rhod. 111. 843, 

ἡ δὲ τέως γλαφυρῆς ἐξείλετο φωριαμοῖο 
φάρμακον, ὅ ρρά τε φασὶ ἸΤρομήθειον καλέεσθαι, 
where a lengthy description of the plant and its virtues is 

given. Prop. 1. 12. 9, num me deus obruit, an quae 
lecta Prometheis dividit herba iugis. 

71. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluv. xvi. 4, γεννᾶται δ᾽ ἐν 
αὐτῷ (Taygetus) βοτάνη καλουμένη Χαρισία ἣν <ai> 
γυναῖκες ἔαρος ἀρχομένου τοῖς τραχήλοις περιάπτουσι 
καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν συμπαθέστερον ἀγαπῶνται" καθὼς. 
ἱστορεῖ Ἰζλεάνθης ἐν a’ περὶ ὀρῶν. 

Χαρισία: Hercher thinks this word is invented from 
the name of a city in Arcadia. 


72. Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 6%, p. 76, 3, Κλεάνθης... οὕτως 
ἀπέδωκε" τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως TH φύσει ζῆν. Cf 
Diog. L. vu. 87, Clem. Alex. Strom. 11 21. 129, p. 497 P., 
179 S., Κλεάνθης δὲ (scil. τέλος ἡγειται) τὸ ὁμολογου- 
μένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ἐν τῷ εὐλογιστεῖν, ὃ ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἐκλογῇ κεῖσθαι διελάμβανεν. 


In the extract from Clement, Krische, p. 423 n., pro- 
poses to insert the words Διογένης δὲ between ζῆν and ἐν 
τῷ εὐχογιστεῖν on the evidence afforded by Diog. L. vil. 
88, Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 6%, p. 76, 9, who both expressly 
attribute the definition εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν TH τῶν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἐκλογῇ to Diogenes Babylonius. His suggestion 
is approved by Wachsmuth (Comm. II. p. 4) and Heinze, 
Stoic. Eth. p. 11 n. For the question as to whether 
Cleanthes first introduced the words τῇ φύσει into the 
definition, see on Zeno, frag. 120. 

73. Diog. L. vil. 89, φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, 
ἡ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως ἀνθρωπίνην" 
ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἡ 
ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους" τήν τε 
ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ αὑτὴν 
εἶναι αἱρετήν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἢ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν" 
ἐν αὐτῇ τε εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτε οὔσῃ ψυχῇ πεποιη- 
μένῃ πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου: διαστρέφεσθαι 
δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγ- 
ματειῶν πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν 
συνόντων, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. 

Diogenes leads us to suppose that Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus dissented as to the interpretation of φύσις, 
and that Cleanthes refused to allow that human nature 
is included. This however is scarcely credible (cf. the 
next frag.), although it is quite possible that Cleanthes 
laid special stress on κοινὴ φύσις and κοινὸς νόμος, Cf. 
frag. 48, 1. 24, Cic. Fin. m1. 73, utrum conveniat necne 
natura hominis cum universa. So Zeller, p. 229, who is 
followed by Wellmann, p. 448. To attain this conformity 
an acquaintance with physics is necessary (Cie, Lee 
Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 9). Hirzel 11. pp. 112—118, 
thinks that Diogenes’ account is substantially ght. He 


regards Zeno as the upholder of Cynicism in preference 
to which Cleanthes devoted himself to the study of 
Heraclitus, cf. Heracl. fr. 7, Sch., διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ 
ξυνῷ, τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς 
ἐδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. To the objection that Zeno had 
already recognised the Heraclitean λόγος as a leading 
physical principle, Hirzel answers that it does not follow 
that he also transferred it to the region of ethics, and 
that Cleanthes must be credited with this innovation. 
The latter part of the fragment has been included in 
deference to the judgment of Wachsmuth, but it appears 
extremely doubtful whether we are justified in tracing 
the epitomised views back to Cleanthes, because his name 
appears in the context. 

διάθεσιν ὁμολογουμένην : for διάθεσιν see on Zeno, frag. 
117, and for the general sense cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. 
Ecl. π. 7. 5", p. 60, 7, κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν 
εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. 

ἅτ᾽ οὔσῃ: Zeller (p. 238, 3) corrects οὔσης ψυχῆς 

ἀφορμάς, cf. frag. 82. 

74. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 6°, p. 77, 21, εὐδαιμονία δ᾽ ἐστὶν 
εὔροια βίου. κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὅρῳ τούτῳ ἐν 
τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ 
τούτων πάντες τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἑτέραν 
τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίου, καίτοι γε λέγοντες τὴν μὲν εὐδαι- 
μονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι τέλος δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς 
εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταυτὸν εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Sext. 
Emp. Math. xt. 80, εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν 
Κλεάνθην, εὔροια βίου. 

σκοπόν. For the distinction between σκοπὸς and τέλος, 
ef. Stob. ἘΠ]. 11. 7. 3°, p. 47, 8, καὶ ἔστι σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ 
προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἷον ἀσπὶς τοξόταις" τέλος δ᾽ ἡ 


τοῦ προκειμένου τεῦξις. βούλονται yap ἐνέργημα ἡμέ- 
τερον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ib. IL. 7. 6%, p. 77, 1—5. 
Wachsmuth believes the distinction to be due to Chry- 
sippus. The difficult passage in Cic. Fin. 11. 22 is not 
really parallel to this: see Madv. in loc. On the whole 
matter see Hirzel, p. 550 foll.: he argues that the dis- 
tinction between σκοπὸς and τέλος was foreign to the 
earlier Stoa, and was introduced by Panaetius. 

75. Clem. Alex. Protrept. vi. 72, p. 91 61 P., 
Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ ᾿Ασσεύς, ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλόσοφος ὃς 
οὐ θεογονίαν ποιητικὴν θεολογίαν δὲ ἀληθινὴν ἐνδείκνυται. 
οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο τοῦ θεοῦ πέρι ὅτι περ εἶχεν φρονών" 

τἀγαθὸν ἐρωτᾷς μ᾽ οἷον ἔστ᾽ ; ἄκουε δή" 
τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβές, 

κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον, 
αὐστηρόν, αὐθέκαστον, αἰεὶ συμφέρον, 

ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον, δ 
ὠφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, 

ἔντιμον 5 * is ὁμολογούμενον, 
εὐκλεές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρᾷον, σφοδρόν, 
χρονιζόμενον, ἄμεμπτον, αἰεὶ διαμένον. 

The same occurs in Strom. v. 14, 110, p. 715 P., 257 S., 
introduced by the words ἔν τινὶ ποιήματι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ 
and also in Euseb. P. E. x. 13, p. 679. 

Clement’s mistake in referring these lines to Cleanthes’ 
conception of the deity, when they really refer to the 
ethical summum bonum, is obvious, and has been pointed 
out by Krische, p. 420 f. Krische thinks that they may 
have formed a poetical appendix to the prose work, which 
is either the περὶ τέλους or the περὶ καλῶν. 

Seven of these epithets, viz. δίκαιον, χρήσιμον, καλόν, 
δέον, συμφέρον, λυσιτελές, ὠφέλιμον are predicated of 


ἀγαθὸν in Diog. L. vit. 98, 99, with the addition of 
αἱρετὸν and εὔχρηστον: cf. Stob. Ecl. π΄ 7. 5%, p. 69, 11, 
πάντα δὲ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι καὶ εὔχρηστα καὶ συμ- 
φέροντα καὶ λυσιτελῆ καὶ σπουδαῖα καὶ πρέποντα καὶ 
καλὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα, ib. 5', p. 72, 19, ib. 11}, Ῥ. 100, 15 foll. 
Chrysippus proved similar statements by his favourite 
chain arguments, Plut. Sto. Rep. ο. 13, Cie. Fin. mt. 27, 
Tuse. v. 4. | 

3. κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ: pointing to the virtue ἐγκράτεια 
(frag. 76): reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes, Cic. Tuse. 
I. 47. 

4. αὐστηρόν: cf. Diog. L. vit. 117, καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ 
φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, Stob. Ἐπ]. 1. 7. 115, 
p. 114, 29. 

αὐθέκαστον : in Ar. Eth. 1v. 7. 4 the αὐθέκαστος is the 
mean between the ἀλαζὼν and the εἴρων, and is described 
as ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ. We may com- 
pare then Stob. Ἐπ]. m. 7, 111, p. 108, 11, where the wise 
man is said to be ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἄπλαστος while τὸ εἰρωνεύ- 
εσθαι belongs alone to the φαῦλος, ib. p. 111, 11, ἐν πᾶσιν 
ἀληθεύειν τὸν σοφόν. ἰ 

5. ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, ἀνώδυνον : because the wise man is 

7. Some word has dropped out here. In Clem. Alex. 
Strom. v. 1. ο. the words ἀσφαλὲς φίλον ἔντιμον are 
omitted and ὁμολογούμενον is placed at the end of 1. 6, 
In Euseb. |. 6. we have two complete lines but εὐάρεστον 
is repeated from 1. 6, thus:—évripov εὐάρεστον ὁμολο- 
youpevov: this is perhaps the original reading, where 
the error is due to εὐάρεστον having been copied from 
the previous line in place of the genuine word. The 
reading in book V. is due to the scribe’s eye wandering 
from the first εὐάρεστον to the second. Mohnike however 
thinks (p. 51) that Eusebius had the work of Clement 


before him while writing, and that the second εὐάρεστον 
is mere patchwork to mend the metre. 

8. &rvov, cf. Diog. L. vir. 117, ἄτυφον τε εἶναι TOV 

πρᾷον, ef. Stob. Ecl. 1. 7. 118, p. 115, 10—12. 

76. Plut. Sto. Rep. vit. 4, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν ὑπομνή- 
μασι φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι “ πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, 
κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ 
ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος, ἐπιφέρει κατὰ 
λέξιν, “ ἡ δ᾽ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς 
φανεῖσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν ὅταν δ᾽ 
ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία" περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιο- 
σύνη᾽ περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη." 

Cf. Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 5%, p. 62, 24, καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ 
ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νεύροις οὕτω 
καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν 
καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή. See also Zeller, p. 128, 2, 256, 2. 

πληγὴ πυρός. This is the material air-current which 
forms the ἡγεμονικὸν of the individual, being an efflux 
of the divine πνεῦμα. Cleanthes here brings his ethical 
teaching into close dependence on his physical researches : 
of the physical aspect of τόνος we have spoken at frag. 24, 
Zeno’s φρόνησις is explained as ἑκανὸς τόνος ψυχῆς, Le. as 
ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος. Possibly Cleanthes was influenced by 
the Cynic use of τόνος : see the passage quoted by Stein, 
Psych. p. 30 n. 87. Not that Cleanthes intended to deny 
the fundamental position of Zeno that virtue is wisdom, 
for we shall find that he expressly declared it to be 
teachable (frag. 79): and cf. frag. 89. Still, he expanded 
and developed his master’s teaching in two ways, (1) by 
showing that the doctrine of virtue rests on a psycho- 
logical basis, and (2) by clearing up an ambiguity in 
Zeno’s statement with regard to the four cardinal virtues. 


Zeno held, or appeared to hold, that φρόνησις is found in 
a double sense, (1) as the essential groundwork of all 
virtue, and (2) as the first of its four main divisions. This 
inconsistency is therefore removed by retaining φρόνησις 
in the wider, but substituting ἐγκράτεια in the narrower 
meaning: see Hirzel u. p. 97 foll. Chrysippus on the 
other hand restored φρόνησις as the cardinal virtue, but 
represented by ἐπιστήμη that notion of φρόνησις which 
was common to Zeno and Cleanthes, 

φανεῖσιν : 80 Hirzel, p. 97, 2, for ἐπιφάνεσιν, coll. Stob. 
Eel. 11. 7. 5”, p. 61, 11, ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνυπέρ- 
βατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον φανέντων. We find 
also definitions of ἐγκράτεια in Diog. L. vir. 93, Sext. 
Math. rx. 153, which are substantially identical with that 
cited from Stobaeus: in Stob. it appears as a subdivision 
of σωφροσύνη, while both in Diog. and Stob. the word 
ἐμμενετέον is found in connection with καρτερία, a sub- 
division of ἀνδρεία. No doubt their account is derived 
from Chrysippus: it is noteworthy, however, that ὀρθὸς 
λόγος appears in these definitions: see Hirzel, 1. ο., Stein, 
Erkenntnistheorie, p. 262. In giving this prominent 
position to ἐγκράτεια Cleanthes was following in the 
steps of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 1. 5. 4, dpa ye οὐ χρὴ πάντα 
ἄνδρα ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα), 
and the Cynies (Diog. L. vi. 15), 

ἀξίας : the full definition, probably that of Chrysippus, 
appears in Stob. Ἐπ]. τι. 7. 5% Ῥ. 59, 11, δικαιοσύνην δὲ 
ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, ib. Τ', p. 
84, 15. 

αἱρέσεις Kal ἐκκλίσεις: σωφροσύνη is concerned with the 
regulation of the ὁρμαί (Stob. Ecl. m. 7. 5%, p. 60, 13, 
ib. 5, p. 63, 16), and is therefore directed to the avoidance 
of πάθη, among which φόβος is defined as ἔκκλισις 
ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ (Stob. Ecl. π΄ 7. 10, Ρ. 90, 11). 


77. Clem. Alex. Strom. τ. 22, 131, p. 499 P., 179 S., 
διὸ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ ἡδονῆς τὸν Σω- 
κράτην φησὶ παρ᾽ ἕκαστα διδάσκειν ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς δίκαιός 
τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ διελόντι τὸ δίκαιον 
ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος καταρᾶσθαι ὡς ἀσεβές τι πρᾶγμα 
δεδρακότι᾽ ἀσεβεῖς γὰρ τῷ ὄντι οἱ τὸ συμφέρον ἀπὸ τοῦ 
δικαίου τοῦ κατὰ νόμον χωρίζοντες. 

Cf Cic. Off. τα 11, itaque accepimus Socratem ex- 
secrari solitum eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia 
opinione distraxissent. cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi 
ut et quidquid honestum esset id utile esse censerent 
nee utile quicquam quod non honestum. id. Leg. 1. 33, 
recte Socrates exsecrari eum solebat qui primus utili- 
tatem a iure seiunxisset: id enim querebatur caput esse 
exitiorum omnium. 

For Socrates, who identified τὸ ὠφέλιμον with τὸ 
ἀγαθόν, cf. Zeller, Socrates, p. 150 foll. Cleanthes, as we 
have seen (frag. 75), asserted that the good was also 
συμφέρον and ὠφέλιμον : for the school in general see 
Zeller, Stoics, p. 229, 2. 

78. Diog. L. vil. 92, πλείονας (εἶναι ἀρετὰς ἢ τέτταρας) 
οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ ᾿Αντίπατρον. 

Zeller, p. 258, thinks that this simply means that 
Cleanthes enumerated the various subdivisions of the 
four cardinal virtues. Hirzel, p. 97, 2, prefers to suppose 
that it is due to the mistake of placing φρόνησις, which 
is the source of the several virtues, on the same level as 
the four main divisions of virtue. 

79. Diog. L. vit. 91, διδακτήν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν (λέγω 
δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν) καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τέλους 
φησὶ καὶ Κλεάνθης. 

This is, of course, ultimately traceable to Socrates, but 


was also enforced by the Cynics: cf. Diog. vi. 10 (Antis- 
thenes) διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν, ib. 105, ἀρέσκει δ᾽ 
αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν ᾽Αντι- 
σθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ. 

80. Diog. L. vil. 127, καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος 
μὲν ἀποβλητήν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον, ὁ μὲν ἀπο- 
βλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ 
βεβαίους καταλήψεις. 

On this point Cleanthes is in agreement with the 
Cynics (Diog. L. v1. 105), whence Wellmann, p. 462, infers 
that Zeno’s teaching must have been in agreement with 
Cleanthes rather than with Chrysippus. See also the 
authorities cited by Zeller, p. 295, 3, and add Οἷς, Tuse. 
II, 32, amitti non potest virtus. 

μέθην: but Zeno held that the wise man οὐ μεθυσθή- 
σεσθαι (frag. 159). 

μελαγχολίαν : Cic. Tusc. U1. 11, quod (furor) cum maius 
esse videatur quam insania, tamen eiusmodi est, ut furor 
(μελαγχολία) in sapientem cadere possit, non possit 

βεβαίους καταλήψεις : although xarddyyus is shared by 
the wise man with the fool (see on Zeno, frag. 16), its 
especial cultivation and possession belongs to the wise 
man only: ef. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 184, 185. Cf. 
also Sext. Math. τι. 6 (quoted on frag. 9). According to 
Hirzel, p. 68, 3, the meaning is not that Cleanthes denied 
that the wise man would get drunk and so lose his virtue, 
but that the strength of his καταλήψεις is so great, that 
even melancholy and drunkenness fail to shake him. In 
support of this he quotes Epict. diss. 1. 18, 21—23, ris 
οὖν ὁ ἀήττητος ; ὃν οὐκ ἐξίστησιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀποπροαι- 
ρέτων. τί οὖν ἂν καῦμα ἢ τούτῳ ; τί ἂν οἰνώμενος ἦ ; τί 
ἂν μελαγχολῶν; τί ἐν ὕπνοις; οὗτός μοι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνίκητος 


ἀθλητής. τι. 17. 33, ἤθελον δ᾽ ἀσφαλώς ἔχειν καὶ ἀσείστως, 
καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορὼς ἀλλὰ καὶ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνώμενος 
καὶ ἐν μελαγχολίᾳ. He thinks that the later Stoics 
invented the distinction between οἰνοῦσθαι and μεθύειν 
to explain the divergence between Cleanthes and Chry- 
sippus on so important a point as the loss of virtue. 
So substantially Von Arnim, Quellen Studien zu Philo, 
p. 106. 

81. Diog. L. vit. 128, ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διὰ 

\ lal lal > lal e Φ \ , / 

παντὸς χρῆσθαι TH ἀρετῇ, ὡς of περὶ Κλεάνθην φασίν. 

ἀναπόβλητος γάρ ἐστι' καὶ πάντοτε τῇ ψυχῇ χρῆται 
οὔσῃ τελείᾳ ὁ σπουδαῖος. 

82. Stob. Kel. 11. 7. 5%, p. 65, 8, πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώ- 
πους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν, Kal οἱονεὶ TOV 
τῶν ἡμιαμβείων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ Κλεάνθην" ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς 
μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. 

ἀφορμάς. For this sense of the word cf. frag. 73 
ἀφορμὰς ἀδιαστρόφους “uncorrupted impulses.” Stob. 
Eel. 11. 7. 5°, p. 62, 9 ἔχειν γὰρ (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) ἀφορμὰς 
Tapa τῆς φύσεως Kai πρὸς THY τοῦ καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν 
καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπο- 
μονὰς καὶ πρὸς Tas ἀπονεμήσεις. ΑΒ ἃ general rule, how- 
ever, it is contrasted with op as “aversion” )( “impulse 
towards,” Stob. Ecl. 1, 7. 9, p. 87, 5, Sext. Pyrrh. 111. 273, 
EYKPATELAV...€V ταῖς πρὸς TO καλὸν ὁρμαῖς Kal ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ 
τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς, ib. Math. χι. 210. Cleanthes re- 
garded our capacity for virtue as innate, but whether at 
the same time he denied an innate intellectual capacity is 
open to question, cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, ἢ. 735. 

Cf. M. Aurel. ix. 1, ἀφορμὰς yap προειλήφει παρὰ τῆς 
φύσεως, ὧν ἀμελήσας οὐχ οἷός τέ ἐστι viv διακρίνειν τὰ 
ψευδῆ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν. 

H, P. 20 


τόν : so Zeller, (p. 243, 1), for τό. 

ἡμιαμβείων : so Wachsm. for MSS. ἡμιαμβειαίων. Meineke 
reads μιμιαμβείων. The meaning is that men possess 
latent capacities which must be brought into play by 
their own exertions, if they would attain to perfection, 
cf. Cic. Tuse. U1. 2, sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina 
innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad 
beatam vitam natura perduceret. 

83. Themist. Or. 11. 27 c, εἰ δὲ αὖ φήσειέ τις κολα- 
κείαν εἶναι τῷ Πυθίῳ παραβάλλειν τὸν βασιλέα, Xpvour- 
mos μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ Κλεάνθης οὐ συγχωρήσει καὶ ὅλον 
ἔθνος φιλοσοφίας ἢ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορὸς οἱ φάσκοντες 
εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ. 

This doctrine depends on the divine origin of the 
human soul. Hence the Stoics could say that good men 
were friends of the gods, and Chrysippus declared that the 
happiness of the wise man was as great as that of Zeus, 
since they only differ in point of time, which is immaterial 
for happiness. Cf. Procl. in Tim. Plat. 11. 106 f, οὗ δὲ ἀπὸ 
τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι θεῶν Kai ἀνθρώπων 
εἰρήκασιν. Cic. Leg. I. 25, iam vero virtus eadem in 
homine ac deo est neque alio ullo ingenio praeterea. 

84. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. plac. v. 6, v. p. 476 K., τὴν 
μὲν τοῦ Κλεάνθους γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶνδε φαίνεσθαί φησι τῶν ἐπῶν. 

Λογισμός. τί ποτ᾽ ἐσθ᾽ ὅτι βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτό 
μοι φράσον. 
Θυμός. ἔχειν, λογισμέ, πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν. 
A. ναὶ βασιλικόν γε' πλὴν ὅμως εἰπὸν πάλιν. 
Θ. ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ ταῦθ᾽ ὅπως γενήσεται. 
ταυτὶ τὰ ἀμοιβᾶια Καεάνθους φησὶν εἶναι Ποσειδώνιος 
ἐναργῶς ἐκδεικνύμενα τὴν περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς 


γνώμην αὐτοῦ, el ye δὴ πεποίηκε τὸν Λογισμὸν τῷ Θυμῷ 
διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἑταῖρον ἐταίρῳ. 

2, 8. ἐγὼ λογισμόν... βασιλικόν γε MSS. ἔχειν, λογισμέ, 
Wyttenbach βασιλικόν ἐστι Mullach, βασιλικόν" εὖ ye 
Scaliger, vai β. y. Mein. Perhaps we should read ποιεῖν 
λογισμόν... ἐγὼ βασιλικός. ' 

4. ὧν Meineke, Mullach, ὡς MSS., ὅσ᾽ Wyttenbach. 

Mohnike, p. 52, thinks that this fragment comes either 
from περὶ ὁρμῆς or περὶ λόγου. 

Posidonius uses the verses to prove that Cleanthes 
was in substantial agreement with himself in supposing 
that the various functions of the ἡγεμονικὸν are radically 
distinct. Zeller, p. 215, 8, says that this is to confound a 
rhetorical flourish with a philosophical view, and it may 
be added that Posidonius must have been hard pressed 
for an argument to rely on this passage at all. Hirzel, 
however, pp. 147—160, labours to prove that Posidonius 
is right, but he mainly relies on frag. 37, θύραθεν eioxpt- 
νεσθαι τὸν νοῦν, where see note, and is well refuted by 

Stein, Psych. pp. 163—167. 

85. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. rx. 1, v. p. 653 K., Ποσει- 
δώνιος...δείκνυσιν ἐν TH περὶ παθῶν πραγματείᾳ διοικου- 
μένους ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τριῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπιθυμητικῆς τε καὶ 
θυμοειδοῦς καὶ λογιστικῆς" τῆς δ᾽ αὐτῆς ὁ ἸΠοσειδώνιος 
ἔλεξεν εἶναι καὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην. 

Though there is no direct proof that Cleanthes adhered 
to the eightfold division of the soul, yet everything points 
‘that way, and Hirzel’s opinion (p. 188) that he only 
recognised three divisions is unfounded: see on frag. 84. 
The present passage of Galen ought perhaps rather to 
be added as a testimonium to frag. 84 than cited as a 
distinct fragment, since the whole argument of Posidonius, 
so far as we know, was founded on the dialogue be- 



tween λογισμὸς and θυμός. For δυνάμεις see Hirzel, 1. 
p. 486, 1. 

86. Stob. Floril. 108, 59, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἔλεγε τὴν 
λύπην ψυχῆς παράλυσιν. 

This appears to be the only remaining indication of 
the position of Cleanthes as regards the definition of the 
πάθη, but it is not without significance. Zeno had pro- 
bably defined λύπη as ἄλογος συστολὴ ψυχῆς (see on 
Zeno frag. 143), but Cleanthes saw his way to a better 
explanation from the standpoint of τόνος: the soul 
of the wise man, informed by right reason, is characterised 
by ἰσχύς, ἱκανὸς τόνος, evtovia, but if the emotions over- 
power the natural reason of a man, there supervenes a 
resolution of tension, ἀτονία or ἀσθένεια. This view of 
the emotions was adopted by Chrysippus, cf. Galen, Hipp. 
et Plat. v. 387 K. ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται peta τῆς κατὰ 
τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας: see especially the long passage be- 
ginning ib. p. 404 K. where the view of πάθος as drovia 
or ἀσθένεια is explained at length by Chrysippus. With 
regard to λύπη cf. Tusc. mI. 61, omnibus enim modis 
fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt, propter 
magnitudinem aegritudinis. Ex quo ipsam aegritudinem 
λύπην Chrysippus quasi solutionem totius hominis appel- 
latam putat. ib. I 54, animus intentione sua depellit 
pressum omnem ponderum, remissione autem sic urgetur, 
ut se nequeat extollere. No doubt Cleanthes, like Plato, — 
derived λύπη from Avw: Plat. Crat. p. 419 c. See also 
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 130. 

87. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. m1. 5, v. 332 K., οὐ μόνον 
Χρύσιππος ἀλλὰ καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ζήνων ἑτοίμως αὐτὰ 
τιθέασιν (scil. τοὺς φόβους καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα 
τοιαῦτα πάθη κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν συνίστασθαι) = Zeno, 

frag. 141. 


Hirzel’s contention (p. 152 f.) that Cleanthes placed 
the ἡγεμονικὸν in the brain, and that hence we are to 
explain Plut. plac. Iv. 21. 5, is controverted by Stein, 
Psych. p. 170, from this passage, for we have seen that 
the πάθη are affections of the ἡγεμονικόν. Hirzel replies 
(p. 154) that ὁρμαὶ and πάθη, though dependent on the 
ἡγεμονικόν, are yet distinct from it. The improbability 
of Hirzel’s whole theory lies in the fact that, if it 1s cor- 
rect, Cleanthes was in vital opposition to the whole Stoa 
down to Posidonius on the most important doctrines of 
psychology. Such an inference ought not to be accepted, 
unless the evidence conclusively points to it, and no one 
will affirm that such is the case here. 

88. Sext. Emp. Math. x1. 74, add Κλεάνθης μὲν 
μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν (ἡδονὴν) εἶναι μήτ᾽ ἀξίαν ἔχειν 
[αὐτὴν] ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν 
μὴ εἶναι. 

ἡδονὴ is, according to Cleanthes, not merely an ἀδιά- 
φορον but also παρὰ φύσιν, being entirely devoid of ἀξία, 
ef. Diog. L. vil. 105, and see on Zeno, frag. 192. 

κάλλυντρον cannot here mean “a broom,” but must be 
“an ornament”: see Suidas s.v. All kinds of personal 
adornment appeared to the Stoics, as to the Cynics, to 
be contrary to nature: Zeno wore the τρίβων (Diog. 
L. vul. 26), recommended the same dress for males and 
females (frag. 177), and forbade young men to be ἑται- 
ρικῶς κεκοσμημένοι (frag. 174). 

αὐτὴν is bracketed by Bekker. Hirzel discusses this 
passage at length (pp. 89—96). He thinks that the first 
part (μήτε... βίῳ) contains a climax: ἡδονὴ has no connec- 
tion with virtue and therefore is not ἀγαθόν (κατὰ φύσιν); 
further, it has no ἀξία and is not even προηγμένον. Hence 
Zeno and Cleanthes did not identify τὰ κατὰ φύσιν with 


προηγμένα : for in that case they could not have treated 
προηγμένα as ἀδιάφορα. Zeller and Wellmann are, there- 
fore, wrong in regarding Cleanthes’ attitude towards plea- 
sure as cynical; rather, his position is that pleasure in 
itself (for this is the force of the second αὐτὴν which 
should be retained) is ἀδιάφορον in the narrower sense. 
Cf. Stob. Ecl. 11. 7. 7°, p. 81, 14 οὔτε δὲ προηγμένα οὔτ᾽ 
ἀποπροηγμένα.. ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο 
τοιοῦτος. Next, κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι is ἃ gloss, and when — 
this is struck out we should supply ἀξίαν ἔχειν with 
καθάπερ δὲ κάλλυντρον. In short, Cleanthes treats plea- 
sure as an ἐπιγέννημα (Diog. L. vit. 86): cf. Seneca Ep. 
116, 3, voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non 
ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus 
vivere, gratiora nobis faceret illius accessio. But it does 
not follow that, because virtue consists in τὸ ὁμολογου-. 
μένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, therefore everything, which is κατὰ 
φύσιν, is ἀρετὴ or μετέχον ἀρετῆς. Cf. Stob. Ecl. 7. 75, 
p. 80, 9 διότε κἄν, φασί, λέγωμεν ἀδιάφορα τὰ σωματικὰ 
καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως ζῆν (ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὸ 
εὐδαιμόνως) ἀδιάφορά φαμεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς 
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμήν. Rather, 
we have seen reason to hold that the class of τὰ κατὰ 
φύσιν is wider, or, at any rate, certainly not narrower than 
that of τὰ προηγμένα. Indeed, this is apparent from the 
present passage :—o δὲ ᾿Αρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι 
ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν, ie. 
there are some things which may be κατὰ φύσιν and yet 
devoid of ἀξία. Again, Sextus obviously treats Cleanthes 
as more hostile to pleasure than Archedemus, but the view 
which Hirzel would attribute to Cleanthes is scarcely to 
be distinguished from that of Archedemus. Certainly, the 
passage from Seneca ought not to be quoted as an illustra- 
tion of Cleanthes’ meaning: contrast μήτε κατὰ φύσιν 


εἶναι with natura—admiscuit. The inelegant repetition 
of μή...εἶναι has an object, namely, to contrast τὸ καλ- 
λυντρον With τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, whereas, on the other 
hand, if the second αὐτὴν is retained, it cannot be inter- 
preted differently to the first αὐτὴν, and to press the latter 
would make nonsense. 

89. Stob. Floril. 6. 37, Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, εἰ τέλος 
ἐστὶν ἡδονή, πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν φρόνησιν 

This is no doubt directed against the Epicureans. 
Diog. L. x. 128, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν Kat τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι 
τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. Chrysippus also wrote a treatise 
described as ἀπόδειξις πρὸς TO μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος 
(Diog. L. vir. 202). τὴν φρόνησιν furnishes a proof that 
Cleanthes upheld Zeno’s view of virtue as φρόνησις : see 
on frag. 76. 

δεδόσθαι: so Meineke for δίδοσθαι. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 
§ 40, cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil 
mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono 
nihil tam esse inimicum quam voluptatem. 

90. Cic. Fin. τι. 69, pudebit te illius tabulae quam 
Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iube- 
bat eos qui audiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in 
tabula Voluptatem, pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in 
solio sedentem: praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae 
nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nist 
ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admo- 
nerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne 
quid faceret imprudens quod offenderet animos hominum 
aut quicquam e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. “nos quidem 
Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus ; alind negotil 
nihil habemus.” Cf. Aug. de civit. dei v. 20, solent 


philosophi, qui finem boni humani in ipsa virtute consti- 
tuunt, ad ingerendum pudorem quibusdam_philosophis, 
qui virtutes quidem probant, sed eas voluptatis corporalis 
fine metiuntur et illam per se ipsam putant adpetendam, 
istas propter ipsam, tabulam quandam verbis pingere, ubi 
voluptas in sella regali quasi delicata quaedam regina 
considat, eique virtutes famulae subiciantur, observantes 
eius nutum ut faciant quod illa imperaverit, quae pruden- 
tiae iubeat ut vigilanter inquirat quo modo voluptas 
regnet et salva sit; iustitiae iubeat ut praestet beneficia 
quae potest ad comparandas amicitias corporalibus com- 
modis necessarias, nulli faciat iniuriam, ne offensis legibus 
voluptas vivere secura non possit; fortitudini iubeat, ut 
si dolor corpori acciderit qui non compellat in mortem, 
teneat dominam suam, id est, voluptatem, fortiter in 
animi cogitatione ut per pristinarum deliciarum suarum 
recordationem mitiget praesentis doloris aculeos; tem- 
perantiae iubeat, ut tantum capiat alimentorum et si qua 
delectant ne per immoderationem noxium aliquid valetu- 
dinem turbet et voluptas, quam etiam in corporis sanitate 
Epicurei maximam ponunt, graviter offendatur. ita vir- 
tutes cum tota suae gloria dignitatis tanquam imperiosae 
cuidam et inhonestae mulierculae servient voluptati; 
nihil hac pictura dicunt esse ignominiosius et deformius 
et quod minus ferre bonorum possit aspectus; et verum 

Further references ap. Zeller, p. 235—239. Epiphan. 
Heres. ΠΙ. 2. p. 1090 ο Κλεάνθης τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν 
λέγει εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς is a stupid blunder of the epitoma- 
tor: cf. Krische, p. 431. Hirzel, p. 96, 1, holds that it is 
merely an exaggeration of Cleanthes’ position: see on 

frag. 88. 
pulcherrimo vestitu: this illustrates κάλλυντρον in 

frag. 88, 



si modo...possent: Madvig points out that these words 
belong to Cleanthes’ statement, and are not a part of 
Cicero’s comment. 

Virtutes ut ancillulas: on the controversial character 
of the work περὶ ἡδονῆς see Krische, pp. 430—432. In 
the Epicurean system virtue has only a conditional value, | 
as furnishing a means to pleasure. Diog. L. x. 138 διὰ δὲ 
τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ tas ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι’ αὑτάς" 
ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι Διογένης. 

91. Epict. Man. ο. 53. 

ἄγου δέ μ᾽, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύγ᾽ ἡ πεπρωμένη, 
ὅποι ποθ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, 

ὡς ἕψομαί γ᾽ ἄοκνος" ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω 
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι. 

The first line is quoted by Epict. diss. 11. 28, 42, and 
two lines by id. ib. 11. 22. 95, Iv. 1. 131, and Iv. 4. 34. 
Senec. Epist. 107, 10, et sic adloquamur Iovem cuius 
gubernaculo moles ista dirigitur, quemadmodum Cleanthes 
noster versibus disertissimis adloquitur; quos mihi in 
nostrum sermonem mutare permittitur Ciceronis disertis- 
simi viri exemplo. si placuerint boni consules; si dis- 
plicuerint, scies me in hoe secutum Ciceronis exemplum. 

duc, o parens celsique dominator poli, 
quocumque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. 
adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens, 
malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono. 
ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. 

See also the commentary of Simplicius on Epict. 1. c. 
p. 329. These celebrated lines constitute the true 
answer of the Stoa to the objection that the doctrine 
of πρόνοια is incompatible with the assertion of free- 


will. Zeller p. 182. The matter is put very plainly in 
the passage of Hippolyt. Philosoph. 21, 2, Diels p. 571, 
quoted at length in the note on Zeno frag. 79. The spirit 
of Stoicism survives in the words of a modern writer :— 
“It has ever been held the highest wisdom for a 
man not merely to submit to Necessity,—Necessity will 
make him submit,—but to know and believe well that the 
stern thing which Necessity had ordered was the wisest, 
the best, the thing wanted there. To cease his frantic 
pretension of scanning this great God’s world in his small 
fraction of a brain; to know that it had verily, though 
deep beyond his soundings, a just law, that the soul of it 
was Good ;—that his part in it was to conform to the 
Law of the Whole, and in devout silence follow that; not 
questioning it, obeying it as unquestionable.” (Carlyle, 
Hero-Worship, chap. 1.) Marcus Aurelius often dwells on 
the contrast between τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and τὰ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. 
Cf. especially x. 28, καὶ ὅτι μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ Edw δέδοται, τὸ 
_ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαιτοῖς γινομένοις" τὸδὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλόν, πᾶσιν 
ἀναγκαῖον. So ib. vi. 41, 42; vir. ὅ4, 55; vi. 7; xu. 32. 

92. Seneca Epist. 94, 4, Cleanthes utilem quidem 
iudicat et hance partem (philosophiae quae dat cuique 
personae praecepta, nec in universum componit hominem, 
sed marito suadet quomodo se gerat adversus uxorem, 
patri quomodo educat liberos, domino quomodo servos 
regat), sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta 
ipsa philosophiae et capita cognovit. 

The branch of philosophy here referred to is known as 
the παραινετικὸς or ὑποθετικὸς τόπος. Aristo regarded it 
as useless, and it is very possible that his “letters to 
Cleanthes” (πρὸς Κλεάνθην ἐπιστολῶν δ΄ Diog. L. vu. 
163) dealt with this controversy. Cf. Sext. Math. vi. 12, 
καὶ ᾿Αρίστων ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασί, παρῃτεῖτο τήν τε 

φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς 
κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ 
τόπους τινὰς συμπεριέγραφεν, καθάπερ τόν τε παραινετικὸν 
καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον᾽ τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας καὶ 
παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν. The words in which Philo of 
Larissa described the τόπος ὑποθετικὸς illustrate Seneca’s 
statement: Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 2, p. 42, 18, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν μέσως 
διακειμένων ἀνθρώπων πρόνοιαν ποιητέον, οὕστινας ἐκ τῶν 
παραινετικῶν λόγων ὠφελεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, μὴ δυναμένους 
προσευκαιρεῖν τοῖς διεξοδικοῖς πλάτεσιν ἢ διὰ χρόνου 
σ εὐ χώριας ἢ διά τινας ἀναγκαίας ἀσχολίας, ἐπεισενεκτέον 
τὸν ὑποθετικὸν λόγον, δι’ οὗ τὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάχεαν καὶ 
τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴς ἑκάστου χρήσεως ὑποθήκας ἐν ἐπιτομαῖς 
ἕξουσιν. The importance attached by Cleanthes to παραυ- 
νετικὴ illustrates the practical spirit of Stoicism: see also 
Hirzel, 11. p. 104. 

93. Cic. Tusc. mI. 76, sunt qui unum officium con- 
solantis putent malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi 

Consolatio (παραμυθητικὴλ) 1 is a branch οἵ παραινετικὴ 
and is concerned with removing the πάθη, cf. Eudorus ap. 
Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. 2. p. 44, 15 6 δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων 
καλεῖται παραμυθητικός, ὃς καλούμενός ἐστι πρὸς ἐνίων 
παθολογικόςς. Cf. Sen. Epist. 95, 65. As emotion is 
founded on false opinion (see on Zeno, frag. 138), the duty 
of him who offers consolation to another is to explain that 
what appears to the other to be an evil is not really so. 

malum illud: the context in Cicero shows that the 
reference is particularly to death, for which cf. Zeno, frag. 
129. The construction is not to be explained by an ellipse 
of docere or the like, but rather esse is nominalised so that: 
malum...esse = τὸ κακόν... εἶναι. This is common in Lucr., 
see Munro on 1. 331, 418 and cf. Verr. v. 170, quid dicam 


in crucem tollere? Cicero even writes: inter optime valere 
et gravissime aegrotare (Fin. 11. 43). Draeger, § 429. 

94. Cic. Tusc. 11. 77, nam Cleanthes quidem sapi- 
entem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim 
esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non 
tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; alienum autem 
tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse 
hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex 
eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes mee 

Cicero’s criticism ies is twofold: (1) that what is 
called consolation is really only instruction, which is 
ineffective to assuage grief, because’it is inopportune, and 
as regards the wise man, who is ἀπαθής, is unnecessary ; 
(2) that grief may be caused by baseness, which is an 
evil. Cf. Tuse. 1. 30. 

This cannot be treated as merely containing Cicero’s 
comment on frag. 93, for we have the additional statement 
saprentem consolatur, which is surely not an inference 
from Cleanthes’ definition. The statement is strange and 
perhaps not to be entirely explained in the fragmentary 
state of our knowledge, but it is not inconceivable that 
Cleanthes held that the wise man ought to be reminded 
of Stoic principles when attacked by μελαγχολία or when 
in severe pain, in spite of his βεβαίας καταλήψεις (see on 
frag. 80 and cf. Stob. Floril. 7. 21 ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, 
μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ. Cic. Fin. v. 94, quasi vero hoc 
didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, quum doleret! Zeno, 
frag. 158): cf. generally Sext. Math. x1. 130—140 and 
esp. 139 εἰ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τουτὶ μὲν ὀλυγωφελές 
ἐστι, πλείονας δ᾽ ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, σύγκρισιν ἔσται 
ποιῶν αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς ἑτέραν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, 
καὶ οὐκ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ταραχῆς. ὅπερ ἄτοπον᾽ ὁ γὰρ 


ὀχλούμενος οὐ βούλεται μαθεῖν τί μᾶλλον ὀχλεῖ καὶ τί 
φΦ ’ ’ > a a > / / 
ἧττον, GAN ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ὀχλήσεως πεπόθηκεν. 

95. Stob. Floril. 6. 19. 
ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ᾽ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος 
οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ᾽ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ. 

For the doctrine that virtuous action depends on the 

intention and not on the deed itself, see Zeller, p. 264 and 
ef. Zeno frags. 146 and 181. 

96. Stob. Floril. 28, 14, Κλεάνθης ἔφη τὸν ὀμνύοντα 
ἤτοι εὐορκεῖν ἢ ἐπιορκεῖν καθ᾽ ὃν ὄμνυσι χρόνον. ἐὰν. 
μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὀμνύῃ ὡς ἐπιτελέσων τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον 
εὐορκεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ πρόθεσιν ἔχων μὴ ἐπιτελεῖν, ἐπιορκεῖν. 

See on frag. 95, and ef. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Floril. 28, 

97. Seneca de Benef. v. 14. 1, Cleanthes vehementius 
agit: “licet,” inquit, “beneficlum non sit quod accipit, 
ipse tamen ingratus est: quia non fuit redditurus, etiam 
si accepisset. sic latro est, etiam antequam manus 
inquinet: quia ad occidendum iam armatus est, et habet 
spoliandi atque interficiendi voluntatem. exercetur et 
aperitur opere nequitia, non incipit. ipsum quod accepit, 
beneficium non erat, sed vocabatur. sacrilegi dant poenas, 
quamvis nemo usque ad deos manus porrigat.” 

This and the two next following fragments probably 
come from the book περὶ χάριτος. Introd. p. 52. Eudorus 
the Academic ap. Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 2, p. 44, 20 speaks 
in Stoic terminology of 6 περὶ τῶν χαρίτων τόπος as 
arising ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κατὰ THY πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον 
σχέσιν ὑπάρχειν. 

beneficium non sit: because the question 15 concerning 
an act of kindness to a bad man, on whom, according to 


Stoic principles, it was impossible to confer a favour 
(Senec. Benef. v. 12. 3), cf. Stob. Ecl. π΄ 7. 114 p. 95, 5, 
μηδένα δὲ φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν, Plut. 
Comm. Not. 21. 

sacrilegi: the edd. quote Phedr. 1v. 11. Senee. de 
Benef. vii. 7. 3, iniuriam sacrilegus Deo quidem non potest 
facere: quem extra ictum sua divinitas posuit: sed punitur 
quia tanquam Deo fecit. De Const. Sap. 4, 2. 

98. Seneca de Benef. vi. 11. 1, beneficium voluntas 
nuda non efficit: sed quod beneficium non esset, si 
optimae ac plenissimae voluntati fortuna deesset, id aeque 
beneficium non est, nisi fortunam voluntas antecessit ; non 
enim profuisse te mihi oportet, ut ob hoe tibi obliger, 
sed ex destinato profuisse. Cleanthes exemplo eiusmodi 
utitur: “ad quaerendum,” inquit, “et arcessendum ex 
Academia Platonem, duos pueros misi; alter totum porti- 
cum perscrutatus est, alia quoque loca in quibus illum 
inveniri posse sperabat, percucurrit, et domum non minus 
lassus quam irritus rediit: alter apud proximum circul- 
atorem resedit, et, dum vagus atque erro vernaculis congre- 
gatur et ludit, transeuntem Platonem, quem non quaesierat, 
invenit. illum, inquit, laudabimus puerum qui quantum 
in se erat quod iussus est fecit: hune feliciter inertem 

Another illustration of the value of the virtuous in- 
tention apart from the results attained by it. Cf Cic. 
Parad. 11 20 nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitiis 
hominum metienda sunt. 

Academia: see the description of this place in Diog. 
L. u1. 7: there was doubtless a στοὰ attached to it, whence 
totum porticum infra. 

circulatorem: a quack, mountebank: cf. Apul. Met. 1. 
ο. 4, Athenis proximo ante Poecilen porticum circulatorem 


adspexi equestrem spatham praeacutam mucrone infesto 
devorare. Probably a translation of θαυματοποιός : with 
respect to these men see the passages collected by Becker, 
Charicles. E. T. pp. 185—189, Jebb’s Theophrastus, p. 227, 
and add Ar. Met. i. 2. 15, Isocr. Or. 15 § 213, where tame 
lions and trained bears are spoken of. 

99. Seneca de Benef. vi. 12. 2, multum, ut ait 
Cleanthes, a beneficio distat negotiatio, cf. ib. 1. ΠΣ 
a benefit expects no return: non enim 5101 aliquid reddi 
voluit (qui beneficium dat), aut non fuit beneficium sed 

negotiatio: probably a translation of χρηματισμός, for 
the Stoic wise man is described as the only true man of 
business: Stob. Ecl. πι. 7. 114, p. 95, 21, μόνον δὲ τὸν 
σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα χρηματιστικὸν εἶναι, γινώσκοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν 
χρηματιστέον καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πότε. 

100. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 3. 17, p. 655 P. 2375S., 
καὶ ἡ KneavOous δὲ τοῦ Στωικοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιητικὴ 
ὧδέ πως τὰ ὅμοια γράφει 

μὴ πρὸς δόξαν ὅρα, ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἶψα γενέσθαι, 
μηδὲ φοβοῦ πολλῶν ἄκριτον καὶ ἀναιδέα δόξαν' 

οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν 

wv re 2 , \ > 3 Υ rn , aA 
οὔτε καλήν, ὀλίγοις δὲ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοῦτό κεν εὕροις. 

Clement also quotes an anonymous comic fragment 
to the same effect:—alcypov δὲ κρίνειν τὰ καλὰ TO 
πολλῷ ψόφῳ. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 326 says :— 
“hatte auch er (Kleanthes) den sensus communis, die 
κοιναὶ ἔννοιαν oder προλήψεις gebilligt, wie konnte er 
dann so wegwerfend und verichtlich iiber das allgemeine 
Laienurteil aburteilen?” He concludes therefore that 
Cleanthes threw over altogether the Stoic concession to 


rationalism implied in the doctrine of ὀρθὸς λόγος and 
προλήψεις, but see Introd. pp. 39, 40. Cf. generally Cic. 
Tuse. 11. 3, 4. 

δόξαν : this is changed to βάξιν by Meineke, who is 
followed by Wachsmuth, and Cludius is reported as 
suggesting ἄλογον for ἄκριτον. The reason given for 
the change by Wachsmuth is that δόξαν “male con- 
iungitur cum ἄκριτον," presumably because δόξα implies 
κρίσις, but surely the words may mean “ undiscriminating — 
opinion ” as explained by the next line. The text is con- 
firmed by M. Aurel. Iv. 3,76 εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἄκριτον τῶν 
εὐφημεῖν δοκούντων. Cf. ib. π΄. 17. 

οὐ.. «οὔτε.. «οὔτε, 18 justified by Homer, 1]. vi. 450, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὔ μοι Τρώων τόσσον μέλει adyos ὀπίσσω οὔτ᾽ αὐτῆς 
Ἑκάβης οὔτε Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος, κιτιλ. Cf. Soph. Ant. 

101. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 14 110, p. 715 P. ΒΥ ΚΒ. 
ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς (Κλεάνθης) κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον τὴν τῶν 
πολλῶν διαβάλλων εἰδωλολατρίαν ἐπιφέρει 

ἀνελεύθερος πᾶς ὅστις εἰς δόξαν βλέπει 
ὡς δὴ παρ᾽ ἐκείνης τευξόμενος καλοῦ τινος. 

In Clem. Alex. Protrept. γι. 72, p. 21S. 61 P., the same 
two lines are cited as the conclusion of frag. 75, but they 
are obviously distinct. 

δόξαν : for Zeno’s definition, ef. Zeno, frag. 15. Cleanthes 
wrote a separate treatise περὶ δόξης, from which we 
may conjecture that the present and the preceding frag- 
ments are derived. Introd. p. 52. The Cynics described 
εὐγενείας τε καὶ δόξας as προκοσμήματα κακίας (Diog. L. 
VI. 72). The Stoics regarded them as προηγμένα (Diog. 
L, vir. 106). 


102. Mantiss. proverb. (in paroemiogr. Gr. vol. I. 
p. 757) cent. 1. 85. 

κακῶς ἀκούειν κρεῖσσον ἢ λέγειν κακῶς. 

Κλεάνθους. This is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. II. 
p. 8), whose note is as follows :—“Inter ecclesiasticorum 
scriptorum sententias hie trimeter laudatur ab Antonio 
Meliss. 1. 53 et a Maximo 10, vid. Gregor. Nazianz. carm. 
p. 1574” 

103. Stob. Floril. 42. 2. 

, OX A Μ 
κακουργότερον οὐδὲν διαβολῆς ἔστι πω" 
λάθρα γὰρ ἀπατήσασα τὸν πεπεισμένον 

nw ᾽ 
μῖσος ἀναπλάττει πρὸς τὸν οὐδὲν αἴτιον. 

διαβολῆς: defined, ap. Stob. Ecl. um. 7. 115, p. 115, 21, 
εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαβολὴν διάστασιν φαινομένων φίλων ψευδεῖ 
λόγῳ, and hence, reasoning on the basis that slander is 
only connected with apparent and not with true friend- 
ship, the Stoics declare that the wise man is ἀδιάβολος 
both in the active and the passive sense (1.6. μήτε δια- 
βάλλειν μήτε διαβάλλεσθαι), but their utterances are not 
consistent on this point: see Zeller, p. 253 n. 6, who in 
citing passages to the contrary effect fails to notice this 

104. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 11), p. 103, 12, ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ 
Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον 
ἠρώτησε τοιοῦτον: πόλις μὲν «εἰ» ἔστιν οἰκητήριον 
κατασκεύασμα, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι 
καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦ- 
τόν ἐστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον" ἀστεῖον ἄρ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις. 

Possibly this belongs to the πολιτικός : Introd. p. 
52. Cleanthes has here adopted the syllogistic form 

H. P. 21 


of argument, which occurs so frequently in Zeno’s frag- 
ments: see Introd. p. 38. The Cynics’ line of argument 
is somewhat similar. Diog. L. vi. 72 ov yap, φησίν 
(Diogenes), ἄνευ πόλεως ὄφελός τι εἶναι ἀστείου: ἀστεῖον 
δὲ ἡ πόλις" νόμου δὲ ἄνευ, πόλεως οὐδὲν ὄφελος" ἀστεῖον 
ἄρα ὁ νόμος. Cicero’s definition is as follows, Rep. 1. 39, res 

publica est res populi, populus autem...coetus multitu-. 

dinis iuris consensu, et utilitatis communione sociatus. 
Cf. Ar. Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 37. 

εἰ, inserted by Heeren, who is followed by Wachsm. 
Meineke omits it and changes δὴ before πόλιες into δ᾽ ἡ 

105. Seneca Trang. An. L 7, promptus compositus- 
que sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum: quorum 
‘tamen nemo ad rem publicam accessit, nemo non misit. 

See on Zeno, frag. 170. 

106. Stob. Floril. 4, 90, Κλεάνθης ἔφη τοὺς ἀπαι- 
δεύτους μόνῃ TH μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν. 

The same occurs in Stob. Ecl. 1. 31. 64, p. 212, 22, 
where Wachsmuth cites other authorities. Stein, Erkennt- 
nistheorie, p. 326, quotes this frag. in support of his 
theory that Cleanthes refused to admit any inborn intel- 
lectual capacity. Zeno declared τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν 
ἄχρηστον (frag. 167 and note), with which opinion this 
passage is not necessarily inconsistent, though it probably 
implies an advance in teaching. See also on frag. 53. 

107. Epict. diss. rv. 1. 173, παράδοξα μὲν ἴσως φασὶν 
οἱ φιλόσοφοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, οὐ μὴν 

παράδοξα : the Stoics themselves accepted and defended 
this description of their doctrines. Cic. Paradox. Prooem. 
4 quia sunt admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium ab 
ipsis etiam παράδοξα appellantur. Plut. Comm. Not. 3 



\ \ \ , “Ὁ \ , \ > , ’ 
Ta κοινὰ καὶ περιβόητα, ἃ δὴ παράδοξα καὶ αὐτοί, μετ 
Ψ 4 
εὐκολίας δεχόμενοι τὴν ἀτοπίαν. 

108. Plut. vit. Ale. νι. 2,6 μὲν οὖν Κλεάνθης ἔλεγε 
τὸν ἐρώμενον Up ἑαυτοῦ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὦτων κρατεῖσθαι, τοῖς 
δ᾽ ἀντερασταῖς πολλὰς λαβὰς παρέχειν ἀθίκτους ἑαυτῷ, 
“τὴν γαστέρα λέγων καὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα καὶ τὸν λαιμόν. 

This may be referred to the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη or περὶ 
ἔρωτος, Introd. p. 52. See on Zeno, frags. 172 and 173, 
and ef. Diog. L. vit. 24 (Zeno apoph. 7) λαβὴ φιλοσόφων 

>’ \ > ΓΑ εξ \ a Vv 
ἐστὶν ἐπιδέξιος ἡ διὰ τῶν ὠτων. 

109. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 111. 200, οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην 
ἀδιάφορον τοῦτο (τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας) εἶναί φασιν = Zeno 
frag. 182. 

110. Stob. Floril. 6, 20. 

πόθεν ποτ᾽ dpa γίνεται μοιχῶν γένος ; 
, A hd \ > > / 
ἐκ κριθιῶντος ἀνδρὸς ἐν ἀφροδισίοις. 

μοιχῶν : for Stoic views on μοιχεία, see Zeno, frag. 178. 
κριθιῶντος : for this word cf. Buttmann’s Lexilogus, 5. v. 
ἀκοστήσας, EK. T. p. 78. 

111. Plut. de Aud. Poet. c. 12, p. 33, ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ai 
παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν, αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐχρή- 
σατο καὶ ᾿Αντισθένης" ὁ μέν κιτ.λ....ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης περὶ 
τοῦ πλούτου, 

φίλοις τε δοῦναι σῶμά T εἰς νόσους πεσὸν 
δαπαναῖσι σῶσαι, 

μεταγράφων οὕτω" 
πόρναις τε δοῦναι σῶμά T εἰς νόσους πεσὸν 
δαπαναῖς ἐπιτρίψαι. 

The lines in question are from Eur. El. 428, 9, where 


ξένοις is read in place of φίλοις. Stob. Floril. 91, 6 quoting 
the passage has φίλοις. 

The ordinary view of the school regarded πλοῦτος 
as ἃ προηγμένον, and we have seen that Zeno concurred 
in this (frag. 128). It would be hazardous to infer from 
evidence of this kind that Cleanthes dissented from his 
master’s opinion on this point: a similar question arises 
with regard to δόξα (frag. 101), but that word is am- 

112. Diog. L. vi. 14, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν εἰσέ- 
πραττε τοὺς περιϊσταμένους (ὁ Ζήνων) ὥστε δεδιότας τὸ 
διδόναι μὴ ἐνοχλεῖν, καθά φησι Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ περὶ 

For the title of the book see Introd. p. 53. The 
above is Cobet’s text; omitting ὥστε δεδιότας, Wachs- 
muth reads χαλκοῦ for χαλκὸν MSS., and also suggests 
ἐνίοτε for ἐνίους, but ἐνίους implies that the payment 
was not always exacted, while the article shows that, 
when made, it was made by all. Similarly Soph. O. T. 
107 τοὺς αὐτοέντας χειρὶ τιμωρεῖν τινας and Ar. Pac. 832. 

113. Philodem. περὶ φιλοσόφων ap. Vol. Hercul. vim. 
col. 13, v. 18, κκαὶ KA>eavOns ἐν «τῶι περὶ στεήλη;»ς 
<tn>s Διογένους αὐτῆς«ς;» μνης«μονεύξει καὶ ἐπαιν-«εῖ» 
καὶ «μικρὸν; ὕστεςρ;»ον ἐν αὐτεῶι τούτωι Kaba>m<eEp 
ἑτρέρςω;θ᾽ ἐνίων <é>xOeor<v> []. ἔκθεσιν] «ποι»εςῖ- 

Such is the restoration of Gomperz in Zeitschrift fiir 
die Oesterr. Gymn. Jahrg. 29 (1878) p. 252 foll., who, in 
justification of this somewhat strange title, refers to a 
book by Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, entitled 
ai Χρυσίππου ταφαί (Comparetti, Papiro Ercolanense col. 

46). For the circumstances of the burial of Diogenes ef. 

Diog. Τῷ νι. 78. αὐτῆς refers to the πολιτεία of Diogenes, 


114. Schol. ad Nic. Ther. 447, p. 36, 12 Keil, κραν- 
τῆρες λέγονται οἱ ὕστερον ἀναβαίνοντες ὀδόντες παρὰ τὸ 
κραίνειν καὶ ἀποπληροῦν τὴν ἡλικίαν. νεωτέρων γὰρ ἤδη 
ἡμῶν γενομένων φύονται οἱ ὀδόντες οὗτοι. Κλεάνθης δὲ 
σωφρονιστῆρας αὐτοὺς καλεῖ. νῦν ἁπλῶς τοὺς ὀδόντας. 
σωφρονιστῆρες δὲ διὰ τὸ ἅμα τῷ ἀνιέναι αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ 
σῶφρον τοῦ νοῦ λαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς. 

For κραντῆρες cf. Arist. Hist. An. IL. 4. φύονται δὲ οἱ 
τελευταῖοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γόμφιοι, ods καλοῦσι κραντῆρας, 
περὶ τὰ εἴκοσιν ἔτη καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξί. It seems 
fairly safe to infer that Cleanthes the Stoic is meant, and 
the account given above is probably more correct than 
that appearing in Etym. M. p. 742, 35 κατὰ τὴν τοῦ 
φρονεῖν ὥραν περὶ τὸ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος, and Melet. ap. Cramer 
Anecd. Ox. Ul. 82, 26 τοὺς δὲ μυλίτας τῶν ὀδόντων τινὲς 
σωφρονιστῆρας ἐκάλεσαν διὰ τὸ φύεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ 
ἄρχεσθαι φρονεῖν τοὺς παῖδας ὥραν. Thus, while the 
growth of the reasoning powers is complete in the four- 
teenth year (Zeno, frag. 82), the attainment of σωφροσύνη 
may well have been assigned to the conclusion of the third 

115. =Zeno frag. 184. 


1. Diog. L. vit. 169, φασὶ δὲ καὶ ᾿Αντίγονον αὐτοῦ 
πυθέσθαι ὄντα ἀκροατήν, διὰ τί ἀντλεῖ; τὸν δ᾽ εἰπεῖν, 
ἀντλῶ γὰρ μόνον ; τί δ᾽ οὐχὶ σκάπτω; τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἄρδω, 
καὶ πάντα ποιῶ φιλοσοφίας ἕνεκα ; καὶ γὰρ 6 Ζήνων 
αὐτὸν συνεγύμναζεν εἰς τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκέλευεν ὀβολὸν φέρειν 
ἀποφορᾶς. Plut. de vitand. aere alieno 7, 5, Κλεάνθη δὲ 
ὁ βασιλεὺς ᾿Αντίγονος ἠρώτα διὰ χρόνου θεασάμενος ἐν 
ταῖς ᾿Αθήναις, ἀλεῖς ἐτι, Κλέανθες; ἀλῶ, φησίν, ὦ βα- 
σιλεῦ, ὃ ποιῶ ἕνεκα τοῦ Env μόνος δὲ ἀποστῆναι μηδὲ 
φιλοσοφίας. Cf. Stob. Floril. 17, 28, Χρύσιππος ὁ Σολεὺς 
ἐποιεῖτο τὸν βίον ἐκ πάνυ ὀλίγων, Κλεάνθης δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ 
ἐλαττόνων. Epict. diss, III. 26. 23, πῶς Κλεάνθης ἔξησεν 

ἅμα σχολάζων καὶ ἀντλῶν. Senec. Ep. 44, 2, Cleanthes 
aquam traxit et rigando hortulo locavit manus. 

2. Diog. L. vil. 170, καί ποτε ἀθροισθὲν τὸ κέρμα 
ἐκόμισεν εἰς μέσον τῶν γνωρίμων, καί φησι, Κλεάνθης μὲν 
καὶ ἄλλον Κλεάνθην δύναιτ᾽ ἂν τρέφειν, εἰ βούλοιτο. οἱ 
δ᾽ ἔχοντες ὅθεν τραφήσονται, παρ᾽ ἑτέρων ἐπιζητοῦσι τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια, καίπερ ἀνειμένως φιλοσοφοῦντες. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ 
δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο. 

8. Ῥίορ. L. vit. 171, προκρίνων δὲ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον 
τοῦ τῶν πλουσίων, ἔλεγεν, ἐν ᾧ σφαιρίξουσιν ἐκεῖνοι 
αὐτὸς γῆν σκληρὰν καὶ ἄκαρπον ἐργάζεσθαι, σκάπτων. 


4. Diog. L. vu. 170, καὶ σκωπτόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ TOV 
συμμαθητῶν ἠνείχετο, καὶ ὄνος ἀκούων προσεδέχετο" 
͵ Ἂ \ , , / \ , if 
λέγων αὐτὸς μόνος δύνασθαι βαστάζειν τὸ Ζήνωνος φορτίον. 

δ. Diog. L. vit. 171, καί ποτε ὀνειδιζόμενος ὡς δειλός, 
διὰ τοῦτο, εἶπεν, ὀλίγα ἁμαρτάνω. 

6. Diog. L. vil. 174, ὀνειδίσαντος αὐτῷ τινος εἰς TO 
a ? / ” > , μ 4 \ / 
γῆρας, κἀγώ, ἔφη, ἀπιέναι βούλομαι: ὅταν δὲ πανταχόθεν 
a / 
ἐμαυτὸν ὑγιαίνοντα περινοῶ καὶ γράφοντα καὶ ἀναγι- 
νώσκοντα, πάλιν μένω. 

% Diog: L: ΎπΠᾶορ-17}. πολλάκις δὲ Kal ἑαυτῷ ἐπέ- 
e ’ / 3 / ia ” 5 , 
TAHTTEV’ ὧν ακούσας Αρίστων, τίνι, ἔφη, ἐπιπλήττεις ; 
Ν ἊΝ , , , \ Ν »” a 
Kal ὃς γελάσας, πρεσβύτῃ, φησί, πολιὰς MEV ἔχοντι, νοὺυν 
δὲ μή. 

8. Diog. L. vi. 119, Σωσιθέου Tod ποιητοῦ ἐν θεάτρῳ 
εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν παρόντα, 

οὺς ἡ Κλεάνθους μωρία βοηλατεῖ, 

v 3 Ἧ, ’ A / nb ed e ’ / « 
ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ ταὐτοῦ σχήματος. eb ᾧ ἀγασθέντες οἱ 
> “ Ν \ > , \ \ / εἰ a 
ἀκροαταί, τὸν μὲν ἐκρότησαν, TOV δὲ Σωσίθεον ἐξέβαλον. 
μεταγινώσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ λοιδορίᾳ προσήκατο, 
>’ \ " ες \ \ U4 \ \ ¢ yA 
εἰπὼν ἄτοπον εἶναι, τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον καὶ τὸν Hpaxrea 
φλυαρουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ 
ἐπὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ βλασφημίᾳ δυσχεραίνειν. Cf. Plut. de 
Adulat. 11. 

9, Diog. L. vit. 171, εὐπόντος δέ τινος ᾿Αρκεσίλαον 
XN a ΑῚ I an ἐμῷ \ AY / > Ἂν 
μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, παῦσαι, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ eye. εἰ γὰρ 
lal ’ Lal aA an lal 
καὶ λόγῳ τὸ καθῆκον ἀναιρεῖ, τοῖς γοῦν ἔργοις αὐτὸ τιθεῖ. 
aay ae) , > , , \ A ¢ 
καὶ 6 ᾿Αρκεσίλαος, οὐ κολακεύομαι, φησι. πρὸς ὃν ὁ 
Κλεάνθης, vat, ἔφη, σὲ κολακεύω, φάμενος ἄλλα μὲν λέγειν, 
ἕτερα δὲ ποιεῖν. 


10. Diog. L. vit. 173, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περι- 
πάτου ὅμοιόν τι πάσχειν ταῖς λύραις al καλῶς φθεγξά- 
μεναι αὑτῶν οὐκ ἀκούουσι. 

11. Cic. Tuse. π. 60, e quibus (philosophis) homo 
sane levis Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone fortis esse 
didicisset, a dolore dedoctus est. nam cum ex renibus 
laboraret, ipso in eiulatu clamitabat falsa esse illa, quae 
antea de dolore ipse sensisset. quem cum Cleanthes 
condiscipulus rogaret quaenam ratio eum de sententia 
deduxisset, respondit: quia si, cum tantum operae philo- 
sophiae dedissem, dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis 
esset argumenti malum esse dolorem. plurimos autem 
annos in philosophia consumpsi nec ferre possum: malum 
est igitur dolor. tum Cleanthem, cum pede terram per- 
cussisset, versum ex Epigonis ferunt dixisse : 

Audisne haec, Amphiarae, sub terram abdite ? 
Zenonem significabat a quo illum degenerare dolebat. 

Dionysius 6 μεταθέμενος is mentioned also in Zeno 
apoph. 52, where see note. For the quotation from the 
Epigoni, cf. Soph. fr. 194, 195. (Dind.) 

8. renibus: but according to Diog. L. vit. 37,166 and 
Cic. Fin. v. 94 the disease was ophthalmia. 

7. si: inserted by Mady. (on Fin. v. 94), who is 
followed by the later editors. 

12. Stob. Floril. 82, 9=Ecl. τι. 2 16, Κλεάνθης 
ἐρωτώμενος διὰ τί παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐ πολλῶν φιλοσο- 
φησάντων ὅμως πλείους διέλαμψαν ἡ νῦν, ὅτι, εἶπε, τότε 
μὲν ἔργον ἠσκεῖτο, νῦν δὲ λόγος. 

18. Ῥίορ. L. vit. 172, μειρακίῳ ποτὲ διαλεγόμενος 
ἐπύθετο εἰ αἰσθάνεται; τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπινεύσαντος, διὰ τί οὖν, 
εἶπεν, ἐγὼ οὐκ αἰσθάνομαι ὅτι αἰσθάνει ; 


14. Diog. L. vit. 172, ἐρομένου τινὸς τί ὑποτίθεσθαι 
δεῖ τῷ vid, τὸ τῆς ᾿λέκτρας, ἔφη, σῖγα σῖγα λεπτὸν 

The quotation is from Eurip. Orest. 140. 

15. Stob. Floril. 33, 8, σιωπῶντος τοῦ Κλεάνθους, 
> / μη Η aA Ἂ \ ἐῶ a , ς a 
ἐπεί τις ἔφη, TL σιγᾷς; Kal μὴν ἡδὺ τοῖς φίλοις ὁμιλεῖν. 
ἡδύ, ἔφη, GAN ὅσῳπερ ἥδιον τοσῷδε μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τοῖς 
φίλοις παραχωρητέον. 

16. Diog. L. vit. 174, πρὸς δὲ τὸν μονήρη καὶ ἑαυτῷ 
λαλοῦντα, οὐ φαύλῳ, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπῳ λαλεῖς. 

17. Exc.e MS. Ioan. Flor. Damasce. 11. c. 18. 125 = 
Stob. Ecl. τι. 31. 125 Wachsm., ἢ οὐ τοιοῦτος παῖς ἐκεῖνος 
ὁ Λάκων, ὃς Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἠρώτησεν εἰ ἀγαθὸν 
ὁ πόνος ἐστίν ; οὕτω γὰρ ἐκεῖνος φαίνεται φύσει πεφυκὼς 
καλῶς καὶ τεθραμμένος εὖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὥστε ἔγγιον εἶναι 
νομίζειν τὸν πόνον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ" 
ὅς γε ὡς ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ μὴ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν 
εἰ ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὧν ἐπυνθάνετο. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης 
ἀγασθεὶς τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν ἄρα πρὸς αὐτόν, αἵματος εἷς 
ἀγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος, of ἀγορεύεις (Hom. Od. Iv. 611). 
Diog. L. vit. 172. Λάκωνός τινος εἰπόντος, ὅτι ὁ πόνος 
ἀγαθόν, διαχυθείς φησιν, αἵματος εἷς ἀγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος. 

πόνος is an ἀδιάφορον (Stob. Ecl. τι. 7. δ᾽ p. 58, 3. 
Diog. L. vir. 102), but it may perhaps be inferred from 
this passage that Cleanthes classed it among the mpony- 
μένα. See on Zeno frag. 128. Antisthenes regarded it as 
ἀγαθόν (Diog. L. vi. 2). 

18. Stob. Floril. 95, 28, Κλεάνθης, ἐρωτώμενος πῶς 
ἄν τις εἴη πλούσιος, εἶπεν, εἰ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν εἴη πένης. 

19. Exc.e MS. Ioan. Flor. Damasce. 11. 13. 63 = Stob. 
ἘΠῚ. u. 31. 63 Wachsm., Κλεάνθης, ἑταίρου ἀπιέναι 


μέλλοντος Kal ἐρωτῶντος πῶς ἂν ἥκιστα ἁμαρτάνοι, εἶπεν, 
εἰ παρ᾽ ἕκαστα ὧν πράττεις δοκοίης ἐμὲ παρεῖναι. Cf. 

Zeno, apoph. 42, and Maxim. Serm. 5. 

20. Diog. L. vit. 178, λέγεται δέ, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ 

\ ’ \ “. ΝΟ > yy / 
κατὰ Ζήνωνα καταληπτὸν εἶναι τὸ ἦθος ἐξ εἴδους, veavic- 
κοὺυς τινὰς εὐτραπέλους ἀγαγεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν κίναιδον 
ἐσκληραγωγημένον ἐν ἀγρῷ, καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ 
τοῦ ἤθους" τὸν δὲ διαπορούμενον κελεῦσαι ἀπιέναι τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δὲ ἀπιὼν ἐκεῖνος ἔπταρεν, ἔχω, εἶπεν, αὐτόν, 
ὁ Κλεάνθης, μαλακός ἐστιν. Cf. Zeno, frag. 147, 

21. Diog. L. vi. 172, φησὶ δὲ ὁ ἝἙκάτων ἐν ταῖς 
χρείαις, εὐμόρφου μειρακίου εἰπόντος εἰ ὁ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα 
τύπτων γαστρίζει, καὶ ὁ εἰς τοὺς μηροὺς τύπτων μηρίζει, 
ἔφη, σὺ μὲν τοὺς διαμηρισμοὺς ἔχε, μειράκιον. [αἱ δ᾽ 
ἀνάλογοι φωναὶ τὰ ἀνάλογα οὐ πάντως σημαίνουσι πράγ- 
Hata.] Cobet brackets the concluding words. 

22. Diog. L. vit. 176, καὶ τελευτᾷ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον" 
διῴδησεν αὐτῷ τὸ οὖλον: ἀπαγορευσάντων δὲ τῶν ἰατρῶν 
δύο ἡμέρας ἀπέσχετο τροφῆς. καί πως ἔσχε καλῶς ὥστε 
τοὺς ἰατροὺς αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ συνήθη συγχωρεῖν. τὸν δὲ 
μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ εἰπόντα ἤδη αὐτῷ προωδοιπορῆσθαι 
καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀποσχόμενον τελευτῆσαι. Lucian, Macrob. 
19, Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ Ζήνωνος μαθητὴς καὶ διάδοχος ἐννέα καὶ 
ἐνενήκοντα οὗτος γεγονὼς ἔτη φῦμα ἔσχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους 
καὶ ἀποκαρτερῶν ἐπελθόντων αὐτῷ παρ᾽ ἑταίρων τινῶν 
γραμμάτων προσενεγκάμενος τροφὴν καὶ πράξας περὶ ὧν 
ἠξίουν οἱ φίλοι, ἀποσχόμενος αὖθις τροφῆς ἐξέλιπε τὸν 
βίον. Stob. Floril. 7, 54, Κλεάνθης ὑπὸ γλώττης ἕλκους 
αὐτῷ γενομένου τὴν τροφὴν οὐκ ἐδύνατο παραπέμπειν" ὡς 
δὲ ῥᾷον ἔσχε καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς αὐτῷ τροφὴν προσήγαγεν, σὺ δέ 
με, ἔφη, βούλει ἤδη τὸ πλέον τῆς ὁδοῦ κατανύσαντα 
ἀναστρέφειν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔρχεσθαι; 
καὶ ἐξῆλθεν τοῦ βίου. 


{The references are to the numbers of the fragments, except where p. is 

A Athenaeus ΧΙ]. ὅ68 6 ......... 118 
Achill. Tat. 1888; 194.τ......... Z 35 eee peas τον τον ΞΕ 
ἘῸΝ eee ΟΝ Z, 65 ἈΠῚῚ ΟΥ̓ ZiT pasicaeen 6 
ag re | eee Ο 33 Augustin. c. Acad. 1. 11...... Ὡ 153 
Aelian. Nat. An. vi. 50......... C 45 —— τα. 7. 16...2 125 

Ambros. de Abraham, 11. 7...Z 148 
Anon. τέχνη ap. Spengel Rhet. 

τ» το 494s 23 seas sonck ecb e sass Z 25 
Anon. τέχνη ap. Spengel Rhet. 

Gr. 1. 447. 1 
Anon. variae coll. math. in 

Hulstchiana Heronis geom. 

et stereom. edit. p. 275...... 
Anton, Meliss. 1. δῷ... 005806 Z 189 
Apollon. soph. lex. Hom. p. 

eee eee eee vecccecee 

MP ASBCKK, etscsaeecouci ee ceseenes C 66 
‘Atnobs ad Nats IL Occ cievenctes Z 54 
Arrian. Epict. diss. 1.17. 10, 

1D eh Soe he Seo See ee 4,C2 
Arrian. Epict. diss. 1. 20.14 ...2 123 

ee 1 C8 

es TIO Ae ΟΣ 


SSS ay. ΠΡ οὐ 

ee τ 1 178.  CA0T 

ἘΞ Ὸ-- - τ ie  πο ἐς C91 

Se an Pace Ya 28 
Athenaeus Iv. 158 Ὁ ............ Z 156 

ὙΠ 2959. θυ εν δεν Z 169 
ΞΘ SX τὰ ἢ Didovescescs ce ¢ 11 
ee exit DOLG< ιν τον Z 163 

= 9218: aa 
111.17.38...242, 95 
de Civ. Dei v. 20... C 90 
de Trinit. x111.5.8...Z 125 

ἍΜ. Gelly ἀπο δος ἐεϑγονς εξε εν 2128 

Censorin. de die nat. 1v. 10... Z 80 

RVI 2a. oe 

frags Ti 4ς vow csecatas C 28 

Certamen Hom. et Hes. p. 4. 

MS ΙΖ ΒΟΥ os cs cr κε πε ϑον C 67 
Chaleidsin Dim. ὃ. 144. {ως C18 
C2220 aa Z 90 

eh 8 a  πὀιθοθυ τς Z 49 
---- στ ΤΣ Z 50 
Chrysost. Hom. Matt. 4...Z 162 
Cicero Acad; ας 5.0: ον εν νος ἐν ἐν Z 130 
nes b> eae Z 134, 138 

1, 39......Z 34, 46, 86 
5 48,9, 11,15, 

17, 19, 20 
1. 42...2 10, 18, 21, 22 
Tiss Sonn eee Dek: 
sO Cay i RPE enor Zi1l 



Cicero Acad. 1, 145 ............ Ζ 88 Clem. Alex. Strom. vm. 6. 33... © 44 
— de Div. 1m. 119 ......... Z 103 — vit. 9. 26... C7 
—— Fam. rm. 22.1 ......... Z186 Cornut. de Nat. 1 Dee: OOS iis. C 62 
—— Fin, m, 17 ............00 Ζ2 82 Oyrill. Lex. Bodl. m. 11, ap. 

— — 1. 69 ............... C 90 Cramer Anecd. Par. rv. 190...Z 31 
— — m7. 52............... Z131 
— —iv.12............... Z 86 D 
— —iv.l14............... Z 120 
pred 3k | See ae Z126 Dio Chrysost, um. 4............ Z 195 
τον OF MOD ΝΣ Z126 Diog. Laert. v1. 91............... Z 194 
————--— —— WW, 72... ccc eeee Z 120 —. WIL ἐδ Saas C 112 
———_— — V. 88 o.oo eee cco ece C 44 — 1B ΑΨ ΑΟΡΗΓΟΝΑ Z 30 
———_— — W. 79 ono e ee cceeee Z 125 eee = py eee α, Z175 
— — V. 84 oo... Z151 — peepee eee Z 16 
— — Vv. 88 ..... 0.000... Z 120 —_— - Soret Z 145,196 
—— Muren. 61...Z 132, 133, 148, — ORs 03 cn Z 154, 167 
150, 151, 152, 153, 155 ---. Z 149, 166, 
— Nat. De. 1. 86... Z 87, 39, 41, 168, 177 
72, 110 —. eee Z 
— — 1. 37 ...0 14, 15, 16, if; — Me ere Z2s 
46 — | See: Cl 
Cicero Nat. De. 1.70 ......... Z8 — ΒΕ τως Z 119 
---- -——_ 1. 18—15 ... C 52 —. 87 Z 120, C 72 
--- — —-§- —_ 21 ....:.... — 5. να B C73 
--- egy "2.89, 60, 63 — WE, csuctenstane C79 
— -- o 2.,........ C 42 — 5, C78 
—- ὦ... πᾷ ; See C 80 — δ δον ον Z 145 
--- ———-_ τ, 87........... 0 46 --Ο-͵ὠ. Be i seek Z 145 
----ὀ  — 1.58......... Z 48 es po | BP Saba Ses Z 136 
----  — 1160 ...... C 44 — νἀ ρι τ, Z 132 
---- — 11 1θ0......... C 52 — ESE eS te Z171 
--- | - —__ m™. 27......... Z 46 —_— Ly petty dah 4 Z1 
— -- m7. 87......... C 29 —. 127 ... Z 125, C 80 
— Orat. 32.113 ......... Z 32 — be en Nghe rae C8 
— Tuse.1.19............... Z 86 — eS peels: Poe iy by, 
— — 7. 29 0, Z 127 — i st i Ἐὶ Z 176 
— — m1, 74.75 ...... Z 143 — at. Z 35, C 12 
—— — 11.76 ............ C 93 — ες ΤΡ oscee Z 52 
— - 11. 77 ............ C 94 — 485 τον σον Z 52 
— — 1.11 ............ Z 136 — 108 Soe C 28 
--Ἕ —- 44 = Δ ΑΝ ives Z 136 ---- pt SEE Z 142 
yescaeiidant Z 127 — 149 nin oe 

Clem. ἃ Alex. F ilo 111.11,74..Z 174 — ον ρρρέπρ κε: Z 58 

—— Protrept. νι. 72...0 75, 101 — 185 ον Z 73 
—  Strom.m.20.105... © 44 — ROG: oe Z 73 
— —— 1.20.125...Z 187 — peter ace wtb. Z 66 
--- .-- π||21.129. ζ 120, — 149 Z 45, 118 

C 72 — Pee ose Z 51 
---« — τι. 22.181.. C77 ---- beeen ie Z74 
— — v.3.17 ...C 100 — δὲ eeeer Z74 
— — v.8.48... 0831 — ROT cece Z 85, C 41 
εἰ... — v.12. 76...Z 164 ----- pt Ni ΟΡ secede 184 
—_—_ — v.14. 95...Z 149 — RTO", cocci Z147 
— v. 14, 110...C 75,101 — vit. 48 ........:... Z 193 



Epict. Man. 53 .........se00es00 C 91 
Epiphan. Haeres. 1. 5 ......... Z 51 

—S—s —_—swr7.. 2. 9 (10. 
530). παρὰ Z 81, 79, 95, 164, 185 

Epiphan. Haeres, 11. 2. 9 (III. 
Bi\enae saceasecncaeseaesscs ates C 53 
Euseb. P. Εἰ. xu. 13, p. 671...Z 149 
— p. 679... Ο 75 
—. RV evo d stan ete a C 28 
— VB isd scone cure Z 54 
— 90:1 τ τος Z 106 
-—— 20, 2...Z 83, C 38 

ΟΣ ἐπῶρσε Ζ 28 
Eustath. in Il. Σ. 506, p. 1158. 

Galen de cogn. anim. morb. 

Velde (UNM ΡΥ oes 
Galen in Hippocr. de humor. 

δι (Ris SET) Εν Mees Z 53 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. 1. 

5 (v. 241 K.) Z 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. 1. 

δι (Ὁ. DAT Tee) senswspaesenssects Z 101 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. τι. 

Bilye 208) Ks) νους η ones Z 87, C 39 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. m1. 

(Ws BAB Ks) .ccsssccesscsesnes Z 102 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac, m1. 

5 (v. 382 K.)..........5. Z 141, C 87 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. tv. 

ΜΉ τ ΚῸ 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. tv. 

Z 188 

B (¥. B77 Ka) cscscsccroesseeese 39 
Galen.Hipp. et Plat. plac. rv. 

NG ALG Ko) ssisccaessasescere 143 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. v. 

DAR 1.29:.:}. scovsnensrversends 139 
Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. v. 

Oi (ye AO: Ka) io seyisne reese neelsinsie 84 

Galen Hipp. et Plat. plac. rx. 

ὙΠ γ. G53 Ki): < cssavesseseane'sss C 85 
Galen Hist. Phil. 5 (xrx. 241K.) Z 36 
9 (xrx. 254K.) Z 91 
—— 10(xrx. 258K.) Z 78 
— 13 (x1x. 271K.) C 33 

13 (x1x. 272K.) Ο 34 
31 (xrx. 322K.) 
...Z 106, 107 


Galen. nat. facult.1. 2 (11.5 K.) Z 53 
Gemin. Elem. Astron, p. 53 
(in Petau’s Uranol.)......... © 35 


Harpocration 8. v. Néoxau...... C 61 
Hermias Irris. Gent. Phil. 14. 

p. 654 Diels C 
Hippolyt. philosoph. 21.1... Z 36 

Lactant.Epit. ad Pentad.38...Z 144 
- τ ΤΉ ΒΕ ὙΠ. cess: Z 39, C15 
Se 0 Oe near Z 153 
pee ὧ: Ξ τ τον sence Z 120 
es «5.0. TNS νοι a aUntsie’ Z 120 
SS I, 23:5. Z 132, 144 
Ss Sv OF aoe ποῦν Z 44 
a VEL, ise sce tenes GM 
=e nde 861. 110 cx sasd: Z 109 
a=, UG) Ver Dale oscscntsrs Z 44 

Longinus ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 

OTe Bie το ccboo teense Z 88, C 40 

Macrob. Sat. 1.17.8 ......... C 58 
es ee 191 eae C 60 
τι -- 9. ἘΠ Relea Ο 59 
Ξξ τ Ξε ree! otal c Serre C 57 
———S 1. 25:.2 ὡς hoax C 29 

Somn. Scip. 1.14.19... Z 89 
Mantiss. Proverb. (in paroem. 

Gr. u. p. 757) cent. 1. 85...C 102 
Maxim. ΒΊΟΥ δ: 6. τον πεν Z 190 
Minue. Fel. Octav. x1x. 10... Z 39, 
41, 44, 111, C 14 

Nemes. Nat. Hom, p. 32...... C 36 
“Ὁ  —-__ p. 96...... Z 93 
Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E 
ΧΙΝ, Oi Ps (Odes sors seeacersinens “1 

Olympiodorus in Plat. Gorg. 
cy eee 7 12,05 
Origen ὁ. Cels. 1. 5. p. 324 ...Z 164 
ἘΞ- eee WITS, Ps 100.. 08 



Philargyriusad Verg.G. 11.336. Z 57 

Philo liber quis virt. stud. p, 
DOP i veneseues tick ἐεο νι με ον ταὶ Z 157 
Philo mund. incorr, p. 505.27. C 23 
— p. 510,11. 2 56 

Philo de de Provid, 1. 22 ......... Z 35 
hy. Sate C19 

Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβ. 5.8 Z 40,117 
a9. had 16 

----- --- εν 18.. C 54 
-- p. 84G....Z 109 

— περὶ μουσικῆς 6. 28. C 49 
—— περὶ φιλοσόφων 5.18, C113 

Philoponus on Ar. Phys. rv. 6, 

Πὰς ΕΣ Ws Ge ctichcdsccensiae Z 70 
Photius 8. v. λέσχαι ..........Ψὄ.. C 61 
Plutarch Alc. 6, 2............... C 108 

Alex. virt. 6 ......... Z 162 
Γι eee Z 148 
Aud, Poet. 11......... C 55 
——  12.........2.197 
— i12......... C1i1 

Comm. Hesiod 9 ...Z 196 
— Not, 23. 1...Z 120 
— — 31.5... Ο 47 
‘_—— —— $1, 10. C 25 

eel {Π{Π{Π1]{Π11Ὲ 

de facie in orbe lunae 
BES epics ΨΩ C 27 
Plutarch de fluv. 5. 3.. .. C69 
---- --- ὅδ. bees C 70 
---- —s-— — 17. 4... ss. C71 

— frag. dean. Wytt. V? 
Lb OR asenePeredckteeee chor Z 121 
Plutarch Is. et Osir. 66 ...... C 56 
— Lycurg. 31............ Z 163 
— plac. 1. 3. 89 ......... Z 35 
— —1r.10.4......... Z 23 
---- — 1.15.5 ......... Z78 
— — im. 14, 2......... C 33 
— —u.16.1......... C 34 
— — um, 20.3......... C 29 
—  ~——1v.11.1........: C4 
— ~— vw. 21.4......... Z 98 
—  ~— v.41 ......... Z 106 
— ——— v.5.2 2.0... Z 107 
—— prof. in virt. 12...... Z 160 
—— quaest.Conv.11.6.1.. Z180 
— — v. 10,3 C 44 
— Soll. an. 11. 2,3 C 45 


Plutarch Sto. Rep. 7. ι 2 he 134 
scams. Mees fo see C 76 
--- seme 05 A ES. Z 29 
—-— s ———_ .ΩΙ..5.: Z6 
ae me BET Ἰδὲ Z 131 
—— Virt. Mor. 2 ....:::.. Z 134 
arent el ie ΝΣ 

Porphyr. de Abstin. mr. 19 ...Z 122 
—- — m1. 20 ... C 44 
— vit. Be Bicsute C 68 

Probus ad Virg. Ed. vr. 31. Ὁ. 

0, 88 τ τ πιο ον Z 52, C 20° 

Probus ad Virg. Ed. vr. 31. p. 
ee ES BE νος προ μα Z112 

Proclus ad Hes, Op. 291...... Z 196 


Quintil. Inst, Οὐ. τι, 15. 383—35 © 9 
---- ———. 2 TY, 41.5 ΟἿ 
—_— — u2.7.. 232 
—, τ IV. 2.117,...2 


Rufus Ephes. de part. hom. 

ΠΑΡ δὴ, τ ἄττα, Αγ ἐπ ἃ Ζ 84 

. ~. 
Bekk. Anecd. p. 663, 16. . 218 
Schol, ad Hes. Theog. 117... “2114 
134 ...Z 115 
139 ...Z 116 
Hom. Il, m. 64 ... C 63 
— xvi. 233. C 55 

Hom. Od, 1.52 (Cra- 
er A. 0. τι. a A tee C 65 

Plat, Alc. 1.121 8... 
Seneca de Benef, 1. 31, 12 ... 

—. — v.14,1...... C97 
— — v.11.1 ... C98 
— — vw.12,2 ... C99 
— Epist. 82, 7............ Z 129 
— — 83.8 2.0000... Z 159 
— -- 944. .... σ 

— — 104, 21......... Z 161 
— — 107.10......... Cc gl 
— — 108.10......... C 50 
— — 113.18......... C 43 

Seneca de Irat. 16. 7 


Simplic. ad Cat. 



sicsiodeese Z 158 
—— Nat.Quaest. vir.19.1.. Z 75 
—— de Otio Sap. 30. 2 ...Z 170 
Tranq. An.1.7...Z 170, C105 
Sext. Emp. Math, 1. 7......... Z 32 
=) ΟΠ LD 
OY eee A 
----- τι On Ζ7.0 9 
ΞΘ Vib ρι πεν ect 
-- | var, 248... Ζ11 
Ὁ VOD Ζ 10 
— vil. 872.. 214, C3 
ΞΞΞξξ τυ τῆς 1 clos 
ξξ τς τ 490... Ζ11 
--ἑ ἧ νι. 355 Z8 
--ὀ vi. 400 C3 
— ix. 88...... C51 
—  1x.101 Z 59 
— 1x. 104 Z 61 
a re 107.6: oe 
----ὀ 1χ. 133 ‘Z 108 
— x1. 30 Z, 124, C74 
— ὄχι, 74...... C 88 
--ὀ  σχι. 77...... Z 128 
— x1.190...2179,181 
xr, 191, 2 160 
Piyrrh, ΤΙ Δ eers. Zil 
1 a! (| een 63 
—— mm. 200 ....... Z 182 
— 111. 205...... Z 180 
— wi. 206...... Z 183 
— im. 245...... Z 179 
a πὰ ONG ess Z 180 
80a; 4:0: Z 76 
in Epict. Man. 53... C 91 
Stob. Ecl, 1. 1. 12. p. 25. 3... C 48 
1. 29>. p, 34.20... Ο 14 
p. 35.9... Z 42 
5.15. p.78. 18... Z 45 
8. 40°. p. 104. 7. Z 76 
10. 14. p. 126.17. Z 35 
11. 5%. p. 182.26. Z 51 
12. 3. p. 196. 21. Z 23 
13. 1°. p. 138.14. Z 24 
15. θᾶ, p. 146.19. C 26 
Ῥ. 146. 21. Z 68 
16. 1. p.149. 8... 18 
17..3:-p. 152. 19. 7. 52 
—— p.153.7... C 24 
18, 14. p. 156.27. Z 69 
19. 4, p. 166. 4... Z 67 

0. 15. ». 171. 
..Z 54, C 22 
21. 69, p. 187.4... C 28 

Stob. Eel. 1. 



. 2,12. p. 22. 12... 


22. 3, p. 199. 10. 
23. 1. p. 200, 21. 
24,24, p. 205. 25. 
25. 81. p. 211. 18. 
25. 5. p. 218. 15. 
26. 1i. 
48. 7. Ὁ. 317. 15. 
49. 33. p. 367. 18. 
49. 34. p. 369. 6. 






WowwndM WOH 
νι ὥϑ τ πιο μα OWE @D 


Toke Pypoloccees 
Do 39010053 
— 5*, p. 57. 18... 
— 58, p. 65. 8... 


—11¢, 99.3......Z 148 

—11i,p.103.12..C 104 

31. 64. p. 212.22.C 106 

Stob:. Ploril:4: 90! . eiccs wesscaes C 106 

— 210 7 σε, ΣΝ cee Z 202 

aa VIGO a ΤΕΥ ΨΤΕΟ C 95 

---- BQO ial onascce C 110 

===; Geese Z 201 

- - 6.917. ὐπκεν εν νοις C 89 

pa eee ρει rn eee! Z 192 

5: 9 14. Ὧν τον τρτο ρον Ζ 189 

----- τὶς 50. Ὁ Cee Rene ΤΡ C 96 

--- BOMB. ose ἀν 38} Ζ 200 

ΞΕ ΓΟ ΤΗΣ C 103 

ΞΟ πὶ νσνσι Z 165 

----- 5.91 ee acstes Z 199 

- NOSBOD: sess Storer C 86 

Strabo wast Gc ccti ον ρον ο Z 198 

Puldas 8. Vs ANCONA - Ὁ. ses ἐὐνοὺν C 61 

Syrian. ad Metaph. 892b,14... C6 

Tatian ad Graec. 6.3. ἐἸ νερό Z 47 

ce Ὧν eer Z 55 

Hlortilian de Anim. 6. 5..Z.89, C 36 

ΤΑΣ ΣΝ Ζ 94 

=! 16) Doerr C 36 

— Apol. 21......... Z 44, C13 

—— Mare: 1.13) 26.4. Z 41 

ΞΘ ΞΕ ἀν enon Z 46 

— Bid Ps ol rece Z 38 

—— Praes. Cup. 7 ...... Z 51 


‘Themist. de An. 68 a ......... Z 96 
--- — 72b ........ Z 43 
--- — 900 ........ Z 140 
— Or. m. 27¢............ C 83 
— Or. vir.108c......... Z 196 
— Or. xm1.171p ...... Z 196 

i, oS ΕΝ ΘΝ Z70 

Theodoret Gr. Cur, Aff. m1. 
RTE ΡΟΣ oth deb ede oxo vavpis Z 164 

Theodoret Gr. Cur. Aff. rv. 12. Z 35 

— — tv. 20. C 33 
v. 25. Z 106 

Theodoret Gr. Cur Cur, Aff. v. 25 

ἧς. Eee ee ΨΗΟΝΝ Z 88, C 40 

Theodoret Gr, ΡΝ regs ἐχγι 
ie p. eee 
Thee of Ankle 8p 

819 δ᾽ in iiccsnctetlival Z 184, Ο 115 

Varro Ling. Lat. ν. 9 ......... C10 

--- π---.--- VV. 9. Z 105 

—R. RB. 1.1, 8 ............ Z 81 

— — π΄ 4.9 .... C 44 



Academies, Z 109. 

Alemaeon, Z 82. 

Alexander, Z 30. 

Alexandria, Z 30. 

Alexinus, Z 5, 61. 

Amoebeus, p. 226. 

Anaxagoras, Z 81, 113, C 27. 

Anaximander, Z 81, C 29. 

Anaximenes, Z 52. 

Antigonus Carystius, p. 228. 

—— Gonatas, p. 2, 5, 6, 228. 

Antiochus, p. 17, 25, Z 126. 

Antipater, p. 114, C 59. 

Antisthenes, p. 19, 20, 22, 53, Z 3, 
23, 109, 162, 163, 171, 187, 195, 
σ 79. 

Apollodorus, p. 19. 

Apollonius, p. 2, 4, 26. 

Arcesilas, Z 11, 145. 

Archedemus, C 7. 

Archelaus, Z 81. 

Aristarchus, p. 42, 51, C 27. 

Aristippus, Z 197. 

Aristo, p. 36, Z5, 131, 191, C 92. 

Aristotle, p. 24, 25, Z 12, 26, 35, 
49, 50, 53, p. 110, 265, 67, 68, 
69, 81, 99, 104, 112, 116, 117, 
128, 134, 135, 136, 163, 167, 168, 
169, 195, C1, 37, 52, 53. 

Aristoxenus, C 42. 


Bion Borysthenes, p. 230. 
Boethus, Z 54. 


Caphesias, p. 231. 
Carneades, Z 11. 
Chremonides, p. 6, 232. 



Chrysippus, p. 7, 20, 27, 28, 34, 36, 
38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49, 50, Z 2, 7, 
11, 14, 21, 23, 24, 49, 52, 66, 72, 
74, 76, 79, 100, 102, 136, 139, 143, 
144, 160, 167, 185, C 3, 8, 9, 13, 
18, 19,-28, 24,37, 41,43, 44, 46 
(17), 76. 

Cicero, p. 34, Z 126. 

Cleanthes, p. 1, 23, 35, 36—53, 2 3, 
7, 13, 14, 35, 45.4, 52, 56 (54), 58, 
79, 93, 120, 128. 

Crates, p. 3, 31, Z165. 

of Mallus, Z 198. 

Critolaus, p. 111. 

Cynics, p. 18—21, 30, Z 9, 125, 149, 
162, 164, 167, 171, 172, 176, 177, 
184, 186, 194, C76, 79, 60, 88, 
101, 104. 


Demetrius, p. 27. 

Diodorus, p. 40, C 8. 

Diogenes, p. 18, 19, 20, 21, Z9, 
168, 171, 185, p. 225, C 113. 

—— of Apollonia, Z 42, 81. 

— of Babylon, Z 100, 108, C72. 

Dionysius (ὁ μεταθέμενος), p. 234, 


Empedocles, p. 114, Z73, 81, 110. 

Empedus, p. 233. 

Epicurus and Epicureans, Z 8, 
9, 21, 50, 55, 58, 69, 72, 73, 74, 
85, 102, 112, 167, C 16, 89, 90. 


Heraclitus, p. 21—23, 50, Z 52, 54, 
p. 114, Z 64, 65, 77, 83, 85, 87, 
C 1, 3, 21, 28, 29, 33, 48 (10, 24, 



Herillus, p. 52, Z 17. 

Herodicus, Z 77. 

Hesiod, p. 31, 32, Z 29, (Theog. 
118, 119) Z 113, (Theog. 126— 
128) Z 193, (Op. 291), Z 196. 

Hippocrates, Z 106, C 42. 

Homer, p. 31, 48, 51, Z 174, 195, 

Indians, Z 187. 


Marcus Aurelius, Z 52, 162, C 44. 
Megarians, Z 5. 

Neanthes, p. 51. 


Panaetius, Z 54. 

Parmenides, Z 64, 81. 

Peripatetics, p. 110 f., Z 159, 169. 

Persaeus, p. 31, 53. 

Phocylides, Z 29. 

Plato, p. 25, 26,30, Z 1, 16, 21, 23, 
34, 35, 62, 65, 91, 99, 103, 110, 
112, 134, 135, 136, 142, 149, 162, 
163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 177, 
197, C 37, 57, 58. 

—— Cratylus, p. 44. 


Polemo, p. 3, 25. 

Posidonius, p. 49, Z 24, 49, 52, 66, 
76, 80, 131, 143, 198, C 35, 84. 
Ptolemy, Philadelphus, p. 5, 6, 228. 
Pythagoras and Pythagoreans, Z 50, 

- 65, 70, 73, 81, C 26, 27, 29, 


Seneca, Z 162. 
Socrates, p. 45, 53, Z 59, 123, 134, 

158, 159, 162, 194, p. 227, 280," 

C 76, 77, 79. 
Sophocles (frag. 711), Z 197. 
Stilpo, p. 3, 28. 
Strato, Z 64, C 43. 


Thales, Z 73. 

Theophrastus, p. 110 f., 233. 

Virgil, Z 97. 

Xenocrates, p. 8, Z 1, 128, C 37. 
Xenophanes, Z 56 (33), 81, 113, 117. 


Zeno, p. 1—365, 46, C 18, 18, 24, 76. 
—— of Tarsus, Z 57, 87. 



ἀγαθά, p. 14, 15, Z 127, 128, C 75. ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Z 56 (45). 

ἀγέλη σύννομος, Z 162. ᾿Απόλλων, C 58. 
ἄγνοια, Z 18. ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος, p. 31, 
ἀδεής, Z 169. Z 199. 

ἀδιάφορα, p. 14, 15, 17, 46, Z 127, ἀπονεμητέοις, Z 134. 
128, 129, 145, 154, 161, 171, 172, ἀποπροηγμένον, Vv. προηγμένον. 

178. ἀπόρων (περί), p. 49. 
ἀήττητος, Z 148, 157. “ApaBes, Z. 198. 
ἀθάνατος (νοῦς), Z 95. ἀργικέραυνε, Ο 48 (82). 
ἀθαύμαστος, Z 169. ἀρετή, Z 125, 128, 134, 135, C 78, 
αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον, Z 6d. 19, 80, 88. 
αἰθήρ, Z 41, Ο 15. ἀρετῶν (περί), p. 52. 
αἷμα, Z 87, 88. ᾿Αρίσταρχον (πρός), p. 51, 
αἰσθήσεως (περί), p. 50, 51. ἀῤῥωστήματα, Ζ 144, 
αἴσθησις, Z 8, 20, 121. apxat, Z 35. 
αἰσθητόν, Z 20. ἀρχαιολογία, p. δ]. 
αἴτιον, Z 24. ἀρχαιότεροι, p. 40, Z 10. 
ἀκολασία, Z 138. ἀρωγῆς (περί), p. 47, 52. 
ἀλλαγή, Z 168. ἀσεβείας γραφή, C 27. 
ἀλλοίωσις, Z 52. ἀσόλοικος, Z 30. 
ἄλλως, C 45. ἀστέρες, C 33, 84. 
ἄλογα ζῴα, C 44, 45. ἀστραπή, Z 14. 
ἁμάρτημα, p. 15, Z 132, 133. ἀτόμων (περί), p. 47. 
ἀμετάπτωτον, 2.155. ἀτραπός, C 45. 
ἀμφήκης, C 48 (10). αὐγή, C 23. 
av, Z 190. αὐθέκαστος, C 75. 
dvadwowyate, C dd. αὐλὴ, Z 131. 
ἀναθυμίασις, p. 23, Z 83, C 55. ἀφορμαί, C 82. 
ἀναλαμβάνειν, p. 226. ᾿Αφροδίτη, C 63, 64. 
ἄναμμα νοερόν, C 29. 
ἀναπεπταμένον, Z 174. βάρος, Z 67. 
ἀνδρεία, Z 134, C 76. βασιλείας (περί), p. 52. 
ἀνεπιτρεπτεῖν, Z 194. βασιλικός, Z 148 (16). 
ἀνθρωποβορίας, Z 184, Ο 115. βιάζεται, Z 148 (12). 
ἄνω κάτω ὁδός, Z 52. βίος. Z 145. 
ἀξία, p. 14, Z 180, 131. βουλῆς (περί), p. 52. 
ἀξιωματικός, Z 148 (16). βροντή, Z 14. 
ἀπάθεια, Z 158. . 
ἀπαιδεύτους, C 106. γάμος, Z171. 
ἀπαξία, p. 14, Z 130, 131. γάμου (περί), p. 51. 
ἀπέριττος, Z 169. γενεά, Z 77. 

ἁπλώς γένεσις, Z 50. γεωμετρία, Z 28. 


γιγάντων (περί), p. 51. 
Γοργίππου (περί), p. 52, 
γυμνάσια, Z 166, 
γυναῖκες, Z 176. 

δακτυλίων, C 8. 

Δεινιάς, Ο 11. 

δεσπόζει, Z 148 (12). 
δημιουργεῖν, Z 88. 
δημιουργός, Z 48, 
Δημόκριτον (πρόξ), p. 51, 
δῆξις, Z 139, 158. 
διαβολή, C 103. 
διαθέσεις, Z 117, 135, C 36, 51. 
διαίρεσις, Z 51 
διαιρετέοις, Z 134. 
διακεκλασμένον, Z 174. 
διακόσμησις, Z 52. 
διαλεκτική, Z 6, 82, C 1. 
διαλεκτικῆς (περί), p. 49. 
διαλεκτικοί, p. 88, Z 5 
διάνοια, Z 100, 135. 
διατριβαί, Ῥ. 80, Z 179. 
διατριβῶν β΄, p. 53. 
διαχύσεις, Z ‘139. 
διαψεύδεται, Z 148 (14). 
διήγησις, Z 25. 

διήκειν, C 18. 

δικάζειν (περὶ τοῦ), p. 52. 
δίκαιον, C 77. 
δικαιοσύνη, Z 122, 134. 
δικαστήρια, Z 166. 
Διόνυσος, C 57. 
Διοσκούρους, Z 117. 

δόξα, Z 15, 143, 153. 
9 ἐν p. 47, 48, 50, 52, C 100, 
ἝΩ ψυχῆς, Z 

98, Ο 8ὅ. 
δυνατόν, Ο 8 
δυνατών (περί), p. 50. 
δυσμαὶ βίου, C 51. 

ἐγκράτεια, p. 45, C 76. 
ἐγκύκλιος ταιδεία, Z 167. 
sees Z 19, 45, 45 A, C 18. 
εἰσοχή, C 
ἔκκλισις, A 143, C 76. 
ἐκλείψεις, Z 71, 73. 
ἐκπύρωσις, Z 52, 54, 55, C 22, 24, 
ἔλεγχε σαυτόν, Ζ 189. 

ἔλεος, Z 144, 152. 
 €XevBeplas (περί), p. 52. 
ἐλευθέρους, Z 149, 
ἕλιξ, C 29, 60. 


Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας (περί), p. 30. 

ἐναπομεμαγμένος, Z 11, 

ἐνάργεια, p. 84, 2 9. 

ἐνδυμάτων, 81. 

ἐνεργητέοις, Z 184. 

ἐννοήματα, Z 23, C 6. 

ἔννοια, p. 10, 34, Z 21. 

ἐξαγωγή, Z 161. 

ἐξέδραι, Ο 61. 

ἕξις, oA Prd Ρ. 110, Z 56 (53), 117, 
134, 135, C5. 

ἐξοχή, C 3. 

ἐξύγρωσις, Z 52, C 24, 

ἔπαρσις, Z 139, 143. 

ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, Z 123. 

ἐπιγεννήματα, p. 46. 

ἐπιγιγνόμενα νον Z 138, 139. 

ἐπιθυμία, Z 142, 1 

ἐπιστήμη, Z 16, i, 18, 33, 184, 

ἐπιστήμης (περί), p. 50. 

ἐπιστολαί, p. 31. 

ἔρως, Z 113, 163, 172. 

ervey τέχνη, p. 30, 52, Z 174, 

Epwros στὴ) p. 52. 
ἐσθής, ὦ 

ἐσθίειν resi Z 31. 
‘Eoria, Z 110, C 27. 
ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, C 24. 
εὐβουλίας (περί), p. 47, δ2. 
εὐδαιμονία, Z 124, C 74. 
εὐκρασία, p. 23, C 42. 
εὔλογον, Z 145. 
εὐπρέπεια, Z 56 (63), 
εὑρεσίλογος, Ο 62. 

εὔροια, Z 124, Ο 74. 
εὐφυΐα, Z 172. 

εὐφυΐας (περί), Ῥ 

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, Z 79, % aL 

Ζεύς, Z 111. 
—_ (περὶ τῆς Z. φυσιολογίας β΄), 

εύδιον, Z 71. 
ζώνη διακεκαυμένη, C 35, 
ζῷον (ὁ κόσμος), Z 62. 

ἡγεμονικόν, p. 18, 42, Z 24, 33, 67, 
bo 101, 135, 141, Cc 15, 25, 28, 

sek, p. 46, Z 127, 186, 189, 142, 
148, Ο 88, 89, 90. 

ἡδονῆς (περί), p. 47, ὅϑ. 

ἠθικά, p. 81. 


ἠθικόν, Z 2, 119. 

ἦθος, Z 146, 147, C 36. 

ἥλιος, Ὁ 25, 28, 29, 30, 31. 
Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεων δ΄, p. 50. 
Ἡρακλῆς, C 62. 

Ἥρη, Z 110. 

Ἥριλλον (pos), p. 52. 
Ἥφαιστος, Z 111. 

θάνατος, Z 129. 
θαυματοποιός, C 98. 
θεολογικόν, C 1. 

θεομαχία, p. 51. 

θεός, Z 35, 108, 109. 

θεὸς κακῶν ποιητής, Z 47, C 48 (17). 
θεὸς φθαρησόμενος, C 47. 
θεῶν (περί), p. 49, 51, C 47. 
θερίζων, p. 224. 

θερμασία, Z 84. 

θέσει, Z 89. 

Θηρίκλειον, Ο 11, 

θύραθεν, C 37. 

Ἰάπετος, Z 115. 
ἰδέαι, Z 23, C 6. 
ἴδιον, p. 49. 

ἰδίων (περί), p. 49. 
ἰδίως ποιόν, Z 
ἱερά, Z 164. 

ἰλύς, Z 113. 

ἴσος, V. ἁμάρτημα. 
᾿Ιφικρατίς, C 11. 

καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα, Z 130. 

καθαρός, Z 36, 174. 

καθέλκειν, Z 80, 

καθῆκον, p. 15, 84, Z 145, 161, 169, 
170. 171. 1712 17%, 178; 192: 

καθήκοντος (περί), Ῥ. 29, δ2. 

καθολικά, p. 27, Z 28. 

κακά, p. 14, Z 127, 128. 

κακία, p. 46. 

κάλλυντρον, C 88. 

καλῶν (περί), p. 52. 

καρδία, Z 141, C 87. 

κατά, Z 145. 

κατὰ φύσιν, p. 14, 15, Z 130,169, 192, 
C 88. 

καταληπτική, V. φαντασία. 

καταληπτόν, Z 147. 

κατάληψις, p. 34, Z 10, 16, 18, 33, 
C 80. 

(περὶ τοῦ x. φ. βίου), p. 


καταπίνεται, Z 102. 

κατηγόρημα, Z 23, 24, C 7. 

κατηγορημάτων (περί), p. 50. 

κατόρθωμα, p. 15, 34, Z 145. 

κεκοσμημένος, Z 174. 

κενόν, Z 69, 70. 

κεραυνός, Z 74, Ο 48 (10). 

κηρία, Z 38. 

κηρός, Z 50. 

κίνησις, Z 91. 

κληθείς, Z 29. 

κλήσεις ἱεραί, C 53. 

κοινῶς ποιόν. Z 49. 

Κοῖος, Z 115. 

κομῆται, Z 75. 

κόσμος, L 57, 66, 71, 162, 193, 
C 17, 48 (7). 

κραντῆρες, C 114. 

κρᾶσις du’ ὅλου, p. 11, 23, Z 51, 52, 
53, 96, C 13. 

Kpetos, Z 115. 

κρίσεις, Z 136, 139, 143. 

Κρόνος, Z 118. 

Κύκλωπες, Z 116. 

κυριεύων, C 8. 

κυριεύοντος (περί), p. 50. 

κωνοειδής, Ο 26, 33. 

λεκτόν, p. 40, Z 24, C 7. 

λέσχαι, C 61. 

Λεσχηνόριον, C 61. 

λέξεων (περί), p. 27, Z 30, 31. 

λέξις, p. 27, 226. 

ληπτά, Z 130, 131. 

λιτός, Z 169. 

λογικά, Z 4, C 2. 

λογική, Z 1. 

λογικόν, Z 2. 

λόγος, p. 22, Z 3, 37, 44, C 16. 
— σπερματικός, Z 46, C 24. 

λόγου (περί), p. 27 
--- (περὶ τοῦ), p. 50. 
— στοιχεῖα, Z 3. 

λογόφιλος, Z 200. 

Λοξίας, C 60. 

Notes, Z 73. 

ὐκειος, C 59. 

Λύκιος, C 59. 

λύπη, p. 46, Z 127, 128, 139, 142, 
143, 144, C 86. 

λύσεις Kal ἔλεγχοι, p. 28. 

λύσις, Z 139. 

Malova, C 67. 


μεθύειν, Z 159. 

μείωσις, Z 139. 
μελαγχολία, C 80 

μέρη (ψυχῆ), Z 98, 94. 

μέσα, Z 145. 
μεταβάλλεσθαι, Z 153. 
μεταλήψεως Ἱπερὶ), p. 50, C 11. 
μετανοεῖν, Z 153. 
μετέχοντα, p. 46, Z 128. 
μῖξις, Z 51, δῶ. 

μνήμη, Z 14. 

μοιχεύειν, Z 178, C 110. 
μυθικά, p. 51. 

μύρμηκες, C 45. 
μυροπώλια, Z 174. 
μυστικὰ σχήματα, C 53. 
μῶλυ, C 

ναοί, Z 164, 
νοήματα, C 6. 
νόμισμα, Z 168. 
νόμος, Z 39. 

νόμου (περί), p. 80, 
νόμων (περί ) Ps p. 52. 

νόσοι, Z 144. 

νοῦς, ὦ 48, C 37. 
νοῦς (κόσμου), Z 42. 

ὁδοποιητική, Z 18. 

οἴησις, Z 15, 16. 

οἰκείωσις, Z 121, 122, 126. 

ὁλοόφρονος, Ο 65. 

ὅλου (περί), p. 

“ὁμολογία tg Ζ 120, 128, Ο 72. 

ὁμόνοια, Z 108, 

ὀνείρων, Z 160. 

ὅρασις, Z 104. 

ὄρεξις, Z 148. 

ὄρη, Z 56 (8). 

ὀρθὸς λόγος, pp. 8---10, 40, Z 8, 117, 
128, 167. 

ὀρθῶς λέγειν, C 9. 

ὁρμαί, Z 128, 138. 

ὁρμῆς (περί), p. 29, 52, 

ὁρῶν (rept), p. 52. 

οὐρανός, Z 66, 


οὐσία, p. 41, πω 50, 51, 53, p. 110. 
οὐσίας (περί), Ρ. 29 
ὄψεως (περί), p. 29. 

πάθη, p. 45, Z 135—144, 172, 086. 
παθῶν (περί), p. 29, 184. 
παιδαγωγοί, Z 188, 

παιδεία, υ. ἐγκύκλιος. 
πανσέληνος, Z 73, | 
παραβάλλειν, Z 185. | 
παράδειγμα, Z 26, 

παράδοξα, C 107. 

παράθεσις, Z 51. | 
παραινετική, Ὁ. 47, C 92, | 
παράλογα, C 107. 

παραμυθητική, C 93, 94. 

παρὰ φύσιν, p. 14, 15, Z 130, 169. 
πάσχον, Z 34, 35, 

περίοδος, Ζ 52, 56 (43). 

περιπατεῖν ἀξόνων: Z 31, 

περίστασις, p. 15, Z 169, 170, 184. 

πηγή, Z 146. 

πιλοειδής, C 32. 

πληγὴ πυρός, C 76. 

πλῆκτρον, C 31. 

πλοῦτος, ΖΦ 169, C 111. 

πνεῦμα, p. 11, 40, 42, Z 41, 48, p. 
110, Z 84, 85, C 13. 

διατεῖνον, C 43. 

πνευματικὴ δύναμις, p. 110. 

πνευματικὸς τόνος, Z 56 (54). 

ποιητικῆς areas: (περί), p. 31. 

ποιητοῦ Sy See i 

ποιά, Z 

ποιότης, Z 53, 92. 

ποιοῦν, Z 34, "85. 

πόλις, C 104. 

πολῖται, Z 149. 

ϑονας p. 20, 29, Z 23, 97, 149, 

: 2 

πολιτεύεσθαι, Z 170, 

πολιτικόν, C 1. 

πολιτικός, p. 52. 

πολυχρόνιος, Z 95. 

πολυώνυμος, Ὁ 48 (1). 

πόνος, Z 128, 187, 201. 

πορεία, Z 175. 

Ποσειδών, Z 111. 

πράξεων (περῖ), p. 52. 

προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν, p. 81. 

προηγμένον, Ὁ. 15, 84, Z 127, 128, 
131, 145, 169. 


προηγούμενος, p. 15, Z 123, 131, 
169, 170. 

προκοπή, p. 84. 

προκόπτοντες, Z 160. 

πρόληψις, p. 10, 34, 40, Z 21. 

πρόνοια, Z 36, 45 a, C 18, 19, 44. 

προπέτεια, Z 22. 

προσδοκία, Z 143. 

προσηγορία, Z 23. 

προσίεσθαι, Z 160. 

προσκαλεῖσθαι, C 27. 

πρὸς χάριν, Z 189. 

πρόσωπον, Z 25, ᾿ 

προτρεπτικύς, Ὁ. 52, 

πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, Z 122, 126. 

πτοία, Z 137. 

πτῶσις, Z 23, 139. 

Tlv@ayopixd, p. 29. 

πῦρ τεχνικόν, Ὁ. 23, Z 41, 42, 46, 
O35-91,,C:13;. 15,2326. 30; 

πυροειδής, C 82. 

ῥέω, Z 25, 56 (ὅθ), Ο 21. 
ῥητορική, Z 32, C 9, 

σελήνη, Z 73, C 32. 
σημείων (περί), p. 29. 
σκοπός, p. 45, C 74. 
σολοικίζειν, Z 81. 
σοφίσματα, Z 6. 
σοφόν (περὶ τοῦ τὸν o. σοφιστεύειν), 
p. 53. 
σπέρμα, Z 106, 107, C 24. 
σπουδαῖος, Z 148—159. 
στατικά, Z 4. 
στήλης (περί), C 113. 
στίχοι, Z 166. 
στοᾶς (περί), p. 53. 
στοιχεῖα, Z 8, 35. 
στρατηγικός, Z 148, 
στρογγύλος, Z 82. 
συγκατάθεσις, p. 84, Z 15, 19, 33, 
123, 139, 158. 
σύγχυσις, Z 51. 
συλληφθείς, Z 106. 
συμβεβηκός, Z 24. 
συμπάθεια μερῶν, Z 58. 
συμποσίου (περί), p. 47, 53. 
συμφέρον, p. 45, C 77. 
συναπτική, Z 40. 
συνεκτική, Z 40. 
συνεστώτων, Z 67. 
συνέχον, Z 96. 

συνιστορεῖν, C 11. 


σύνοδος, Z 73. 

συστολή, Z 139, 143. 

σφαῖρα, Z 67. 

σφάλλεσθαι, Z 153, 

σχέσις, Z 134. 

σῶμα, Z 24, 34, 36, 91. 
σωφρονιστῆρες, C 114. 
σωφροσύνη, Ζ 184, 188, Ο 70. 

ταπεινώσεις, Z 189. 

τείνεσθαι, Z 67. 

τέλειος λόγος, Z 82. 

τελετάς, C 53. 

τέλος, p. 45, Z 120, 124, C 74. 

τέλους (περί), p. 52. 

τέχνη; p. 27, Z 5, 12, 18, 118, C 5. 

τέχνης (περί), p. 50. 

τεχνίτης, Z 48 

τίθεσθαι (ὄνομα), Z 116. 

τιμῆς (περί), p. 47, 52. 

τινά, Z 23. 

Τιτᾶνας, Z 115. 

tévos, p. 8, 22, 23, 42, 45, 51, Z 33, 
35, p- 110, 2 91, 103, C 24, 42, 76. 

Τόπος, Z 69. 

τρίβων, Z 194, 

τριμερής, Z 1. 

Τριτογένεια, Z 1. 

τρόπων (περί), p. 50. 

τυγχάνοντα, Z 23. 

τύπωσις, p. 34, Z 1. 

ὕλη, Z 35, 49, 50, 51. 
ὑμεναίου (περί), p. 51 
ὑπακούειν, Z 29. 

Ὑπερίων, Z 115. 

ὑπόθεσις, Z 25. 

ὑποθετικὸς τόπος, Ὁ. 47, C 92. 
ὑπομενετέοις, Z 184. 
ὑποπίπτειν, Z 28. 

ὑποστάθμη, Z 114. 

ὗς, C 44. 

φαινόμενα σώζειν, Ο 27. 

φακῆ, Z 156. 

φαντασία, p. 24, 38, Z 7, 8, 33, 123, 
158, C 3. 

καταληπτική, p. 8, 9, 24, Z 


φάντασμα, Z 28. 
φανταστικόν, Z 160. 
φαῦλος Z 148, 154. 
Φερσεφόνη, C 56. 
φθονερίας (περί), p. 47, 52. 


φθορὰ τοῦ κόσμον, Z 56. αλκοῦ (περί), Ῥ. 58, Ο 112, 
Z 103, Χά, Ζ 1 ( τ ils. 
φιλίας (rept), gd 53, χάριτος (enh, Ρ. 47, 52, C 97—99. 

horyos, , χάρτην C4, 
sien 249 χρεῖαι, ie Z 194. 
φλόξ, χρειῶν (περί), p. ὅ3. 

, p. 46, Z 128, 142, 143, ματισμός, é 99 

φορά (ἐγκύκλιον), Z 71, 116. ov (περί), p. 50. 
Φρεάντλης, p. 85, C 21, χρόνος, 
φρόνησις. seer 15, 16, 45, 2 184,156. χρώματα, Z 78 
φυγάς, Z χώρα, Z 69 

φύσει, Z 89, p. 110. 

φύσεως (rep), p. 28. ψιλός, C 49. 
φυσικόν, Z Why Z 43, 56(60), 83—96, C 36— 
pint Are Z 48, 45, 46, C 51, v. 
κατά, —— τοῦ κόσμου, C 14, 21. 
— (κοινή), Ο 73. 
φύω, Z cy ὡς av, Z 56(99). 
φωνᾶεν, Z ὠφέλιμος, Z 190, C 75, 77. 

φωνή, 499.1 100, p. 226. 


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